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Abstract 
This study addresses public sector intermediaries and their role in facilitating 
innovation in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in South Korea. The 
primary aim is to understand and address the informational and relational barriers 
that SMEs face during the innovation process and how these are resolved through 
interaction. Although the government has been implementing SME support policies 
for several decades, the Korean National Innovation System (KNIS) has been 
characterised with six words: ‘strong large firms, weak small firms’. Korean 
Government policies for R&D have not been effective in enhancing the economic 
performance and innovative capabilities of SMEs and the ‘low level of 
competitiveness’ of SMEs obstructs knowledge interaction between firms. Policies 
directed at SMEs mainly focus on direct support and do not reflect the interactive 
nature of the innovation process. This mismatch between policy and desired 
outcomes has led this study to go beyond examining the informational and relational 
constraints. It analyses the factors influencing successful (or less successful) 
innovation and asks whether public intermediaries have provided an effective 
mechanism in resolving innovation barriers (i.e. system failures). 
Yet, there has been a lack of research into public intermediaries and SMEs within the 
National Innovation Systems (NIS) framework. The NIS approach is a loosely 
configured framework and the intermediary literature is fragmented and has rarely 
been integrated with the NIS literature. Research has tended to focus on specific 
functions of private intermediaries and far less on the public intermediaries, which 
have been playing a crucial role in facilitating innovation in Korean industry for 
several decades. The central focus of this study is on the knowledge interaction 
process between public intermediaries and SMEs occurring at multiple levels of 
interaction in the Korean NIS. This study therefore attempts to integrate the NIS 
concept and the intermediary approach to provide a robust way to explore the 
knowledge interaction process at meso- and micro-levels. Four functions of the 
intermediary are constructed to explore how they might influence SME innovation: 
knowledge facilitation, learning facilitation, knowledge enabling and managing 
interfaces. 
xiii 
Through in-depth analysis of five case studies encompassing firms in mechatronics 
and IT, this study explicates the knowledge interaction process and influential factors 
of successful innovation. The analysis addresses a series of issues that the generic 
NIS concept cannot fully explain: (1) knowledge interaction at meso- and micro- 
levels; (2) multiplicity of relationships and their evolving nature; (3) the role of 
public intermediaries in a specific cultural context; and (4) the heterogeneity of 
SMEs with their pre-existing resources and routines. Sociological perspectives 
especially provide insights for investigating not only the dynamic nature of 
interactions but also micro-level factors that determine successful interactions and 
innovation that are largely neglected in both NIS and intermediary studies; e.g. 
productive combination of competing rationalities, social learning, and the 
importance of reflexive individuals. Focusing on a modulated NIS concept for public 
sector intermediaries and SMEs in a Korean context, the study opens the ‘black box’ 
of knowledge interaction and learning that resolves the barriers, shapes the 
successful innovation environment and hence strengthens the innovation system. 
The findings have implications for policy, including the need to establish new policy 
measures aimed not simply at achieving a set goal but rather at facilitating the 
interaction process with a long-term view. The study recommends that public 
intermediaries need to focus on monitoring activities that integrate and support the 
knowledge interaction process by facilitating ‘associativeness’ among actors. 
Furthermore, the heterogeneity of the local contexts and SMEs in the innovation 
process need to be taken into account in designing the programmes, moving away 
from one-size-fits-all type services. 
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1 Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 What is This Research About? 
This study concerns the issue of public-sector intermediaries and their role in 
facilitating innovation in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs). The primary 
aim lies in understanding and addressing the informational and relational constraints 
that SMEs face during the innovation process and how these are resolved through 
interaction. SMEs in South Korea constitute 99% of businesses and 98% of 
employment (Hong, 2005); thus, fostering innovative SMEs has been a major policy 
issue, linked to the creation of jobs as well as achieving economic growth. Despite 
the importance of SMEs in the Korean economy, the Korean National Innovation 
System (KNIS) has been characterised with six words: ‘strong large firms, weak 
small firms’. 
Recognising the weakness of SMEs that only have limited access to the various 
resources needed for successful innovation, such as technologies, human resources, 
information, and knowledge, compared to large corporations (D. Cho, 2005), the 
Korean government has put great effort into building a support mechanism. As a 
result of sustained effort, the number of innovative SMEs has been growing; 
however, some mismatches remain in the innovation system in several ways. For 
example, a mismatch exists between research and development (R&D) investment 
and performance, a low level of cooperation among firms, and weak SMEs. Unlike 
the government’s successful experience in fostering large corporations, the SME 
policy that has been implemented seems to be unsuccessful. It neither links to 
economic outcomes nor to enhancing innovative capabilities of SMEs. 
Notwithstanding the increasing attention on fostering innovative SMEs in the KNIS, 
SME policy does not, in general, seem to be effectively incorporated in the National 
Innovation System (NIS) framework. Rather, SME policy has been criticised due to 
its standardised forms of services based on one-way knowledge flow, ignoring 
heterogeneous demands of innovative SMEs. Innovation is a spiral, complex process 
that takes place through interactions among an array of actors and institutions 
involved and affected (Williams and Edge, 1996, p867), but this view has been 
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largely overlooked in SME policy. One can speculate that policymakers do not 
understand the dynamic process or that the mechanism been ineffective. 
In this vein, the role of the public intermediary as an external linkage of SMEs has 
attracted policy attention (Y. B. Kim, 2005), because they have been the mechanism 
in recent Korean S&T history to facilitate the rate of innovation by linking policy to 
the SMEs and large corporations. Although other issues must be considered when 
discussing ways of facilitating the innovation of SMEs in Korea, the focus of this 
study is the bridging mechanism to overcome barriers between SMEs and other 
entities in the innovation process. 
Stakeholders know little about the interaction process between intermediaries and 
SMEs. Few research studies attempted to understand the role of intermediaries as 
linkage organisations in the KNIS. In this research into the Korean context, I define a 
public intermediary as a publicly funded intermediary that promotes innovation 
between two or more parties without pursuing profits from their services. The 
framework for this study was constructed to investigate the case of Korean SMEs 
and the role of public-sector intermediaries in facilitating innovation. In particular, 
this study seeks insight into how barriers at the early stages of innovation can be 
resolved by answering the following research questions: 
 Why do public intermediaries interact with SMEs? How do the 
relationships and interactions affect the innovation process of SMEs? 
 - How do relationships form and evolve between public intermediaries 
and SMEs? 
 How does knowledge get interpreted and knowledge flow take place 
between public intermediaries and SMEs in Korea? 
 - Do public intermediaries decrease the barriers to innovation of SMEs in 
South Korea? If so, how do mechanisms effectively work for SMEs and 
how do they enhance the firm’s innovative capability? 
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 What are the distinctive patterns of interactions and relationships among 
firms and how are they different? 
 - What are the factors that determine and differentiate the patterns of 
interaction and the innovation process? How do these factors affect the 
innovation process? 
Emphasising relationships and interactions in the innovation process between public 
intermediaries and SMEs, this study will broadly investigate the social aspects at the 
meso- and micro-levels.1 To provide a detailed explanation, I explore intermediary 
perspectives, while also applying the NIS concept to show how interactions with 
intermediaries affect the shaping of innovation processes. I will draw insights from 
these processes to build on existing theories of social learning in technology 
innovation (SLTI), to offer improved understanding of learning processes during 
interactive innovations. I also provide an account of how significant knowledge and 
relational barriers (or gaps), described as system failures in the KNIS, and 
uncertainties may be overcome through interactions between intermediaries and 
SMEs with a specific focus on how public intermediaries facilitate the innovation 
process. 
1.2 Objective of the Study 
The study aims to contribute to the understanding and practice of innovation 
facilitation for SMEs on three different levels. Considering the contribution of public 
intermediaries in the S&T history of Korea, I examine how they interact with SMEs 
to resolve the barriers during innovation processes on a case-by-case basis for further 
policy development. 
First, on the national level, I propose important factors that may resolve the obstacles 
entailed in the complex innovation process by analysing the nature of successful or 
less successful innovation processes of SMEs. Therefore, I contribute to establishing 
an appropriate policy framework that focuses on the knowledge-interaction process 
                                                        
1 Meso-level actors are innovation service providers such as intermediaries and the micro-level actors 
are firms, public and private institutes, etc. (Seidel et al., 2013). The meso- and micro-level analysis 
will be further explained in Section 2.3.2. 
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between SMEs and other entities, overcoming the linear view of innovation prevalent 
in Korean S&T policy. 
Second, on the intermediary organisational level, this paper will contribute to 
establishing SME policy tools, based on the interactive model, by reflecting 
heterogeneous demands of SMEs and different patterns of interaction of each SME. 
Furthermore, the study attempts to contribute to redefining the role of public 
intermediaries by examining their hidden role as an innovation facilitator for SMEs 
in Korea.  
Last, on the research level, I brought together separate bodies of literature—NIS and 
Innovation Intermediaries—whereas extant research has rarely made those 
connections. 
Separately, the study proposes a conceptual framework to analyse the interactions 
between public intermediaries and SMEs. By reviewing the intermediary literature, I 
develop four functions—(a) knowledge enabling, (b) facilitating relations, (c) 
facilitating learning, and (d) managing interfaces, that allow a systemic approach to 
analyse the knowledge-interaction process and how the process decreases the barriers 
on a specific level. Based on the framework, I analysed forty-five interviews with 
CEOs, policymakers, and staff from intermediaries, indicating the usefulness of 
public-sector intermediaries as innovation facilitators of SMEs; two factors 
considered in analysis of the empirical data. 
First, while acknowledging the complex interaction in the innovation network, 
incorporating firms, social, and technical factors, this study does not endeavour to 
consider all factors that shape and influence innovation processes of all SMEs to the 
same degree. Instead, the study seeks to examine how intermediaries interpret 
heterogeneous knowledge requirements in the innovation process and perform those 
roles to bridge the knowledge and relational barriers from firm to firm. 
Second, whereas the main interest of this study lies in gaining insight into the 
interaction and relationships that affect innovation processes of SMEs, and finding 
determining factors, it tries to capture the evolving nature of relationships and 
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multiplicity of interactions among heterogeneous individuals and other entities 
during the innovation process. 
1.3 Theoretical Motivation 
This study responds to a theoretical challenge embodied by a lack of research into 
public intermediaries and SMEs in the NIS framework. On the one hand, 
stakeholders have questioned whether the knowledge-interaction process between 
public intermediaries and SMEs can be explained in the loose NIS framework. 
Previously studies making use of the NIS framework largely focused on national 
comparisons of innovative performance with relatively few focusing on 
intermediaries and SMEs in a specific setting (Lundvall, 2007a; OECD, 2002; 
Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005). On the other hand, the intermediary 
literature is fragmented, and scholars rarely integrated it into the NIS literature 
(Watkins et al., 2014). The intermediary literature further remains biased towards 
supply-side functions showing one-way knowledge flow from intermediaries to firms, 
ignoring microsociological factors such as the interactive nature of innovation and 
preexisting resources and routines of SMEs (Howells, 2006). This apparent lack of 
concepts (or framework) in explicating the knowledge-interaction process between 
two actors is the concern of this study. 
Although I do not aim to provide all-encompassing new concepts or tools to facilitate 
innovation of SMEs, I aim to elicit insights and ideas that might be useful for 
operationalisation of the NIS framework, focusing on the specific actors (i.e. public 
intermediaries) and SMEs, which face heterogeneous barriers in the innovation 
process. Throughout the journey towards analysis of the knowledge interaction in the 
uncertain innovation process, I was motivated by several aspects of the research: the 
NIS concept, intermediary studies, and more broadly by the interdisciplinary field of 
science and technology studies. As previously indicated, this study addresses several 
interesting theoretical challenges. 
The first challenge is how much the loose NIS framework can convey country-
specific characteristics. Dodgson (2009) indicates that Korean technology-based 
firms had great advantages in economic institutional support afforded by the 
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government, which possesses key technological standards, skills, capital, and 
markets. Also, patriotic entrepreneurs (Dodgson, 2009) and the high level of 
urgency2 towards economic growth are distinctive features in Korean S&T 
development history. In this regard, Dodgson (2009) contends that cultural and social 
specifications cannot be ignored because attitudes to risk, hierarchy, trust, and social 
relations impact innovation (i.e. relationships between suppliers and customers). In 
addition, many Asian nations—especially, Korea, Japan and Taiwan—possess 
country-specific characteristics such as non-market modes of coordination, whereas 
those three countries have different industry structures that result from different 
political, economic, and social influences. In Korea, industry–government research 
institutes’ (GRIs’) interaction has been a common form of cooperation (Yusuf, 2008) 
rather than industry–university interaction. However, to the best of my knowledge, 
no references explain or visualise the differences at micro-levels, such as the role of 
strong governments in the NIS framework. The NIS literature making use of static 
indicators does not yet fully recognise or explore the significance of nation-specific 
legacies (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004; Mahroum and Alsaleh, 2012). 
The second theoretical challenge is whether the ‘degree of abstraction’ of the 
framework can act as a comprehensive guide to analyse ‘what is happening’ in the 
system. The KNIS has grown in size and sophistication and, as a result, the scope to 
analyse and identify the barriers in the simplified concept is more complex and 
difficult. Yet, no indication exists of barriers (i.e. system failures) and levels of 
complexity in the NIS framework. Consequently, SMEs and linkage organisations, 
so-called public intermediaries, and their interaction process cannot be explored in 
the vaguely designed framework. It is difficult to know whether SMEs’ needs are 
met by public intermediaries through knowledge interaction and if so, how the 
process can decrease the barriers. This difficulty gave this study momentum. I 
recognised that the applicability of the NIS concept at a specific level is questioned, 
despite its popularity in the policymaking sphere3. I attempt to demonstrate that the 
                                                        
2 Urgency comes from the memory of deprivation and hard times under Japanese occupation and 
during the Korean War (L. Kim 1993). 
3 The policymaking sphere is defined as supranational organisations (e.g. OECD) and single nation-
states that formulate innovation and technology policies (Sharif, 2006). The academic sphere refers to 
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simplistic NIS concept needs to be revised at an appropriate level and the object of 
experimentation, especially targeting the interactive approach to analyse ‘what is 
happening’ during the innovation process and to apply the policy at an appropriate 
level. 
These challenges led to calls for operationalisation of the NIS concept at meso- and 
micro-levels, linking the NIS concept with practical approaches such as intermediary 
functions and sociological perspectives to the interaction process. By adopting meso- 
and micro-level approaches, I am able to reveal dynamic interplay between public 
intermediaries and SMEs. Four intermediary functions developed for this study 
provide an analytical tool for the knowledge-interaction process and how it decreases 
the diverse barriers in the complex and uncertain innovation process. These functions 
do not interact with SMEs in a ‘knowledge vacuum’; their role can be different 
between regions, technology fields, actors involved in interaction processes, 
innovative capabilities of SMEs, and experiences and resources of intermediaries. 
The microsociological perspective on innovation helps describe ‘a range of factors: 
organisational, political, economic and cultural’ that may determine the pattern of 
interaction and relationships among intermediaries, SMEs, and other actors and non-
actors (Williams and Edge, 1996).  
1.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
The focus of this study is on the interaction between public-sector intermediaries and 
SMEs during the innovation process. Involving a set of case studies, I attempted to 
elicit insights that can be used to build on the NIS framework, focusing on the nexus 
of the barriers and institutional influences on innovation. The study extends previous 
works by focusing on several critical influences in the innovation process of SMEs: 
the knowledge and relational barriers, uncertainties at the early stage of innovation, 
and interaction between public intermediaries and SMEs. Unlike previous studies 
that examined knowledge flows among idealised actors at macro-levels, the 
conceptual framework developed for this study indicates that knowledge interaction 
between intermediaries and SMEs occurs at interactive and multiple levels to 
                                                                                                                                                             
universities, research institutes, and centres where the study of innovation systems is central to 
scholarly research programmes (Sharif, 2006). 
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decrease the heterogeneous barriers that each SME faces, leading to evolution of 
different patterns of relationships and interactions. 
Innovation scholars (Lundvall, 1992, 2010; Nelson, 1992, 1993) have studied 
knowledge flow, competence building, and learning in a limited social context, but 
undertook little empirically-based research in mainstream NIS studies to understand 
learning by interaction at multiple levels in the innovation process in a specific 
setting (Lundvall, 2007a).4 Similarly, the mainstream of intermediary research has 
rarely addressed the role of innovation facilitators as interactionists in the complex 
innovation process. Rather, intermediary studies tend to focus on specific functions 
of private-side intermediaries and far less on public intermediaries (Dalziel, 2010; 
Howells, 2006; Watkins et al., 2014). From this point, an innovative aspect of this 
study can be the integration and focus on constructs of the multiplicity of interaction 
and intermediation processes that received little attention, either in the theoretical or 
empirical literature on the NIS and intermediary studies. 
In addition to emphasising the importance of multiplicity of interaction and 
relationships in collectively addressing the barriers in the innovation process, this 
study demonstrates, through analysis of the empirical evidence, the necessity of 
closely assessing microsociological factors. By adopting social dimensions of the 
interaction process, microsociological aspects in the interaction process in the 
analysis provide a more systematic and interactive approach to understanding the 
knowledge-interaction process (Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005; Lundvall, 1996). 
Although these constructs have been identified separately in different traditions or 
domains, researchers rarely treat them together as potential factors in the innovation 
process, nor are they addressed in depth in the mainstream NIS or intermediary 
research. This more comprehensive approach provides a robust way to explore the 
knowledge-interaction process between intermediaries and SMEs and among 
individuals, especially when the loose NIS framework at the macro-level has 
limitations to open the black box of interactive learning, knowledge flow, and the 
                                                        
4 Lundvall (2007a) criticised the distortion of the NIS concept, which was biased towards science-
based innovation that focused on the formal technological infrastructure and on policies aiming almost 
exclusively at stimulating R&D efforts in high-technology sectors; limitations of encompassing 
individual, organizational, and interorganisational learning in the innovation process. 
9 
 
evolving nature of relationships (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004; Russell and Williams, 
2002). 
The study also contributes to elicit the role of public intermediaries in facilitating the 
innovation of SMEs at the early stage of innovation. The four functions, if effectively 
organised by intermediaries, do appear to have the potential to influence the 
innovation process of SMEs. The investigation of functions draws from the 
innovation intermediary literature and then, linking it to knowledge-interaction 
process, represents a conceptual contribution, which also helps to generalise the 
findings of this study to a certain extent. In particular, this study illustrates the role of 
public intermediaries as reflexive actors encapsulating particular experiences and 
applying these to other settings, so-called social learning, which has been a relatively 
understudied in the NIS framework.5 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background 
of the NIS which relates to key questions of the knowledge-interaction process 
among actors. The chapter describes the barriers, based on the systems-failure 
perspective emerging in the interaction process. In particular, this chapter emphasises 
the loose nature of the NIS which brings disagreement between policymaking and 
academic spheres, highlighting two different approaches to innovation. In this regard, 
the chapter also raises theoretical issues in relation to the limitation of implementing 
the NIS framework, drawing attention to the involvement of a multiplicity of 
relationships and their evolving nature. 
Chapter 3 concerns the theoretical context of intermediaries, focusing on the four 
functions in knowledge interaction developed for this study. The chapter examines 
how intermediaries resolve the barriers emerging in the innovation process of SMEs 
through knowledge enabling, facilitating relations and learning, and managing 
interfaces. I argue that knowledge interaction is more complex than the roles and 
                                                        
5 Several scholars (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Watkins et al., 2014; Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and 
Gilsing, 2005) indicated the neglected part of the NIS; that is the bridging institutions. Williams, 
Stewart, and Slack (2005) highlighted the role of intermediaries in social learning but not in the NIS 
framework. 
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activities explained in the related literature where the role of the intermediary is 
merely static and conceptual. On that basis, I attempt to delineate dynamic entities of 
innovation intermediaries, highlighting public-sector intermediaries acting as 
innovation facilitators at the early stages of innovation. 
Chapter 4 covers the research design and methodology, describing the field work, the 
procedures for selecting SMEs, which provide the empirical data for the thesis, and 
the methodology for data collection and analysis. I adopted the case-study approach 
in cooperation with semi-structured in-depth interviews, given that little has been 
studied in this area and the need existed to contribute to theory building. The primary 
data collection involves in-depth interviews at three levels: four intermediaries, 26 
SMEs and an observer, to obtain a more objective and accurate picture of the 
knowledge-interaction process. I selected five SMEs for a second in-depth interview 
to obtain more detailed information about the process and the factors that hinder or 
facilitate the innovation process. Interviews at firms provided an opportunity to 
check the veracity of statements made by intermediaries. 
Chapter 5 reviews the history of science, technology, and innovation policy, focusing 
on SME policy and innovative SMEs in Korea. In particular, the chapter highlights 
the role of the government and public intermediaries as non-market mechanisms to 
deliver government policy to SMEs. Then I examine weaknesses of the KNIS, 
characterised as ‘strong large firms and weak small firms’, explore the definition of 
innovative SMEs in Korea, critically review policy implemented for SMEs, and 
figure out mismatches between input and output. I emphasise the low level of 
interaction among firms (e.g. large corporations and SMEs), which hinders 
interactive learning and knowledge flow, and the lack of capability of SMEs, as 
problems of the KNIS. 
Chapters 6 and 7 provide the main field research, examining how the evidence from 
the knowledge interaction between the public intermediary and SMEs differs from 
the NIS concept presented in the previous chapter. In the empirical discussion, 
Chapter 6 presents five case studies examining the knowledge-interaction process 
between the public intermediary and SMEs through the lens of the four intermediary 
functions developed in Chapter 3. It includes the different history and capability of 
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SMEs, how each SME interacts with intermediaries to bridge the heterogeneous 
barriers emerging at the early stages of innovation, and the outcomes of multiplicity 
of the knowledge-interaction process. 
Chapter 6 analyses successful and less successful factors, identifying differences and 
similarities among the five cases. It focuses on the variety of factors incorporated in 
the interaction process such as the capabilities of SMEs and intermediaries, the 
existence of reflexive individuals, quality of knowledge, the level of trust, and the 
multiplicity of interaction and relationships. Emphasising the role of public 
intermediaries linking all the services and actors in the knowledge-interaction 
process, I afforded special attention to the evolving characteristics of relationships of 
each SME, which differs from case to case. The chapter shows the difference 
between the NIS framework and empirical findings that entail constellations of actors 
and interactions at multiple levels. It raises issues in relation to sociological micro-
level factors embedded in multiple levels of interaction, which are mostly neglected 
in NIS and in intermediary studies. 
Chapter 7 provides the rationale for the involvement of public intermediaries that 
facilitate the innovation process and lower barriers of innovation in the KNIS. The 
chapter highlights the concept of innovation as a process that involves a number of 
failures and constraints, and covers a wide range of activities. Therefore, a need 
exists to maintain durable, satisfactory relationships with multiple actors during 
knowledge interaction and constantly negotiate acceptable solutions to remove 
barriers. In this regard, this chapter emphasises how and why public intermediaries 
facilitate innovation at the innovation systems level: it is characterised as a constant 
process of interaction, multiplicity of relationships, and mutual learning. This chapter 
further presents some dilemmas between the role of public intermediaries and their 
need to meet performance indicators, which may overlook activities in the 
innovation-facilitation process, arguing they are often hard to measure and quantify. 
Chapter 8 presents insights and findings of the study, including implications for the 
NIS concept and intermediary theories, policies, and SMEs. I discuss the possibility 
of generalising the results and their effects on different contexts, followed by 
reflections on the study that address its strengths and limitations and 
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recommendations for future research. Concluding the main theme of the study, the 
chapter argues that the simplistic and loosely descriptive NIS framework has 
shortcomings in explaining different patterns of interaction and relationships that are 
evolving over time; this outlook emphasises the lack of attention paid by NIS to the 
social dimensions embedded in the process. With emphasis on the crucial role of 
public intermediaries in the KNIS, this chapter concludes that the loose NIS 
framework needs to be operationalised at a more appropriate level (i.e. public-sector 
innovation intermediaries and SMEs), and incorporate other disciplines of study to 
identify the barriers and resolve the problems relating to the KNIS. 
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2 Chapter 2. National Innovation Systems: 
Towards a Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The NIS concept, which first appeared in the mid-1980s in Europe, has been 
enjoying currency in academic and policymaking contexts (Sharif, 2006) in many 
countries. Along with Freeman’s (1987) book on Japan, the concept has been widely 
diffused through Europe and Asia, with a growing literature and influence on 
policymaking in the last few decades. Rejecting the linear view of innovation, the 
NIS emphasises firms in interaction with other firms and with a knowledge 
infrastructure at the core of the system, arguing that the most important resource in 
the economy is knowledge, and the most important process is learning (Lundvall, 
1992). However, it is not just firms but the role of government that is crucial in 
achieving a high level of competitiveness in a global market, considering Japanese 
success. 
Many scholars have positively welcomed the concept, but the generic NIS model has 
brought disagreement to the policymaking and academic spheres (Sharif, 2006), 
questioning whether the loose concept is useful as a policymaking tool. Most of all, 
the ambiguous nature of the concept does not allow for how governments intervene 
and where support should go to enhance the innovation capacity of firms and nations. 
The system-failure concept can be applied to identify barriers to innovation and a 
rationale for public support. However, some limitations in implementing NIS remain: 
the role of governments in a specific nation as a mechanism to resolve barriers, and 
the knowledge-interaction process at specific levels (i.e. public intermediaries and 
SMEs), and its evolving process. 
This chapter presents the theoretical background to the NIS, its emergence, 
development, and surrounding debates in policymaking. Section 2.2 illustrates the 
emergence of the NIS as an interactive model of innovation and its historical 
background, followed by two different approaches to the NIS concept. Section 2.3 
examines the developmental direction of the NIS concept towards policymaking and 
academic spheres. In particular, I analyse the limitations of such a nebulous concept 
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as a policymaking tool. Then, I investigate types of system failures as barriers to 
innovation in Section 2.4, which provides a rationale for government intervention. 
Adopting a broader notion of knowledge flows, this section highlights the knowledge 
interactions and important role of public intermediaries as innovation facilitators in 
the NIS. The conclusion, in Section 2.5, addresses theoretical issues in relation to the 
limitation of implementing the NIS framework due to its ‘loose concept’. 
2.2 Genesis and Development of the NIS 
2.2.1 Its Origin: Refutation of the Linear-Based Model of Innovation 
Innovation in science and technology has been an economic factor since the time of 
the classical economists, and modern discourse on innovation management tends to 
trace its roots to the work, in particular, of Schumpeter (e.g. Roberts, 1998). 
Schumpeter (1939) considered innovation to be a fairly linear process that moves 
through the gathering of commercially practicable ideas (invention) by 
entrepreneurial figures who stimulate product development and diffusion 
(innovation). In criticising the neoclassical and Schumpeterian notions of linearity 
(Mytelka and Smith, 2002), evolutionary studies start to highlight learning feedback 
(Kline and Rosenberg, 1986), heterogeneity, environment, differences between firms 
themselves (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and the unpredictable nature of innovation 
(Freeman, 1988; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). 
Evolutionism offers a holistic view that innovations, ‘far from being isolated’, are a 
complex learning process across firms and sectors intertwined with technological and 
nontechnological aspects. Emphasising the complex array of factors in the innovation 
process, researchers have moved away from a single linear model to investigate 
heterogeneous factors including firms, specific industries, or regions and nations, at a 
system level, since the 1980s. Partly, this movement is a response to the failure of 
economists to integrate institutions into theories and econometric models (Edquist, 
1997; Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). These 
institutions are firms, institutes, universities, governments, and others that interact 
with each other at a systems level. 
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During the 1980s, some nations that made profits from innovation policy expanded 
economically at firm and government levels. Japan in particular emerged as a new 
global powerhouse that called for governments of many countries to learn from the 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). This phenomenon led 
a variety of commentators to conduct research into national capabilities; their 
research strongly connected innovation to national performance, collectively 
recommending government intervention in the innovation process to pursue national 
competitive advantage (Roberts, 1998). 
Amid the climate of analysing ‘developmental gaps’ among nations, discussions of 
the NIS arose to frame international comparative studies particularly of Japan, 
Europe, and the United States. Scholars Freeman, Lundvall, and Nelson performed 
the majority of studies. However, Freeman (1987)6 first used the concept of national 
innovation systems, analysing the increasing economic dominance of Japan as a 
result of policies in the Japanese system pursued over many decades (Sharif, 2006). 
Although no single definition or boundary of the NIS emerged (see Appendix 1), one 
widely quoted definition follows: 
The set of institutions that (jointly and individually) contribute to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies. These institutions 
provide the framework within which governments form and implement 
policies. … It is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store, 
and transfer knowledge, skills, and artefacts which define new 
technologies. (Metcalfe, 1995, as cited by OECD, 1999, p24) 
Focusing on the knowledge, learning, and interactivity among actors that gives rise 
to ‘systems of innovation’ (Freeman, 1988) draws attention to the ‘national 
environment where institutional developments have produced conditions conducive 
to the growth of interactive mechanisms on which innovation and diffusion of 
technology are based’ (OECD, 1992, p238). The NIS approach rests on the 
interactive model of the innovation process, which emphasises market and 
nonmarket knowledge transactions among firms, institutions, and the human 
resources involved (OECD, 2002) in the innovation process. This provides a ‘richer 
                                                        
6 Although the NIS concept came from several scholars (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993), Freeman (1995) indicated that the idea goes back to Friedrich List’s conception of ‘The 
National System of Political Economy’. 
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picture’ of the innovation process, thereby overcoming the weaknesses of the 
neoclassical approach. In this approach, the firm was conceived as a ‘learning 
organisation’ embedded in a broader institutional context (Lundvall, 1988). By 
paying greater attention to the mechanisms that shape the system, instead of viewing 
the system as a market with anonymous players, the NIS approach (Lankhuizen and 
Woolthuis, 2003, p13) carries the potential to provide effective mechanisms. 
In parallel with the above phenomenon, the OECD looked for conceptual 
frameworks7 to draw the attention of policymakers and averred the NIS could do the 
job, providing better understanding of differences among member nations (Godin, 
2009). The OECD started to produce a number of reports on many countries’ NIS, 
comparing systems in various aspects and components (Dodgson, 2009) and 
encouraging member nations to use the concept (OECD, 1997).8 In particular, an 
Industry and Technology Scoreboard of Indicators published by the OECD provided 
a readily understandable story by generalists and the press (Godin, 2006; OECD, 
1998).  
The publication included a series of economic and science and technology indicators, 
graphically ranking countries on different dimensions with a brief analytical text 
(Godin, 2009). It soon became a popular analytical tool for policymakers in many 
countries who wanted to more firmly grasp the interaction processes underlying a 
country’s technological and economic development (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004; 
Edquist, 2005; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Freeman especially 
played a crucial role in stimulating the concept centred on the Science Policy 
Research Unit at Sussex University, and the concept has been adopted as an 
intellectual agenda for theory building, occupying economists, sociologists, and 
political scientists for several decades. 
For example, Porter emphasised the importance of managing technological change as 
a means of gaining economic advantage from a perspective of innovation 
                                                        
7 The OECD entrusted the programme on NIS to Lundvall (who used to be a deputy director of the 
OECD from 1992 to 1995) to develop the conceptual framework (Godin, 2009). 
8 The concept has become the international standard with the adoption of the OECD Frascati Manual 
by member countries in 1963. 
17 
 
management. Sociologists also attempted to widen the innovation process. Williams 
and Edge (1996) attempted to broaden policy discussions by introducing new 
theoretical approaches that examined the sociopolitical context of innovation. Meso-
level patterns of the NIS across firms and industries aligned with the idea of Social 
Shaping of Technology (SST; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985) in the tacit and 
cumulative character of knowledge, path dependency in directions of change, and 
choices between contradictory pressures (Russell and Williams, 2002). However, 
these scholars criticised the NIS concept as it only focuses on ‘revealed performance 
of organisations and systems’, remaining a black box of the dynamic interaction 
process and learning nature of innovation9. 
Along with the growing body of the NIS knowledge, produced by a group of leading 
scholars and policymakers who had specific agendas, disagreement emerged about 
ambiguities or uncertainties relating to the concept or usage of the NIS (Sharif, 2006). 
Although the NIS concept was defined differently by various scholars and 
policymakers, it can be regarded as an analytical tool to explain economic growth 
and competitiveness of a nation—as briefly mentioned above—and a synthesis of 
analytical results produced by scholars (Lundvall, 2007a). This topic will be 
examined further in the following section. 
2.2.2 Key Concepts and Different Approaches to Innovation Systems 
Although the NIS concept is quite broad and loose, basic characteristics of the NIS 
can be set-up10 institutionally, related to innovation and emphasising relationships 
and interaction between components that can be the ‘semantic core’ implied in most 
definitions. Interactions and linkages are key ingredients of the interactive model that 
assumes that growth in interactions leads to improved innovative performance. 
Hence, ‘innovation systems may grow through complementary interactions at three 
                                                        
9 Lundvall (2010) argued the international organisations distorted the original concept of the NIS, 
which tended to focus on science-based innovation without encompassing individual, organisational, 
and interorganisational learning. Edquist (2001) criticised the SI approach as largely neglecting 
individual learning. 
10 The building blocks of the NIS are a set of institutions, organisations, routines, rules, norms, 
linkages, and flows that regulate relations between actors and shape interaction. Firms are at the centre 
of the NIS, and effective interaction between firms and the knowledge infrastructure affect economic 
performance (Lundvall, 2007c). 
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levels’ (OECD, 2002, p16): first, firms and knowledge institutions; second, 
interactions among different markets; and third, interactions between market and 
nonmarket mechanisms (interactions through networking and collaboration; Figure 
2-1). 
 
Figure 2-1 Actors and linkages in the innovation systems. 
Source: OECD (1999, p23). 
Interactive learning can be viewed as a leitmotif of the NIS because it is the learning 
system of national economies (Lundvall, 1992, 1998, 2005, 2007c). Thus, 
understanding the interactions that facilitate knowledge creation, diffusion, and 
utilisation are crucial for analysis and development of the NIS. Lundvall (2007a, 
2007b) distinguished two modes of innovation, arguing that this distinction is 
fundamental in analysing innovation systems. The first is the DUI-mode of 
innovation, which refers to learning by doing, using, and interacting (so-called 
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experience-based learning). The second is the STI-mode of innovation, which refers 
to use and development of science-like understanding and explicit knowledge (know-
what type) rather than tacit or experience-based knowledge. 
The DUI-mode emphasises organisational learning, representing that firms have 
closer relationships with customers and may have structured and tacit elements of 
communication involved in interaction. Because Lundvall (1996) conceptualised 
innovation as learning, creating novelty in capabilities as well as knowledge, which 
contributes to developing innovative technology, user–producer interaction has been 
an important learning process, with information and knowledge flow, and feedback 
between actors. Although a variable reflecting the level of relationships of firms with 
customers can measure the DUI-mode, it has a strong focus on organisational 
learning as well as on user needs (Jensen et al., 2007). The DUI-mode of innovation 
also involves organisational frameworks and relationships between employees that 
facilitate creating implicit knowledge and promoting interactive learning (Jensen et 
al., 2007; Lundvall, 2007a, 2007b). 
In this regard, Lundvall et al. (2002) highlight knowledge interaction among 
constellations of actors.11 Organisations where individuals follow a different kind of 
rationality, characterised by a shared understanding of new phenomena, technologies, 
and knowledge, would be successful in innovations through learning-by-interaction 
(Lundvall, 1996). In other words, interactions with individuals with different 
rationalities can be seen as the process of combining competing rationalities towards 
successful innovations: so-called ‘productive combination of competing rationalities’. 
The second mode of innovation, the STI-mode, focuses on science-based learning 
such that science is seen as the first step towards technology and innovation, and 
knowledge may reach users in the form of disembodied codified knowledge 
(Lundvall, 2005, 2007b). Inspired by the S&T tradition in the United States, the STI-
mode considers the NIS an expanded concept of earlier analysis of national science 
                                                        
11 These constellations can provide a space with mixed rationalities to enable interactive learning and 
new knowledge creation. If instrumental rationality completely dominated the interaction between 
engineers from R&D labs belonging to different firms, very little knowledge would be gained and 
very little learning would occur (Lundvall et al., 2002). 
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systems and national technology policies (Mowery and Oxley, 1995). Because 
mapping indicators of national performance regarding R&D efforts, S&T 
specialisation, and innovation has been the major issue, the related policy is likely 
skewed towards the S&T domain, ignoring considerations of wider dimensions of the 
NIS.12 
From this point, the DUI- and STI-modes of innovation reflect two major studies on 
the NIS, published in the early 1990s. The first is a major extension of Lundvall and 
collaboration in Aalborg (Lundvall, 1992); the second is the national comparative 
study of Nelson (1993). Lundvall distinguished these two approaches as a narrow 
and a broad definition of the NIS: 
The narrow definition would include organisations and institutions 
involved in searching and exploring—such as R&D departments, 
technological institutes and universities. The broad definition … 
includes all parts and aspects of the economic structure and the 
institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and 
exploring—the production system, the marketing system and the system 
of finance present themselves as subsystems in which learning takes 
place (Lundvall, 1992, p12). 
Nelson’s NIS follows a narrow definition focused on the core of the NIS approach in 
partial ways (STI-mode), whereas Lundvall highlighted conceptual characteristics of 
the NIS and interactive learning (DUI-mode). Martin (2012b) further claimed that 
Schumpeter defined innovation in a broader way and innovative activities may not 
always be visible: so-called ‘dark innovation’, which could be design, software, or 
intangible investment. The narrow definition of innovation tends to focus on 
systemic relationships between R&D efforts in firms, S&T organisations, universities, 
and public policy, and as a result, the analysis focuses on interactions between supply 
and demand (Freeman and Soete, 2009). 
However, the development of the NIS is not a technical achievement but a web of 
society, politics, and economics engineered by actors responsible for its conception 
(Sharif, 2006). For this reason, the broader concept is more appropriate to analyse the 
                                                        
12 This tendency may affect production of many quantitative survey-based innovation studies that 
overlook DUI-mode learning in favour of innovative performance based on their narrow view of 
innovation. 
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nation, where specific sociocultural factors and groups co-construct formulating the 
concept.13 A country’s competitiveness can be interpreted flexibly, having different 
meanings for different concepts through a wider approach (Sharif, 2006) where 
different mechanisms or bridging arrangements for knowledge flows and interactive 
learning exist. For example, the NIS concept perceived in Asian countries (e.g. Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan) may differ from that perceived in Western countries (the 
UK, United States, and Scandinavia) or other developing countries. 
In this vein, Fransman (1990, 1991, 1992) analysed the role of the Japanese 
government, showing how the long-term vision was shaped by an interactive and 
coordinated process. In Japan, the MITI became the spearhead coordinating 
innovation activities in the 1970s and 1980s. In the case of Brazil and South Korea, 
which were known as the most successful industrialising economies (Viotti, 2002), a 
sharp contrast arose in education, firm level R&D, telecommunication infrastructure, 
and the diffusion of new technologies, in addition to R&D activities in the early 
1980s. Although South Korea has grown fast since the 1980s, the GNP growth rate 
of many Latin American countries fell to less than 2%. 
What are the systemic features driving success and causing differences between 
countries? It seems other factors than R&D investment or capability of firms explain 
the contrast. Looking into Japanese success and the role of innovation in national 
economies, it is not just individual firms, but coordinated efforts by government that 
achieve the high level of competitiveness. In other words, creating novelty and 
attaining competitive advantage in a rapidly changing global market intensifies the 
firm-specific and nation-specific pressures that highlight the broader context in the 
development of the NIS concept. 
However, a strong tendency exists among policymakers to consider innovation 
processes largely as aspects connected to formal processes of R&D (Jensen et al., 
                                                        
13 The NIS concept has been popular especially in the early 2000 in Korea. It seems that the 
popularity of the concept did emerge at a single moment in South Korea, precisely when a financial 
crisis attacked the Korean economy in the late 1990s. At that time, the government needed legitimacy 
to intervene and the NIS, as a policymaking tool recommended by well-known organisations (OECD 
and Science Policy Research Unit), played a crucial role in providing a rationale for government 
intervention. 
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2007), although the wider approach emphasises interactive learning with customers, 
suppliers, and knowledge institutions (Freeman, 1987; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; 
Lundvall, 1988, 1993). This tendency may affect production of many quantitative 
survey-based innovation studies that overlook DUI-mode learning in favour of 
innovative performance (Jensen et al., 2007) based on a narrow view of innovation. 
Emphasising the STI-mode of innovation, policymakers demonstrate huge 
investment in S&T systems and develop statistical analyses14 on science and 
technology use to manage the efficiency of policy (national commitment) and learn 
about performance. In this regard, Lundvall (2007a, 2007b) and Freeman and Soete 
(2009) expressed concern that an STI focus may result in weak organisational 
learning and a weak focus on user needs that has limited positive impact on 
innovation. Often, in contrast to Frascati Manual’s R&D focus, a more routine use 
and new combination of knowledge base without a particular leap in S&T facilitates 
innovation; so-called innovation without R&D (Freeman and Soete, 2009). 
Along with the different approaches to the innovation system, the loose nature and 
flexible interpretations of the NIS bring debate on the meaning of the concept (Figure 
2-2). On one hand, Edquist has been undertaking a major comparative study to build 
a ‘theory-like’ concept. On the other hand, Lundvall emphasised the importance of a 
broader concept in policymaking, although Lundvall (2004, 2007c) proposed the NIS 
needs help from other disciplines with more insight into human societies and social 
interaction. This discourse will be further analysed in Section 2.3. 
                                                        
14 Indicators have weaknesses, and are inadequate to describe the dynamic system of knowledge 
development, acquisition (OECD, 1995), and diversity across innovation systems (Smith, 2001). The 
OECD (1995) report further argued that feedback loops between markets and R&D were often 
overlooked. Describing subsystems where long-term relationships and trust for innovation shape 
different forms of innovation is insufficient. However, traditional indicators, based on a linear view of 
innovation, still dominate S&T measurements that are far from the concept of interactive learning, 
considered as the most important factor in a knowledge-based economy. Although some made efforts 
to reflect characteristics such as tacit knowledge, the results are not yet fruitful (Godin, 2006). 
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Figure 2-2 Different meaning of the NIS concept. 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
2.3 The Debates: Academic Sphere vs. Policymaking Sphere 
2.3.1 Consistency and Adequacy 
Since its appearance as a new conceptual framework, the NIS has drawn the attention 
of academics for more than two decades. Two groups of NIS research programmes 
exist: one group argues that the concept should be theorised and needs to be applied 
in greater detail (i.e. Edquist, Metcalfe, and Fagerberg); the other concedes its 
usefulness as a loose and flexible concept (i.e. Lundvall, Nelson, Rosenberg, Sharif, 
and Viotti).15 
In the former group, Edquist (1999, 2001) criticised the systems approach due to a 
lack of functions that can describe causes and determinants of components in the 
system. This led Edquist and some other scholars to put effort into theory building 
                                                        
15 There is no clear consensus on whether the NIS concept is purely academic or policy related 
(Sharif, 2006). Godin (2009) considered Lundvall’s approach to be more theoretical than Nelson’s in 
focusing on knowledge and the process of learning itself. 
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and sharpening the concept by overcoming the vagueness of the functional 
boundaries of the system (Table 2-1). They considered that the fuzziness of the 
concept is why the systems approach does not deserve theoretical status. Yet, Edquist 
consented that policymakers might appreciate the fuzzy concept of the NIS, 
especially in the policymaking sphere (interview with Sharif, 2006, p758) because 
the policymaking sphere and academic sphere have different user groups with 
different requirements for the NIS concept. The loose concept helps policymakers 
sell their ideas to the public because the analytical reports based on quantitative data 
are sufficiently objective. 
Instead, Edquist (2005) developed ten activities (functions or determinants) 
influencing innovation to provide rigour and specificity, criticising lack of clarity of 
the NIS concept, and delineating where to draw the lines around the innovation 
system. Edquist (2001) argued that Lundvall and Nelson seemed to neglect what 
actually happens in the system, which can be questioned at a more specific level. In 
the same vein, Liu and White (2001) identified five activities highlighting how 
fundamental functions (or determinants) of the system are organised and coordinated. 
A. Johnson and Jacobsson (2000) further emphasised assessing the functionality of 
the system in the way functions are provided. This group of scholars contributed to 
theory building by identifying ‘determinants of innovation’ that can be important 
attempts to increase the theoretical status of the systems approach. 
Lundvall, Freeman, Nelson, and Smith emphasised the importance of the abstract 
nature of the NIS as a policymaking tool. From this perspective, the definition of the 
NIS must be flexible for a wider application as an analytical tool, as well as a policy 
tool in different contexts, and thus no sharper guide is necessary to explicate what 
should be included and what could be left out of the innovation system (Lundvall, 
1992, 2007a; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Lundvall (2004) especially, as a 
proponent of the NIS approach, argued that Edquist’s approach lacks consistency in 
the list of functions, that is, the heterogeneous character of the elements that make 
the approach less theoretical. Moreover, some functions (e.g. R&D and competence 
building) can be organised differently in different national innovation systems, and 
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some activities (e.g. formation of markets and articulation of user needs) cannot be 
organised by any specific types of organisations.  
Table 2-1 The Different Research Focus of the NIS Concept 
 
Research 
focus Keywords (or functions) Authors 
Towards 
flexible 
concepts 
Interaction Innovation as an interactive process Freeman (1987) 
Interactive 
learning 
Interactive learning (DUI and STI modes of 
innovation). The NIS as a socioeconomic formation 
Lundvall (1992, 
2004) 
STI modes 
of learning 
The NIS as a science and technology system 
concentrating on institutions that promote the 
acquisition and dissemination of knowledge 
Nelson (1992, 
1993) 
Interaction Socioeconomic dimensions 
Broader innovation systems where qualified 
institutions and organisations exist  
Smith (1995, 
1999) 
Towards 
more 
rigorous 
and 
theoretical 
concepts 
Developing 
functions 
1. R&D, 
2. Competence building, 
3. Formation of new product markets, 
4. Articulation of user needs, 
5. Creation and change of organisations, 
6. Networking around knowledge, 
7. Creating and changing institutions, 
8. Incubating activities, 
9. Financing innovation, 
10. Consultancy services 
Edquist (2005) 
 1. Research (basic, developmental, engineering), 
2. Implementation (manufacturing), 
3. End-use (customers of the product or process 
output), 
4. Linkage (bringing together complementary 
knowledge), and 
5. Education  
Liu and White 
(2001) 
 1. To create ‘new knowledge’, 
2. To guide the direction of the research process, 
3. To supply resources (i.e. capital or competence), 
4. To facilitate the creation of positive external 
economies (in the form of an exchange of 
knowledge and vision), 
5. To facilitate the formation 
A. Johnson and 
Jacobsson 
(2000) 
Measuring 
capabilities 
Factor analysis (innovation system, governance, 
political system, openness) in data for 24 indicators 
Fagerberg and 
Srholec (2008)  
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Instead, Lundvall (2004, 2007a) claimed that the theory behind the innovation 
system is the combination of innovation and learning, emphasising that ongoing 
activities may result in innovation that comprises understanding of the learning 
process. This leads to further arguments on STI and DUI modes of innovation in 
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policymaking discussed in a previous section (2.2.2). For example, the concept needs 
a socioeconomic dimension (Gu, 1996; Lundvall, 1992, 2005, 2007c) and real 
structure to become a useful framework, such as quality of institutions, different 
contexts of firms and economies (Sharif, 2006), social capital, loyalty, and a mix of 
trust (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Anderson and Jack, 2002; Lundvall et al., 2002). 
Edquist is undertaking a major comparative study and invoking the 
scientific principle partly to unify the meaning of the concept. On the 
other hand, Lundvall questions the value of taking a rigorously 
scientific approach in social science, defending a broader attitude and 
conceiving of the NIS concept as a loose umbrella approach. (Sharif, 
2006, p760) 
Although, theoretical efforts contribute to building a strict definition with general 
applicability, the approach may mislead policymakers to focus on static factors and 
functions at a specific time. Statistical analysis of the NIS has been popular among 
policymakers, but only shows the linear and static nature of innovation capacity in 
different nations (Bergek at el., 2008; Edquist, 2005). Furthermore, developing a 
general theory for the NIS may limit time and space, which changes over time, and 
the heterogeneity of functions (or determinants) differ across contexts. 
In that sense, the wider approach has an advantage, notwithstanding the conceptual 
flexibility and subsequent diversity in the literature (Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 
2003). As a ‘focusing device’ (Lundvall, 1992), the broad concept (Lundvall, 2007a; 
Sharif, 2006, 2010) may play an important role in interpreting cases and organising 
the flexible NIS framework. The wider context of the NIS approach may show how 
the sociocultural and political situation shapes norms and values of the NIS and how 
the NIS affects them conversely (Sharif, 2006), along with its powerful impacts on 
the internal organisation of firms, and on firm interrelationships. However, the 
combination of approaches may provide a focus for analysis, explaining what 
happens and what is going to happen by linking inputs to outputs (Lundvall, 2007a, 
2007b), and identifying the conditions (functions) determining innovation and 
economic growth (Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003). The combination allows 
policymakers to drive an appropriate strategy for government intervention in 
innovation (Edquist, 1999; Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003). 
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2.3.2 Its development as a Policy Tool and Limitations 
Building on work performed by OECD explained in Section 2.2.1—the NIS concept, 
as ‘a name or label’ for policymakers to coordinate the political agenda—the 
conceptual approach of the NIS contributes to expansion of the literature16 (Balzat 
and Hanusch, 2004; Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003), emphasising the systemic 
characteristics of innovation but with a focus on other levels of the economy than the 
nation (Lundvall, 2007c). These approaches are technological systems (Bergek et al., 
2008; Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991), regional systems of innovation (RSI; Cooke, 
Uranga and Etxebarra, 1997), and sectoral systems of innovation (SSI; Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1997). Some crucial ideas inherent to the innovation system concept 
appear in other literature (Lundvall, 2007c): regional industrial systems (Saxenian, 
1994), industrial clusters (Porter, 1990), and the Triple Helix concept (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000). For example, the Triple Helix concept is the related notion of 
systems of innovation that highlight the crucial role of ‘entrepreneurial universities’ 
in the knowledge economy (Martin, 2012a). 
Although the NIS concept is useful to examine institutional characteristics for further 
development of innovative capacity, there are still concerns in the policymaking 
community that the NIS approach has too little operational value and is difficult to 
implement (Carlsson et al., 2002; Mahroum and Alsaleh, 2012; OECD, 2002; Viotti, 
2002). It may need other policy frameworks to anchor its ‘loose concept’ (Song, 
2009). In this regard, the NIS, RSI, and SSI may complement each other rather than 
exclude each other (Edquist, 1997). Lundvall (2007c) claimed that expanded 
concepts are not an alternative analytical tool for national systems, and may well be 
applied in a supranational or regional context, or an industry (technology) context, or 
some combination (Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003). Martin and Johnston (1999) 
further portrayed that Technology Foresight has been used as a process to achieve 
effective organisational learning and system-wide learning, and thereby innovation in 
                                                        
16 Influenced by evolutionary theories, the systems-of-innovation (SI) approach emphasises 
determinants (functions) of innovations, not their consequences. The main emphasis was initially on 
national SIs; regional and sectoral SIs emerged and were used in addition to the national one (Edquist, 
2001). Edquist (1997) argued that these three approaches can be addressed as variants of a generic 
system of innovation approaches, whereas Lundvall (2007c) considered that technological systems, 
regional systems of innovation, sectoral systems of innovations, and national systems of innovation 
have systemic characteristics of innovation. 
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the NIS. In spite of its contribution to the expansion of literature and usefulness as a 
policy tool, the conceptual framework has actuated several discourses. 
First, although the systems concept can be applied in various regions and sectors, it is 
questionable whether the framework explains a nation’s specificity. Lundvall 
claimed that this “kind of theory must have a very strong historical dimension. … 
Some people want to abstract from both dimensions of space and time [miss] that the 
system of innovation has different meanings in different historical periods and 
different locations” (Sharif, 2006, p759). The nation is the arena where cultures and 
institutions are rooted, and furthermore, a specific national focus helps governments 
intervene (Gu, 1996; Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003). 
For example, striking differences arose among global semiconductor businesses in 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993) such as the different 
national R&D systems and their role in economic performance, different roles of 
institutions such as the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan 
and Korea’s Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), and different 
national histories and cultures defining development paths and reifying the NIS. The 
Japanese government targeted strategic areas and orchestrated resources, firms, and 
cooperation programmes that shaped efficient innovation systems (Fransman, 1990, 
1991; Freeman, 1995; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Most of all, innovation policy 
concerns important consequences that innovations have for socioeconomic and 
political matters (Borrás and Edquist, 2013). 
However, member nations tend to use OECD indicators to measure innovative 
capacity and its comparison among nations, although Lundvall, Freeman, and other 
leading scholars emphasised the importance of a nation and a wider institutional 
framework that should include socioeconomic factors and institutions. In other words, 
stakeholders employed the NIS concept for comparisons that were locked into 
homogenised views of the NIS in different nations. From this viewpoint, one may 
question whether the loose concept provides specificity of a nation along with 
popularity in policymaking or scholarly work. Also this view is inconsistent with the 
view of leading scholars, who suggested the search for solutions suitable for each 
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nation17 rather than depending on best practices (Godin, 2009; Lundvall, 2010; 
Viotti, 2002). For example, Lundvall (2010) contended that interactive learning is the 
most important process, which cannot be generalised because uneven access to 
knowledge and barriers for interaction might reflect different nation-specific 
arrangements. 
Second, the heuristic and fuzzy concept or focusing device may be applicable in 
different contexts by offering the broad utility of the concept as an analytical tool. 
However, the concept does not have any indicators that can explain the patterns of 
interaction and learning process, although it emphasises the evolving aspects of the 
system. Interaction and learning still remain a black-box (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004; 
Mahroum and Alsaleh, 2012; Russell and Williams, 2002) and other disciplines may 
need to explain the micro-behaviours of individuals. Although leading scholars such 
as Lundvall and Metcalfe insist on the importance of firms, knowledge, and 
interactive learning, little literature describes how interaction and learning occur at 
specific levels (e.g. firms and firms or firms and research institutions). Furthermore, 
the concept has limits in identifying specific problems that may hinder innovation 
(e.g. the existence of knowledgeable individuals). 
What drew the above criticism in applying the NIS to the policymaking sphere? 
Criticisms can be summarised as two major limitations in applying a flexible concept 
to the policymaking process. First, whereas other systems approaches may be useful 
as complementary policy tools, the NIS and related approaches in the policymaking 
sphere still lack an explanation of interactions between specific actors and their 
relationships. Although some researchers worked to identify regional, sectoral 
specificities, or local varieties, these approaches tend to analyse the system as a 
whole at the macro-level rather than unpicking underlying processes within the 
system (Kastelle, Potts and Dodgson, 2009; Lundvall, 2007c). Notwithstanding calls, 
                                                        
17 David and Foray (2005, as cited by Godin, 2009, p5) argued “A system of innovation cannot only 
be assessed by comparing some absolute input measures such as R&D expenditures, with output 
indicators, such as patents or high-tech products some absolute input measures such as R&D 
expenditures, with output indicators, such as patents or high-tech products.”  
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notably from Lundvall (2004, 2007c) to integrate macro and micro analyses18, 
research conducted within the NSI framework still largely fails to address 
interactions among specific actors at the meso- and micro-level (e.g. SMEs and 
public intermediaries).  
The meso-level approach refers to analysing the NIS at the level of support for 
institutions and innovation programme. Typical meso-level actors include innovation 
service providers that encourage the innovative capability of firms; such as 
innovation-support institutions and programmes (Seidel et al., 2013). The micro-
level encompasses support at the level of developing specific innovation capacity, 
overarching support for the main actors such as large firms and SMEs, universities, 
and public and private institutes (Seidel et al., 2013). 
Most current NIS research tends to focus on macro-level analysis (Kastelle, Potts and 
Dodgson, 2009) and does not adequately consider intermediary institutions that solve 
the problems of firms (Watkins et al., 2014). Lack of empirically-based research 
using meso- and micro-level approaches (or guidance) may mislead policymakers to 
focus on measuring the system at a static level. This phenomenon can be one of the 
reasons the NIS concept is widely used to measure nations’ innovation capacity 
rather than to facilitate interactive learning and knowledge flow as a policymaking 
tool. 
In this regard, several scholars (Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003; Lundvall, 2007a; 
Sharif, 2010; Viotti, 2002; Watkins et al., 2014) highlighted the need to address areas 
that had been neglected in the NIS literature. Lundvall (2007a) suggested that could 
not develop effective institutions at the meso- and macro-level without understanding 
micro-structure—what goes on inside and between firms, engagement of people in 
competence building, and learning. However, firms are treated as if they are identical 
in the NIS framework and it does not show how firms generate innovation 
(Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003; Sharif, 2010). Therefore, it is important to 
understand innovative action undertaken by actors in many different contexts: in 
                                                        
18 Lundvall (2004, 2007c) suggested four steps of macro- and micro-level analysis: what takes place 
inside firms, analysing interactions among firms, explaining international differences, and explaining 
competitive and growth performance of the innovation system.  
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large firms, small firms, universities, and research institutes (Kastelle, Potts and 
Dodgson, 2009).  
 
Figure 2-3 The NIS approach and its weaknesses as a policy tool. 
Source: Author. 
Second, the NIS concept as an analytical framework can be useful to explain the 
current status (or policy goals) of the NIS in nations. As Lundvall (2010, p23) put it,  
innovation thrives in a context where there are few barriers for 
interactive learning among diverse agents. This has to do with the 
uneven access to knowledge and with the fact that barriers for 
interaction will reflect nation-specific arrangements that shape agents 
and the way they interact. 
The problem is that the loose framework does not indicate what innovation barriers 
are and how to identify the barriers in the system. Edquist (2001) suggested 
identification of a problem should be supplemented with an analysis of the 
innovation system. As a consequence, the framework does not guide governments in 
how to support actors or functions and enhance the efficiency of the innovation 
system (Edquist et al., 1998). This mismatch can be explained (or resolved) in some 
theoretical approaches. I examine the system-failure rationale in the following 
section. 
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2.3.3 System Failures: Types and Issues 
The previous section described the NIS approach, offering policymakers the potential 
to derive more appropriate avenues for intervention than the neoclassical approach19 
(Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003), followed by a brief discussion of the limitations 
that still remain in implementing the NIS concept in the policymaking process (i.e. 
where to intervene). In this regard, this section presents where system weaknesses 
arise and how the systems-failure approach can capture barriers or weaknesses of the 
NIS for policy intervention. 
From the NIS perspective, innovations take place in a complex and dynamic context, 
using and generating new knowledge, and consequently coordinating groups of 
organisations and actors in an important systemic dimension (Metcalfe, 2005), as 
examined in Section 2.2.1. However, the overall function of the system does not 
imply that all actors work to provide the function of the system. Actors are likely to 
have different goals, which may bring conflicts and tensions into the innovation 
system, and interactions may be weak or develop in an unintentional manner (Bergek 
et al., 2008, p408), resulting in system failures in the NIS, where elements of systems 
are not functioning effectively. 
In criticising the loose nature of the NIS as a policy tool, and lacking the clarity 
towards a theoretical concept of the NIS, as indicated in Section 2.3.2, the systems-
failure approach provides an opportunity to identify where public support should be 
provided, which actors to address, and when innovation is obstructed, and helps 
policymakers from a practical and specific point of view (Edquist et al., 1998). The 
approach captures specificity, such as the array of components and relations, and the 
boundaries of the system. Hence the approach helps identify specific barriers to 
innovation that the loose NIS approach could not address. In other words, well-
functioning systems create and distribute knowledge, and collective efforts at a 
system level facilitate innovation in firms (Edquist, 1999). 
                                                        
19 The neoclassical market-imperfections approach suggests a rather linear process of innovation 
where R&D spending underpins innovation and stimulates invention, and the connection between 
R&D and innovation is a matter of investment (Metcalfe, 2005). The approach does not show how to 
capture key elements of technological progress (OECD, 1992) and lacks precision such as 
entrepreneurship phenomena, competition, and innovation as a coupled dynamic process, and the 
ability to exploit knowledge in the innovation process (Metcalfe, 2005). 
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Various system-failure literature addresses deficiencies in the functioning of the 
system: problems, weaknesses, or deficiencies that block flows of information and 
knowledge, and thus learning in the innovation system. Several authors (Carlsson 
and Jacobsson, 1997; Metcalfe, 2005; Niosi, 2002; Smith, 1995, 2000; Tödtling and 
Trippl, 2005) looked into the nature of system failures (Table 2-2) focusing on 
weaknesses of the system, and Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) classified 
them into four types: infrastructural failures (physical and S&T infrastructure), 
institutional failures (hard and soft institutional failures), interaction failures (soft and 
strong network failures), and capability failures (transition and learning failures). 
Regarding capability failures, Smith (2000) attributed the weakness of firms in 
innovation to their limited experience and resources; firms are constrained to access 
knowledge from outside, and even if they could take in information, huge gaps arise 
between acquired knowledge and the ability to integrate it into their innovation 
process. 
Edquist (2001) defined four main categories of system failures20 that led to problems 
or deficiencies in the functioning of a system, arguing that identifying a problem 
should be supplemented by policy analysis. Later, Bergek et al. (2008) criticised the 
four types of failures as lacking structural and process foci, and developed so-called 
blocking mechanisms21 that might hinder specific functions in an innovation system. 
Tödtling and Trippl (2005) identified three types of ‘innovation barriers’ as system 
failures in their Regional Innovation Systems research: organisational thinness 
(underdeveloped organisational set up), lock-in (lack of cooperation or too tightly 
joined), and fragmentation (poorly developed external links). Niosi (2002) observed 
failures related to institutions and to systems: sources of institutional inefficiencies 
and ineffectiveness, and sources of system inefficiencies. 
As can be seen in Table 2-2, concepts of system failure vary, lacking consensus. 
Various scholars name similar concepts differently and describe system failures as 
                                                        
20 System failures are inappropriate or missing functions, organisations, institutions, and interactions 
or links between those elements in the system of innovation (Edquist, 2001). 
21 Blocking mechanisms are uncertainties of needs among potential customers, inadequate knowledge 
of relations between investments and benefits, lack of capability and articulation of demands, lack of 
standards, few university programmes, and weak advocacy coalitions (Bergek et al., 2008). 
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functional weaknesses, barriers, blocking mechanisms, or inefficiencies of the 
system.  
Table 2-2 The Taxonomy of System Failures 
Level Types System imperfections Authors 
Infrastructure Infrastructural 
failure 
Lack of physical infrastructure and S&T 
knowledge 
Lack of appropriate internal and system 
resources 
Niosi (2002) 
Smith (2000) 
Firms Transition failure or 
capability failure 
Lack of capabilities in adapting new 
technologies and markets 
Organisational inertia 
Niosi (2002) 
Smith (2000) 
 Lack of learning routines Niosi (2002) 
Path-dependence 
and lock-in 
Inefficiencies and ineffectiveness caused 
by dependence on a historical process 
Interactions Network failure Strong or weak network failure that leads 
to a lock-in situation 
Carlsson and 
Jacobsson 
(1997) 
Lock-in barrier Situations of lock-in caused by strong ties Tödtling and 
Trippl (2005) 
Fragmentation Lack of interaction and network Tödtling and 
Trippl (2005) 
Interaction failure Inappropriate or missing interactions 
between elements in the system 
Edquist (2001) 
Institutions Institutional failure Hard or soft institutional failure Smith (2000) 
Missing organisations or institutions 
(including rules) 
Edquist (2001) 
Niosi (2002) 
 Weak coordination among units and lack 
of knowledge flows 
Niosi (2002) 
Organisational 
thinness 
Low levels of clustering and a weak 
endowment with relevant institutions 
Tödtling and 
Trippl (2005) 
Functions Functional failure Missing functions Edquist (2001) 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Metcalfe (2005) criticised supply-side measures of the system-failure approach 
directed at the invention system, overlooking the wider context of the innovation 
process. Innovation is a complex social activity: “a spiral process that takes place 
through interactions among an array of actors and institutions involved and affected” 
(Williams and Edge, 1996, p867). Therefore, several system failures may intertwine 
and cannot be addressed directly or by a single actor consisting of a complex 
amalgam of causes and effects, and involve multiple actors and institutions 
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(Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005). From this point, the meso- and micro-
level approaches are crucial to understand what takes place inside firms and analyses 
interactions among firms (Lundvall, 2004, 2007c). In other words, analysing the NIS 
needs to be centred on understanding firms as they are positioned at the heart of the 
NIS—what type of failures they face in the innovation process, and how failures can 
be overcome through interactions with other institutions. This analysis will be 
described in following section. 
2.4 The Usefulness of the NIS as a Policy Tool: Identifying and 
Removing the Barriers in the NIS 
2.4.1 Firms and Innovation Barriers 
As previously indicated, firms are playing a central role in innovation (Edquist, 
1999; Lundvall, 2004, 2007c; OECD, 1999, 2002) and interactions between firms 
and in interaction with the knowledge infrastructure (Lundvall, 2005) are at the core 
of the system. In this vein, the term knowledge interaction, rather than knowledge 
flows, could be appropriate to understand a broader spectrum of knowledge flows 
and learning between firms and other entities that may interactively affect the whole 
system.22 Firms need to participate in the knowledge-interaction process with 
external organisations because complementary knowledge produced by other firms, 
universities, and research institutes is the most important resource to facilitate 
interactive learning, create novelty, and maintain competitiveness of firms (Smith, 
1995). In this vein, identifying and resolving the barriers in knowledge-interaction 
processes, and thus effective learning among actors, is crucial for practical use of the 
NIS framework and successful innovation. 
However, firms are often unable to find innovation opportunities or create new 
knowledge. For example, 
                                                        
22 Five types of knowledge flows (see Appendix 2) suggested by OECD (1997) seem to conjure up 
the image of bilateral interaction or public-sector transfer of information or technology to private 
sectors unidirectionally As Rothschild and Darr (2005) argued, know-how, information, and 
knowledge flow back and forth through social networks in a complex process. The interaction process, 
characterised by reciprocity and interactive mechanisms, affects the success of innovation (e.g. 
Edquist, 1997; Freeman, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). 
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innovation capabilities of most firms are limited. There are both market 
and systemic failures that lead to significant weaknesses, e.g. the ‘low 
capability trap’ in which firms with low capabilities and learning 
performance have problems in entering virtuous circles of knowledge 
accumulation and innovation. (OECD, 2002, p19) 
What, exactly, does innovative capability mean? Innovative capability takes an 
important role in innovation studies (Martínez-Román, Gamero and Tamayo, 2011). 
Edquist (1999) also argued that a well-functioning NIS underpins the innovative 
capability of firms. Dodgson and Bessant (1996) defined innovative capability as 
features of firms and their management that enables them to define and develop their 
competences in ways that provide distinctive and sustainable advantages over their 
competitors. Innovative capabilities include learning capability, organizational 
capability, resource-exploiting capability, and strategic capability (Guan and Ma, 2003). 
Innovation capability relates to innovative organizational culture, internal processes, the 
capability to respond properly to changes in environment (Akman and Yilmaz, 2008), 
and the ability to understand that the environment could be part of the innovative 
capability (Neely et al., 2001). It is a dynamic concept allied to the ways firms change 
(Dodgson and Bessant, 1996). 
This view aligns with the dynamic capability of firms, defined as “the capacity to 
renew competencies so as to achieve congruence with the changing business 
environment” by “adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external 
organizational skills, resources, and functional competencies” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997, p515). Dynamic capabilities could come from outside the firms; for example, 
CEOs could use external organisations that have experience transforming other firms, or 
strategic change consultants. In using external organisations, innovative capabilities also 
highlight linkage capabilities, networking capabilities, and resource-exploiting 
capabilities to capitalise on external sources of knowledge (Forsman, 2011; Guan and 
Ma, 2003; Kroll and Schiller, 2010). 
As indicated in Section 2.3.2, the NIS concept does not fully explain meso-level 
actors (i.e. firms and intermediaries) and in this vein, the various capability-based 
approaches might contribute to understanding capabilities and problems of firms. 
Ideas from the dynamic capability of firms have tacitly informed this study: capacity 
and search. However, the focus of this study is the challenges each SME faces and 
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intermediaries rather than explaining performance of firms; the frameworks derived 
to understand performance of big firms may not track well onto small firms 
(Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier, 2009).23 Individual differences are often 
downplayed in big firms whereas background and experiences of individuals have a 
huge impact on preferences and arguments between players that shape the routines in 
small firms. OECD and the NIS literature refer to innovative capability of firms in a 
broader context. Some scholars (Li and Kozhikode, 2009) considered dynamic 
capabilities to be part of innovative capabilities. In this vein, this study adopted the 
wider definition of capability of firms: the innovative capability of firms. 
What is missing in the capability-based approach is a focus on learning capabilities 
related to the DUI-mode of innovation: different kinds of learning are taking place in 
different contexts as a result of firm-specific learning and different kinds of 
interaction between firms and other organisations (Lundvall, 2004). Learning 
capabilities enable firms to align resources, competences, and capabilities, in the 
short term and in a dynamic over the long term (Dodgson and Bessant, 1996). 
Capability building involves interactive learning by individuals and organisations in 
diverse innovation processes. Therefore, what needs to be understood is how and to 
which extent firms are geared to achieve innovation through interactive learning with 
diverse institutions and actors to address diverse problems (Lundvall, 2004). 
2.4.2 Why is Public Support Needed? 
The system-failure approach helps identify specific barriers that block flows of 
knowledge and learning in the system.24 This viewpoint implies two factors: on one 
hand, barriers are not automatically resolved and need public support; for example, 
the government can organise cooperation and collaboration between firms to 
facilitate knowledge flows, regulation, and the creation of incentives (Smith, 1999). 
On the other hand, although various types of failures accrue, correcting the failures 
(or overcoming the barriers) may refer to enhancing ‘effective interactions between 
                                                        
23 Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier (2009) argued the performance of dynamic capabilities would not 
lead to positive performance outcomes only when the firm actually had the required order of dynamic 
capability; the approach may not be well-suited to small firms that do not have existing resources. 
24 Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) criticised system-failure displays as a loosely 
configured framework. 
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actors in the system’ (Martin and Johnston, 1999, p50) where knowledge flows 
freely and learning can be stimulated among actors. 
From an innovation-systems perspective (innovative-capability perspective), the 
accessibility of external knowledge and managing it to be internally applicable to the 
firm is the foundation: “the external organisation of the firm and the management of 
its internal processes are essential elements” (Metcalfe, 2005, p50) to overcoming the 
barriers. Muller and Zenker (2001) argued that accessing qualified interfaces 
between technological and business expertise and localised knowledge and 
capabilities plays a crucial role in allowing firms to overcome weaknesses and 
generate innovations. Thus, the ability to access different sources of knowledge such 
as firms of different sizes, consultancies, research organisations, and universities, and 
to apply these to their own needs becomes crucial (Dodgson, 2009) in pursuit of 
shared visions towards innovation. In other words, firms must have capabilities 
(Caloghirou, Katelli and Tsakanikas, 2004; Lundvall, 2004; Shu, Wong and Lee, 
2005) to interact with knowledge agencies because firms seem to be crucial actors in 
defining and resolving problems in the innovation system. 
The problem is that only innovating firms can access and combine these different 
aspects into a plan for innovation (Smith, 1995). Especially in a newly emerging 
context, small individual firms (or SMEs) found difficulties in accessing the 
knowledge developed by research institutes, universities, or large corporations that 
they need for innovation, and produce competitively, due to their weak capabilities 
described as various types of failures in the previous section (Sharif, 2006). Most 
SMEs hardly interact with external knowledge providers such as universities and 
research institutes and often SMEs are not well aware of the importance of the 
knowledge sources as means to overcome the barriers (Kaufmann and Tödtling, 
2002). In certain circumstances, access to technical knowledge is restricted not only 
by the weak capability of firms, but also by global corporations that protect 
intellectual property (Lundvall, 2007c). 
In this regard, several scholars (Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002; Nooteboom, 1994; 
Sawers, Pretorius and Oerlemans, 2008) indicated limited capabilities of SMEs, 
described in Section 2.3.3 (i.e. capability failure). SMEs lack human, financial, and 
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knowledge resources, and technological capabilities; they are less engaged in R&D 
and less able to shape external environment than large firms. One of the serious 
weaknesses of SMEs may be lack of interaction with external organisations and a 
limited number of relationships (mostly user–producer) restricting the innovative 
activities of firms. It may not be possible to provide exhaustive lists of weaknesses of 
SMEs but the general aspects are summarised in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3 Weaknesses of SMEs 
 Lack of capability 
Internal - Technological capabilities 
- Developing and managing intangible resources (codified and tacit 
knowledge) 
- Absorptive capabilities 
- Experts (human resources) and expertise (accumulated skills or 
knowledge) 
- Means for growth (e.g. management skills or strategies) 
External - Relationships with external knowledge sources 
- Accessing external knowledge source (technology, know-how, and tacit 
knowledge) 
- Managing network relations 
- Accessing partners 
- Means for growth (e.g. funding) 
Source: Adapted from Kaufmann and Tödtling (2002), Nooteboom (1994), and Sawers, Pretorius and 
Oerlemans (2008). 
At this point, SMEs should deserve policy attention because they generally have a 
low propensity to network and gain knowledge, and as a result may face obstacles to 
facilitating DUI—as well as STI—modes of learning and innovation (OECD, 2002). 
Policy can be implemented proactively through nonmarket mechanisms to address 
the situation (Edquist, 1999) where interaction and interactive learning can be 
intentionally fostered to promote knowledge use by building structures and 
relationships (Lundvall, 2007b). Therefore, the government has a role to ensure that 
rich knowledge is available (Metcalfe, 2005) from which interactive learning 
facilitates innovation of firms and thereby strengthens the NIS. The nation is 
particularly important because external relations are more confined to the nation and 
the exact nature of national support for the innovation process of SMEs heavily 
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depends on the specific institutional setting, such as GRIs, universities, technology 
centres, and transfer agencies (Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002).  
For example, developed Asian nations traditionally have nonmarket modes of 
coordination as mechanisms to correct failure and thereby improve the overall 
efficiency of the NIS (Dodgson, 2009; Gu, 1996). These mechanisms often take the 
form of intermediary institutes that can be part of public intermediaries (Dodgson, 
2000); their role in resolving the barriers to NIS will be illustrated further in the 
following section. 
2.4.3 Supporting Mechanisms to Overcome System Weaknesses 
Dalziel (2010) defined innovation intermediaries as single organisations or groups in 
organisations that enable innovation either directly, by enabling the innovation of 
firms, or indirectly, by enhancing the innovative capacity of regions, nations, or 
sectors.25 Dalziel (2010) further argued that intermediaries may or may not be 
involved in technology innovation, adopting Schumpeter’s definition of innovation 
as new or improved goods, a new method of production or distribution, the opening 
of a new market, the use of new supplies or engagement of new suppliers, or a new 
mode of industrial organisation (Schumpeter, 1934). 
In the NIS literature, the role of the public sector can be found in public–private 
interactions for knowledge flows that seem to focus on generation of patents or 
publications, based on bilateral interactions between industry–university or industry–
research institutes. However, knowledge interactions involve more than co-patenting 
and co-publication (Appendix 1) involving more than two parties. The facilitation of 
connection and integration processes is not designed to generate passive knowledge 
flows but to encourage the engagement of all parties in the knowledge-interaction 
process (Coombs, Harvey and Tether, 2004); the interaction creates new knowledge 
and enables firms to master various types of knowledge necessary for innovation (e.g. 
                                                        
25 Specifically, Dalziel’s (2010) definition confines innovation intermediaries to public-sector 
intermediaries such as industry and trade associations, science parks, business incubators, and 
research institutes; Dalziel does not classify intermediaries who seek the interests of individuals or 
firms as innovation intermediaries. 
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technology development or opening of a new market) and, in doing so, may 
overcome the barriers. 
From an innovation-systems perspective, production and knowledge exchange are 
not the only prerequisites for innovation; several additional factors play a key role, 
such as policy, legislation, infrastructure, funding, and market developments 
(Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005). In other words, the innovation process 
may require complex knowledge and relationships, capabilities of organisations, 
heterogeneous actors, regulations, and infrastructure; that is, more than just 
technology. This complexity implies not only the importance of accessing external 
knowledge sources, as mentioned in the previous section, but also of garnering a 
wide range of interactions and relationships with knowledge agencies. The form of 
knowledge can be intertwined with the technological and sociopolitical process, 
taking the form of experience, skills, or routines embedded in individuals, 
organisations, and industries. 
Accordingly, the various types of barriers relating to different kinds of knowledge 
and relationships may emerge in a complex and iterative process, and the innovation 
may be hindered by several system failures, as noted in Section 2.4.1, particularly in 
areas such as the complex knowledge base, relationships, and the know-how needed 
to be adequately shaped or deployed for the new business. Considering that the NIS 
does not emerge naturally, these problems have to be organised at the system level, 
highlighting the necessity of supporting mechanisms for innovation or a new 
business to gain success that may be very complicated, requiring not only actions and 
deliberate efforts by firms, but also the actions of supporting organisations (Nelson, 
1994). Providing effective bridging mechanisms between organisations and 
institutions, but ultimately between individuals, is crucial for the government to 
organise a rich knowledge ecology in the system (Metcalfe, 2005). Public 
intermediaries, as nonmarket modes of collaboration, have to be active for two 
reasons, as it may be difficult for market mechanism to simultaneously address 
complex problems adequately and improve system efficiencies. 
First, public intermediaries can build necessary infrastructures by identifying new 
rules and emerging buyers, configuring in favour of actors and technologies, and 
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providing additional support for innovation trials. Second, public intermediaries 
might address system failures by pushing a country to organise and implement 
policies that would contribute to linking actors for the new knowledge infrastructure 
or enhance skills required by the new business areas. In this regard, researchers 
emphasised the role of public research organisations26 that support firms to resolve 
the problems of innovation and move into a new generation of technologies and 
products by enhancing the level of knowledge and capability of domestic firms 
(Malerba and Nelson, 2011). Yet, a tendency remains to neglect those kinds of 
institutions that support and mould innovation, and correct failures of firms in the 
NIS literature (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007). This tendency leads to further analysis 
of the interaction process at specific levels that may provide insights into how public 
intermediaries facilitate the dynamic interplay among actors and thereby decrease 
barriers to innovation. The following chapter explores specific roles of intermediaries 
in the innovation process, to further develop the conceptual framework. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates the NIS as an influential concept, how it has developed, and 
how the institutional framework shapes current national systems. The chapter also 
describes the constituents of the NIS—the importance of knowledge flows and 
interactive learning—as ways to build effective innovation systems. Section 2.3.1 
explains the nature of two different approaches to innovation—a broader and a 
narrower approach—and argues that many policies have been worked out on the 
basis of the narrow definition of innovation systems focused on science-based 
innovation (STI-mode). The section emphasises interactive learning as one of the 
core foundations of innovation systems (Lim, 2008; Lundvall, 1988, 1992; Martin 
and Johnston, 1999) and in this vein, the wider setting (DUI-mode) has a major 
impact on interactive learning and on the performance of the innovation system. 
Section 2.3.2 analyses limitations in implementing the NIS framework in the 
policymaking process, highlighting the lack of meso- and micro-level approaches. 
                                                        
26 Edquist (1999, p11) added, “research institutes and company-based research departments may be 
important organisations in one country (e.g. Japan) while research universities may perform a similar 
function in another (e.g. the United States).” 
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The section further indicates that the framework does not indicate what innovation 
barriers are, how to identify them, and where public support should go in the system. 
Then Section 2.3.3 highlights the emergence of the systems-failure literature. The 
section addresses how the systems-failure approach provided a new rationale for 
government intervention by identifying innovation barriers and correcting them. 
Section 2.4.3 briefly illustrates that the government has been playing a crucial role in 
some Asian countries in enhancing national performance through policy intervention. 
In this regard, Lundvall, Intarakumnerd, and Vang (2006) argued that the static 
descriptions of the NIS produced by international organisations have shortcomings in 
explaining the intrinsic capabilities of nations, thereby inferring the need for more 
qualitative analysis of the dynamic responses of Asian innovation systems. 
In the case of the literature review, the following issues were raised. First, the 
analysis of innovation systems may be seen as an analysis of how knowledge evolves 
through processes of learning and innovation (Lundvall, 2007c, p106). Learning is 
local and specific to individuals (Lundvall, 2005) and interactive learning among 
knowledgeable individuals is crucial for productive combinations of competing 
rationalities towards innovations. Lundvall (2004) further highlighted different kinds 
of interactions and the DUI-mode of learning in different contexts. However, 
knowledge and learning are presented as a ‘black-box’ concept (Lundvall, 2004; 
Russell and Williams, 2002) because the loose NIS concept does not seem to provide 
an adequate tool (Sharif, 2006) to examine knowledge interactions at specific levels 
and contexts. Researchers have not addressed how institutions and actors interact and 
co-evolve, shaping learning and innovation and driving the process of development 
(Lundvall, 2007c).  
In this regard, several scholars (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004; Godin, 2006; Lankhuizen 
and Woolthuis, 2003; Mahroum and Alsaleh, 2012) indicated the little operational 
value27 of the NIS framework and indicated the unit of analysis needs to be changed. 
In other words, the NIS framework tends to focus on the macro-level analysis that 
                                                        
27 The SI framework has not been operationalised sufficiently to enable policymakers to develop 
policy tools and guidelines (Alsaleh, 2010; Carlsson et al., 2002; Lundvall, 1992) 
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does not specify meso- and micro-level actors; how intermediary institutions solve 
the problems of firms has not yet been fully explained (Watkins et al., 2014). 
Therefore, this study argues to modulate the NIS at meso- and micro-levels to 
understand the co-evolution process of the NIS. This will be further examined in 
Chapters 6 and 7, and discussed in Chapter 8. 
Second, this chapter highlights the importance of public-sector intermediaries who 
support the joint-learning process, making connections among different types of new 
knowledge (Choung, Hwang and Song, 2014), and thus facilitate innovation. 
However, in spite of the importance of public-sector intermediaries as mechanisms to 
correct failures, knowledge interaction between firms and intermediaries has drawn 
relatively little policy attention in the NIS literature. Rather, researchers have failed 
to study public-sector intermediaries and SMEs in the NIS framework, and the 
intermediary literature has rarely been integrated with the NIS literature. It seems 
that the loose nature of the NIS has shortcomings in uncovering interaction processes 
at a specific level (Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003; Watkins et al., 2014)—public 
intermediaries and SMEs—and thus the concept needs be operationalised to 
explicate the knowledge interaction between them. The following chapter examines 
public intermediaries, what they do, how they interact with firms, and how 
knowledge interaction decreases (or resolves) innovation barriers. 
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3 Chapter 3. Intermediaries and Intermediation in 
the Innovation Process 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the literature on the NIS and the rationale of 
government intervention (i.e. supporting mechanisms) in overcoming the barriers of 
innovation and thereby facilitating innovation in firms. Because intermediary 
organisations have been regarded as innovation facilitators, understanding innovation 
intermediaries is useful as it draws attention to an aspect that has previously been 
somewhat overlooked in studies of national innovation systems (Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Interest in intermediaries has featured prominently in 
innovation studies, where the discourse linking intermediary activities to competence 
building, knowledge transfer, and diffusion of knowledge amongst communities of 
organisations emerged (Bessant and Rush, 1995).  
Faced with bridging the barriers in the innovation process explained in the previous 
chapter, it is very likely that various intermediaries will coalesce to enable 
knowledge de novo, providing the platform for learning/knowledge creation, and 
shaping the new innovative environment. Furthermore, intermediaries may also 
become involved in ‘indirect’ activities such as organising an innovative 
environment, facilitating social interactions, or networking that will allow SMEs to 
share information, knowledge, and experience with each other and, possibly, share 
personnel such as technicians, scientists, and producers. However, literature on 
intermediaries seems to be fragmented, mainly addressing limited roles and activities 
at a specific point of time that are often broadly conceptualised in an innovation 
process. I argue that knowledge interaction is more complex than currently explained 
in the literature. 
Bearing this in mind, researchers must investigate better conceptual frameworks and 
methodological tools to adequately address the wide and complex mix of dynamic 
entities of innovation intermediaries. One contribution of this dissertation is an 
attempt to synthesize the fragmented literature on intermediaries from multiple levels 
of knowledge interaction and the evolution of relationships in which innovation 
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intermediaries exist. In this chapter, I examine activities of innovation intermediaries 
regarding their roles and activities in the innovation process. I begin by examining 
the existing literature on innovation intermediaries in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, I 
review the function of innovation intermediaries, particularly focusing on four 
functions: how intermediaries enable knowledge, facilitate learning and relationships, 
and provide interfaces based on multidirectional interaction and relationships. This 
format delineates how intermediaries resolve the barriers for SMEs that lack 
knowledge and resources and facilitate innovation during the interaction. Section 3.4 
puts forward the role of public-sector intermediaries acting as innovation process 
facilitators in the NIS. 
3.2 Theoretical Approaches to Intermediaries 
3.2.1 Overview of Intermediaries 
Over the last few decades, interests in intermediary studies has undergone 
considerable development, emerging from a number of different research fields in 
innovation studies (Nilsson and Sia-Ljungström, 2013). Intermediaries in the 
innovation process have not yet been well-grounded theoretically and little cross 
referencing exists between intermediary studies in different fields of study: 
technology transfer, innovation research, systems of innovation research, and service 
organisations (Howells, 2006).  
Bessant and Rush (1995) considered intermediaries to be primarily facilitators in the 
innovation process, whereas others highlighted the more interactive and diagnostic 
role of intermediaries. Hargadon and Sutton (1997), for example, emphasised the 
proactive role of intermediaries, who not only scan and store information, but also 
retrieve it through brainstorming, social interaction, and informal conversation. They 
also stressed the role of individuals in making analogies between past problems and 
current solutions, and bridging capabilities through ‘cross-pollination’. These 
scholars emphasised the role of brokers who act as individual knowledge repositories 
and provide customers with solutions based on new combinations of knowledge. 
From an innovation-system perspective, intermediaries often connote public-sector 
innovation intermediaries contributing to the shaping of the overall innovation 
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system, facilitating knowledge flows between policymakers and actors in the system 
(Watkins et al., 2014). Van der Meulen and Rip (1998) identified a wider 
institutional role of intermediaries (e.g. research councils or research organisations, 
funding bodies, and government agencies); how they shape an ecology of influence 
on other actors in the system between policy and institutions. Clarke and Ramirez 
(2011) also emphasised the role of intermediary organisations that promote 
knowledge flow between two or more parties among firms and contribute to the 
learning process among the firms or regional clusters with whom they work. 
Although these studies concentrate on policymaking, their important role is 
managing complex networks.  
As mentioned above, the different roles that intermediaries play in the innovation 
process have been described as service organisations, brokers, bridge builders, 
science parks, etc. Therefore, analyses of intermediaries include a variety of 
organisations (Table 3-1). Howells (2006) distinguished intermediaries as 
organisations and intermediation processes28 whereas Winch and Courtney (2007) 
distinguished between different types of intermediaries based on whether their 
primary aim is to undertake an intermediary role or perform intermediary activities 
as a by-product of their main activities. Examples of the former can be innovation 
centres such as science parks, industry associations, and knowledge-intensive 
business services while examples of the latter are consultancies, technology-transfer 
offices, and technology brokers. These are innovation intermediaries although some 
activities do not relate specifically to innovation (Howells, 2006). 
What can we conclude from this review? The underlying metaphor most used in 
intermediary studies is bridging between unrelated groups; these bridging activities 
are increasingly involved in complex relationships and interactions whereas some 
limit their roles as transformers of information or knowledge. Whether acting as 
bridges or undertaking other mediating services, intermediaries have, on the whole, 
been considered useful to augment the competencies of firms, but ultimately play a 
                                                        
28 Howells’ (2006) comprehensive taxonomic review of the different kinds of innovation 
intermediaries reflects a new and more diverse division of labour in the knowledge economy that 
leads to focusing on the nodes and brokers through which knowledge flows among heterogeneous 
organizations. 
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subsidiary function as one external linkage to SMEs, considered to be principal 
performers in business (Clarke and Ramirez, 2011). By reviewing these intermediary 
studies, it is possible to have a wider holistic view of intermediaries in the innovation 
process. The next section will attempt to unpack what functions and types align with 
innovation intermediaries.  
Table 3-1 A Typology of Intermediaries 
Term/Ownership Description Examples 
Service 
organisations 
/Private 
Supporting innovative change; Providing 
knowledge or expertise about specific disciplines  
KIBS, consultancy 
firms 
Technology 
brokers/Private 
Creating new products by making connections 
between existing solutions in other sectors or 
technologies 
Consultancy firms 
Consultants as 
bridge builders 
/Private 
Independent consultants as bridge builders in the 
innovation process (e.g. bridging managerial gaps, 
technology transfer) 
Innovation 
consultants 
Funding bodies 
/Private or 
government 
Bringing together those economic agents with 
surplus funds who want to lend (invest) to those 
with a shortage of funds who want to borrow 
Banks, Venture 
capital 
Innovation 
Centres 
/Government  
Providing knowledge or services that are 
complementary to the firm and facilitate the 
exchange of information 
Innovation brokers 
Governments (or 
government 
agencies) 
/Government 
Facilitating collaboration involving multiple 
organisations and providing direct and indirect 
support 
GRIs, not-for-profit 
organisations 
Regional 
institutes/ 
Government  
Providing surrogate ties by serving as functional 
substitutes for a firm’s lack of bridging ties in a 
network; Networking with local firms to facilitate 
economic development  
GRIs, public 
research institutes 
Industry 
Associations 
/memberships 
Allowing firms to accomplish specific 
organisational objectives 
Trade associations, 
lobbying groups 
Universities/ 
Universities  
Promoting technology licencing and new venture 
formation; 
Undertaking innovation activities on behalf of 
local firms 
Technology-transfer 
offices 
Science parks/ 
Government 
Increasing the wealth of communities by 
promoting innovation and the competitiveness of 
associated businesses and knowledge-based 
institutions 
Research parks, 
technology parks, 
science towns 
Business 
Incubators/ 
Government 
Accelerating the growth and success of firms 
through an array of business support resources and 
services 
Innovation labs, 
innovation 
incubators 
Network-based 
intermediaries 
Emerging actors who bridge gaps in newly 
forming networks and facilitate contacts; Creating 
new knowledge and relationships 
Formal, informal 
actors emerging in 
the technology 
innovation process 
Source: Adapted from Howells (2006), Dalziel (2010), Wu and Dalziel (2012), Van Lente et al. 
(2003), Klerkx and Leeuwis (2009), and Stewart and Hyysalo (2008). 
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3.2.2 Innovation Intermediaries: Types and Functions 
Several authors (Howells, 2006; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009; Van Lente et al., 2003) 
distinguished traditional intermediaries, innovation intermediaries, and systemic 
intermediaries by roles or functions (Table 3-2). Traditional intermediaries provide 
services on a one-to-one basis without involving third parties and play a major role in 
initiating and developing an innovation (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). For example, 
traditional intermediaries may provide services (e.g. providing information or testing 
services) to customers,29 which can be seen as sources of innovation (playing a 
major role in initiating and developing innovation) or carriers of innovation 
(transferring innovation that does not originate from particular knowledge providers; 
Van Lente et al., 2003).  
Traditional intermediaries have been criticised in several ways. First, they are 
unlikely to reshape innovation processes, overlooking interaction between different 
parties and ‘reconfiguring, translating, and redesigning’ to meet with the new 
demands of heterogeneous actors (Van Lente et al., 2003). Second, they do not seem 
to align with different ‘choices’ in the innovation process from the context of 
multiple relationships in complex systems. Another criticism is that they design their 
services for large organisations with ‘standard solutions’, based on the assumption 
that users are homogeneous and that standard solutions to problems can be applied 
(Howells, 2006), although the solutions may not work for SMEs (Bessant and Rush, 
1995). 
When it comes to innovation intermediaries, Howells’ (2006, p720) definition is ‘an 
organisation or body that acts as an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation 
process between two or more parties.’ Klerkx and Leeuwis (2009) argued innovation 
intermediaries are system builders that enable organisations to innovate and facilitate 
innovation processes. Dalziel (2010) confined innovation intermediaries to public-
sector intermediaries who work towards the economic success of firms and create 
                                                        
29 Banks and for-profit firms such as consultancy firms can be considered as traditional intermediaries 
(Bessant and Rush, 1995; Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002) as they deliver services as sources of innovation. 
Wu and Dalziel (2012) argued universities and technology-transfer offices were not dedicated 
innovation intermediaries because they undertook innovative activities (e.g. contract research) on 
behalf of firms as carriers of innovation. 
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socioeconomic benefit in regions and industries, not for their personal success. In a 
similar vein, Van der Meulen and Rip (1998) indicated not-for-profit organisations 
are innovation intermediaries that link basic science to socioeconomic objectives. 
Thus, the functions of innovation intermediaries can be ‘targeted at individual firms, 
and clusters or network of firms, but also can be targeted at higher system 
aggregation levels in innovation systems that involve complex constellations of 
business, government, and societal actors, dealing with complex problems’ (Klerkx 
and Leeuwis, 2009, p851).  
Systemic intermediaries are the new types of innovation intermediaries that facilitate 
and accelerate complex interactions in the multi-level structure of the innovation 
process where there is sociotechnical co-evolution (Van Lente et al., 2003).30 The 
systemic approach to intermediaries (Backhaus, 2010; Boon et al., 2008; Klerkx and 
Leeuwis, 2009; Van Lente et al., 2003) seems to focus on ongoing changes in 
innovation systems and functions in networks during long-term and complex 
transitions in the innovation system. Smits and Kuhlmann (2004) distinguished three 
major trends in systemic intermediaries: the end of the linear model and the rise of 
interactive model, a reinforcement of the systems approach, and the increasing 
importance of the learning process. Under these trends, they provide five systemic 
functions: including knowledge interaction at multiple levels (not limited to bilateral 
contacts), building systems that align consensus and facilitate involvement of all 
actors, providing learning space, providing an infrastructure, and stimulating demand 
articulation. Limiting themselves to examining how intermediaries contribute to the 
learning process, some authors (e.g. Van Lente et al., 2003) seemed to assume that 
systemic intermediaries may replace traditional ‘hard’ (knowledge transfer, technical 
services, or R&D related services) and ‘soft’ (management or organisational 
services) function intermediaries.  
                                                        
30 Several case studies (e.g. Moss, 2009; Moss et al., 2009; Van Lente et al., 2003) also illustrated that 
systemic intermediaries in system transitions operate interfaces on a multi-level structure, different 
scales or levels of action, and further interaction between technologies and social contexts. They 
described how intermediaries facilitate and translate a process of reshaping technologies into different 
sociotechnical contexts during the system transition. 
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Table 3-2 summarises three different types of intermediaries, functions, and levels of 
interaction. While traditional intermediaries carry innovation, which focuses on one-
to-one interactions, innovation and systemic intermediaries can be seen as innovation 
facilitators, involved in more complex interactions and relationships. Innovation 
intermediaries and systemic intermediaries do more than carry innovation 
engagement in unilateral and bilateral activities.  
Table 3-2 Functions of Intermediaries 
Types Definition Functions Interaction 
Traditional 
intermediaries 
(Howells, 2006; 
Smits and 
Kuhlmann, 2004; 
Van Lente et al., 
2003) 
Carriers or 
sources of 
innovation 
Supplying services on a one-to-one 
basis, which involves no interaction 
with other organisations (e.g. 
knowledge processing and 
combination; testing and valuation; 
knowledge transfer) 
one-to-one 
interaction 
(mainly 
bilateral) 
Innovation 
intermediaries 
(Howells, 2006) 
Facilitators of 
innovation 
Foresight and diagnosis (demand 
articulation); scanning and 
information processing; knowledge 
processing and combination; 
gatekeeping and brokering 
(facilitating negotiation); testing and 
valuation; accreditation; regulation; 
protecting the results; 
commercialisation; evaluation of 
outcomes 
One-to-one 
interaction or 
multiple-level 
interactions in 
(distributed) 
innovation 
systems 
Innovation 
intermediaries 
(Klerkx and 
Leeuwis, 2009) 
Innovation 
brokers that 
function in 
networks and 
systems 
Demand articulation; network 
formation; innovation-process 
management (can be aggregated as 
detailed functions presented by 
Howells) 
Multiple-level 
interactions 
Innovation 
intermediaries in the 
public-sector 
(Dalziel, 2010; 
Inkinen and Suorsa, 
2008; Nilsson and 
Sia-Ljungström, 
2013) 
Facilitators of 
innovation 
funded in a 
specific national 
or regional 
system  
Direct and indirect funding support; 
networking and collaboration 
(partnership building and knowledge 
dissemination); other supportive 
functions that align with functions of 
innovation intermediaries 
Multiple-level 
interactions in 
specific 
innovation 
systems 
Systemic 
intermediaries 
(Moss, 2009; Moss 
et al., 2009; Van 
Lente et al., 2003) 
Intermediaries 
that function 
primarily in 
networks and 
systems 
Demand articulation; alignment; 
organising discourse; managing of 
complex, long-term innovative 
projects; learning; creating 
conditions for learning by doing, 
using, interacting and searching; 
feeding actors with tailor-made 
information 
Multiple-level 
interactions 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
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Although a systemic approach attempts to introduce the changing characteristics of 
intermediaries in innovation systems as new types of intermediaries (e.g. Van Lente. 
et al., 2003), this approach may overlook traditional or innovation intermediary roles. 
In reality, no clear boundary of roles exists between traditional intermediaries and 
innovation (or systemic) intermediaries, or between innovation intermediaries and 
public-sector innovation intermediaries. Overlap exists in the roles of innovation 
intermediaries and public-sector innovation intermediaries, and of innovation 
intermediaries and systemic intermediaries (Table 3-2). Many functions of 
innovation intermediaries provided by Howells (2006) can be linked to systemic 
functions in the innovation-system literature, whereas some focuses on supporting 
firms (Nilsson and Sia-Ljungström, 2013).  
For example, contract research and technical activities are often the most prevalent 
role of traditional intermediaries but can be the one of the roles of innovation 
intermediaries (Howells, 2006). Traditional intermediaries may develop functions 
towards innovation or systemic intermediaries through interaction with customers. 
Therefore, care is needed to classify their roles into traditional and innovative (or 
systemic) intermediaries. Rather, innovation intermediaries cover a wide range of 
functions carried out by traditional intermediaries (e.g. knowledge processing and 
combining, testing and valuation, and knowledge transfer) as well as systemic 
intermediaries (e.g. demand articulation and managing innovation process). Howells 
(2006, p725) stated, 
Innovation intermediaries were often not only involved in providing 
mediated innovation services linking their clients with other 
organisations, but also supplying services direct to their clients on a 
one-to-one basis, which involved no other interaction with other 
organisations. Intermediaries therefore can, and do, provide other 
functions within an innovation system, such as contract research, testing 
or training work, which have no third-party or brokerage function 
whatsoever. The role of innovation intermediation may therefore be 
only one amongst a number of other roles an organisation may 
undertake in terms of its strategic remit. 
In this vein, this study does not limit the role of innovation intermediaries to the 
specific activities listed in Table 3-2, but is rather flexible in accordance with barriers 
or opportunities firms face in the innovation process. In terms of the various types of 
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innovation intermediaries, I distinguish public-sector innovation intermediaries, 
whose primary purpose it to enhance socioeconomic benefits, from other types of 
innovation intermediaries for further analysis. As public-sector innovation 
intermediaries are the central focus of this study, discussion centres on the 
interactions between public-sector innovation intermediaries and SMEs. 
3.3 Functions of (Public-sector) Innovation Intermediaries 
As indicated in the previous section, ‘innovation intermediaries’ cover a wide range 
of functions31 not traditionally required, ranging from translating basic research and 
technologies into different levels of practice and markets, to encouraging greater 
resources to enhance knowledge flow in networks and scanning new knowledge, to 
articulating customer needs in innovation processes. Among these, Van Lente et al. 
(2003) categorised three major systemic functions as articulation, alignment, and 
learning, whereas Klerkx and Leeuwis (2009) categorised them as demand 
articulation, network composition, scanning, scoping and matchmaking, and 
brokerage in established networks (aligning actors and mutual learning). 
The roles of innovation intermediaries may be evolving based on social and political 
systems of specific regions or countries, as policies align with characteristics of 
innovation systems that differ from other systems of innovation. Van der Meulen, 
Nedeva and Braun (2005, as cited by Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009, pp851–852) 
explained: “the establishment of an intermediary organisation is often contingent on 
the specific political context or on typical opportunities and needs within research 
and innovation sectors.” Nonetheless, innovation intermediaries have emerging 
important roles at the NIS level that include demand articulation, learning facilitation, 
and networking. By engaging in these activities, innovation intermediaries may 
mitigate the gap (or barriers), thereby facilitating relations and learning through the 
complex innovation process, whether or not intermediaries fulfil traditional 
                                                        
31 In this context, the different roles of intermediaries that facilitate innovation processes have been 
studied (Backhaus, 2010; Howells, 2006; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008; Moss, 2009; Van Lent et al., 
2003). This study does not distinguish between the role of innovation intermediaries and public-sector 
innovation intermediaries, as their roles often overlap (see section 3.2.2). 
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functions.32 Thus, to avoid proliferation of roles and activities, I categorise the 
following roles as key elements in the ongoing innovation process: enabling 
knowledge, facilitating relations, facilitating learning processes, and providing 
interfaces (Table 3-3).  
Table 3-3 Roles and Activities of Innovation Intermediaries in the NIS 
Roles Activities Supporting literature 
Knowledge enabling Demand articulation 
Knowledge generation and combination 
configuration 
Customising knowledge to a specific 
context  
Boon et al. (2008), Brown and 
Duguid (1991), Clarke and 
Ramirez (2011), Howells (2006), 
Smits and Kuhlmann (2004) 
Facilitating relations Bridging links and aligning actors 
Facilitating interpersonal 
communications and relationships 
Building trust  
Howells (2006), Klerkx and 
Leeuwis (2008), Moss et al. 
(2009), Smits and Kuhlmann 
(2004), Van Lente et al. (2003) 
Facilitating learning Stimulating interaction and enhancing 
mutual adaptation 
Building new routines and skills through 
interaction (feedback mechanism) 
Backhaus (2010), Boon et al. 
(2008), Smits and Kuhlmann 
(2004), Stewart and Hyysalo 
(2008), Van Lente et al. (2003) 
Managing interfaces Providing facilities and other knowledge 
infrastructures 
Providing access to human resources 
 
Clarke and Ramirez (2011), 
Hargadon and Sutton (1997), 
Howells (2006), Van Lente et al. 
(2003) 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
Specifically, I try to emphasise the role of knowledge enabling and managing 
interfaces for two reasons. First, many intermediary tasks initially were limited to 
matchmaking and brokering (Howells, 2006) although innovation intermediaries 
could learn and improve their competence, playing an important role in connecting, 
translating, and facilitating flows of knowledge in systems of innovation. Knowledge 
can be configured and translated during the interaction process between innovation 
intermediaries and SMEs and between intermediaries and potential innovation 
players. This can be defined as ‘knowledge enabling’ rather than knowledge 
brokering. 
                                                        
32 Traditional intermediaries may improve their competence and move out of limited roles (such as 
testing and knowledge generation), addressing wider and more complex functions. For example, 
traditional intermediaries can learn and develop those roles because, in part, they can facilitate 
interaction with outside knowledge much more easily, and because intermediary organisations are 
perceived as independent and impartial by supplier and user firms alike (Clarke and Ramirez, 2011). 
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Second, by emphasising a form of learning, such as learning by doing, learning by 
using, or learning by interacting, innovation intermediaries may also need to consider 
providing learning space as part of a follow-up service, defined here as ‘managing 
interfaces’. Because innovation through learning can be achieved through continuous 
interaction, it is important to bridge the gap at each stage of innovation rather than 
providing a one-off service that may not bring any changes. In particular, providing 
interfaces is an important conduit for continuous knowledge flow and interaction 
under high market uncertainties and demand ambiguity. 
3.3.1 Knowledge Enabling 
Knowledge enabling is a challenging activity, defined as providing new knowledge 
inputs and adapting existing knowledge to make it applicable to a different context 
and situation (Clarke and Ramirez, 2011). This definition closely links the roles of 
‘translation’ and ‘bridging the knowledge gap’, that is, helping to transform ideas 
and transfer knowledge. To carry out this role, intermediaries must have knowledge 
infrastructure, human resources, and networks and be seen as independent and 
impartial by supplier and user firms. 
There are three parts to this role: articulating the demands of customers, knowledge 
generation and combination, and customising knowledge to a specific context. 
Through empirical studies, several authors (Backhaus, 2010; Boon et al., 2008; Van 
Lente et al., 2003) averred that intermediaries articulate process, defined as an 
iterative, inherently creative process stimulating technological varieties and 
characteristics of possible futures. They argue that, at the early phase of emergent 
technology development, actors only have ‘vague’ ideas that should be developed 
further in the demand-articulation process. 
These uncertainties in innovation processes include possible technologies and their 
application options, different legal and social settings, the definition of demands, and 
relationships that can be strengthened through learning by interacting. Due to 
uncertainties and flexibilities inherent in the innovation process, other actors than the 
intermediary and the firm will participate in the articulation process. Bessant and 
Rush (1995) indicated the articulation and diagnostic role of consultants while 
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highlighting intermediation as a complex activity involving multiple actors with 
different patterns of relationships and different sets of influential actors and issues. 
The second part of the enabling role is knowledge generation and combination, 
developed with customers on a one-to-one basis, emphasising a deeper understanding 
of what customers need. Clarke and Ramirez (2011) defined this as ‘providing new 
knowledge inputs’ and categorise formal testing, accreditation, and standard setting 
as parts of related activities. However, intermediaries move on from their initial role 
of providing knowledge to needing to carry out more complex functions, due to the 
complexities inherent in new knowledge. Hargadon and Sutton (1997, p716) 
identified the role of broker as not just supporting a linkage role, but as a knowledge 
repository, whose knowledge its workers use to provide clients with solutions that 
are new combinations of existing ideas. 
Izushi (2003) also differentiated intermediaries as ‘high information gap’ and ‘low 
information gap’ services. The latter covers product testing and evaluation using the 
institute’s equipment, offering the use of testing and evaluation equipment to 
individual users. The former services are characterised by technical advice and 
guidance, training, lecturers, and joint research; in other words, intangible services 
requiring skilled intermediaries and interactions. These services relate closely to the 
role of innovation intermediaries, the so-called ‘knowledge translation and 
configuration’. Interaction with potential innovation actors in specific areas plays a 
crucial role in generating a high quality of knowledge in the complex innovation 
process. 
The third part of the enabling role is customising knowledge to a specific context, 
which may require knowledge translation and reconfiguration. Intermediaries not 
only must transmit knowledge, but also re-engineer knowledge, fostering several 
multilateral knowledge flows and adapting knowledge to a different context or a new 
situation. Unless recipients of knowledge understand the original recipes perfectly, 
intermediaries must fill the gaps in their version of knowledge (Sorenson, Rivkin and 
Fleming, 2006) with something suited to the specific social and technical context. 
Often SMEs do not know how to access the ‘original recipe of knowledge’ and are 
incapable of translating it for their own context. This can be the key role of 
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intermediaries who can adapt knowledge and frame it to fit the interests of SMEs 
(Brown and Duguid, 1998) so it is intelligible to them and maintains trust (Clarke 
and Ramirez, 2011). 
Although most intermediary studies focus on their supply-side role (Howells, 2006), 
Stewart and Hyysalo (2008) emphasised the role of the customer. They introduced 
the concept of configuration, which means interpreting products and modifying 
projects to reflect a customer’s interpretation, which can be changed when customers 
introduce new ideas (Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008). In this vein, knowledge enabling is 
an interactive and iterative process where knowledge is reinterpreted and 
reconfigured through interaction, rather than a one-way knowledge flow from 
intermediaries to customers. 
3.3.2 Facilitating Relations 
The second part of the intermediary role is that of facilitating relations. Relation 
facilitation has not attracted much attention in innovation intermediary studies thus 
far. It refers to organising and managing a network; a process of continuous 
alignment of actors in innovation networks, enhancing communication of actors and 
bridging cognitive difference between different knowledge domains (Klerkx and 
Leeuwis, 2008; Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004). In facilitating relations, intermediaries 
must have wide organisational and individual networks, maintain durable and 
satisfactory relationships with potential actors, and have the capability to negotiate 
mutually acceptable solutions (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008). 
Key activities are bridging links, aligning innovation players, and facilitating 
interpersonal communication and relations. First, the role relates to initiating and 
strengthening linkages between the various parts of innovation systems, which can 
involve more than two parties. The activities include building and sustaining the 
relationship and facilitating it so potential players can co-shape the innovation 
environment. Intermediaries can uniquely put potential innovation players together 
and align the expectations of actors across different contexts relevant to a specific 
context (Backhaus, 2010). The capability to interact with other companies favours 
access to and transfer of knowledge, which in turn significantly impacts company 
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growth and shaping innovation (Rothschild and Darr, 2005) over time. The 
relationship reduces transaction costs for firms, providing the necessary resources, 
knowledge, and know-how required in the innovation process that is crucial for 
SMEs. 
Through empirical study, Howells (2006) pointed out the importance of the 
intermediary role in providing longer term and relational innovation capabilities, 
whereas researchers need to study the nature of the relationships in which 
intermediaries are involved.33 Criticising a linear innovation model that considers 
customers as passive receivers of knowledge, the study shows that interaction with 
proactive customers not only helps enhance their knowledge capacity to use a 
knowledge repository of intermediaries, but also provides learning opportunities for 
intermediaries. Long-term relationships between SMEs and intermediaries have the 
largest influence in determining the use of ‘high information gap’ services by 
strengthening interactions. Because intensive interaction with SMEs affects relational 
assets that were initially attached to physical capital, such as equipment, it gradually 
shifts its relational foundation to human capital, such as researchers. 
Second, facilitating interpersonal communication is an important activity, especially 
at an early stage of R&D where technological knowledge is not directly codified 
through artefacts, but is embedded in individuals and their experiences in tacit form 
(Howells, 2006). Technologies, knowledge, and know-how embedded in individuals 
flow best through informal, mainly personal, relationships (Allen, Hyman and 
Pinckney, 1983). Individuals’ relationships not only identify potential innovation 
actors but also facilitate communication to materialise various technical options and 
strengthen ties. In particular, science and engineering graduates are likely to be 
valuable in accessing knowledge developed by intermediaries (i.e. research 
organisations) and perhaps specifically the public science base, which can be remote 
from the commercial pressures commonplace in firms (Tether and Tajar, 2008).  
                                                        
33 Howells (2006, p, 725) further argued “most of the discussion has been in the context of their 
function and not their network relationships. Simple triadic structures are mainly implied, whilst 
where more complex multi-actor relationships in terms of intermediation are, en passant, 
acknowledged they are then largely ignored.” 
59 
 
Relationships represents the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership of networks defined as social capital: “the aggregate of resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or organisation” (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005, p151). From a 
firm level, the use of intermediaries tends to complement firms’ own internal 
innovation activities and to complement other external sources of knowledge (Tether 
and Tajar, 2008). Cooke and Wills (1999) assessed government programmes to 
promote collaboration amongst SMEs to improve innovation capacity by increasing 
social capital through networking.  
Such relationships between individuals or organisations are an avenue where they 
exchange contextual knowledge and solve practical problems. In their IDEO case 
study, Hargadon and Sutton (1997) suggested intermediaries should have a more 
proactive and sophisticated role in innovation processes, such as ‘cross pollination’ 
or ‘bridging’ among unrelated groups of a particular social system to new ideas, 
emphasising individuals as brokers. In this vein, Stewart and Hyysalo (2008) 
emphasised the role of managers at cybercafés, running trials that generate new 
interactions, making activities visible to other actors. Friedman and Podolny (1992) 
highlighted the role of ‘boundary spanners’, who provide a vehicle for 
communications and dispute resolution for negotiations, and interfunctional 
relationships or other cross-group ties in organizations. According to the authors, 
boundary spanners carry influence between constituents and their opponents, and 
represent the perceptions, expectations, and ideas of each side to the other. This may 
be more than the role of representation; rather, they may translate the idea as well as 
its meaning to their own group. 
In particular, innovation accompanying complex knowledge acquisition and creation 
will be difficult to obtain outside the firm without a tight relationship or relational 
capital attached to individuals. The social capital of individuals and intermediaries 
can facilitate the knowledge flow between firms and other organisations in 
innovation systems. However, the knowledge-facilitation process has limitations in 
showing, for example, how knowledge flows back and forth between intermediaries 
and potential players and between SMEs and intermediaries, bridging the gap of 
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social proximity and knowledge, and how intermediaries can access the knowledge 
repository of potential players using relational capital. These processes can be still 
seen as black boxes that need to be explored in a different social context.34 
3.3.3 Facilitating Learning 
A third part of intermediary activities can be the concept of learning facilitation. 
Intermediaries should be able to create conditions for learning by interaction, feeding 
actors’ tailor-made knowledge, which is highly context specific. Learning facilitation 
focuses on an interactive and iterative process that increases opportunities for mutual 
learning, stimulates creation of new knowledge, and simultaneously contributes to a 
firms’ ability to innovate (Nielsen, 2005; Tsai, 2001). In a similar vein, Van Lente et 
al. (2003) pointed out that learning can be enhanced by the feedback mechanisms 
and by stimulating experiments and mutual adaptation. To do so, facilitators provide 
various kinds of learning space, contributing to the added value of the innovation 
system. 
Williams, Stewart and Slack (2005) provided SLTI, lending insight into the role of 
intermediaries who mediate and bridge reciprocal social-learning processes between 
those whose interests, visions, and expertise differ. SLTI particularly highlights 
complex learning processes and knowledge flows among heterogeneous players, 
representation of users and uses, and the processes of appropriation by actual users 
(Williams, 2000; Williams, Stewart and Slack, 2005). Scholars consider brokering, 
configuring, and facilitating activities as central to the social-learning process, which 
creates new relationships and new knowledge. In this context, Williams, Stewart and 
Slack (2005) identified intermediaries as the key players in social learning who 
facilitate relations and knowledge, providing a focus of reflexivity in a social-
learning process.  
                                                        
34 Theorists on social capital emphasise the relationship between actors or organisations, undermining 
the barriers of building networks under certain social and cultural contexts, as shown in Bathelt and 
Zeng’s study (2010) in China, where intermediaries provided a conduit of networks for knowledge 
flow. Tether and Tajar’s (2008) study shows that knowledge flows more efficiently from the public 
science base to firms through intermediaries than it flows directly from one to another. They argued 
that intermediaries such as research institutes tend to be dominated by university graduates, who 
occupy the same social worlds as graduates in firms. The relationships of university graduates are 
likely to be particularly significant. 
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Social learning explains the processes where various actors learn from experiences 
and interactions; thus, social learning can be seen as a cognitive, social, and political 
process, emphasising negotiation and interaction among heterogeneous actors 
(Sørensen, 1996; van Mierlo et al., 2010). Social learning highlights the active role of 
actors, serving to alert policy makers to the necessity of the process and what is 
required to facilitate it. In this vein, intermediaries help SMEs understand and 
articulate demands and mediate among actors by continuously forcing them to learn 
about, filter, translate, and reflect on information, products, and practices of other 
actors to remain relevant and thus in existence.  
The problem is that an important avenue for exploitation may take the form of 
‘embodied knowledge’, given the complexities and difficulties in formulating and 
communicating social-learning experiences (Williams, Stewart and Slack, 2005, 
p231). In this case individuals can be key players as reflexive actors in the social 
learning process, and act as a conduit for knowledge flow. Because certain players 
may have a particularly advantageous viewpoint and a broad span of control and 
action, they may have special opportunities and incentives for reflection (Williams, 
Stewart and Slack, 2005). Intermediaries can be individuals or institutions that 
facilitate learning by others by transferring and translating relevant knowledge and 
information (Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008; Williams, Stewart and Slack, 2005).  
Meagher, Lyall and Nutley (2008) also indicated the role of ‘individual knowledge 
brokers’ as intermediaries who influence and enhance the flow of knowledge during 
the process of knowledge transfer between researchers and users. In this case, 
individuals were allowed to ‘cross-pollinate’ their ideas between products and 
industries by linking otherwise disconnected domains to gain access to ideas from 
others in the innovation process. As shown in the IDEO case, this process was a 
routine that made connections between existing solutions and new problems; 
employees created new knowledge by learning, remembering, and retrieving them in 
new forms that fit a new combination (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997).  
Learning by interacting may augment individual memories and written materials by 
sharing different point of views on specific knowledge, acting as linkages between 
routines in the past and those that lie ahead. Learning by interaction, remembering, 
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and retrieving also take time, which may require consistent and ongoing intervention 
to facilitate interaction of employees at all levels. The presence of legitimate 
facilitators who are capable of maintaining the quality of process facilitation is the 
crucial condition for social learning, providing specific intervention to problems that 
block learning and innovation (van Mierlo et al., 2010).  
3.3.4 Managing Interfaces 
The fourth part of the intermediary role associates activities with accessing 
knowledge, facilities, and human resources aimed at providing a conduit for 
continuous knowledge interaction. Managing interfaces means accessing the way 
intermediaries expose other organisations to a wide range of new sources of 
knowledge and how they can help assess the value of different alternatives (Clarke 
and Ramirez, 2011). Although the term accessing brings forth an image of one 
direction of interaction, managing interfaces does not merely mean supporting or 
brokering the activities of intermediaries, but rather connecting various 
infrastructures that are limited to neither one-off services nor sources of knowledge. 
These activities may include not only knowledge infrastructures but also human 
resources, networks, and other physical infrastructures such as research facilities. 
Intermediaries should offer a space for continuous interactions, while linking 
resources and actors from different places, ‘acting as conduits for exchange of 
knowledge and other resources’, a sine qua non for early stage innovation to 
materialise from vague ideas and options. As explained in Section 3.3.1, the 
knowledge-enabling process is iterative and can be reinterpreted and reconfigured 
during the innovation process. One-off services and unidirectional knowledge flow 
cannot fill the various gaps at every stage of innovation. 
Several empirical studies have offered examples of managing interfaces, ranging 
from brokering activities to providing a space for continuous interaction. Bessant, 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2003) illustrated the way intermediaries play a crucial role in 
providing access to important sources of knowledge, helping the South African 
furniture industry achieve international status. Clarke and Ramirez (2011) showed 
how the intermediary PROMPERU has bridged the gap between producers and 
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overseas buyers in the agricultural cluster in northern Peru by developing a 
knowledge base for producers to contact buyers. 
Izushi (2003) highlighted the role of managing interfaces between the research 
institute and customers, emphasising access to organisational capital and human 
capital. Continuous interaction with staff at the research institute allows customers to 
know more about areas the staff research and other services of the institute. 
Customers learn how to use external knowledge to resolve new issues and find 
opportunities for collaboration. Staff of (government) institutes could constantly 
discuss the possible causes of problems, using their knowledge with customers, 
whereas private-sector intermediaries tend to be limited to one-off specialised 
services. 
3.4 Characteristics of Public-Sector Innovation Intermediaries 
3.4.1 Public-Sector Innovation Intermediaries in Asian Countries 
As indicated in Section 3.2.1, innovation intermediaries often imply public-sector 
innovation intermediaries in the innovation system (Dodgson, 2000; Howells, 2006; 
Izushi, 2003; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008, 2009; Kodama, 2008; Van Lente et al., 
2003). Public-sector innovation intermediaries—industry associations, chambers of 
commerce, economic-development organisations, and research institutes—are active 
in almost every country (Dalziel, 2010). Their activities are directed towards 
economic development through technology catch-up in developing countries 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007) and facilitating collaboration between actors, 
networking to resolve multidimensional problems in developed or advanced 
countries. In this vein, understanding public-sector intermediaries is important for 
two reasons: first, the NIS, SI, and RSI literature often overlooks intermediaries, 
although they are instrumental in addressing problems in the system; second, it is 
useful to examine the innovation intermediary as a single class of organisation in 
developing useful theories. This section further examines the types of public-sector 
innovation intermediaries linking their contribution to the NIS. 
As briefly described in Section 2.4, the development of different types of public-
sector intermediary institutions to address system failures and coordinate support in 
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the NIS (Dodgson, 2000) is not a recent phenomenon in developed Asian countries. 
Government-supported research institutes play the part of innovation intermediaries 
(Choung, Hwang and Song, 2014; Dodgson, 2009; L. Kim, 1993; Lim, 2008; 
Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007): for example, 400 S&T institutions exist in China 
(Xiaoyuan and Yanning, 2011), ITRI in Taiwan, GRIs in Korea, and not-for-profit 
associations and institutes in Japan. In Japan, government intervention played a 
crucial role in leading the electrical and electronics industry. Since 1920, GRIs and 
universities accumulated R&D capabilities that led to the absorption of transistor and 
computing technologies from the United States and Europe in a short period of time 
(Fransman, 1991, 1992). Japanese-government investment in restructuring key 
industries rose significantly during World War I and the post-war period encouraging 
co-operation between GRIs and universities to accelerate economic development. As 
a result, GRIs (e.g. the Electrotechnical Laboratory administered by MITI) and 
universities accumulated technology capable of facing the challenges inherent in the 
information-technology era and transferred these technological capabilities to 
industry under co-operation and competition strategies. 
Through a case study on central-office switches, Fransman (1991) highlighted the 
role of ‘controlled competition’, which was a uniquely Japanese form of organising 
the supply of complex telecommunications equipment during the mid 1980s. 
Government organisations in the form of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone and 
Electrical Communications Laboratories played a significant role in organising and 
managing controlled competition by initiating research, inviting suppliers to join the 
research, helping them specialise in various tasks, facilitating knowledge sharing 
amongst suppliers, and making procurement decisions. Izushi (2003) analysed the 
length of relationships and their effects on information gaps between research 
institutes and SMEs, whereas Kodama (2008) emphasised the intermediating effect 
of the Technology Advanced Metropolitan Area Association in Japan. 
In Korea, GRIs have been a crucial mechanism to foster major industries and firms 
(i.e. Chaebols and technology-based small firms) for several decades (Dodgson, 
2009; Hershberg, Nabeshima and Yusuf, 2007; L. Kim, 1993, 1997; Lim, 2008). For 
example, the Korean Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), 
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played a major role in coordinating and managing the consortia in developing 16-
/64- DRAM with Samsung (Choung, Hwang and Song, 2014). In this regard, Roberts 
(2005) described GRIs as the one of the major innovation actors in ‘Innovation 
Intensive Environments (IIEs)’35, purported to accelerate the rate of innovation and 
proliferation of high-technology industries. Although the author did not name them 
as intermediaries, the notion seems to imply their role as innovation facilitators who 
linked and interacted between actors at regional or national levels. These are the 
public-sector innovation intermediaries whose purpose is to enable innovation in 
firms, industries, and nations. 
3.4.2 Main Advantages in Supporting Innovation Processes 
Reflecting on the conclusions of not-for-profit scholars as to why they know so little 
about not-for-profit organisations (Dalziel, 2010; Salamon and Anheier, 1992), 
previous sections explained how (public-sector) innovation intermediaries perform 
four functions and how public-sector innovation intermediaries influence the 
innovation process of SMEs. Studies on public-sector innovation intermediaries 
(Backhaus, 2010; Boon et al., 2008; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009; Van Lente et al., 
2003) seem to have three main issues under the framework of NIS. The first is their 
role of knowledge interaction at an early stage, the second is maintaining an 
impartial position during the interaction process, and third is resources. 
First, public intermediaries act at a precompetitive stage until actors form a network 
involving other knowledge providers (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). The process 
requires deliberate efforts to create effective linkages between technological 
arrangements, people, and social-organisational arrangements (Geels, 2004) to 
embellish the vague knowledge at the early stages of innovations. Due to the high 
levels of uncertainties and contingent nature of innovation (Nilsson and Sia-
Ljungström, 2013), it may be difficult to predict the services of intermediaries and 
outcomes that may hinder the participation of private intermediaries. Knowledge 
generation and knowledge brokerage are hard to make tangible and visible because 
the services take place in the early stage of innovation. Moreover, a risk associated 
                                                        
35 IIEs are innovation spaces such as science parks, industry clusters, regional innovation systems, the 
technopolis, and the milieu. 
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with long lead times to the arrival of innovation processes makes it hard to recover 
the costs incurred.  
Even venture capitalists are increasingly reluctant to invest in early stage firms and 
prefer to invest in revenue-earning firms (Branscomb, 2001; Branscomb and 
Auerswald, 2002). Thus, publicly funded innovation intermediaries fulfilling these 
roles could provide a solution to avoid the dilemmas of leaving the network-
brokering phase to private consultants (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008). As Hansmann 
(1987) indicated, when the quality of a service is difficult to appraise, compare, 
negotiate, or verify, customers would be better served by a not-for-profit organisation 
than by a for-profit firm because the organisation would not be motivated to diminish 
the quality of the service to maximise profits. Public-sector innovation intermediaries 
must direct their activities towards the early stages of innovation processes, far from 
the commercial stage that other actors are reluctant to undertake to fulfil their 
mission.  
A key premise of this facilitating role is an impartial and independent position 
(Hanna and Walsh, 2002): the second stream of study. Interaction in innovation 
processes involving public-sector innovation intermediaries could be better suited to 
provide insights regarding added value based on impartiality and to remain credible 
to all actors amongst whom they mediate (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008). A for-profit 
intermediary can prejudice the impartial position of an innovation intermediary by 
focusing on tangible and visible services to generate sufficient revenues, making 
them less credible in the eye of SMEs. Also, intermediaries should be able to keep a 
balance between short-term and long-term considerations (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 
2009). 
Here, the centrality of the intermediary, in that they can access suppliers and buyers 
as an impartial third party, will be crucial. Bathelt and Zeng’s (2010) study on the 
Shanghai Chemical Industry Park around the Yangze Delta region shows the barriers 
of learning-by-interaction between wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and 
Chinese vendors. WFOEs, big chemical producers, tended to ship their products to 
specialised intermediaries located in Hong Kong or Shanghai. Chinese vendors did 
not provide WFOEs with much information on customers, markets, and opportunities 
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about local or national markets. Furthermore, due to insufficient market transparency, 
high market uncertainty and a lack of ability to stimulate guanxi networks, WFOEs 
could not develop close relationships with local companies or vendor firms. Instead, 
WFOEs depended on intermediaries distributing their products to learn about 
Chinese markets. 
Third, public intermediaries have knowledge of infrastructure, networks, experts, and 
experience as a result of strong government support. In this regard, Izushi (2003) and 
Kodama (2008) argued that those public intermediaries are unique to the Japanese 
context as an external source of technical knowledge equipped with its own powerful 
‘intellectual and material equipment’. Unlike private-sector providers, experts in the 
public intermediary hold discussions with their customers using the competitive 
knowledge that often derives from their research experiences. 
Interactions with researchers in public intermediaries allow user firms to know more 
research areas, to develop additional contacts in industries or academia, and to access 
other services. A long-term relationship may result between individuals, facilitating 
learning by interaction. Interactions may strengthen the social capital of user firms by 
accessing additional contacts (Izushi, 2001). Cooke and Wills (1999) indicated that 
public intervention may create social capital in support of knowledge flow in 
interactive innovation processes where SMEs rely on good relationships with 
government bodies. 
3.4.3 Innovation Facilitators of Firms in the NIS 
Building on significant resources and their impartial position, public intermediaries 
facilitate knowledge interaction, which stimulates innovation of firms, increases 
efficiencies of the NIS, and thereby buoys economic development over time. 
Considering the contribution of public intermediaries in the NIS, it is important to 
uncover the knowledge-interaction process at an appropriate level of actors. 
Intermediaries interact with heterogeneous SMEs in different regions, technology 
fields, and sectors. However, little explanation of the dynamic interplay between 
actors exists due to the lack of meso- and micro-level approaches in the NIS, as 
explained in Chapter 2. The NIS concept is rather broad and the intermediary 
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literature seems to focus on some functions at a specific point in time and their 
contribution to technical innovation based on the suppliers’ viewpoint. Furthermore, 
research relating to intermediaries still focuses on the private sector and far less on 
the public sector. Public-sector innovation intermediaries are important in the 
innovation process in two respects (see Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.3): they are able to 
interact and resolve the diverse barriers of firms consistently throughout the 
innovation process, and they facilitate knowledge interaction at all levels 
(organisations, institutions, and individual). 
First, due to the high levels of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity inherent in the 
innovation process, the NIS often carries various problems that decrease efficiencies 
of the innovation system. Public intermediaries, as non-market mechanisms, correct 
system failures and failures may not accrue from a single factor or actor but rather 
from a complex set of problems, as posited in Chapter 2. These barriers can be more 
problematic for firms that lack capabilities and resources. In the case of SMEs in 
Korea, not only R&D funding but also a wide range of knowledge regarding social 
changes, new demands, legal issues, and potential big buyers may be necessary (J.-S. 
Kim, 2007; Song, 2009). However, most SMEs are unlikely to have enough 
resources to accomplish their vision when exploring new business areas such as 
prospecting the future of certain technologies and potential innovation actors. 
As examined in Section 3.3, intermediaries may engage in innovation processes of 
firms through a variety of activities, including knowledge enabling, facilitating 
relations and learning, and managing interfaces for continuous interaction. By 
engaging intermediaries, firms can explore a new business area through collective 
support while significantly decreasing or sharing costs involved in the innovation 
process. At a firm level, intermediaries provide interfaces for SMEs to achieve their 
goals during the innovation process in ways they are unable to undertake themselves, 
in a short period of time, by reducing uncertainties and costs. These activities are not 
merely functions that resolve a single problem at one point in time, but rather 
‘process facilitation’ embedded in constant interaction. 
Second, aligning actors’ expectations around realisable objectives (Molina, 1994) or 
enrolling users, suppliers, and developing markets, needs to be involved (Williams 
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and Edge, 1996) in the innovation process. The process entails an iterative process in 
which SMEs interact with a range of organisations (e.g. research institutes, 
intermediaries, buyers, authorities, and financial organisations) and institutions such 
as regulations and culture (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005). As a result, 
managing a wide spectrum of collaborative arrangements of knowledge generation 
occurs in a systemic context, covering a multiplicity of minds and unpredictable and 
unintended paths (Metcalfe, 2005). The innovation facilitation of intermediaries 
might be complicated, as individuals communicate with knowledge in the specific 
context of the firm to which they belong, and routines of the firm also shape the 
knowledge interaction between individuals, requiring specific localised information 
and different kinds of knowledge interaction in relation to specific innovations. 
In other words, the knowledge interaction may not (simply) occur between public 
intermediaries and firms but rather occur around multiple individuals and 
organisations. These connections may change as innovation opportunities and 
problems evolve over time. As a result, mediating involves aligning heterogeneous 
actors and connecting the knowledge embedded in individuals and organisations, 
which are quite complex and time consuming. It is the public intermediaries that are 
able to organise multiple levels of interaction to overcome the barriers (refer to 
Section 2.4.3) and thereby shape the NIS to be the practical ‘device’ to facilitate 
innovations, rather than to remain a loose framework. 
From this perspective, intermediary functions need to be incorporated into the NIS 
framework to facilitate the dynamic interplay among actors at meso- and micro- 
levels: how knowledge interaction between public intermediaries and SMEs occurs, 
decreasing the barriers, and how micro-factors relating to the specific context affect 
the innovation process. Examining specific cases may be helpful in understanding 
whether and how the four functions of the knowledge-interaction process would 
resolve the barriers of firms. This will be elaborated in Chapter 6. 
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3.5 Conclusion  
3.5.1 Summary and Challenges 
This chapter pursues a deeper cross-disciplinary understanding of intermediaries in 
innovation. It proposes a functional analysis of intermediaries to understand the area 
of knowledge interaction between intermediaries and SMEs. Based on a literature 
review of intermediaries, differentiated according to the roles they can play, this 
chapter has suggested four types of intermediary functions: enabling knowledge, 
facilitating relations, facilitating learning, and managing interfaces. This study 
suggests that the four functions can more effectively be understood as ‘innovation-
process facilitation’ rather than merely providing services at one point of time.  
After examining the general characteristics of innovation intermediaries, this study 
highlights the particular role of public-sector innovation intermediaries in Asian 
countries and their characteristics in the innovation process: facilitating innovation at 
the precompetitive stage; impartiality; and a vast knowledge infrastructure. At the 
early stages of innovation, technologies are malleable and uncertainties increase in 
technical options, markets, acceptability of options, and demands. Knowledge 
demands posed by innovating firms at this stage may be more complex, requiring 
long-term interaction with multiple actors to realise technological ideas more than 
the knowledge demands at the later stage. However, the roles of public-sector 
innovation intermediaries are not well defined; this raises question, in particular, 
about how they align resources and multiple actors to decrease the barriers at the 
precompetitive stage, and create new opportunities and dynamics in the system. 
From the above literature review, I can present some limitations of intermediary 
studies that this study seeks to overcome through closer examination. First, 
intermediary studies lack an understanding of public-sector innovation intermediaries. 
What was striking about the NIS in Asian countries was that intermediaries 
supported national strategy with a degree of system openness, allowing industries to 
adopt and improve on technology and organisational practice from advanced 
economies (Watkins et al., 2014). The openness could be explained through 
understanding of intermediary functions in the interaction process between actors, as 
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intermediaries work in the strategic level between policy and firms to correct failures. 
In this vein, understanding intermediary functions in the dynamic-interaction process 
requires examining how they interact with SMEs and how relationships evolve 
around an innovation. This leads to the second issue of functions of innovation 
intermediaries.  
Section 2.4 draws attention to the long-term cooperation and collaboration in 
facilitating a wide range of knowledge interactions that may be needed to resolve the 
barriers. A long-term perspective is needed because problems and relationships may 
change that may affect the activities of intermediaries. The range of services being 
offered does appear to be increasing over time, although intermediaries provide 
functions specialised around particular activities (Howells, 2006). From this point of 
view, the activities may not be simply categorised as activities provided by 
traditional or systemic intermediaries; rather, innovation intermediaries fulfil various 
functions for firms in the NIS. The four functions of (public-sector) innovation 
intermediaries may be expanded over time, covering the role of traditional 
intermediaries in some cases. In contrast, (public-sector) innovation intermediaries 
engage in networking with multiple levels of intermediaries to address diverse 
barriers in time. 
However, most intermediary studies seems to focus on functions at a particular point 
in time (one-off services) perhaps because they are based on the supply viewpoint 
rather than offering longer term, innovation capabilities to them (Howells, 2006). 
Watkins et al. (2014, p6) also argued “central to the NIS concept … relational 
interaction between actors and institutions is often missing.” By undertaking a 
critical examination of public-sector intermediaries in the innovation-facilitating 
process of SMEs, this study enhances knowledge about intermediary functions that 
resolve barriers, and may influence SME innovation at meso- and micro-levels. This 
calls for analysing the NIS at the support level as well as at the innovation-capacity 
level). The four functions of intermediaries developed in Section 3.3 will be used in 
developing the conceptual framework for this study, collecting and analysing 
empirical research.  
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3.5.2 Integration Intermediary Functions with the NIS Framework 
This study aims to investigate the interaction between public-sector innovation 
intermediaries and SMEs during the innovation process. Building on the NIS 
framework it explores how multiple levels of interaction decrease the barriers that 
each SME faces, leading to the evolution of different patterns of relationships. In this 
regard, Chapter 2 has addressed the components of the NIS—the importance of 
interactive learning and knowledge interaction—highlighting the role of public-
sector innovation intermediaries as an effective mechanism to facilitate interactive 
learning and innovation. Chapter 3 reviewed the role of public-sector innovation 
intermediaries: how they perform four functions to address barriers. This chapter also 
emphasised the role of public-sector innovation intermediaries who have provided an 
effective mechanism in overcoming the barriers and thereby facilitating innovation in 
firms.  
The role of intermediaries has not yet been fully integrated into the NIS framework, 
although several scholars (Dodgson, 2000; Howells, 2006; Izushi, 2003; Klerkx and 
Leeuwis, 2008, 2009; Kodama, 2008; Van Lente et al., 2003) emphasised public-
sector intermediaries in the innovation system. One consequence of the convergence 
of diverse analytical traditions on the concept of intermediary is that the literature is 
rather fragmented and tends to focus on specific functions of intermediaries, as 
previously indicated. These problems are augmented by the conceptual limitations of 
the NIS framework and its failure to engage effectively with sociocultural factors, 
and the diversity of actors and institutions in a wider setting. Consequently, the 
dynamics and evolving nature of the interaction process among them, and interactive 
learning (i.e. the DUI-mode of learning) occurring at multiple levels, remained a 
black box. 
This is probably due to the macro-level focus and lack of meso- and micro-level 
approaches of NIS studies in which the role of intermediary institutions is largely 
absent (Watkins et al., 2014). As indicated in Chapter 2, the NIS framework has 
limitations in uncovering the interaction process at a specific level: public 
intermediaries and SMEs. This may be one reason why attention remains largely 
focused on university–industry interactions that still dominate the national 
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characteristics of the innovation system, overlooking other public-sector 
intermediaries (Lundvall, 2007c). Despite the occasional acknowledgement and the 
empirical observations that public-sector intermediaries do play a significant role in 
shaping innovation and economic outcomes, there is a dearth of studies which 
describe how this form of intermediary institution, which provides mechanisms for 
interactions among firms, might shape successful innovation processes in the NIS. 
As criticised in section, 2.3.2, to the best of my knowledge, no empirically grounded 
work has been done on the role of public-sector innovation intermediaries in 
enhancing innovations of heterogeneous SMEs in a specific context. Rather, the NIS 
tends to treat firms as if they were broadly identical actors.  
However, each NIS is unique (Edquist, 1997). Firms are also heterogeneous in 
innovative capabilities and barriers they might face. Learning takes place in a 
localised context. In a similar vein, the role of intermediaries highly depends on the 
sociopolitical context (Van Lente et al., 2003). The NIS is a dynamic and open 
system where institutions and actors co-evolve, and shape the innovation system 
(Kastelle, Potts and Dodgson, 2009); where the different types of innovation system 
interact at the level of specific actors. Therefore, understanding innovation processes 
of firms calls for the modulation of the NIS at an appropriate level, where it is 
possible to investigate how interaction and interactive learning take place in a 
specific context and relationships co-evolve over time. In this regard, in Chapter 2, I 
suggested the adoption of meso- and micro-level approaches in the NIS to examine 
the knowledge-interaction process, highlighting the role of public-sector innovation 
intermediaries as effective mechanisms to resolve barriers of firms in the NIS. 
Integrating intermediary studies into the NIS might provide an analytical lens to 
observe underlying processes and dynamics in the system. 
In sum, the scholarly neglect of public-sector innovation intermediaries is not limited 
to the issue of the facilitation of innovations. Their role as innovation facilitators, 
how they facilitate the DUI-mode of innovation to resolve barriers of firms, has also 
not been fully accounted. Given the objectives of this study to outline how public-
sector innovation intermediaries might influence the successful (or less successful) 
innovations of SMEs, the study attempts to operationalise the NIS at meso- and 
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micro-levels: how public-sector innovation intermediaries interact and perform four 
functions to correct the failures of SMEs in the NIS. From the micro-level approach, 
the system-failure concept provides micro-level factors: the set of determinants that 
influence innovations. However, as Lundvall (2004) criticised, the concept may not 
be applicable to different contexts; in other words, static functions may not reflect all 
multifarious factors or barriers of heterogeneity SMEs may face in innovation 
processes.  
Instead, this study tries to examine the micro-level interaction process and meso-
level institutions; linking firm-level interaction processes to intermediary functions. 
This study will contribute to theory building on the NIS, describing how relationship 
are evolving in the complex innovation process, while also providing a better 
empirical understanding of the role of public-sector innovation intermediaries in 
supporting SMEs at the early stage of the innovation process. To achieve these 
objectives, the study adopts a strategy that employs a case-study methodology, which 
is the subject of the next chapter. The following chapter will explain the 
methodology used to analyse the four functions described in this chapter for the 
empirical case studies. Using these structures in the empirical analysis, I will try to 
show how these functions are fulfilled through the knowledge interaction between 
intermediaries and SMEs, and whether certain activities during the interaction have 
not been highlighted sufficiently in the literature. 
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4 Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology I employed in this study, 
and indicates how I used them to address the research questions. To remind the 
reader, the aim of this study was to investigate the case of Korean SMEs and the role 
of public-sector intermediaries in facilitating innovation. In particular, I sought 
insight into how barriers at the early stages of innovation could be overcome through 
the mechanisms of knowledge interaction and relationships. Although this was the 
main research topic, I chose five innovative SMEs to study innovation barriers. 
Following the introduction, I explain the reasons behind the choice of public 
intermediaries and SMEs from different fields of technologies in Section 4.2. Then, 
Section 4.3 presents the research strategy and design formulated at a preliminary 
stage and adjusted over time. The conceptual framework was constructed based on 
the NIS concept, intermediary studies, and STS perspectives that enabled this study 
to uncover the interaction process based on the specific functions developed in 
Chapter 3. I introduce the choice of strategies from data collection to analysis with a 
justification for each. This section ends with some arguments about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current research design, and the methods of case selection. 
Section 4.4 describes the processes of data collection and data analysis: how I 
collected, triangulated, and analysed data, with some reflections on the research 
process. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes how this chapter provides a methodological 
grounding to developing explanatory and exploratory contexts of the cases in the 
following empirical chapters. 
4.2 Research Methodology and Strategy 
4.2.1 Defining Key Concepts 
Before moving to the analysis of S&T-development history in Korea (Chapter 5), it 
is useful to introduce the two main actors in the KNIS briefly, describing the role of 
public intermediaries in facilitating innovation of SMEs and how I defined them in 
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this study. In Chapter 5, I further discuss the nature of these two actors in the KNIS 
context: how they have interacted and what policy issues need to be resolved. 
Fostering innovative SMEs has long been a major policy issue in Korea in relation to 
economic growth and creating employment. In the overall economy, SMEs play a 
pivotal role in ensuring sustainable growth by enhancing employment and national 
competitiveness. Therefore, since 1990s, the Korean government has been 
establishing support programmes36 to foster innovative SMEs, for which the total 
budget increased from US$2.3 billion in 2005 to US$4.8 billion in 2008 (SMBA, 
2013). In this vein, GRIs have been effective mechanisms, linking government 
policy to industries and contributing to enhancing the innovative capacity of 
industries for several decades (K-R. Lee and Song, 1998; Wong, 2004) that will be 
further explored in Chapter 5. In 2013, the government emphasised the role of GRIs 
as innovation facilitators for SMEs. 
Whilst the government made considerable investments to enhance the innovation 
capability of SMEs, the policy seems to engender some issues: first, policy has been 
directing the growth of SMEs quantitatively37 (i.e. the number of SMEs and 
increasing R&D funding), and second, delivering the standardised ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
programmes from the intermediary to SMEs did not solve the fundamental problems 
that an individual SME faced (SMBA, 2006). The programmes have been mainly 
one-off services that were generic and universal programmes that did not meet the 
various needs of innovative SMEs (Y. B. Kim, 2005). 
In this connection, some SMEs that were involved in receiving intermediary services 
for their innovation processes showed success as a result of the knowledge 
interaction (KISTI, 2013). Various indirect services seem to help SMEs innovate 
                                                        
36 The programmes include ‘Supporting R&D for Technology Innovation’, ‘Supporting R&D for 
Technology Commercialisation’, ‘Supporting Joint R&D among Industry-Academia-Institutes’, 
‘Establishing Research Infrastructure of Industry-Academia-Institutes’ and ‘Feasibility Study of New 
R&D Idea.’  
37 The number of spin-off companies from large corporations between 1997 and 2001 reached 442 
(Suh, 2002) in addition to start-ups and spin-offs from GRIs and universities. In the same period, 
professors and researchers left their organisations to establish venture businesses as a result of policy 
initiatives aimed at stimulating new firms. The initiatives included tax incentives, providing facilities 
and services, relaxing the requirements for establishing firms and granting temporary leave. 
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over time, whilst one-off services (e.g. funding) tend to provide a temporary 
expedient (D. Cho, 2005). To meet demands of SMEs, the Korean government 
recently announced its further intention to provide indirect services such as 
knowledge services by mediating and enhancing the service spectrum (Y. Cho et al., 
2013); but a lack of understanding exists about the dynamics of interactions and 
relationships between the public intermediary and innovative SMEs. 
Thus, I chose to examine the dynamics of interactions between two actors in the 
KNIS that might lead to insights for further programme development for SMEs. 
Following, I suggest brief definitions for key concepts that are frequently used in this 
study: public intermediaries, innovative SMEs, innovation, and knowledge. 
 Public-sector innovation intermediaries (Public intermediaries): as 
defined in Section 3.2.3, these are not-for-profit organisations such as 
government research institutions (GRIs), government agencies, 
foundations, science parks etc. GRIs in particular are amongst the earliest 
form of organisations supporting Korean industries and considered 
important actors in facilitating knowledge creation and linking all actors 
and resources in the KNIS.  
 Innovative SMEs: in this study, following the Korean context, innovative 
SMEs are those registered as venture firms, inno-biz38 firms by the Small 
and Medium Business Administration (SMBA). The Technology Finance 
Corporation defines innovative SMEs as firms that pursue state-of-the-art 
technologies or new technologies in high value-added areas, and the 
SMBA defines them as firms pursuing innovative activities in product, 
process, or marketing innovations, or firms that have achieved success 
through these innovations39. 
                                                        
38 The SMEs which receive 700 marks out of 1000 on the technology innovation system assessment 
together with obtaining more than B grade on the technology assessment provided by SMBA. 
39 In Korea, an SME refers to firms which have up to 300 employees with a limit of gross capital of 
US$3 million (SMBA, 2012). 
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 Innovation: as defined in Section 2.4.3, Schumpeter’s definition of 
innovation is new or improved goods, a new method of production or 
distribution, the opening of a new market, the use of new supplies or 
engagement of new suppliers, or a new mode of industrial organisation 
(Schumpeter, 1934). Emphasising the knowledge production in the 
system, innovation also represents “something new and therefore adds to 
existing knowledge. The second is that innovation is a process where the 
innovating unit operates under uncertainty and therefore regularly is 
confronted with unforeseen problems” (Lundvall, 2007b, p14). These 
views align with the views of SMEs I have interviewed. 
 Knowledge: multiple bodies of knowledge such as scientific, 
technological, or market based on which innovating firms need to draw 
(Metcalfe, 2005). Knowledge is not merely technological, but also 
organisational and societal knowledge, which relates to the technical 
process integrated with skills, routines, use of equipment, training, and 
management systems (Smith, 1995).40 
4.2.2 Research Methodology: Case Study 
The particular focus of the proposed case study centres on the relationships and 
interactions between the public intermediary and SMEs. Some cases of public 
intermediation resulted in successful innovation of SMEs, where the public 
intermediary and the Korean SMEs actively interacted. The impact of such 
intermediation and the role of intermediaries, leads to the following questions: why 
do interactions between some SMEs and public intermediaries yield success stories, 
whilst others do not? If the interactions with the intermediary affect innovations of 
SMEs, what are the major factors; and if not, why not? These are the important 
questions addressed in this study. 
                                                        
40 Smith (1995) presents four characteristics of knowledge different from the neoclassic approach: 
a) multilayered, consisting of articulated forms of different knowledge, b) highly localised and 
specific, c) internally systemic, and d) interactive and externally systemic involving mutual learning 
and knowledge exchange processes. 
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The main objective of this thesis was to discern the interaction and SMEs in the 
complex innovation process, with a focus on the role of public intermediaries at the 
early stages of innovation. Because previous researchers have not adequately studied 
this phenomenon and thus, the topic lacks an extensive empirical base, this study 
focused more on discovery than verification (Adesida, 2005). Research concerned 
with verification tends to test established hypotheses; discovery-type research 
focuses mainly on unearthing new information and ideas that can be used to develop 
new theories or contribute to existing concepts (Alvesson, 1995). Quantitative 
methods are unlikely to explain the complex context of a phenomenon and related 
issues. Secondary data used in examining knowledge-interaction process was 
unavailable. 
Therefore, I adopted the qualitative method in data gathering and in analysis, an 
approach well suited to explore, describe, and understand a phenomenon that is not 
well understood. This is possible because of the engagement of the actors as 
participants in the research process, engaged in a dialogue to uncover what public 
intermediaries are doing that might influence the innovation of SMEs. The remainder 
of this thesis described the procedures and processes used. 
To answer these questions, this study applies case-study methods that allow an 
investigation of contemporary phenomenon when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, the case 
study is “designed to produce theories” (Hammersley, Gomm and Foster, 2000, 
p234) that provide analytical insights and uncover underlying causal processes 
behind a phenomenon (Hammersley, Gomm and Foster, 2000; Yin, 2003). Orum and 
Feagin (1991) define a case study as a method to examine the `hows’ and `whys’ of a 
single phenomenon in rich detail. In this regard, the case-study method is an 
appropriate tool for this study for the following reasons: 1) it permits detailed 
examination of the knowledge-interaction process between public intermediaries and 
SMEs, and 2) it can help uncover insights useful in building on the NIS concept and 
intermediary studies through an in-depth understanding of the role of intermediaries 
in the NIS. Furthermore, this is a longitudinal study41 to a certain extent, as it aimed 
                                                        
41 Longitudinal research is more about how and why rather than length (Pettigrew, 1997). 
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to examine interactions between actors in the innovation process, which required the 
investigation to follow experiences in chronological order. 
In selecting the research methodology, collecting in-depth knowledge is of 
paramount importance in examining the role of public intermediaries facilitating 
innovation of SMEs at the early stages of innovation. Uncovering information about 
how public intermediaries interact with SMEs to bridge the barriers in the innovation 
process underlines the case-study method, given that relatively little is known about 
the phenomenon. Case studies facilitate learning (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 
2000). In particular, this study focuses on learning; that is, interactive learning by 
intermediaries and SMEs in the knowledge-interaction process. 
However, generalisation from a case study is debatable, as “its findings are not 
generalisable, especially by comparison with those of survey research” (Gomm, 
Hammersley and Foster, 2000, p98). Some scholars argue the case study approach is 
especially applicable when complex processes need to be examined, pointing out the 
possibility of erroneous application of statistical notions (A. S. Lee, 1989). Also, the 
important issue can be analytical or logical in character, not a statistical 
generalisation (Hammersley, Gomm and Foster, 2000). Previously developed theory 
can provide a possible link between case studies when adopting the view of 
‘analytical generalisation’ as an alternative to ‘statistical generalisation’ in case 
studies (Yin, 2003). Moreover, SST scholars rely on the case study approach as it 
allows them to generalise certain scopes based on in-depth analysis of cases (Russell 
and Williams, 2002). 
Following the key questions of this study—investigating the evolving characteristics 
of relationships in the innovation process, and how barriers (or problems) can be 
resolved through non-market mechanisms—this study requires an in-depth analysis 
of heterogeneous cases within a certain time frame (around three years). The 
rationale for adopting the case study approach is that knowledge interaction between 
public intermediaries and SMEs in the KNIS is a unique case, observing a 
phenomenon in S&T history, SME policy, and the nature of interactive learning 
between intermediaries and SMEs in Korea. A carefully selected comparative set of 
cases provides an analytical lens to examine how the interaction process operates in 
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different contexts. The process is not composed of mechanical differences that can be 
proven by statistical generalisation. This study requires thick description to be able to 
generalise an implicit perception that emphasises reliability and credibility (Payne 
and Williams, 2005), although this study seeks insights rather than generalisation. 
4.2.3 Research Strategy and Design Process 
This study was influenced by the NIS concept, intermediary studies, and the tradition 
of STS, in particular SLTI. The incorporation of the NIS approach, intermediary 
studies, and the SLTI perspective guided this study to explicate the dynamic nature 
of the knowledge-interaction process, focusing on the specific level of the KNIS. I 
explicate different patterns of relationships that involve heterogeneous actors and 
different evolving patterns during the process. In particular, this study requires 
observation of detailed information on specific barriers that heterogeneous SMEs 
may face in the innovation process and how they can be resolved through the 
interaction. 
For the study to capture how innovation occurred at a specific level of actors in the 
KNIS, I adopted an inductive research strategy, aimed at investigating the interactive 
process between the public intermediary and SMEs to garner insights into their 
current status and to carry out further research (Blaikie, 2000, 2010). As part of the 
strategy, I adopted two key features: a meso- and micro-level focus and a qualitative 
approach. The meso-level approach plays a crucial role in bridging macro and micro 
factors in mediating processes: that is, focusing on “institutions that intermediate 
between the firm and the market or between the individuals and the state” (Misa, 
1994, p139). Meso-level institutions include public intermediaries, business 
associations, and consulting firms. The micro-level focus may bring insights into 
how the system functions, relationships between actors, heterogeneity of the system, 
and individual learning. 
The qualitative method used for this research comprises a series of in-depth 
interviews in a variety of fields. The approach is attractive for social science research 
for many reasons including the ability to gather “rich, full, earthy, holistic, real” 
information about the phenomenon under study (Miles, 1979). In particular, the 
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qualitative approach is appropriate to unearth rich, hidden information on the 
interactions between the public intermediary and selected SMEs that might affect 
complex innovation processes. Because previous research and the empirical base are 
quite limited, this method is a more effective way to uncover the relationships 
between intermediaries and SMEs than engaging the actors and observers in a 
conversation. Hence, it provides “a more precise way to assess causality in 
organizational affairs than any arcane effort like cross-lagged correlations” (A. S. 
Lee, 1989, cited in Adesida, 2005 p153). The use of the in-depth interview is the best 
method42 to obtain information from players embedded in the processes. 
Based on the different perspectives from the literature review, I have developed the 
conceptual framework to observe how public intermediaries often intervene to 
organise knowledge interaction in the complex and uncertain innovation process, and 
thereby decrease barriers. Addressing the public intermediary in Korea and the 
knowledge interaction with SMEs, the framework provides meso- and micro-level 
approaches, integrating social dimensions that go beyond examining the pattern of 
knowledge-interaction processes. The framework guides this study to investigate not 
only the nature of interaction processes and learning but also microsociological 
factors embedded in the relationships and interactions that may produce successful, 
or less successful, innovations by SMEs. 
Furthermore, the conceptual framework suggests that knowledge interaction is 
critical for innovative SMEs to address barriers in the uncertain innovation process 
and in this vein, bridging mechanisms are important devices to resolve system 
failures and enhance efficiencies of the KNIS. For example, the complexity of 
innovations might require enabling knowledge, facilitating relationships and learning, 
and managing interfaces as a result of uncertainties and barriers entailed in the 
innovation process (Chapter 3). In this vein, public intermediaries at the early stages 
of innovation can play a crucial role in resolving the barriers that SMEs may face 
during the innovation process, whereas the intermediating role has comparatively 
                                                        
42 Unlike structured ones, in-depth interviews have advantages in presenting greater interests in 
interviewees’ opinions and insights and having flexibility for interview flow (Bryman, 2004). 
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received little attention compared to the role of firms in the NIS framework. I 
elaborate on this framework in the following empirical chapters. 
 
Figure 4-1 Conceptual framework. 
Source: Author. 
Once I designed the conceptual framework and identified the research methods, I 
carried out the study using the three-phase process shown in Figure 4-2. In spite of 
the sequential nature, the process has been rather iterative throughout the research. 
 
Figure 4-2 Empirical research processes.  
Source: Author. 
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During the first phase, mapping produced a broad understanding of a range of SMEs 
that had intermediary services, and to provide a system of classification aligned with 
suggestions inspired by the conceptual framework. The result was a classification of 
SMEs that provided the basis for the selection of 26 SMEs; I then gathered further 
information for analysis. These SMEs have had regular interactions with staff from 
intermediaries and have shown innovative outcomes for the last three years. The 
selection criteria appear in Section 4.3.1. 
Following the mapping exercise, the second phase was the collection of information 
to be reviewed thoroughly: 1) 26 SMEs, their activities, interactions and relationships, 
2) public and private intermediaries involved in knowledge interaction with the 26 
SMEs. Carrying out semi-structured interviews with participants provided the 
evidence base, followed by the selection of 5 SMEs for further review and analysis. 
The number of in-depth interviews was a trade-off of width of knowledge against 
depth of knowledge that supports the findings of the study. This economical 
methodology, compared with structured interviews, allowed the ease of interviewing 
while mitigating the influence of the interviewer, which might induce biased answers 
(Bryman, 2004). 
At this stage, I adopted the explanatory approach, employing second in-depth 
interviews for 5 SMEs to further develop the information obtained from the first set 
of interviews. I excluded cases that included a single public intermediary (i.e. KISTI) 
as a programme organiser when selecting the five cases, because KISTI could be 
biased towards the supply point of view, especially if considering successful cases. 
Another key challenge for qualitative research that depends on interviews is 
encouraging people to talk honestly or to share information. On the other hand, 
participants may exaggerate claims about what they achieve. To maintain objectivity, 
I employed triangulation of data sources to provide some assurance that the evidence 
gathered is close to reality. 
In the third stage, I coded, categorised, and analysed the collected information. I was 
able to draw recommendations that may lead to solutions to overcome innovation 
barriers through intermediary–SMEs interactions from further analysis. The 
remainder of this chapter provides information on how evidence was gathered 
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through the case study approach and how it was analysed to provide insights into the 
knowledge-interaction process suggested by the conceptual framework. 
4.3 Case Selection and Sites 
4.3.1 Mapping the Knowledge Interaction Landscape: Case Selection 
To determine the selection methods and the number of cases, I considered the data-
collection processes that produce the best quality of information, along with other 
factors such as limitations of budget and timing or data accessibility. Obtaining in-
depth and concise knowledge takes much time, thereby limiting the number of cases. 
Although the number of cases may be considered a small unit of evidence in support 
of arguments compared to large-scale surveys, I did not look at a huge range of cases 
due to the complexity of the interaction process and the meso- and micro-level of 
analysis in this study. As this study addressed several issues regarding interactions 
among specific actors in the KNIS, facilitating mechanisms for interactive learning 
and innovation, microsociological factors and different patterns of relationships 
made it helpful to look into selected cases, delving more deeply into the knowledge-
interaction process to achieve the scope of this study. 
Furthermore, considering the limited time, budget, and space for this study and 
doctoral research, the selected case studies in such depth and width served the 
purpose of this study, bringing insights and findings that provided a rationale for 
possible interventions in complex situations and further contributing to knowledge. 
Bearing this in mind, I chose cases with a certain level of variety to observe the 
interaction process based on the conceptual framework. As this study sought to 
understand the factors of knowledge interaction that distinguish successful cases 
from less successful cases, as indicated in Section 4.2.2, I chose successful and less 
successful (or failed) cases for cross-sectional analysis. 
I selected five SMEs in total using the following criteria. 
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Table 4-1 Criteria for the Case Selection 
Recognised and registered as ‘innovative firms’ by the SMBA 
Recommended by the public (private) intermediary 
Strong interaction with the public intermediary: firms that have had knowledge services that took 
between several months and a year-long of interaction 
Firms categorised as successful or less successful 
- Successful firms that achieved innovative outcomes as a result of the services 
- Less successful firms that are under progress of interaction at the point of interviews or used 
failed experiences to develop another business opportunity 
- Failure firms that reported the closure of business or were unable to yield innovative outcomes 
Source: Author. 
The successful (or failure) of firms, as defined by intermediaries, were firms that 
achieved sales growth as a result of the support. However, the definition of 
successful firms was changed as interviews progressed; firms that experienced any 
changes as a result of interaction were categorised as successful cases. In contrast, 
some firms failed, as they did not yield any profits relating to intermediary support. 
They were recategorised as less successful when experiences contributed to the firm 
achieving organisational changes or R&D direction. 
Along with the selection of the firms by the criteria of success, I considered two 
technology fields: mechatronics and IT.43 Mechatronics is a multidisciplinary field 
of engineering referring to a combination of mechanics and electronics originally, 
but the concept has been broadened to include areas such as intelligent robots, 
semiconductor and display manufacturing equipment, and other automation 
equipment: in other words infrastructural technology applied in various field of 
technologies or industries. Innovative SMEs in this area tend to have supplied large 
global corporations that might contribute to building technological competitiveness 
in global markets. 
                                                        
43 Although I define two fields as mechatronics and IT, all firms had different technological 
backgrounds depending on what types of technologies they combined in producing equipment. The 
technological characteristics of firms were much more complex than I anticipated. Because innovative 
SMEs have a tendency to use a multidisciplinary field of technologies in developing new products, the 
complexity of classification increased. For example, members of IT firms I interviewed combine IT, 
software, mechatronics, electronics, and often design technology. One firm classified as mechatronics 
considers itself a physical chemistry firm. 
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SMEs are under subtle pressure from big buyers to reduce manufacturing costs as 
suppliers and often suffer from intensified price or technology competition with other 
suppliers. To avoid being crushed between price competition and technology 
competition, these SMEs have been seeking new business opportunities or investing 
in R&D to maintain technological competitiveness at a global level. The SMEs in 
this area require new knowledge to explore the new market or new buyers, and to 
exploit new innovation opportunities to enjoy their unique position as global 
suppliers, causing them to demand in-depth knowledge services to enhance their 
innovative capabilities on a mid- to long-term basis. 
The Korean government has supported the IT sector as part of its S&T strategy for 
several decades. When the government put huge efforts into fostering innovative 
SMEs during the late 1990s and early 2000s, a large number of startup firms and 
small businesses were established. At that time, R&D investment was the main 
support strategy for IT firms and researchers and professors as entrepreneurs 
benefited from the policy. Although SMEs in this sector depend less on big buyers 
compared to SMEs in mechatronics or other traditional sectors, they still lack 
capabilities to design and produce key components, new products, or new customers. 
Some SMEs are technologically competitive, which can replace foreign products, 
whereas some try to discover new business opportunities in areas where industry or 
technology fusion emerge. This phenomenon might lead SMEs to look for 
specialised services rather than R&D funding. 
Recently, the government designated the ICT sector as the infrastructure to create 
new industries through technology or product fusion so more firms could benefit 
from the national policy. As the part of efforts to create new markets, the Korean 
government also established a long-term S&T strategy for how existing technologies 
could combine with emerging technologies in different fields of technologies. The 
government defines the role of public intermediaries in the KNIS, and what they 
should do in identifying not only policy direction (where it should go) but also the 
capability of SMEs and their demands in exploring new opportunities (the 
heterogeneous nature of SMEs). This topic will be further examined in the following 
empirical chapters. 
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I conducted the entire data-collection process in Korea over the course of 1 year. 
Then, I analysed the collected data using qualitative methods, which took another 1.5 
years. 
4.3.2 Case Sites 
Many other players, however, participated in innovation programmes of SMEs. The 
candidate space for case selection was where the interactions and relationships were 
formed: where policymakers, public and private intermediaries, and SMEs interacted 
in innovation processes. Public intermediaries promoted the fostering of innovative 
SMEs such as the Innovation Foundation (IF) and KISTI. The IF is one of the major 
organisations administered by the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning 
(MSIP),44 charged with diffusing innovation and creating knowledge. The 
foundation, set up 1994, has operated many support programmes such as funding, 
networking, and consultations, in cooperation with other public and private 
intermediaries and global partners (Innopolis Foundation, 2014). Furthermore, the 
foundation has aimed to foster innovative SMEs in Daedeok Science Town,45 
linking the resources from universities and research institutes since its inception. As 
a result, it has extensive experience in collaborative programmes and in particular 
innovative SME support programmes. 
KISTI has been taking an active part in SME support programmes funded by SMBA 
since the early 2000s, whereas other GRIs mainly focus on R&D collaboration with 
SMEs. KISTI has formed the Association of Science and Technology Information, 
which consists of 13,000 members from industry (mostly SMEs), academia, and 
institutes. Additionally, since 2000, policymakers have often pointed to KISTI as a 
linkage organisation in the KNIS. Based on a brief review of the landscape of public 
intermediaries, their programmes, and their roles in the KNIS, I chose IF and KISTI 
as major intermediaries. However, I also included the Korea Techno-Venture 
                                                        
44 The IF was administered by the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy while KISTI was 
administered by the Ministry of Education and Science Technology until the new government took 
over in 2013. Now all intermediaries listed in case sites belong to the MSIP. 
45 Daedeok is the specific area where Daedeok Science Town is located. In the region, 30 GRIs, 5 
universities, 1,300 firms, and 20,000 researchers reside to foster collaboration among industries, 
academia, and research institutes. 
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Foundation (KTVF), an organisation affiliated with the KIST and the Gyunggi SME 
Business Centre administered by Gyunggi Provincial Government to increase 
credibility of the collected data, based on the knowledge services that public 
intermediaries provided and the roles designated by the government. 
However, this study aimed to understand the knowledge-interaction process, based 
on the views of demand side rather than supply side. I then thoroughly examined the 
demands and problems of innovative SMEs in the innovation process and how they 
resolve problems through knowledge interaction with intermediaries. I included 
policymakers involved in designing SME-support programmes or acting as advisors 
on the execution of the programmes who might provide a balanced view of the 
information collected. Therefore, I list in Figure 4-3 a number of players, according 
to their major role, categorised as policymakers, intermediaries, and SMEs. 
Furthermore, I updated the categories and the list of organisations, as well as their 
positions, as the research matured. 
 
Figure 4-3 Overview of major players in interactions. 
Source: Author. 
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4.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
4.4.1 Types of Data: Documents and Interviews 
For the data collection, I employed various types of data and processes to get the 
benefits of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). The sources included in this 
study were mainly in the form of documents and interviews. I triangulated the 
information from these data and from theories to give valid accounts of the 
knowledge interaction between public intermediaries and SMEs and their effects on 
bridging barriers to innovation. 
The first type of data was a systematic review of secondary sources such as literature 
on the NIS concept and intermediary studies, Internet searches, and scholarly works. 
I collected secondary data throughout the research period to broaden the research 
point of view through longitudinally or cross-sectionally comparing information. 
These documents increased the reliability of other methods (e.g. interviews) by 
triangulating data sources (Yin, 2003). Hence, the secondary analysis method 
involves the use of existing data in order to pursue research interests which is distinct 
from that of the original study; this can be new or alternative perspectives on the 
original questions (Heaton, 1998). 
I retrieved data from various sources including some major S&T policy reports in 
Korea, government proceedings, technical and industry reports published by research 
institutions and research departments in industry, technical journals, PowerPoint 
slides used at conferences, and other consultation reports on specific SMEs. Among 
multiple sources of documents, government publications were the major source of 
S&T history, KNIS and SME policy, from the Science and Technology Policy 
Institute (STEPI), Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), MSIP, 
the SMBA, and KISTI. The public intermediary to which I belonged held extensive 
information on SMEs as the national focal point of SME support in Korea, and I was 
able to use this resource. 
For SME related information, some were not officially provided to the public and yet 
were traceable and accessible. In particular, those reports that included crucial 
information about innovative SMEs were unavailable at the beginning of the research, 
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although they were imperative in analysing the changes in R&D investment plans, 
relationships with big buyers, and marketing plans. This information could be 
obtained as interviews progressed. I could also contact the relevant person using 
personal contacts in the organisations to request a copy. This enabled the tracing of 
how intermediaries translate knowledge and how interactions between intermediaries 
and SMEs affect the development and innovation process, which was the main 
question for this research. 
I acquired the second type of data through in-depth interviews in a semi-structured 
format, organised in two sessions to examine and track the interaction of actors and 
effects on the innovation process. In addition to the interviewees from SMEs, I 
interviewed experts from various organisations to increase the credibility and validity 
of the study phenomenon. These interviewees included experts from public and 
private intermediaries, policymakers from the Innopolis Foundation, and a professor 
from Hannam University who had been acting as an advisor on S&T policy. The data 
gathered from this group provided insights from different positions to define the 
effects of interaction between public intermediaries and SMEs in each stage of the 
innovation process. 
4.4.2 Interviewee Guideline and Process 
4.4.2.1 Interview Guideline 
I designed the interview to yield a certain level of fluidity and to reflect the four 
functions described in the previous chapter. I prepared a preliminary interview 
design and tailored it where needed to bring good questions that could not be 
answered by going through documents, and to cover any specific issues that arose 
during the interviews. Based on the first interview, I revised or expanded the 
questions in accordance with the interviewee’s expertise. This iterative process 
played a crucial role not only in developing the questions but also learning the 
innovation process in real life. As indicated in Section 4.3.1, interviewees had 
various concepts of successful (or less successful) innovation that required me to set 
aside any bias of success (or failure), even though some firms were designated as 
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successful firms by public intermediaries. This realization caused me to refrain from 
using some terms such as success factors or failure factors directly.  
Table 4-2 presents the main areas of inquiry or interview themes aligned with 
candidate questions I asked to interviewees. A series of questions was developed 
around the research questions. In addition to answering the questions, questions were 
also included the context of knowledge interaction derived from the conceptual 
framework. In other words, questions were designed to seek information on the firms, 
their views of relationships, interaction processes, outcomes and their perceptions of 
innovation. The initial questions were more open-ended in order to listen to how 
interviewees considered experiences with intermediaries in general. Interviewees 
were asked to explain the history of firms and the nature of the knowledge 
interaction in order to identify why public intermediaries were involved in the 
specific types of demands from SMEs and how these differences affected on 
different patterns of relationships.  
I presented the guideline to interview questions (Table 4-2) to interviewees prior to 
conducting interviews but the interviews did not follow the guidelines rigidly, as the 
iterative interview process led to ongoing feedback and modifications in questions. 
This flexibility is a peculiar aspect of semi-structured interviews where initial 
questions only provide guidance. I developed a series of questions around the topic 
and asked questions about the context regarding participants’ views of particular 
types of intermediaries and their perceptions of experiences in the innovation process. 
However, when conducting interviews around the outcomes of the knowledge 
interaction, of foremost importance was to discern interviewees’ views aligned with 
the meaning of innovation. Because of a certain level of expectations that support 
programmes and interactions might bring, questions ensued about outcomes of the 
knowledge interaction in the beginning: Did the support programmes generate any 
outcomes? What caused the low level (or high level) of sales growth? What are the 
effect of supporting programmes for driving successful innovation? However, 
participants debated the meaning of innovation and its outcomes, and some 
interviewees directly indicated different viewpoints about innovation between 
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policymakers and firms. I sensed these questions needed to be revised and should be 
asked directly. 
Table 4-2 Guideline to Interview Questions 
Categories Sample questions 
Technology - What is the competitive situation for the firm’s products (technologies)?  
- Which are your most important marketing tools? (e.g. trade shows, agents, 
seller- initiated relationships, buyer-initiated relationships, recommendations 
from existing customers, intermediaries) 
- Have there been any barriers to innovation that have had a negative impact 
on the firm? 
- Which individuals within the firm manage the maintenance of contact with 
intermediaries? (How have the relationships with them changed over time?) 
- Can you describe how the communication processes within the firm work? 
- What was the motivation to look for external expertise? 
Relationships - Can you briefly describe relationships that you think are the most important 
for the firm’s activities? (Are some of these relationships with big buyers?) 
- Which actors were specifically involved in the creation of relationships 
between the firm and customers? (Were there any existing contacts or 
relationships between individuals in the firm’s management and players in the 
new market?) 
- How did the firm communicate/work with these customers? What do you 
expect through communication? 
- Did the communication give you improved knowledge? Did the interaction 
improve your technological and managerial knowledge? 
- What would you ideally want your customer relationships to be like? How 
did you overcome the barriers if you have? 
Knowledge - What are your main knowledge sources? 
- What kind of knowledge existed within the firm was used to develop the new 
product? (How did the firm obtain the knowledge and resources needed for 
developing the new business area, if you did not have?) 
- How was previously developed knowledge about strategy development 
stored and transferred? (Do you use manuals, databases, etc.?) 
- Can you suggest any other individuals within and outside the firm who have 
much knowledge about the subjects that we have discussed? 
- Did similarities in business climates play any role in the choice of target 
markets? 
- Were there gaps between employees or between your firm and other 
participants in developing a new product? 
Intermediary - What was the motivation of using the intermediary? How did you make a 
choice? 
- What did intermediaries (your firm) provide to your firm (intermediaries)? 
- How did the service affect your firm? If not, what should it be? 
- Are you still contacting the intermediary? 
Innovation - What do you mean by (successful) innovation? 
- Has the firm used any distinctive strategies during new technology 
development or market expansion? 
- Do you believe in the support programmes provided by public intermediaries 
in innovation process? What should it be? 
- What is the role of universities and research institutes in promoting 
innovation? What should it be? 
Source: Adapted from Lindstrand, Melén and Nordman (2011, pp210–211) and Y. S. Park et al. (2006, 
pp268–288). 
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I asked interviewees the aims behind the participating the programmes in order to 
understand whether (or how) firms’ needs were met by public intermediaries, and 
whether it brought any benefits firms. Initial questions included success or failure 
factors which affected the innovation process but I realised questions relating success 
or failure (factors or outcomes) could be problematic as the research were progressed. 
Some CEOs argued there were no such factors which could determine success or 
failure of firms. Therefore, I tried not to ask directly about the outcomes of 
knowledge interaction with intermediaries as it is related to the notion of success or 
failures of firms. Instead, I tried to analyse the meaningful texts drawn from other 
categories of questions. 
4.4.2.2 Interview Process 
As Yin (2003) points out, a case-study approach relies on theoretical sampling 
instead of statistical sampling; the choice of interviews was influenced by conceptual 
questions rather than a concern with representativeness (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Because interviews are the major sources of data in a case study, well-conducted 
interviews may provide insights into the black-box of knowledge interaction. This 
insight could not be identified by statistical analysis. The information needed for the 
study required insiders’ views and knowledge that consisted of more than 
information on patterns of relationships and interaction in the KNIS: these are micro-
factors that determine success of innovation, different histories of SMEs, and 
different relational capital with external expertise.  
The interviewees were chosen mainly centred on CEOs for two reasons; to explain 
the knowledge interaction process with intermediaries and firms’ strategies which 
might change over time; and to explain the organisational and individual changes as 
the result of the knowledge interaction. Furthermore, many CEOs have also involved 
in the existing business area for a long time and were able to provide insights into the 
long-term based relationships between intermediaries and SMEs. Most of all, the 
CEOs were the key actors who identified problems of firms, involved in the 
knowledge interaction directly and maintained the contact with intermediaries. 
However, I also applied the ‘degree of heterogeneity’ of cases in selecting 
interviewees, when necessary. Although most interviewees from SMEs were CEOs, I 
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interviewed CTOs or staff from the firm if they were interacted with intermediaries 
to seek a holistic picture of complex innovation processes at multiple levels rather 
than fragments of relationships at a specific point in time. 
From the intermediary side, key researchers (or directors) were identified through 
their involvement in the knowledge interaction process with SMEs. They had sound 
knowledge about which SMEs were involved in the programmes and which were 
successful (or less successful). Targeting 26 SMEs and 5 intermediaries, I mainly 
chose one key person from one organisation except two SMEs. Although the number 
of intermediaries seemed to be small compared to the number of SMEs, public 
intermediaries chosen for this study have been supporting multiple SMEs up to 26 
SMEs. The researchers interviewed were actively involved in the knowledge 
interaction between public intermediaries and 5 SMEs, and were able to explain the 
‘what was happening’ during the interaction processes. Furthermore, they had 
experiences with other SMEs in different fields and were able to provide insights into 
complexity and diversity embodied in the knowledge interaction process. 
Through the iterative process, I interviewed 47 people during 2012 and 2013: 38 
interviewees from 26 SMEs, 7 interviewees from public and private intermediaries, 
and 1 from a university (Table 4-3). Among them, 15 interviewees were particularly 
informative, as they had various experiences as CEOs or policymakers for a long 
period of time. Interviews with these participants took 2 to 3 hours and sometimes 5 
to 6 hours at the first interview. As I had to trace whether the interaction process was 
successful, it was important to maintain an unbiased attitude as an interviewer. Had I 
let my biases interfere, interviewees may have tried to show only the good side of 
interactions with public intermediaries to maintain good relationships with 
government bodies. 
I conducted the first in-depth interviews in Korea to obtain the specific details of the 
interaction with public intermediaries about innovation and its effects on enhancing 
innovative capabilities. For this stage, I interviewed CEOs who had used 
intermediary services. Because I have been involved in services and in regular 
contact with the same CEOs, I had the advantage of communicating with them 
without barriers. For policymakers, they had extensive knowledge of innovation of 
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SMEs and government support programmes. I contacted these participants as the 
interviews with SMEs proceeded to cross-check the information I obtained. 
I took a careful approach to selecting interviewees who were well aware of the 
context of the innovation process of the firm. In seeking participants in SMEs, I 
emphasised interviewing CEOs or senior-level staff. These participants were the 
founders of firms and therefore knew well the history of their firm, collaboration 
programmes, and knowledge interactions with external organisations. Unlike big 
corporations, small firms often do not have clear structures (e.g. marketing, R&D, 
and management departments.) and CEOs have a huge impact on R&D, management, 
and marketing. Most of all, CEOs were key actors involved in the knowledge-
interaction process with public intermediaries and big buyers, delivering feedback to 
intermediaries and facilitating internal communications. However, I also interviewed 
CTOs or other senior-level officials, if CEOs delegated roles to them or they were 
involved in the knowledge-interaction process. This approach was useful to explain 
the single phenomenon of an SME in rich detail, such as history, relationships, and 
capabilities of each firm, because little research has been done in this area. 
This study was an ex post evaluation of the knowledge-interaction process. Learning 
was not monitored systematically during interactions but had to be monitored and 
assessed by recollection of the participants. This format might imply a greater risk of 
bias and selectivity by respondents (SMEs). Therefore, in addition to the CEOs of 
SMEs, I interviewed intermediaries as a way to corroborate the evidence collected 
from each SME. Intermediaries interviewed were researchers or project managers 
responsible for managing programmes and key activities of the knowledge 
interaction. Although I interviewed a small number of participants, they were the key 
actors who interacted with SMEs for a long period of time, managing interfaces. 
They provided rich evidence on the knowledge-interaction landscape, offering 
experiences and consultation reports in the case-study approach. In addition, as I was 
involved in designing SME support programmes and knowledge interaction with 
other types of intermediaries and SMEs, I was able to serve as a reflexive actor 
during the interviews.  
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Even though I clearly stated my position as a student, my work experiences may 
have limited the boundaries of interviews. However, my position had more 
advantages than disadvantages. Because the information I needed was often treated 
as confidential, it might not have been possible to access those CEOs without my 
background or a referee who recommended me as an analyst from the public 
intermediary. I was able to deliver a credible image to interviewees and my status as 
a student made them open their thoughts more freely. One interviewee who I met 
three times spent 3 to 6 hours at every meeting not only talking about interactions 
with intermediaries, but also his disappointing experience with the intermediary for 
which I worked. Some interviewees who were dissatisfied with the service seemed to 
be careful about giving a candid statement that could affect their potential 
relationships with the public intermediary, but most seemed to be open to deliver 
what they really wanted to say. 
Following the first interviews targeting 47 interviewees, I organised a second in-
depth interview process to examine the interactions that occurred between SMEs and 
the public intermediary, along with characteristics of successful (or less successful) 
innovative SMEs. I selected interviewees who were CEOs, CTOs, or staff of the five 
SMEs in charge of co-operation with external organisations. I visited the firm more 
than once to have second interviews and third interviews with the same interviewees 
when necessary. To maintain a ‘neutral stance’, one researcher from Hannam 
University accompanied me to two firms classified as successful cases. At the second 
interviews, I tried to look into the hidden nature of interaction rather than the 
organisational level, but also at an individual level such as individual thoughts on a 
certain project or relationship with analysts or consultants from the intermediaries. 
Prior to interviews, I conducted document analysis and a web search to identify any 
participation in government support programmes, to remind interviewees of the 
experience of collaboration. Furthermore, I investigated additional information 
including innovative capabilities of CEOs, technologies, markets, networks, and 
outcomes for the last three years (2008–2010) with the help of public and private 
intermediaries involved in the programmes. Then, as previously stated, I interviewed 
researchers from the public intermediary who were involved in strong relationships 
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with those five SMEs to seek ways they interacted and transferred knowledge. As 
Altrichter et al. (2008, p147) insist, triangulation “gives a more detailed and balanced 
picture of the situation”; the data triangulation had clearly affected my preconceived 
notions of SMEs I interviewed and the concept of successful (or less successful) 
innovation, as shown in the selection criteria. In one case considered to be a good 
example of bilateral interaction between a specific intermediary and an SME, 
relationships were evolving at multiple levels, enrolling heterogeneous actors from 
public and private sectors. SMEs were not passive recipients of services. 
The process was iterative which brought in-depth knowledge and information by 
building up the events related to the innovation process of SMEs. I benefitted from 
this study in accessing and acquiring information from CEOs and policymakers 
because the topic was a significant area of interest for demand and supply-side actors. 
Often, interviewees spent more time than they planned and some CEOs introduced 
key staff in case they could not deliver the interaction process in detail. Each 
interview was recorded after receiving the consent of the interviewee, who agreed to 
the use of the interview contents for the study. However, I decided to keep all names 
anonymous and some information confidential because the information may be 
critical to their relationships with big buyers. Then the interviews were transcribed 
with significant sections translated into English for further analysis. 
The interviews conducted in the field are listed in Table 4-3. The detailed 
interviewee’s list is provided in Appendix 3. 
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Table 4-3 Interviews Conducted for the Case Study 
 Fields 
KISTI 
and IF* KTVF GSBC 
Private 
consultancies Sum 
SMEs Mechatronics 6 (10) 3 (4) 2 (2) 1 (1) 11 (17) 
Chemistry 2 (4) — 1 (3) — 3 (7) 
IT 6 (8) 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) 12 (14) 
Subtotal 13 5 5 3 26 (38) 
Intermediaries 2 (4) 1 (2) — 2 (2) 5 (8) 
University     1 (1) 
Subtotal 2 2  2 6 (8) 
Total 32 (48)† 
Note. Number of interviewees in parentheses; * among the 13 cases, KISTI carried two cases alone 
and the IF was the organiser of the support programme for the other cases. † The actual number of 
interviews was 47 because one CEO from the mechatronics firm operated a private intermediary. 
4.4.3 Data Analysis 
This study sought to explore, understand, and describe a particular phenomenon, 
with its focus on providing an understanding of how intermediaries facilitate 
knowledge interaction between organisations and institutions, but ultimately between 
individuals and how the process can resolve barriers to innovation. The study was 
therefore about discovery, uncovering the intermediating process based on the four 
functions suggested in the framework. The line-by-line review of the interview texts 
provided the basis to examine the research questions suggested by the conceptual 
framework. The analysis of the data derived insights from the case that I compared to 
the conceptual framework, while connecting the analytic focus to broader debates in 
the literature on the NIS and intermediary studies. The analysis step provided a rich 
description, covering theoretical and policy implications. 
For the data analysis, I used an interpretive approach to analyse the narrative 
obtained from semi-structured interviews and linking the new ideas from thematic 
coding to constructs introduced in the theoretical framework (Van der Blonk, 2003). 
Before coding the data, I noted my thoughts related to specific comments from the 
interviewees, which were then used for further inquiry in the second interviews or 
analysis of primary-interview data. The collected data went through hermeneutic 
iterations of interpretation with new emerging theoretical constructs (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990).  
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Throughout the analysis process, the conceptual framework was the basis for 
analysis of the data using the case study approach, but did not limit my ability to 
derive new properties or categories, because this process was one of the steps of the 
grounded-theory method. Furthermore, I had pre-established no clear direction for 
analysing the qualitative data (Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor, 2003). Thus, the 
coding process included several iterative processes of applying new categories. I 
assigned concepts and labels to the meaningful transcript excerpts that could respond 
to research questions and then I re-categorized a number of concepts and labels into a 
smaller group. The iterative processes were time consuming and involved careful 
examination of the transcripts to gain an understanding of participants’ views, which 
allowed segmentation of a transcript into the categories suggested by the conceptual 
framework. 
The line-by-line review, segmentation and categorisation process provided a basis to 
examine the research questions, while the process also informed certain directions of 
the study. The aim of the analysis was not to make judgements, but rather to uncover 
how the knowledge-interaction process affects innovation of SMEs by decreasing 
barriers. Ensuring reliability of the data collected from firms, policymakers, 
academics, and intermediaries, I cross-checked various levels of evidence during the 
process, thoroughly examining ideas from the case analysis and comparison of those 
ideas with the expectations of the conceptual framework. 
Once I categorised and analysed all interview texts, I used document data to support 
the validity of the analysis. Documents incorporated into the analysis included 
consultation reports on each SME, inside data from SMEs (e.g. strategic plans), SME 
policy reports, evaluation reports, and whitepapers on support programmes. In 
particular, inside data of SMEs and consultation reports were useful in building 
credibility of the findings obtained from the case study. The documents provided not 
only information on firms that added credibility to retrospective comments made by 
interviewees, but also findings on how SMEs implemented support programmes and 
the gaps between the programmes and expectations of SMEs. I triangulated these 
documents with analysed data from interviews to generalise the role of public 
101 
 
intermediaries in facilitating innovation of SMEs in Korea through the four functions 
provided in the previous chapter. 
However, the analysis was not meaningful without presentation of the findings 
because data presentation is an integral part of research (Van der Blonk, 2003). In 
this vein, subsequent chapters present a rich description of the knowledge interaction 
between the public intermediary and SMEs in the KNIS. They cover the different 
innovation patterns of successful and less successful cases and how the interactions 
and learning influenced the innovation processes of SMEs in different directions. 
Furthermore, they uncover what is happening in the system, the involvement of 
heterogeneous actors, and evolving characteristics of relationships. The rich 
description and analysis of the evidence further provide theoretical and policy 
implications derived from interpretations of the findings. 
4.4.4 Reflections 
A major strength of this study is the shift from an intermediary-centred perspective 
towards the demand side, focusing on the shaping of mutual relationships and 
learning between the public intermediary and SMEs in the innovation system. In 
particular, the focus on the knowledge-interaction process and the role of 
intermediaries represents the major backbone of this research, based on the theories 
relating to the NIS concept and intermediary studies applying STS perspectives. 
During the process of analysing data, it was difficult to justify keeping the research 
stance away from the supplier’s viewpoint of public intermediaries. It was by 
strengthening the framework and making it more robust through data analysis that 
this study could overcome the dominant discourse on the role of public 
intermediaries as suppliers delivering services to firms. In particular, I was interested 
in why some firms were successful and others were not although the group of firms 
benefited from the same type of knowledge services. It led to observing the view of 
demand side and the interaction process. 
The data triangulation, applying STS perspectives, provided a rationale for the 
heterogeneity of relationships and actors, and the sociological factors that affect the 
innovation process that have rarely been explained in the NIS framework. Thus, this 
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study could provide adequate answers to the research questions designed to extend 
the existing NIS concept and intermediary studies into relationship value in the 
innovation processes and their influence on innovative capabilities of innovative 
SMEs, and thus KNIS. It might be impossible to explicate the black box of 
interaction and relationships without field data and theory triangulation, but it also 
brought disadvantages. 
Sometimes, preconceptions gained by personal experience seemed to hinder the 
interdisciplinary field of research. As the research had been carried out as planned, I 
could strengthen the examining process by applying an interdisciplinary approach 
that provided a better framework for analysis and insights to policymakers in Korea. 
In particular, the processual approach to the NIS and intermediary studies elucidated 
the contingent and complex innovation process and interactions at meso- and micro-
levels involving heterogeneous actors and factors. The relationships and interactions 
evolved in different ways: the innovation path and technological expertise that 
accumulated in the firm tended to shape the innovation environment.  
For the cases selected, I had an advantage because I have been deeply involved in 
intermediary services as a researcher. I am well aware of policy structures, corporate 
cultures, and language, and at the same time have in-depth experience and 
relationships with SMEs in Korea. Considering that the corporate culture of SMEs is 
quite closed, especially in that actors depend on large corporations such as Samsung 
or LG, it is one of my major strengths to be able to observe the SMEs without key 
barriers, due to the impartial position I hold.  
As I developed the study, I was able to aver my position allowed me to be open to 
different perspectives. I was not just a researcher but also a social scientist standing 
back from the situation. I needed to reflect on how interviewees might answer 
questions while thinking of my position, given their contexts. My neutral stance 
helped me overcome the local knowledge that I had at the beginning of the study. 
Some SMEs were defined as failure cases whereas others were not in innovation, 
however many interviewees consented that the innovation entailed several failure 
and success experiences. I could keep away from concluding the ‘end-status’ of 
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success or failure of firms by adopting the processual perspective of the innovation 
process. 
However, the weaknesses of this research may also be found in the selected cases, 
due to the timeline of this study. This research required in-depth, concise, and 
detailed knowledge and this led to a limit to the number of cases. To overcome the 
limitations, information from around 47 interviewees from various levels supported 
the key findings from the five case studies. Most of all, the study seeks a coherent 
description of complex knowledge interactions and relationships rather than 
providing common ground for generalisation that can only be strengthened and 
supported by in-depth study of a specific situation. However, I shall communicate 
with potential readers of this study through findings and policy implications. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explained the research methods adopted for the study. Although the 
case study approach influenced the research process, the empirical chapters also 
benefited from a grounded-theory approach. The general framework of the research 
design built on the NIS concept, intermediary studies, and STS perspectives, which 
guided examination of the complex interaction process. The research design does not 
aim to provide a generalisation of interaction patterns between public intermediaries 
and SMEs in different sectors or nations; rather, it attempts to provide insights into 
the role of public intermediaries in the KNIS, which facilitates innovation of SMEs 
by decreasing the barriers in the complex innovation process. Conducting five case 
studies provided width and depth to this study, enabling me to look into the complex 
evolving process of heterogeneous relationships during the innovation process.  
Chapter 5 provides an explanatory country-specific context of innovation systems 
and how the government has played a crucial role in facilitating innovation, pointing 
out mismatches between policy support and the demands of innovative SMEs. 
Chapters 6 and 7 are exploratory parts of the study, presenting the primary data 
obtained from the interview analysis. 
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5 Chapter 5. Challenging the KNIS: Its Adaptability 
and Flexibility  
5.1 Introduction 
Korea, as one of the countries that devotes relatively more of its resources to 
technology learning and technological processes than most others, has surpassed the 
leading European countries in R&D intensity (Hemmert, 2007). S&T policies and 
public-sector R&D appear to have grown in Korea to a level considered adequate for 
a technologically advanced country or ‘newly advanced economy’ (Hemmert, 2007). 
However, these policies, implemented for several decades, do not effectively link to 
economic outcomes, resulting in mismatches between institutions and actors. In 
particular, weak SMEs have been considered a chronic problem in the KNIS in spite 
of government efforts for several decades (Lim, 2008). 
Many scholars (D. Cho, 2012; Chu and Cho, 2006; Chung, 2002; L. Kim, 1993; K-R. 
Lee, 2004; K-R Lee, Choi and Park, 2004; Lim, 2008) criticise the low level of 
cooperation between firms (e.g. between large and small firms) in the KNIS that 
obstruct knowledge flow and learning. The low level of competitiveness of SMEs (D. 
Cho, 2005; Chu and Cho, 2006) may hinder interaction with large corporations (Lim, 
2008). In this vein, the role of the public intermediary as an external linkage of SMEs 
has drawn policy attention as it has been an innovation facilitator, transferring and 
facilitating knowledge interaction to enhance the innovation capacity of Korea (Y. B. 
Kim, 2005). Yet, displaying a broader framework, the KNIS has a limited grasp of 
the innovation process, which entails dynamic interaction with heterogeneous actors 
in a system where the national characteristics and institutions have strong impact on 
the innovative capability of firms. It is necessary to look into specific characteristics 
of the KNIS where institutions and actors evolve, examining the linkages and how 
they interact to resolve specific problems relating to the KNIS. 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the KNIS. Section 5.2 addresses the history 
and characteristics of S&T policy and its strengths and weaknesses, highlighting the 
role of GRIs as bridging organisations in the KNIS. Section 5.3 investigates SME 
policy, focusing on its developmental direction, a move towards fostering innovative 
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SMEs and related programmes. Then, the section stresses policy mismatches and 
indicates that the programme tends to concentrate on the R&D and 
commercialisation stages, overlooking the process in between. I argue that the 
problems (e.g. weak SMEs) embedded in the KNIS may come from the linear view 
of innovation, missing complex interaction processes at specific levels. Section 5.4 
suggests the modification of the KNIS to at an appropriate level (i.e. public-sector 
innovation intermediaries and SMEs) examine the interaction process, emphasising 
the interactive approach. 
5.2 Evolution Process of the Korean National Innovation System 
5.2.1 Main Historical Trends of S&T Policy in Industrial Development 
The urge to build the Korean economy after the Korean War (1950–1953) created an 
industry infrastructure and caught up with advanced technologies in a short period of 
time, driving S&T policies since 1960s. This effort resulted in one of the distinctive 
features of Korea’s capability building: the role of government.46 The Korean 
government directed limited resources to targeted industries, defending its domestic 
markets to encourage the entry of national firms and the construction of 
infrastructure and efficient facilities, influencing the acquisition of foreign 
technology, and promoting export activities (MarketLine, 2013). Taking a leadership 
role in enhancing technological competitiveness, the government started to establish 
GRIs as effective mechanisms to provide R&D and technology infrastructure to 
industries. Since the Five-Year Plan of Economic Development was initiated in 1962, 
the continuing steady increase in the number of GRIs in South Korea had been 
remarkable (Chung, 2002; S. Kim, Lee and Kang, 2012; Wong, 2004). 
In addition to the establishment of KIST in 1967, many GRIs were established 
during the 1960s and 1970s to support major Korean industries, with researchers 
equipped with expertise in specific technology areas. The GRIs linked the national 
                                                        
46 The role of government was fulfilled through the Five-Year’s Economic Development Plan, 
organised in five phases between 1962 and 1986. It continued to the 6th and 7th five-year plans, 
which ended in 1996. The Plan acted as a national blueprint that directed resources and sectoral 
investment plans and coordinated economic policies to implement the Plan. While Japan had the MITI 
to create similar kinds of conditions through guidance for developmental programs (C. Johnson, 1982), 
Korea had the Economic Planning Board where the deputy prime minister was in charge of the Five-
Year program. 
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vision and policy47 to local industries when the government pressured industries to 
enhance their technological capabilities by providing various incentives (H-D. Cho et 
al., 2011; Wong, 2004). The absence of university R&D capability in the 1960s and 
1970s also affected the increase in the number of GRIs. In this period, as a backbone 
of building national R&D capabilities, GRIs received 90% of the research grants in 
new technology areas awarded by the government (K. Kim, 2003). Government 
support focused on industrial-technology development, taking charge of many 
projects from industries. 
Beginning in 1980, industries showed rapid growth, and private corporations, known 
as chaebols,48 appeared as major players in national R&D activities. Because the 
central role of GRIs was to support industries, the growth of chaebols brought 
controversy over the redefinition of the function of GRIs. Since the 1990s the policy 
had started to facilitate cooperative R&D among GRIs, universities and firms, and 
the role of GRIs shifted from enhancing the R&D capabilities of major industries (i.e. 
chemicals and heavy industries) to supporting specific actors (i.e. SMEs) and areas 
where high uncertainty existed and large investment was required (H-D. Cho et al., 
2008). In this period, funding was seen as a major mechanism to encourage 
collaborative R&D and about 27% of funding was involved in information and 
knowledge exchange (K. Kim, 2003). While interactive learning did not seem to 
occur actively at this time, progress occurred in S&T policy, adopting the concept of 
an interactive approach: introduction of a Plan to Construct a National Innovation 
System (PCNIS; Lim, 2008) and the TF49 (Technology Foresight; Schlossstein, 
2007). 
                                                        
47 Many GRIs were established to deal with industrial needs: the Korean Atomic Energy Research 
Institute in 1959, the Korean Science and Technology Information Centre in 1960, which became the 
KISTI in 2001, the Korea Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute in 1967, the Korea 
Research Institute of Standards and Science in 1975, etc. 
48 According to the Oxford English dictionary, chaebols are large family-owned business 
conglomerates in South Korea. 
49 TF can be defined in various ways (Martin and Irvine, 1984; Salo and Cuhls, 2003) but common 
traits are focusing on alternative future scenarios, drawing a common understanding of emerging 
social and economic issues, deriving results through superior processes and need-orientation, and 
distilling policy recommendations (Schlossstein, 2007). The TF was widely used in 34 countries, 
mostly European, and by five supranational organisations, and in Korea, technologies called Next 
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In 2004, the government adopted the PCNIS as the major national S&T policy. This 
reflected the government commitment to moving towards an innovation-driven 
economy, emphasising the coordination of S&T policies among ministries and 
monitoring according to mid- and long-term S&T strategies and planning. The 
Ministry of Science and Technology was in charge of coordination and monitoring 
activities in cooperation with the National Science and Technology Council at that 
time. 
Along with the PCNIS, the TF framework had been used at the national level to tap 
decentralised knowledge resources and pool their ‘collective wisdom’ (Schlossstein, 
2007). Schlossstein (2007) argued that the TF framework seemed to lend itself to the 
innovation-systems perspective, replacing the linear model of innovation. For 
example, two national R&D programmes, the Highly Advance National projects and 
the Frontier Research Programme were formulated under intensive interaction with 
academia, industry, government and civil society. This coordination drew policy 
attention to the concept of system failure, introduced for the first time in a third TF 
study along with an NIS concept. In this regard, researchers recommended to use 
bridging institutions to remedy the shortfall; the low level of collaboration between 
scientists and product developers, and large corporations and small firms (Georghiou, 
2001; Schlossstein, 2007).  
In early 2011, the new government reformed the National Science and Technology 
Council into the National Science and Technology Commission to reinforce and 
supervise inter-ministerial coordination, R&D spending and evaluation. Focusing on 
new investment avenues in the future, many policies commenced towards the 
development and enforcement of ‘creative and convergence-oriented R&D’. To 
enhance the capabilities of SMEs, the government launched the New Technology 
Purchasing Assurance Scheme and Procurement Programme through which 
opportunities are given to SMEs that can provide goods and services to public 
organisations. The government also considered implementing ‘a globally open 
innovations system’ and an inter-ministerial cooperative programme, along with 
                                                                                                                                                             
Generation Engines of Economic Growth were selected for resource allocation covering the time 
frame until 2015 (Schlossstein, 2007). 
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increasing investment in basic research areas. To implement the policy vision the 
new government also emphasised the role of GRIs as innovation facilitators of SMEs, 
supporting whole stages of the innovation process. Table 5-1 shows the history of 
S&T policy described above. 
Table 5-1 The Direction of S&T Policy in Industrial Development 
Period Policy focus Activities 
1960s Fostering HR Launching the Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962–
1986) 
Establishing GRIs to lure Korean graduates overseas to support 
industrial needs 
Acquiring human resources and improvement in engineering skill 
levels 
1970s Fostering 
heavy 
industries 
Legislation entitled the Technology Promotion Development Act 
to foster domestic indigenous technologies 
Establishing GRIs to address industrial needs 
Establishing Daedeok Science Town 
1980s Enhancing 
internal 
resources 
Supporting R&D activities through the National R&D Programme 
Legislating Industrial Technology Association development 
Establishing the Korean Federation of Science and Technology 
Societies and Korea Basic Science Institute 
Late 1990s ~ 
early 2000s 
Increasing the 
number of 
SMEs 
Establishing the Presidential Commission on Small and Medium 
Enterprises (1998) 
Promoting new venture businesses and heavy investment in R&D: 
Increasing the number of newly established ventures from 422 
(1996) to 878 (1999; OECD, 2000) 
Encouraging SME-led innovation through joint research 
Conducting the first TF study (1993) and second TF study (1999): 
Formulating the HAN Project (1992) and the Frontier Research 
Programme (1999) 
2000s ~ late 
2000 
Fostering 
innovative 
SMEs 
 
 
Facilitating 
cooperative 
R&D 
Establishing the venture firms policy aiming at stimulating 
innovative SMEs in new and traditional industries 
Conducting the 3rd TF study (2003–2004) 
Announcing A Plan to Construct a National Innovation System 
(PCNIS; 2004). 
Shifting policy towards facilitating cooperative R&D among GRIs, 
universities and SMEs 
Increasing R&D funding and diversification of support 
programmes 
Early 2010s 
~ present 
Strengthening 
capabilities of 
SMEs 
Encouraging 
Start ups 
Reforming the National Science and Technology Commission 
(2012): Strengthening inter-ministerial coordination and 
designating new investment areas for the future 
Investing in R&D funding for SMEs, increasing the R&D budget 
to 18% (2018) from 12.4% (2012). 
Strengthening the role of GRIs as innovation facilitators for SMEs 
Note. HR = human resources. 
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5.2.2 Current Status of the KNIS: Its Strengths and Weaknesses 
The previous section described the history of S&T policy, which played an important 
role in shaping the current KNIS. Korea, as a full-fledged newly advanced 
economy50 competing in global markets, possesses a fully developed NIS that 
supports its future competitiveness (Hemmert, 2007). A number of strengths of the 
KNIS can be summarised as follows: 
• excellent innovation infrastructure; strong large corporations that have 
achieved global technological leadership 
• competitive knowledge base in the IT sector and its high diffusion rate 
• strong national propensity for education and learning 
• successful experience of R&D consortia that has accumulated in firms, 
GRIs and ministries, along with capability of GRIs to provide a strong 
knowledge infrastructure based on accumulated experience 
An excellent innovation infrastructure can be a key competitive advantage when led 
by strong government. R&D expenditures in GDP accounted for 4.03% in 2011, 
whereas the average of OECD countries was 2.37% in that year (OECD, 2013). 
According to the World Bank, high-technology exports (percentage of manufactured 
exports) comprised about 26% of total exports in 2011, whereas the figures for the 
U.S. and Japan were 18% and 17%, respectively. Additionally, Korea has large, 
innovation-driven corporations that are highly renowned in the international market 
for their high-technology products (MarketLine, 2013). Moreover, there is a highly 
qualified labour force, in which the number of researchers has reached 11.51 per 
thousand in 2011, compared to 8.29 in the U.S. and 9.96 in Japan in the same year 
(World Bank, 2013). In particular, the knowledge infrastructure has been 
accumulated by major actors through collaborative research led by GRIs.51 These 
factors have contributed to creating the image of Korea as a ‘high-end innovation 
centre’. 
                                                        
50 Lim (2008) defines the KNIS as a mix of advanced and developing country features in that it has 
advanced large corporations with weak small firms. 
51 Examples of collaboration research are 4M DRAM, Electronic Switching System, optical fibre 
production, robotics and super-minicomputers (L. Kim, 1993). 
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Although Korea’s development has made remarkable progress in recent decades, it 
has also caused a number of imbalances in its innovation system and economy. Some 
weaknesses52 that may render the innovation system inefficient (MarketLine, 2013) 
include: 
• weakness in innovation policy; prevalence of uncompetitive SMEs 
• weak science base 
• lack of R&D capabilities in universities 
• small pool of knowledge intensive businesses, closed networks of alumni 
and families (Lim, 2008) 
• underdeveloped linkages for use of knowledge stock among actors (H-D. 
Cho et al., 2011) 
Innovation policy significantly lags behind other factors in terms of capacity to 
conduct fundamental research, bringing a number of constraints. Universities were 
not regarded as knowledge sources until the government started to focus policy on 
increasing the R&D capability of universities in the late 1990s. Underdeveloped 
linkages and a low level of collaboration among major actors limit both the use of 
existing knowledge and the creation of new knowledge through interaction with 
different sectors (L. Kim, 1993). In addition, poor coordination among ministries 
with their own policies on research and funding, and poor cooperation, due to intense 
rivalries, have exacerbated the problem. Ministries organise their own activities, 
resulting in considerable overlap between different S&T policies in different 
programmes implemented by ministries (H-D. Cho et al., 2011; Hemmert, 2007).  
The government has been unable to create equal business opportunity between the 
chaebols and SMEs, despite repeated efforts (MarketLine, 2013; Suh, 2004). In this 
regard, Lim (2008) defines the KNIS in six words: ‘strong large firms, weak small 
firms’. For example, a huge productivity gap exists between chaebols and SMEs, in 
that the value added per worker among SMEs is 65% lower than in chaebols. SME 
                                                        
52 Hemmert (2007) indicates a ‘lack of highly skilled technical specialists’ as one of the weaknesses 
of KNIS, but other scholars tend to consider a ‘highly educated and skilled labour force’ one of its 
strengths. 
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expenditures in R&D activities is also far lower than in chaebols per unit of sales. 
Part of the reason for the dismal performance of SMEs is the high lobbying power of 
the chaebols, which are able to hinder SME reforms to protect their monopolistic 
trade practices (MarketLine, 2013). 
 
Figure 5-1 The polarization of profits between large corporations and 
SMEs. 
Source: The Bank of Korea as cited by D. Cho (2012, p8). 
Strong chaebols lead networks and vertical linkages with affiliated large firms that 
are common in the KNIS. This phenomenon may result in a lack of interaction 
between chaebols and small firms, and several authors (Chu and Cho, 2006; Lim, 
2008; Suh, 2004) have indicated that networking among firms is not well developed 
in Korea. Networking has been ranked low, 23rd among all indicators in the COSTII 
index (KISTEP, 2014c),53 which contrasts with the high rank of cooperation among 
firms, GRIs and universities (3rd). This phenomenon was closely related to the 
catch-up process that took place between the 1980s and late 1990s, in which large 
corporations actively interacted with foreign corporations to assimilate the 
                                                        
53 Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP) developed the COSTII index based on 
OECD indicators to examine input-activities and outcomes using the NIS framework (KISTEP, 
2014c). 
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technology, and which might have caused the low level of interaction among 
domestic firms. In addition, ‘clannish attitudes’ may obstruct interaction among 
major actors in the KNIS. Large corporations tend to interact with firms in their 
group and are reluctant to communicate with SMEs, while government agencies are 
inclined to work with their own departments or ministries. 
Table 5-2 COSTII Ranking of Korea, 2013 
Sectors Subsectors 
Ranking of 
Korea 
Relative level (%) 
Korea 
Average of 
OECD 
Resources Human Resources 12 58.5 50.5 
Organisations 8 7.2 8.5 
Knowledge 
infrastructure 
8 8.0 9.3 
Activities R&D investment 2 94.3 48.6 
Start-up activities  22 27.4 39.8 
Network Cooperation among 
firms, research institutes 
and universities 
3 96.6 48.2 
Cooperation among 
firms 
23 32.2 55.9 
International cooperation 18 10.0 20.1 
Environment Support infrastructure 24 39.2 60.2 
Physical infrastructure 1 100.0 70.9 
Culture 20 50.0 61.2 
Performance Economic performance 7 54.4 40.7 
Knowledge creation 16 34.7 35.7 
Note. *100 = A country ranked as No. 1 in the subsector; Source: KISTEP (2014c, p26). 
It is possible to speculate that the lack of capability of SMEs and low level of 
interaction among firms are the major impediment that needs to be resolved.54 The 
problem is that knowledge-generating organisations such as universities55 are still 
weak in spite of recent government efforts to upgrade R&D capabilities. GRIs still 
seem to be major players in knowledge generation but a lack of centralised 
                                                        
54 The ranking of the level of cooperation among firms dropped to 23rd in 2013 from 16th in 2008 in 
COSTII index. 
55 Universities were not regarded as a knowledge source until the government started to facilitate 
interaction among universities, GRIs and industries in late 1990s. 
114 
 
organisation and poor knowledge dissemination have been indicated as weaknesses 
(MarketLine, 2013).  
However, COSTII, OECD and IMD indicators (KISTEP, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) give 
only a rigid and static picture, with no detailed insight into identify weaknesses and 
further resolving the imbalance between innovation input and innovation output 
(Table 5-2). For example, although the government has developed and implemented 
support programmes for several decades, economic performance and knowledge 
creation still appear to be below the average of OECD countries (Table 5-2), in 
which the rankings are 7th and 16th respectively. The analysis of KNIS at macro- 
levels has shortcomings when it comes to explaining why the level of cooperation 
among firms is low, what barriers exist, and what supporting mechanisms can be 
applied to overcome weaknesses. In a similar vein, the KNIS does not show whether 
linkage organisations facilitate knowledge flow and interactive learning among 
various actors (K-R. Lee and Song, 1998; Song, 2004) in the KNIS. The following 
section will illustrate the characteristics of public intermediaries and their role in the 
KNIS. 
5.2.3 Unrevealed Performance: Firms and Supporting Mechanisms  
In Korea, GRIs are amongst the earliest form of organisations supporting industries56 
(see Section 5.2.1), making their appearance around 1960, whereas the role of 
universities in economic development has been the production of well-trained 
graduates focusing on teaching (Yusuf, 2008). As a result of government support 
since the 1960s, GRIs equipped themselves with trained personnel, powerful 
‘intellectual equipment and materials’, wide networks of industries, academics, 
policymakers and consultants, and accumulated experience as innovation facilitators, 
linking policies and industries for several decades. 
Professor SS Seol in the Economics Department of Hannam University explained: 
It is impossible to talk about the growth of SMEs without the role of the 
government in Korea. For example, the ranking of leading corporations 
                                                        
56 Dodgson (2007, 2009) asserts that the form of collaboration has evolved from the development of 
intermediary institutes (i.e. ITRI in Taiwan), which was indicative of significant institutional 
development in the evolution of the NIS. 
115 
 
is the same as that of the munitions industry in the 1970s that was led 
by the strong government policy. [The government policies and 
programs still have a strong impact on industrial growth.] Korean 
people have been pursuing innovations to survive but the problem 
comes when people start looking for resources for innovations. The 
resources are information and knowledge. Who owns them? All the 
knowledge infrastructure is owed by the government related 
organisations. 
(Interview with SS Seol at Hannam University, 27 May 2013) 
The infrastructure of GRIs plays an important role in configuring the information and 
knowledge required in the innovation process of SMEs. Also, the accumulated 
history of knowledge services to SMEs that include intermediaries, provides more 
chances to resolve new issues. As a result, many SMEs experienced the services and 
facilities of the intermediaries, and the relationship with public intermediaries 
became a key driver to facilitate constant knowledge interaction, thereby decreasing 
the barriers at every stage of innovation. This history seems to shape distinct features 
of the KNIS such that public intermediaries, as linkage organisations57, have been 
considered important actors in generating new knowledge, connecting all the actors 
and correcting the failures (Figure 5-2). 
                                                        
57 The ITRI in Taiwan can be seen as an innovation intermediary that facilitates technology transfer, 
creates consortia and develops joint ventures (Dodgson, 2009) whereas intermediary institutes in 
Korea have been evolving centred around specific roles e.g. S&T knowledge dissemination, 
technology transfer, promoting SMEs, supporting the Daedeok Special Research and Development 
Zone, innovation clusters, etc. 
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Figure 5-2 Major actors and interactions in the KNIS. 
Source: K.-R. Lee and Song (1998, p60). 
Whereas GRIs mostly carry out R&D and link knowledge in the KNIS to some 
extent, so-called linkage organisations (i.e. public intermediaries) exist independently 
as one of the key players generating and connecting knowledge in the system. They 
can be GRIs or public organisations but roles of linkage organisations are different 
from GRIs whose main role is the R&D activity itself (H-D. Cho et al., 2011; K-R. 
Lee and Song, 1998; Wong, 2004). Linkage organisations include KISTI, Korea 
Institute for Advancement of Technology, Technoparks, SMBA, Korea Technology 
Finance Corporation and National IT Promotion Agency, each entitled to bridge 
knowledge barriers and facilitate networking in the KNIS (K-R. Lee, Choi and Park, 
2004). Among them, KISTI has played a national focal role as the S&T information 
centre since its establishment. These organisations can be called public 
intermediaries in the sense that they do not pursue profits for their services and create 
socioeconomic benefits over time as defined in Chapter 3. 
Although other types of intermediaries exist, public intermediaries can be considered 
important actors in the Korean context, spending the largest part of government 
funding (Chung, 2002; K-R. Lee, Choi and Park, 2004) and delivering government 
policies to industries (i.e. large corporations and SMEs) for several decades. Often 
their organisational purpose is to enable innovation of SMEs by linking all the actors 
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and resources in the system based on their impartial position. From this point, the 
relationship with public-sector innovation intermediaries seems to be beneficial for 
SMEs to consciously seek heterogeneous and diverse sources of learning with long-
term or short-term links to compensate infrastructure and to develop capabilities (see 
Sections 2.4.1 and 3.4.1.). Y. B. Kim (2005) highlighted the role of public 
intermediaries in supporting SMEs by removing the barriers during the exploration 
process of new businesses. K-R. Lee, Choi and Park (2004) also claimed that public 
intermediaries should act as knowledge brokers in the KNIS, providing necessary 
knowledge to SMEs, universities and researchers, interacting with CEOs to articulate 
demands and renew their knowledge during the innovation process.  
Yet, the interaction process between the public intermediaries and SMEs has not 
been fully examined in spite of the perceived importance of fostering innovative 
SMEs. The loose KNIS framework seems too broad to examine the interaction and 
knowledge flow among heterogeneous actors. For example, the KNIS rarely consider 
(integrate) the innovative SMEs to be differentiated actors (SME policy) and 
consequently, it is difficult to explain why SMEs still remain weak actors though the 
Korean government has accumulated successful experiences in fostering industries 
and has been trying to impart the experiences to SMEs for several decades.  
5.3 The Role of SME Policy and its Direction of Development 
5.3.1 SME Policy: Trends and Limitations 
As described in previous section, the KNIS has been confronted by a problem of 
‘strong large firms and weak small firms’. Because the polarisation between 
chaebols and laggard SMEs made it difficult to chart the direction of the KNIS in the 
1970s and 1980s (Lim, 2008), the government has been trying to solve the chronic 
problem. Until the late 1990s, the government directed policy at increasing the 
number of SMEs, facilitating cooperation among actors in the KNIS and increasing 
R&D funding. In the late 1990s, policy shifted to diversify programmes and foster 
‘technology-based small firms’ to invigorate the economy by encouraging small-
venture businesses. The effort included identifying venture businesses that should 
receive incentives such as financial benefits and R&D funding from the government. 
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At the same time, several policy tools aimed to resolve the polarisation by 
strengthening the capability of SMEs. 
In 1998, the Presidential Commission on Small and Medium Enterprise (PCSME) 
was established to integrate and manage all programmes provided by ministries, the 
SMBA and the Korean Intellectual Property Office. The PCSME, directly 
responsible to the President, was in charge of drawing up SME policies and 
programmes, monitoring and assessing the performance of activities until 2008. In 
this period, PCSME created several action plans: they launched public intermediaries 
(e.g. the Korea Technology Transfer Centre); and the government legislated the 
Technology Transfer Promotion Law to foster private intermediaries to facilitate 
technology transfer activities (Lim, 2008). 
In 2002, the SMBA designed the new-knowledge-support programme for SMEs as 
an attempt to expand support programmes from direct investment to indirect support. 
Since that time, the KISTI, in cooperation with other public and private 
intermediaries, has been carrying out and delivering knowledge service to thousands 
of SMEs. According to the PCSME, the number of experts from public 
intermediaries who support SMEs reached 38,369 in the mid 2000s (SMBA, 2013) 
and as a result, SMEs could receive various supports: funding, technical support, 
marketing, informatisation, linking external expertise, cooperation among firms, etc. 
As knowledge generation centres contributed to providing various services and 
developing advanced technologies through collaborative research, public 
intermediaries have effectively delivered government policies and programmes in 
support of SMEs in Korea (see Table 5-3). 
Between 2008 and 2013, the government announced the ‘Science and Technology 
Basic Plan’, which had four objectives: achieving efficiency of national R&D 
investment; supporting technology innovation of SMEs; enhancing regional 
technology capabilities; and strengthening the science and technology infrastructure. 
Recently, President Park Geun-hye’s administration has announced strengthening 
SME policy by export financing, offering incentives to recruit a skilled labour force, 
and increasing R&D investment to 18% in 2017 from 12.4% in 2012 (MarketLine, 
2013). 
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As shown in Table 5-3, various SME policies have been designed and applied to 
resolve problems relating to the KNIS such as insufficient cooperation among firms 
and a ‘weak level of competitiveness’ of SMEs for several decades. Using a 
qualitative approach, the policies provided indirect support through the new-
technology feasibility study for start-ups, consultations diagnosis services (Im, 
Chung and Yang, 2005). The policy further strengthened bridging mechanisms, 
innovation facilitators, who could recognise and provide necessary resources 
required at every stage of innovation of SMEs. The recent policy report (S. Kim, Lee 
and Kang, 2012) asserts that the government needs to support the activities of GRIs 
as important mechanisms, recognising them as the backbone of the KNIS. 
Table 5-3 The Trend of SME Support Policy 
Period Keywords The development of S&T policy in Korea 
 1980s Protection Enhancing internal resources (i.e. R&D funding) 
 1990s Enhancement of 
the SME 
structure 
Enlargement of R&D funding and venture capital; Enhancement of 
cooperation among industry, academia and research institutions 
 Early 2000 Fostering venture 
businesses 
Enhancement of technology transfer and commercialisation; 
Fostering innovative SMEs; Facilitating cooperation among 
industry, academia and research institutions 
 Late 2000s Upgrading 
efficiency of 
SME policies 
Supporting SME-led technology innovation; Fostering innovative 
SMEs and their innovative capabilities; Strengthening linkage 
among supporting programmes; Differentiation of supporting 
programmes 
 Early 2010s Facilitating 
Start ups 
Strengthening support functions of SMEs and establishing the role 
of GRIs as linkages between the policy and SMEs; Increasing R&D 
funding; Fostering SMEs as major actors for a ‘creative economy’ 
Source: Adapted from B. H. Lee and Chang (2005). 
The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning proposed the ‘Building Plan for 
Eco Systems for Government Research Institutes’ in 2013 to strengthen the SME 
support functions of GRIs. The plan included establishing an integrated SME support 
system of 25 GRIs and reinforcing their mission to support SMEs. To do so, the 
current government plans to invest more of the budget in GRIs; and GRIs plan to 
enhance support functions by restructuring organisations (i.e. Technology Licensing 
Offices [TLO]) and recruiting more experts. The president has emphasised the role of 
GRIs as innovation facilitators that support SMEs from R&D to the 
commercialisation stage. 
120 
 
In spite of sustained effort to strengthen SME capabilities, criticism arose of the 
policy and programmes implemented for SMEs. For example, a number of business 
incubators were established to support new venture businesses in the early 2000s, 
similar to the number in advanced countries, but their services did not seem to meet 
with the demand of SMEs due to the lack of experts and expertise that could satisfy 
the needs of new ventures (J. Kim and Lee, 2005). The recent restructuring plan to 
support SMEs seems to focus on R&D investment and strengthening TLOs in GRIs, 
which means policymakers still tend to depend on linear models of innovation where 
R&D input or technology transfer may result in economic outcomes (HelloDD, 
2013; MarketLine, 2013; Song, 2012).  
Furthermore, programmes did not seem to align with the needs of SMEs whereas the 
different industry characteristics, growth stages of firms and their capabilities, are 
considered important factors in programme design (D. Cho, 2005; Im, Chung and 
Yang, 2005; Y. B Kim, 2005; B. H. Lee and Chang, 2005). Scholars seem to consent 
to the need of indirect programmes such as enhancing infrastructure of SMEs and 
building the ecosystem for innovation (Hong, 2008; J-S. Kim, 2007; Y. B. Kim, 
2005; B. H. Lee and Chang, 2005), but the discourse has remained at a theoretical 
level without detailed action plans. Rather, policies and programmes have a tendency 
to increase a number of programmes and deliver standardised programmes that may 
ignore the needs of technology-based SMEs whose demands may be different from 
SMEs in the 1980s and 1990s. The emergence of influential SMEs and their 
characteristics are discussed in the following section, 5.3.2. 
5.3.2 Innovative SMEs: Who Are They and What Do They Do? 
SMEs in South Korea account for 99% of all enterprises, 98% of all employment, 
and 50% of manufacturing output. However, most SMEs are financially vulnerable 
due to their dependence on bank and government loans, a cause for serious concern 
in the medium and long term (MarketLine, 2013). Private venture capitalists in 
Korea account for a marginal proportion of funding in high-risk areas, worsening 
financial structures, and undermining entrepreneurship. This phenomenon might lead 
policies to focus on constantly increasing R&D funding. 
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As to the internal capabilities of SMEs, they have had little chance to build a 
knowledge infrastructure through relationships. Section 5.2 1 described the evolution 
process of S&T policy between the 1960s and late 2000s, which characterised the 
current feature of the KNIS affecting the low level of interaction patterns among 
domestic firms; foreign external knowledge replaced domestic knowledge because 
large corporations heavily relied on foreign technology sources, resulting in a lack of 
interaction among domestic actors (Suh, 2004), and a lack of opportunities to 
accumulate knowledge resources through interaction.  
This lack of interaction and cooperation limited the access of SMEs to global 
markets as they encounter a number of difficulties compared to larger corporations, 
such as the inability to explore new-knowledge sources, the level of skilled workers, 
and financial resources. However, high technology-based SMEs (so-called 
‘innovative SMEs’) started to emerge in the late 1990s, as the government constantly 
attempted to move businesses towards higher value and technology-intensive 
products (Section 5.3.1). It seems that government policy58 has had a major impact 
on the quantitative increase of innovative SMEs (Figure 5-3). Hemmert (2007) 
contended that these globally competitive independent venture firms that did not 
exist before would gain further importance in the KNIS. 
                                                        
58 Spin-off companies from large corporations between 1997 and 2001 reached 442 (Suh, 2002) in 
addition to start-ups and spin-offs from GRIs and universities. In the same period, professors and 
researchers left their organisations to establish venture businesses as a result of policy initiatives 
aimed at stimulating new firms (Lim, 2008). The initiatives included tax incentives, providing 
facilities and services, relaxation of the requisites for establishing firms, and granting temporary leave. 
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Figure 5-3 The increasing number of innovative SMEs. 
Source: Adapted from SMBA (2013). 
Innovative SMEs are influential actors, especially in emerging industries, providing 
solutions to the problem of weak competitiveness in some sectors. They have 
technological capabilities in specific areas and often have relationships with large 
corporations in the innovation process (Suh, 2004). Several authors (Choi et al., 
2011; Hong, 2008; Min, Kim and Kim, 2005) consider them to be trailblazers, 
contributing not only to employment but also to a nation’s competitiveness in 
technological frontiers. These SMEs have several features: 1) they are highly R&D 
intensive and growing fast, 2) they are doing businesses in high-risk areas, pursuing 
innovative and unique products, and 3) the CEOs are highly qualified. 
CEOs especially seem to have specialised technical knowledge and relatively good 
relationships with GRIs, universities and large corporations (Y. B. Kim, 2005) 
because many of them have had research experience in those organisations before 
they established their own firms. These founders have a high level of loyalty and 
commitment, referenced as ‘strong patriotism’, which often shows as a very 
distinctive institutional reality. They have often chosen to receive only small-scale 
international venture-capital investment despite accepting several offers, due to their 
fear of diminishing the firm’s Korean identity under the dominance of foreign 
investors (Dodgson, 2009). Some SMEs appear to play a very dominant role in 
achieving technological leadership in their fields (Hemmert, 2007) or building 
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business relationships with large corporations as their suppliers. This challenges 
them to maintain a competitive advantage in the global market.  
In this regard, K-R. Lee, Choi and Park (2004) explain that large corporations in 
Korea are searching for globally competitive suppliers to substitute for domestic 
suppliers. This search puts increasing pressure on SMEs because domestic SMEs 
have to compete with foreign suppliers to maintain their position. To avoid 
competition with domestic SMEs and foreign suppliers (D. Cho, 2012), innovative 
SMEs try to explore global business opportunities. D. Cho (2012) expects that the 
competition among SMEs will decrease by 13% while competition with large 
corporations and global firms will increase by 14.5% in five years (Figure 5-4).  
 
Figure 5-4 Competitors of SMEs in S. Korea. 
Source: D. Cho (2012, p46). 
This change contrasts with the view that relationships with chaebols have been 
considered to have much more satisfactory outcomes than independent growth in a 
Korean business context. However, the lack of capability to access knowledge 
sources and potential partners is a barrier to exploring global business opportunities 
(D. Cho, 2005). Policies that tend to focus on improvement of relationships between 
large corporations and SMEs is another problem that may not completely solve the 
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knowledge barriers of innovative SMEs. In this regards, D. Cho (2012) suggests that 
policies need to be diversified into not only fostering the capability of SMEs to deal 
with large corporations, but also enhancing the global competitiveness of SMEs as 
independent actors.  
In summary, innovative SMEs are doing business in uncertain and risky areas, 
developing globally competitive products, which leads to building new-knowledge 
infrastructures that no longer have a homogenous group of buyers. It is important for 
innovative SMEs to integrate and reconfigure internal and external organisational 
skills, resources and functional competencies towards a rapidly changing 
environment in a short space of time. However, as indicated above (D. Cho, 2012), 
the competition among innovative SMEs is intensifying; put simply, the more 
innovative SMEs are in certain emerging fields, the less knowledge there is available.  
Particularly at the early stage, identifying the appropriate technological and non-
technological knowledge is difficult because the market has not been created yet and 
little information is available. Similarly, innovative SMEs do not know who their 
new buyers or competitors will be, and therefore do not know what their specific 
demands and wishes will be in a new business area. Even in a leading SME, 
knowledge does not flow from leader to follower as a result of increasing 
competition and speed of innovation, causing system failures (e.g. failures in 
infrastructure, interaction, networking etc.) that many SMEs face in the innovation 
process. Therefore, SME policy should be directed towards addressing various 
barriers, diverging from the myopic policy that protects SMEs against competition 
with large corporations in business relationships or increases only their R&D 
capabilities. In this context, Y. B. Kim (2005) further emphasises the importance of 
programmes for ‘knowledge supply and interaction facilitation’ to enhance learning 
and innovative capabilities in new business areas, for example providing 
management consulting and technology and market information, as well as 
promoting interactions among CEOs, GRIs and universities. 
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5.3.3 Misaligned Perspectives Between the Policy and Innovative 
SMEs 
Section 5.2 indicated some gaps in the KNIS: a mismatch between input and R&D 
performance, a low level of cooperation among firms, and weak SMEs. In particular, 
the chronic problem of weak SMEs has been emphasised as a major policy issue to 
be resolved. Unlike the government’s successful experience in fostering large 
corporations, SME support policies neither link to creating enough economic 
outcomes nor to enhancing innovative capabilities of SMEs. Lim (2008) argues that 
no successful cases result from cooperative R&D between GRIs and SMEs, and the 
‘low level of competitiveness’ of SMEs limits the knowledge interaction necessary 
for innovation.  
Notwithstanding the increasing attention to innovative SMEs as explained in Section 
5.3.1, the SME policy does not seem to be effectively incorporated into the KNIS 
framework though the situation has been gradually improving (e.g. an increasing 
number of innovative SMEs and increasing opportunities for collaborative R&D). 
The government still tends to strengthen the role of GRIs as suppliers of services that 
focus on R&D and technology commercialisation stages indicated in Section 5.3.1 
overlooking the interactive approach and the dynamic nature of innovative SMEs. 
Dodgson (2007, 2009) indicates that support programmes provided by public 
intermediaries do not seem to focus on linkages or joint creation of new knowledge 
but in dissemination of existing knowledge. Therefore, it is possible to conjecture 
that the programmes delivered to SMEs are not likely to match the needs of 
innovative SMEs. Two policy directions could describe the mismatches. 
The first is the greater emphasis on R&D funding as the direct input that brings 
economic outcomes. It is assumed that direct investment in R&D contributes to 
enhancing technological capabilities to some extent, but not enough to increase 
capabilities of SMEs to adapt themselves to the competitive business environment. 
Section 5.3.2 describes the barriers of innovative SMEs (i.e. the lack of capability to 
access knowledge sources), which are more than lack of R&D capabilities. 
Compared to SMEs in general, innovative SMEs are technologically capable but still 
lack capabilities to address barriers such as knowledge and relationships necessary in 
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exploring new business areas. This lack implies a need for mechanisms to overcome 
the various barriers that SMEs face during the innovation process, in addition to 
supporting R&D and commercialisation activities. Although indirect support 
programmes have been designed and delivered to innovative SMEs, the programmes 
tend to be concentrated in the commercialisation stages that does not match the 
diverse needs of innovative SMEs. Furthermore, the programmes have tendency to 
deliver generic solutions (i.e. technology development, marketing, and equipment 
investment), targeting SMEs in general without considering the heterogeneous nature 
of innovative SMEs. Sometimes, programmes have similar content under different 
service schemes provided by different intermediaries. 
Second is the policy focus on science and technology, which ignores the ‘economic 
and social aspects’ entailed in the innovation process (Lim, 2008).59 Although 
innovation policy has tried to incorporate socioeconomic dimensions in the mid 
2000s, adopting Technology Foresight activities and replacing the linear model of 
innovation (Section 5.2.1), the policy is still skewed to the STI approach (or a 
narrower approach) as opposed to the DUI approach. For example, the level of 
network is measured based on the number of joint patents, number of patents per 
researcher, R&D investment as a percentage of sales, and expenditure of the 
government and universities. Performance relating to knowledge generation is 
measured by number of patents, number of papers, number of patents to R&D 
expenditures, etc. The measurement does not reflect the complex and dynamic nature 
of the innovation process and as a consequence, various barriers emerging in the 
innovation process are difficult to identify. Lim (2008) argues that the strong focus 
on STI approach is why R&D input, incubation activities, competence building and 
other economic subsystems have not worked together to encourage innovation 
activities in the KNIS. 
Policies and programmes driven by the supply-side view of innovation seem to have 
limits in capturing the complex innovation process and the heterogeneous 
                                                        
59 Lim (2008) further argues that Korean S&T policy has been driven by the perspectives of the 
science and engineering fields. The KNIS still lack wider-DUI approaches in spite of the 
governmental effort in the mid 2000s, incorporating socioeconomic factors into innovation policy. 
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characteristics of innovative SMEs. In this vein, Chung (2002) and Lim (2008) 
contend that the interactive approach is vital to resolving the sophisticated problems 
of the KNIS, which become increasingly complex in the number of actors involved 
in innovation, interaction among them, and social settings. The KNIS at the macro- 
level does not specify specific actors, limitations and challenges in the innovation 
process and therefore, how public intermediaries facilitate the innovation process of 
SMEs and decrease the barriers still remain unrevealed. In this vein, modulating the 
KNIS at an appropriate level to examine the specific actors, their relationships and 
linkages can be a contingent condition for implementing an interactive model, and 
doing so may lead to explicate the detailed dynamic properties of the modulated 
system. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the evolution process of the KNIS and its current perspectives, 
with emphasis on public intermediaries and SMEs. In particular, this chapter 
addresses the first research question: why public intermediaries interact with SMEs. 
Whereas this chapter focuses on a historical perspective on the role of government 
and mechanisms in fostering industries, Chapter 7 further provides in-depth analysis 
on why SMEs look for public intermediaries in their innovation process and how 
relationships evolve through the facilitation process. 
The KNIS has had its beliefs about how to foster specific industries and large 
corporations for several decades, which might be different from the needs in current 
times. In spite of unsurpassed economic growth, the KNIS has faced several 
weaknesses in innovation policy, low levels of cooperation among firms, and weak 
SMEs, that have not been resolved. For example, innovative SMEs have been 
growing since 2000 but their linkages are relatively weak (Hemmert, 2007). For the 
last decade, the KNIS has grown in size and sophistication, having the scope to 
analyse and resolve barriers that are becoming more complex and difficult. Yet, 
policy is likely to focus on simple input and output factors, based on the narrowly 
defined NIS which seems to overlook the interactions between actors and institutions. 
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Lacking in interactive approaches, the loose NIS framework does not specify specific 
actors and the knowledge interaction between them—SMEs and public 
intermediaries, the linkage organisation—in the KNIS. The scope of the KNIS may 
need to be modified to address the research question. Innovative SMEs pursue 
developing innovative products or technologies in high-risk areas. Consequently the 
problems that hinder innovation may be different from firm to firm. However, the 
broad framework does not indicate how to disentangle complex innovation processes 
and heterogeneous demands of innovative SMEs. This can be the reason that 
mismatches between programmes delivered and outcomes (e.g. weak SMEs) have 
been solved yet, in spite of the effort, developing various programmes. In the same 
vein, what types of barriers emerge and how public intermediaries as bridging 
organisations can correct the failures by facilitating interactions have not been 
demonstrated in the KNIS context. 
The ‘dynamic interplay’ between actors and institutions, in describing why some 
actors are becoming strong and some actors are not, needs to be examined based on 
an interactive approach, to remove the barriers and thereby facilitate innovation (K-R. 
Lee, Choi and Park, 2004; Lim, 2008). To do so, analysis must encompass what is 
happening in the innovation process of SMEs and how public intermediaries address 
the heterogeneous demands of SMEs and barriers to innovation. The following 
chapter will present five case studies explicating the dynamic nature of interaction 
process between public intermediaries and SMEs. Each case will demonstrate the 
complex knowledge-interaction process based on the conceptual framework (Chapter 
4). The chapter will provide how public intermediaries perform four functions to 
decrease the barriers that each SME faces based on the interactive approach and 
identify some micro factors that the loose NIS concept is unable to explain. 
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6 Chapter 6. Cases: The Knowledge Interaction 
Process Between Public Intermediaries and SMEs 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 described country-specific innovation policies, characteristics of the KNIS, 
and the role of public intermediaries in facilitating innovation in Korea. I pointed out 
that weak linkages among firms and low levels of competitiveness of SMEs have 
been a problem for the KNIS, and highlighted the role of public intermediaries, often 
described as linkage organisations, that resolve problems relating to the KNIS. The 
previous chapter also indicated the shortcomings of the macro-level approach. The 
KNIS is becoming sophisticated, having the scope to analyse and resolve barriers 
that are becoming increasingly complex and difficult. Yet, policies (or programmes) 
are likely to be implemented in a linear way, based on a loose framework, 
underestimating the interactive approach (Section 5.3.3). This may lead to a 
mismatch between the demands of SMEs and programmes provided by public 
intermediaries. 
In this chapter, I explore the knowledge interaction between public intermediaries 
and SMEs, based on the four functions provided by the conceptual framework: 
knowledge enabling, facilitating relations, learning, and managing the interface. I use 
these intermediary functions to discuss the main research problems of this study; a 
macro-level approach to the NIS overlooking the knowledge-interaction process 
between intermediaries and SMEs, microsociological factors embedded in the 
process, and different patterns of relationships. I use the conceptual framework 
constructed by characterising the functions of public intermediaries for interviews 
and analysis. 
The sections in this chapter examine the results of interviews about whether public 
intermediaries play a crucial role in facilitation innovation of SMEs and, if so, how 
the knowledge interaction occurs at meso- and micro-levels between public 
intermediaries and SMEs, thereby decreasing the barriers to innovation. Section 6.2 
presents five cases of innovative SMEs, each illustrating the history of the firm, 
knowledge enabling, facilitation of relationships, and changes of knowledge 
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infrastructure as a result of interactive learning. Managing the interface with 
intermediaries is a means of maintaining constant interaction, which facilitates 
interactive learning as an ongoing process. 
In this vein, intermediary functions can be understood as a facilitating process rather 
than providing services at a specific point in time. Similarly, the four functions are 
carried out without clear boundaries rather than provided in order. Each case contains 
analysis: describing the differences among cases, why each case has different 
evolving patterns of relationships, and specific factors that contribute to the 
innovation process. Section 6.3 summarises initial findings about why these factors 
are important and how they affect the innovation process at the level of firms, 
individuals, and the interaction process. Then, I compare the different patterns of 
relationships and analyse two different fields of technologies—mechatronics and 
IT—although it was slightly problematic to classify them into only two groups, due 
to the multidisciplinary characteristics of their products and technologies. 
The results from this chapter will be complemented by Chapter 7, which presents the 
remainder of the empirical findings with a focus on the rationale of engaging public 
intermediaries in innovation of SMEs and the underlying policies that propose public 
intermediaries as effective mechanisms to facilitate innovation in the KNIS. 
6.2 Case Studies 
6.2.1 Case 1: Firm K 
Firm K is a manufacturer of semiconductor thickness analysis and measurement 
equipment (Table 6-1), and has been interacting with KISTI since 2008. It received 
knowledge services and follow-up services provided by KISTI, sponsored by the 
Innovation Foundation. The interaction was successful in enabling knowledge of 
medical-diagnosis equipment and facilitating relations with potential buyers for Firm 
K. 
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Table 6-1 Description of Business 
The firm has been developing and supplying the unique and advanced analytical solutions for 
semiconductor, flat panel displays, electronic materials, life sciences, and chemical analysis. 
Major products are as follows 
- Thin film thickness analysis and measurement system: analysing and measuring the 
thickness of flat panel displays 
- Bio//medical diagnosis system: Immune diagnostics, molecular diagnostics, point of care 
testing and surface plasmon resonance (SPR)-based biosensors 
Source: Adapted from the homepage of Firm K. 
6.2.1.1 History of the Firm 
Firm K was founded in 1996 by a former senior researcher at the Analysis 
Laboratory of ETRI in South Korea. Firm K supplied the spectroscopic equipment 
the CEO had designed and built using the technological expertise acquired at ETRI. 
The corporation’s key buyers were university and government laboratories that used 
the equipment for their own research activities. These buyers did not prove to be a 
lucrative source of revenue because they tended to be small in size and operation. 
Limited revenue was viewed as a stumbling block to the steady and potential growth 
of the corporation. 
The CEO began exploring other business opportunities to overcome this financial 
challenge. Meanwhile, a friend of the CEO, who worked as a professor, became 
interested in the liquid crystal display (LCD) industry in Korea. An opportunity 
finally arose for Firm K that would turn out to be a major stepping stone for the 
corporation. It was at an exhibition at which the corporation received a sales order 
from LG Electronics (LG) for one piece of industrial-sized thickness analysis and 
measurement equipment (TAME) required for the ‘four-mask process’, one of the 
stages in LCD production that analyses the layers and measures the thickness of 
LCDs. 
In 2004, LG ordered Firm K to manufacture 14 pieces of TAME. Working for LG 
was indeed a blessing to the corporation. While striving for the highest possible 
standards of equipment to satisfy the demands of the global giant, Firm K was able to 
enhance its technical expertise and achieve technological advances. Firm K became 
the world’s first developer and manufacturer of TAME for the four-mask process of 
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LCD production. LG became the world’s first developer and manufacturer of the 
four-mask process. Beginning 2006, Firm K also started to supply TAME to 
Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd. (Samsung). The firm’s annual revenue skyrocketed to 
U$14 million in 2004—the corporation had generated annual revenues of 
approximately U$2 million dollars until 2003—followed by U$10 million in 2005, 
and then to U$10.5 million in 2006. Firm K had the most profitable year in 2008 
with an annual revenue of U$20 million, bouncing back from U$8.6 million it 
generated in 2007. 
However, Firm K’s growth was accompanied by three major challenges: the firm’s 
uncertain financial future, irregular human-capital management practices, and lack of 
diverse products. It was no coincidence that the CEO’s desire for new business 
opportunities increased, weighing the challenges the firm was facing and the 
potential for growth the corporation might have in the long run. After trailblazing for 
more than a decade in this chosen line of business for the LCD industry, the CEO 
decided that the industry in Korea was already past its prime, as the firm had built a 
proven track record in the industry. The CEO decided to venture into something new, 
encouraged by personal assets and those the corporation had accumulated 
(technological expertise and advances). In the field of medical-diagnosis equipment 
the firm possessed the necessary technological infrastructure. 
As interest in other industries grew stronger, the CEO explored new business 
opportunities. A new set of barriers surfaced: (a) differences in opinion and attitude 
between the CEO and the employees at Firm K towards new ventures, (b) differences 
between the technology Firm K used for the LCD industry and what it would need 
for other industries, (c) differences in knowledge of the LCD industry possessed by 
employees at the firm and what they would need to obtain for the biotechnology 
industry, and (d) the disconnection between Firm K and the potential players in the 
biotechnology industry. 
The abovementioned challenges caused a gap to form between the realities of the 
situation at Firm K and the necessary conditions for K’s success in other industries 
(the CEO inclined toward the biotechnology industry but was keeping options open). 
Essential to increase the chances of K’s success was to reduce the gap significantly, 
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or better, completely removed it. With this ultimate goal in mind, the CEO started 
seeking professional intermediaries for their expertise. 
6.2.1.2 Knowledge Interaction Process 
6.2.1.2.1 Engagement of Public Intermediaries 
The CEO contacted public intermediaries, the IF, and the KISTI. 
• The Innopolis Foundation (IF): The Innovation Sponsor 
IF is a not-for-profit organization administered by the Korean Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy. The foundation provides programmes ranging from R&D 
funding to commercialisation to help SMEs enhance their innovative capabilities. 
Since the IF was established in 2005 in Daedeok Science Town, where more than 
1,400 research and educational institutions and firms reside, the organisation has 
played a key role in fostering the world’s-best clusters by linking all resources built 
in the region and other regions in Korea (Innpolis Foundation, 2014). The IF has a 
wide network that includes GRIs, universities, SMEs, and private consultancies as a 
part of linkage support to build the cluster. For example, KISTI designed one 
consultation programme that IF sponsored and coordinated to deliver customized 
consulting services to SMEs seeking new ventures to maximize their success. 
• The Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information: The 
Innovation Facilitator 
KISTI is a not-for-profit research institute administered by the Korean Ministry of 
Science and Technology. KISTI is considered to be the national hub of science and 
technology information. One institute mandate is to strengthen the competitiveness 
of SMEs by providing support: operating a nationwide S&T data bank, operating the 
SME supporting centre, publishing industry reports, providing one-on-one 
customised consulting services, carrying out technology-feasibility studies, and 
managing the national supercomputing centre. 
Along with a more than 10 years of history supporting SMEs, the institute has 
approximately 10,000+ members of the Association of Science and Technology 
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Information using its services. The institute has highly qualified experts in all science 
and engineering disciplines, and patents, databases, industry reports, methodologies, 
and a global network. The qualities KISTI boasts convinced the CEO to conclude 
that the institute had the reputation and credibility to help strengthen the argument to 
pursue new ventures. 
6.2.1.2.2 Knowledge Enabling 
KISTI and Firm K immediately organised a task-force team (TFT) for effective 
communication. A project manager in the IF participated as an observer to monitor 
the process and give support, if required. From KISTI, four qualified researchers 
actively participated in interactions with the CEO, CTO, top-management team, and 
one of the managers. Firm K considered two factors in exploring the new business 
area: the first was the possibility of using the technological infrastructure the firm 
had built in the LCD area; the second lay in determining whether the new business 
area was relevant to societal, political, environmental, and technological trends. 
Players intensively interacted at all levels between Firm K and KISTI to articulate 
demand and gain a sound understanding of the firm’s capabilities. This was the early 
stage of innovation, and little information was available on market and technology 
trends, competitors, or policy direction. Interaction was important for two reasons. 
First, it was essential for researchers from GRIs to interact with potential customers, 
scientists, and policymakers. These initial stages tended to be lengthy and required 
more resources than subsequent stages because knowledge at this stage was 
malleable and ambiguous, and innovation players needed time to achieve something 
concrete and transparent. Only organizations equipped with the right set of resources, 
including intellectual materials and competent players, can come through these 
demanding stages successfully. Second, interaction among employees is vital to 
facilitate knowledge absorption as well as individual learning. 
Frequently, TFT members at Firm K had different points of view, resulting in KISTI 
researchers getting involved in facilitating knowledge interaction among employees. 
This interaction helped decrease the knowledge gap among employees. Interviewee 
H indicated the firm needed face-to-face interaction to gain insights and 
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interpretations of individual analysts, as Firm K had difficulty accessing and 
enabling the new knowledge. Interaction provided a learning opportunity for 
employees at the firm where the ‘original recipe of knowledge’ could be translated 
into a specific context through several stages of the consultation process. In 
particular, one researcher at KISTI and a manager at Firm K played a crucial role in 
delivering active feedback back and forth between the two organisations. 
Four individual researchers made the best use of in-house materials and their 
relationships in GRIs and industries to create high-quality knowledge. Individual 
researchers who had varied expertise and experience in the fields of chemistry, 
management, and machinery interacted with each other and with other GRIs and 
industry experts to create new knowledge. The combination of competent knowledge 
and experiences specific to individuals (i.e. a productive combination of competing 
rationalities) inside and outside KISTI resulted in delivering credible knowledge at 
the early stages of innovation. When the KISTI TFT gave their first presentation, 
Firm K was satisfied it would facilitate the knowledge flow between KISTI and Firm 
K more effectively. 
The quality of knowledge contributed to building trusting relationships among 
individuals in both organisations. Interviewee H, explained, ‘Trust was built from the 
moment of that presentation, and the responsible individual researchers helped us to 
maintain trust-based relationships.’ Interviewee C, a researcher at KISTI, said, ‘This 
was due to their capabilities in absorbing the knowledge. During the consultation 
process, the CEO and other employees gave valuable feedback which was a real 
challenge in enabling the knowledge.’ Because codified knowledge was unavailable, 
interaction with innovation players actively occurred throughout the knowledge-
enabling process. 
In sum, KISTI configured knowledge on technical and nontechnical aspects of the 
new business area, and enabled knowledge in a specific context for the firm. Firm K 
functioned effectively, adhering to the knowledge, ideas, and concepts that remained 
almost unchanged since its establishment. Employees at the firm were well versed in 
the nontechnical aspects of the LCD industry such as societal, political, cultural, and 
environmental trends. Although the firm was locked into the knowledge 
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infrastructure that had evolved solely in the industry, the firm was able to build new 
knowledge infrastructure through knowledge enabling by obtaining technology and 
market knowledge and identifying potential buyers in the new business area. 
6.2.1.2.3 Facilitating Relations 
Identifying potential buyers in the new business area and linking them to the 
innovative space of the firm was a different matter. As a new innovator in a new field, 
Firm K was incapable of accessing potential buyers. The project manager at IF 
participated in the entire process, realizing the missing piece remained in spite of 
successful outcomes. Firm K needed to enter relationships with potential buyers to 
co-shape the innovative space at an early stage. Interviewee C explained: 
It was impossible to identify and contact potential buyers in the bio 
industry such as Greencross Ltd and YD Diagnostics Co., in spite of our 
reputation in the LCD industry. The bio industry was totally different 
from the LCD industry, and we could not approach to the buyers 
without a credible mediator. 
The Foundation sponsored a follow-up programme called ‘Technology Round Table’ 
(TRT). KISTI, as an innovation facilitator, organised TRT, providing Firm K with an 
opportunity to expand its relational capital. Scientists from GRIs attended the TRT, 
although it was not easy for KISTI to identify the right contacts among potential-
buyer firms due to the closed environment of the biotechnology industry in Korea. 
One professor who worked at KISTI contacted several pharmaceutical firms and 
managed to identify potential buyers over time. 
KISTI brought together GRIs, the professor, and potential buyers through the TRT, 
where all participants were able to share their views and R&D plans connected with 
medical-diagnosis equipment. Researchers at KISTI and the professor facilitated the 
interaction, maintaining impartiality, narrowing the gap among all participants in a 
short space of time. After the TRT, a favourable environment was shaped in which 
Firm K could interact directly with potential buyers such as Greencross Ltd and YD 
Diagnostics Co., without the need for a facilitator. As the firm began developing its 
relationships with domestic customers, IF brought in Frost & Sullivan, a global 
consultancy, to provide a one-off consultation service, preparing a future roadmap to 
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explore the overseas market. During the interaction process, KISTI, IF, and Firm K 
actively shared opinions regarding the progress, bottlenecks, and outcomes, which 
further contributed to linking all activities to Firm K’s innovative process. 
6.2.1.2.4 Facilitating Learning 
KISTI facilitated learning on a wide level inside the firm, and between the firm and 
potential buyers throughout the knowledge-interaction process. Multiple levels of 
interaction with public intermediaries and potential buyers led the CEO and the top-
management team to learn how to create and adapt new knowledge, align potential 
buyers, and apply the knowledge interaction process in a new setting. 
Firm K achieved three objectives by building the new learning routine that changed 
the mindset of employees, leading to new patterns of coordinated action towards the 
new business. At first, the CEO could not afford to gamble K’s future by making 
decisions alone, even though the CEO’s insight and vision had, up to that point, been 
a driving force behind the firm’s direction and development. Knowledge interaction 
could help minimize the risks associated with key decision making and, subsequently, 
contribute to learning and achieving the ultimate goal of the firm: the future success 
of the new venture. Internally, the CEO would be able to articulate the vision to 
employees, whereas externally, the firm would venture into a new business area by 
integrating new knowledge and approaching potential buyers. 
First, a vast disconnection existed between Firm K and the potential innovation 
players of the new business area. The firm was unaware of its potential buyers and 
suppliers, competitors, policymakers, and regulatory bodies. The firm would have to 
establish contact with potential players to co-shape the innovation process at the 
early stage. At the end of interaction with intermediaries, the firm could enter 
relationships with potential buyers in the field of medical-diagnosis equipment and 
YD Diagnostics became a major customer. This success was possible because public 
intermediaries facilitated learning between the firm and potential buyers, providing 
them with motivation, explaining how both parties could benefit from the 
relationship. 
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Second, Firm K had been using virtually the same technology for 12 years for the 
LCD industry, a practice that had worked successfully for employees and the 
industry. As a result, employees at the firm did not feel the need for technological 
innovation and experiment. The firm needed to confirm whether its technological 
expertise and capabilities were transferable and applicable to the new business area. 
The strong knowledge interaction among various levels of employees provided 
coherence of routines between an old and new area of business; performing as an 
effective learning mechanism that coordinated old and new skills and knowledge, 
and led employees to share new perspectives. 
Finally, employees at the firm did not receive well the CEO’s decision to explore 
new business opportunities. They did not share the enthusiasm and vision. They 
showed implacable opposition to the decision and its potential consequences. The 
CEO commented on the situation: 
No one at the firm was as determined as I was to create a better, more 
secure future. Once they had got themselves into their own routines, 
they wanted to maintain the status quo. It is human nature to favour 
stability. When I told them to do something new, most of them 
responded negatively, asking me why they had to do it. 
The knowledge interaction facilitated interactive learning at all levels inside the firm 
that allowed the CEO to justify the logic behind the decision to pursue new ventures 
and helped persuade employees through mutual adaptation towards the innovation. It 
was a long process, taking several years to change the perceptions of all employees 
and restructure the knowledge infrastructure to fit with the new business area. The 
presence of public intermediaries as legitimate facilitators played a crucial role in 
addressing the barriers during the long and uncertain innovation process. 
6.2.1.2.5 Managing Interfaces 
At the end of the knowledge interaction with KISTI, the firm was able to use KISTI 
as an innovation facilitator. KISTI and IF managed interfaces with the firm such that 
the firm was able to access intermediaries when necessary through which it could 
receive additional information services and renew the knowledge to its own context. 
In particular, key individuals managed interfaces in both parties. It was the CEO who 
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dispatched a staff to KISTI for a year to transfer methodologies and processes that 
KISTI used during the interaction process for the firm. The staff was able to learn the 
knowledge-creation process and build social capital with researchers at KISTI and 
other GRIs. Since then, these key individuals have acted as mediators, linking Firm 
K and KISTI, and integrating external knowledge into the firm. 
The firm constantly obtained the specialised knowledge essential to the innovation 
process for the new venture it was contemplating. In addition, both parties were able 
to build trusting relationships where active knowledge interaction resulted in some 
positive outcomes. The CEO was able to rationalise insights, and employees were 
convinced the consultations would bridge the gap between them and the CEO at the 
end of the year-long process. Then, Firm K would be able to invest in medical-
diagnosis equipment for further R&D activities with confidence. Since then, KISTI 
has been providing long-term client support, including one-on-one follow-up 
services, monitoring industry trends, and providing S&T information (reports and 
databases) that helps the firm reconfigure knowledge. This would not have been 
possible without the IF, the innovation sponsor. By maintaining interfaces with 
public intermediaries, the firm was able to interact not only with IF and KISTI—the 
policymakers and facilitators—but also with potential buyers for its future business. 
6.2.1.3 Case Analysis 
This case illustrates knowledge interactions between public intermediaries and Firm 
K at the early stage of innovation, which brought changes to the firm (Table 6-2): 
obtaining necessary knowledge, establishing new organisational structure, and 
entering into new business relationships. 
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Table 6-2 Key Events and Major Changes in Firm K 
Period Key events Changes 
1996 Established the firm Supplied spectroscopic equipment 
2004 Developed the TAME Expanded relationships with big buyers 
2008–2009 Entered into knowledge interaction 
with KISTI to explore the new 
business area 
Obtained the necessary knowledge 
Changed the organisational structure to apply 
the knowledge-interaction process to the firm 
and address the new business area 
2009–2010  Follow-up programmes provided by 
the KISTI and IF 
Entered into relationships with potential buyers 
in the new business area (medical-diagnostic 
equipment) 
2011–2012 Continued interaction with multiple 
public intermediaries 
Went public with an IPO (2011) 
Dispatched a staff to learn how to translate and 
adapt new knowledge, and maintain 
relationships with KISTI 
 
Researchers from KISTI enabled the knowledge and had a strong level of interaction 
with Firm K to meet its needs. In the beginning, researchers believed the firm only 
needed specific knowledge in certain areas, but the result produced more outcomes 
than they expected, as the level of interaction intensified. As in other SME cases, this 
case highlights the barriers to innovation, in particular, knowledge flow between the 
SME and big buyers. Firm K had relationships with big buyers in their old and new 
business areas, but the relationships had limits in bridging the knowledge gap. First, 
Firm K had a good business relationship with Samsung and LG in the field of TAME 
but knowledge in the field of LCD was different from that surrounding medical-
diagnosis equipment. Second, the firm and LGLS were engaged in joint R&D for 
medical-diagnostic equipment, which evolved into a supplier–buyer relationship. 
However, unlike the LCD industry, the major buyer did not have a knowledge 
infrastructure in the emerging area, showing a tendency to share the risks with Firm 
K. A high level of uncertainty existed as to whether the supplier–buyer relationship 
could guarantee sufficient revenue, as it had done in the LCD industry. Although the 
big buyer was successful in exploring global markets, the market share may not have 
been big enough in an emerging area where multiple players tended to share the 
market. Therefore, transformation from TAME to medical-diagnosis equipment 
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required not only a new knowledge infrastructure for the new business area, but also 
relationships with multiple new buyers. 
To overcome barriers, the CEO used informal relationships with experts in academia 
and industry, but these relationships only helped in sharing general trends and 
organisational concerns. When Firm K decided to explore the new business area, it 
faced difficulties in obtaining the required knowledge because the market had not 
been created yet and little information was available. It was necessary to work with 
potential innovation players to obtain uncodified knowledge, but it was difficult for 
the firm to identify them and enter a relationship. Even if the firm had been able to 
access and approach them, interpretation and configuration of knowledge can be 
difficult. Timeframes can be a problem because speed of innovation allowed the firm 
to enter the market in advance and enjoy first-mover advantage. 
Most importantly, the knowledge behind the firm’s ostensible demands was more 
than just technological and nontechnological. The CEO wanted to build an internal 
process and methodology through interaction with KISTI that would integrate new 
knowledge into the firm’s resources. As a reflexive individual who experienced 
several failures in the past, the CEO believed this process would facilitate not only 
individual learning by having employees follow the process, but also organisational 
change when adapting to a new business area. How could the firm build the 
knowledge infrastructure and adapt to the new business area by resolving the 
barriers? Was the firm capable of building the new process? Was the strong vision of 
the owner enough to persuade employees to work towards the new goal? It was the 
constant interaction with the intermediary and the formal programme that enabled the 
firm to bridge the barriers and enter into new relationships with potential buyers. The 
CEO added, 
I needed the voice of a third party to persuade my employees. If the 
knowledge came from a credible third party, then it would become 
easier to absorb that new knowledge without internal resistance. In 
addition, I believed only global consultancies or KISTI were able to 
produce the level of knowledge that I could be satisfied with. 
The knowledge configured by KISTI gave the firm the confidence to make the 
decision to invest in medical-diagnostic equipment. Additionally, bridging the 
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relational barriers between Firm K and potential buyers opened business 
opportunities with multiple buyers (see Figure 6-1) that would contribute to 
improving the financial status of the firm. Furthermore, as the owner expected, long-
term interaction with KISTI led to individual learning as well as organisational 
change (i.e. establishing new divisions, new relationships, new decision-making 
processes and new communication processes). 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Firm K—Multiplicity of relationships and interactions. 
 
To examine the aspects of this case that brought about such positive changes, some 
questions arise. What separates a successful case such as this from less successful 
cases? What are the crucial differences in each case? What is the key success factor? 
The first major factor that differentiates this case from other cases is the firm’s 
capabilities. First, it had built technological expertise and capabilities as a supplier of 
LG and Samsung, gaining better knowledge of the technical specifications required 
by fastidious big buyers. Second, the learning capabilities of individual employees 
had improved as the firm interacted with big buyers. In addition, the firm 
experienced organisational changes in early 2000 when it changed its target market 
from university laboratories to big buyers. 
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Being a supplier to big buyers in the LCD industry was different from working in the 
small test-equipment market, and the firm faced several challenges such as market 
fluctuation, technical failure, lack of skills, and managing human personnel. The 
experience enabled the firm to build specific routines and learning capabilities, 
resulting in greater possibilities to bring about change by rebuilding the knowledge 
infrastructure through knowledge interaction. Crucially, the CEO had a very strong 
vision from the outset that had a positive influence on the integration of new 
knowledge and learning, and adapting it to the new field of technology. 
The CEO remarked on this new-found objective, 
As I was emboldened by the competitiveness Firm K had demonstrated 
over the years, I became more confident about exploring other 
possibilities that would require the use of analysis and measurement 
equipment. I was also convinced of my ability to lead the corporation 
on yet another path to success because virtually all industries would 
need the equipment we specialized in. It was not too obvious then, but 
doing business with big buyers such as LG and Samsung helped us lay 
the foundation for investing in other industries at a later time. 
I had always paid attention to the changes taking place in the world 
outside of business that influenced industry and commerce. Being 
mindful of those changes, I had been thinking constantly of the 
direction in which Firm K should be headed. To draw an analogy, if the 
Firm would be a boat, the changes were the sea, and I would be a 
shipbuilder. I was responsible and ready for constructing a vessel well 
equipped for travelling in a sea of change. 
The routines the firm had adopted in the past could be successfully replicated for a 
new business area if the knowledge intermediary and ‘professional shipbuilder’ 
joined in the turbulent process of constructing a vessel. The CEO proactively used 
the intermediary as a partner to access necessary resources as well as facilitate 
learning inside the firm during the process of innovation. In this case, the consistent 
and strong levels of knowledge interaction over relatively long periods of time were 
an important factor in building a new routine. This affected patterns of relationships 
with the intermediary. Compared to other SMEs in the field of IT that needed 
technology transfer, joint R&D, or test sites, Firm K had very focused knowledge 
demands that resulted in strong levels of interaction with few intermediaries (Figure 
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6-1). The interaction evolved over time at meso- and micro-levels addressing the 
knowledge and relational barriers. 
The second major difference is the technology-specific factor, which affected 
different levels of relationship and interaction. When Firm K made its decision to 
enter the biotechnology industry, technological capability was not the main difficulty. 
The same technology infrastructure was applied to manufacturing the medical-
diagnosis test equipment, requiring a slight modification of equipment and 
measurement methods. However, the business environment of the biotechnology 
industry, where potential competitors and customers had not emerged yet, was 
different from that of the LCD industry. Interviewee H, the business strategy division 
manager at Firm K, expanded on the objectives: 
We needed to examine the biotechnology industry in its entirety and 
investigate the societal, political, environmental, and cultural trends 
surrounding the new industry. We knew nothing about the existing or 
emerging markets for the industry, and were ignorant about prospective 
customers. However, we knew full well our business strategy had to be 
altered from one-on-one customization tailored to the LCD industry to 
the mass production required for the biotechnology industry. 
The new business required a different set of players, expertise, and skills. What 
became crucial, especially in the early stages of the innovation process, was 
configuring the vague knowledge. It was also important to bring potential key 
players into the innovation process to co-shape early markets and gain a competitive 
advantage. However, this may have hindered participation by private intermediaries 
or potential buyers, as this stage is far removed from commercialisation. Therefore, it 
was essential to have long-term interaction with a public intermediary capable of 
configuring a high quality of knowledge and bringing in potential players. 
Monitoring the changes in a sociotechnical setting was also important, because the 
level of market uncertainty was quite high. Along with the firm’s capabilities, the 
technological characteristics affected the firm’s pattern of relationships, which was 
shaped to centre around a few intermediaries with targeted buyers. Individuals in 
Firm K, KISTI, and IF played a crucial role in maintaining strong levels of 
interaction, sharing views and monitoring activities. 
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The crucial question is whether this knowledge interaction facilitated the innovation 
process, even though the CEO clearly asserted gaining a great deal from it, including 
a logical justification and validation for the vision. Answering this question requires 
a determination as to whether the knowledge interaction contributed to interactive 
learning and thus reduced the various knowledge barriers, thereby overcoming the 
obstacles to innovation. Several influential factors were behind this. 
First was the level of individual and organisational capability in the intermediary, 
producing reliable knowledge throughout the process. The capability to enable a high 
quality of knowledge provided the basis for trust-building relationships in which both 
parties had a sense of fellowship that, as the consultation progressed, facilitated 
frequent interaction at all levels of employees. To do so, it was essential for both 
parties to have mutual interests and responsible correspondence. However, the level 
of trust depended on individual capabilities rather than the name of KISTI or IF, as 
relationships developed throughout the process. 
Interestingly, researchers from KISTI and a project manager at IF were involved in 
the interaction process with the owners, top-management teams, CTO, managers, and 
researchers, facilitating knowledge interaction and learning among employees inside 
Firm K and increasing consensus in views about the new business. Interactions 
helped the firm approach other types of service functions in KISTI such as 
technology mentoring services, education programs, and one-on-one follow-up 
services that minimized barriers at different stages of innovation. 
Coupled with KISTI, IF played an important role in monitoring the process and 
sponsoring the follow-up programme for the firm. The private global consultancy 
had advantages over public intermediaries in accessing foreign markets and related 
information. By linking KISTI’s service with the follow-up programme to provide a 
global-marketing plan, the weakness of a single public intermediary service could be 
overcome. The interaction contributed to resolving the barriers (e.g. lock-in barriers) 
between owners and employees, and between internal and external resources. 
Interviewee H explained: ‘Relationships bring more than the knowledge. These 
relationships resulted in successful outcomes of the consultation project and 
organizational changes.’ In summary, this was due to a multiplicity of relationships 
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and interactions. To be more exact, it was the result of interactive learning that 
brought changes to the firm as well as to individuals. 
This case illustrates the knowledge interaction that decreased the barriers Firm K 
faced. Focusing on the firm’s knowledge demands, the interaction succeeded in 
enabling the knowledge required at all levels of employees. Trusting relationships 
influenced both organisations. Since then, Firm K has interacted with KISTI in 
reconfiguring knowledge, where necessary. The process contributed to rebuilding the 
knowledge infrastructure and the organisational structure. It was possible for KISTI 
to have knowledge interactions with Firm K due to the existence of a sponsoring 
organisation, IF, and their project manager actively involved in the whole process, 
ensuring satisfaction of the SME. The not-for-profit structure of KISTI and the 
participation of IF improved not only the quality of knowledge but also quality of the 
relationships. As can be seen in the case, some firm specific factors affected success, 
summarised as follows. 
First the CEO’s level of urgency was quite high, evoking internal risks and 
delivering this vision to employees. This sense of urgency decreased any 
unnecessary discrepancy in the interaction processes between Firm K and the 
intermediary, and facilitated learning. The second was the quality of the top-
management team and employees. Members of the top-management team had a 
variety of working experiences in GRIs, government agencies, and larger firms 
before they joined Firm K, bringing different skills and knowledge. They had 
communication and adaptive skills that increased the level of absorption of new 
knowledge and learning. Third was the existence of reflexive individuals who could 
integrate external knowledge into the firm and constantly facilitate learning. For 
example, Firm K dispatched some staff to KISTI for a year to learn the knowledge-
configuring process and to secure the relationship at individual levels. Finally was 
the reconfiguration of knowledge throughout the process inside the firm. The top-
management team actively reconfigured the knowledge at every stage of innovation 
and used it when the firm went public with an IPO. 
The abovementioned barriers, innovative outcomes and micro-level factors yielding 
a successful innovation process are summarised in Table 6-3. 
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Table 6-3 The Result of Knowledge Interaction: Firm K (Successful) 
  Summary of the interaction process 
Barriers 
resolved 
 Internal - Different views on innovation between the CEO and 
employees 
- Lack of nontechnical knowledge required in the new business 
domain 
External - Lack of relationships with potential buyers  
Outcomes Internal - Building new learning routines (new decision-making 
process) 
- Acquiring new technical and nontechnical knowledge 
- Entering into relationships with big buyers 
 External - Expanding relationships with intermediaries and 
policymakers 
Micro-level 
factors 
 Firm - Capability of CEO (long research experience and a wide 
network throughout the industry) 
- Technological capabilities and experiences with big buyers in 
the existing business domain  
- High level of urgency of the CEO 
- Failure experiences in the existing business domain 
- Existence of reflexive individuals 
 Process - Long-term interaction with focused intermediaries 
- Multiplicity of interactions and relationships, and a 
productive combination of competing rationalities 
- Strong levels of interaction between the firm and 
intermediaries 
 Intermediary - Capability of intermediaries to generate new knowledge 
- Existence of monitoring organisation 
- Existence of reflexive individuals 
 Current status - Entered into the new business area 
 
6.2.2 Case 2: Firm P 
Firm P is a manufacturer of semiconductor-packaging inspection systems, 
established in 1995 (Table 6-4), that has been interacting with KISTI since 2009. The 
firm is involved in knowledge services and follow-up services provided by KISTI 
and sponsored by the IF. The knowledge interaction was successful in enabling the 
knowledge of the LED packaging-inspection system and bringing changes to the 
knowledge infrastructure. 
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Table 6-4 Description of Business 
The firm has been developing and supplying a precision-measuring tool that can be used in 
detecting defects in nanometre-sized semiconductor surfaces. 
Major products are as follows: 
- The world’s fastest component-inspection equipment for semiconductors that provides 
packaging inspection, detecting surface defects such as scratches and cracks, based on moiré 
interferometry technology 
- LED vision-inspection equipment to monitor the LED assembly line 
- Vision-inspection equipment to detect manufacturing processes of solar wafers and solar cells 
Source: Adapted from the homepage of Firm P 
6.2.2.1 The History of the Firm 
Firm P was founded in 1995. The founder of the firm was a former contract 
researcher in the Precision Measurement Laboratory at KAIST in South Korea. The 
laboratory was operated by a well-known professor who boasted world-class 
research outcomes in measuring degrees of precision.60 The founder was actively 
engaged in conducting research on analysis and measurement equipment during the 
contract period at the institute. When the contract period terminated, the founder had 
a chance to join Firm P as a CEO where the professor of KAIST owned a major 
share. 
The professor started playing a conduit role, with the CEO absorbing state-of-the-art 
technology and building strong technology competitiveness in the firm. The 
laboratory provided a source of talented human resources, as the major management 
team of the firm consisted of Ph.D. graduates from the Precision Measurement 
Laboratory at KAIST. They had the professional technical knowledge about 
measuring the ‘degree of precision’ that affected the direction of innovation. 
During the early years of business, Firm P was an R&D service provider for 
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. and LG Electronics Co. Ltd. In early 2000, the firm 
tried to develop its own product and lured enough funding from angel investors. 
However, the firm failed to develop its own product in 2 years, and began running 
out of funds. The CEO took the view that the failure was due to the lack of 
nontechnical knowledge such as market trends, needs of customers, and regulations. 
                                                        
60 This technology has been crucial in developing flat panel displays that require to ‘the ruler’ for the 
inspection of display surfaces. 
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The CEO said, ‘I had painful experiences in the past. I only expended effort on 
technology development, but had no idea how the business would progress.’ The 
experience of failure showed the importance of societal aspects of the technology 
that caused the CEO to prepare for knowledge before starting a new business at a 
later date. From the failure experience, the CEO learnt how and why 
nontechnological knowledge needed to be considered in technology development. 
At the end of the 2002, Samsung offered the firm a contract to supply the inspection 
system, because the firm had experts from KAIST who had been researching the 
moiré technique for 10 years. Until then, companies used a laser technique to inspect 
semiconductor packages, which limited the test speed. When Firm P entered the 
industry, the global firm RVS, which was a supplier for Samsung, took 80% of world 
market share with a testing capacity of 200,000 semiconductors per 24 hours. 
Applying the moiré technique to the component inspection system, the firm could 
increase the test speed threefold. In 2004, Firm P finally could supply 
‘Semiconductor Packaging Inspection Equipment’ (SPIE) to Samsung with which 
the firm could increase technological expertise continuously. The firm came to 
produce the world’s fastest semiconductor-component inspection system, boasting 
high levels of accuracy and performance by the mid 2000s. 
A new business opportunity came to the firm in late 2008 when Samsung Electro-
Machine Co. Ltd. offered some information on its future roadmap. The big 
corporation held a briefing session on its future plans and requirements for 
cooperative SMEs, where the CEO got an idea about new products in the LED 
industry. Although the firm had a good relationship with Samsung Electronics Co. 
Ltd., it did not initiate a new business relationship with Samsung Electro-Machine 
Co. Ltd. Severe competition ensued among SMEs and having technological 
competencies was the first condition to become a supplier to the big buyer in the 
chosen field. 
Although the CEO was interested in an LED-inspection system that could make the 
best of the core technical competencies the firm had built in the field of SPIE, the 
CEO did not know about the inspection process, market prospects, or the strategy of 
big buyers. If it was to fail, Firm P would be responsible for financial damages. This, 
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coupled with failure experiences in the past, led the CEO to examine the LED 
industry ahead of big buyers, but limited capability was a barrier to accessing and 
analysing the industry and business opportunity. 
However, P’s growth was accompanied by major challenges: most prominent was 
the firm’s uncertain financial future caused by the subprime financial crisis and a 
lack of diverse products. Samsung and LG were the only customers whose sales 
decreased between 2008 and 2009, due to the crisis that affected Firm P’s sales. The 
CEO’s desire for new business opportunities grew stronger in view of market 
fluctuation; Firm P put a plan into practice earlier than scheduled. Furthermore, as 
the leading firm in the field of semiconductor-packaging inspection for many years, 
the CEO knew that the semiconductor industry in Korea had already reached 
saturation. The CEO decided to venture into new areas, encouraged by the assets the 
firm had been accumulating: technological expertise and advances. The firm could 
use the technological infrastructure in LED packaging-inspection equipment. 
A new set of challenges surfaced as the CEO determined to explore new business 
opportunities and interest in the business area grew stronger: (a) the difference 
between the knowledge of the CEO and the firm, and the knowledge that the new 
venture required, (b) the difference between the technology the firm had and used for 
the semiconductor area and the technology the corporation would need for other 
business areas, and (c) the disconnection between the firm and potential players in 
the new industry. 
The abovementioned challenges were the gap between the reality at P and the 
necessary conditions for the firm’s success in the new business area. The CEO and 
employees inclined toward the same industry area—using technology 
infrastructure—but they were keeping their options open in case they may had 
missed some opportunities. What was essential to increasing the chances of P’s 
success was to have the gap reduced significantly. Because the CEO had a good 
relationship with the IF, having regular contacts, the CEO could get the information 
about KISTI that led the firm to use external expertise to fill the gap. 
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6.2.2.2 Knowledge Interaction Process 
6.2.2.2.1 Engagement of Public Intermediaries 
The CEO came to contact public intermediaries such as KISTI and the IF. 
6.2.2.2.2 Knowledge Enabling 
KISTI formed a team consisting of researchers who had the same educational 
background as staff in Firm P. One researcher, a KAIST graduate, had active 
communication with the executive director from the beginning. A project manager in 
IF participated as an observer to monitor the process and to give support if required. 
Because the CEO already knew the firm could use the technological infrastructure in 
developing the new inspection system, the company wanted to gain confidence by 
obtaining two types of knowledge: first was the nontechnical knowledge regarding 
the LED inspection system, whether the market would be promising, and whether 
there were other business opportunities in addition to the LED inspection system; 
second was the technical knowledge regarding the new process and technical 
specifications required in the new inspection systems. 
Although the firm had a good relationship with Samsung Electronics, the firm had 
limited ability to gain decisive information from Samsung Electro-Machine. Other 
SMEs were capable of competing with the firm and the relational capital might not 
help unless the firm was considered to be the best partner for Samsung Electronics. 
The CEO explained: 
I believe the reason we could not get information from the big buyer 
was due to a lack of capability in accessing them. At that time, we were 
not recognised as the capable firm that Samsung had to deal with. Thus, 
we had to figure out its investment plan one step ahead so we could 
prepare for new products proactively. 
Intensive interaction occurred to articulate demands and to get a sound understanding 
of the firm’s capabilities. Similar to Firm K’s case, little information on market and 
technology trends, competitors, and potential buyers existed regarding the inspection 
system. Reports from global consultancies have a tendency to focus on upstream 
markets where big buyers are major players. Knowledge of policies and regulations 
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were considered less important for Firm P because the firm had relatively useful 
knowledge about them. However, Firm P did not have strategic information on 
whether big buyers would invest in the new area because the investment plan was 
normally classified as secret information. 
Interaction was important for two reasons. First, it was essential to have interaction 
with researchers from GRIs and potential big buyers. This stage required greater 
relational capital of individual researchers to access in-house information of the big 
buyer, because no codified knowledge was available regarding investment plans in 
the new industry. Only the organisations that could maintain an impartial position 
were able to access both parties—buyers and suppliers—addressing the demanding 
stages successfully. Researcher R at KISTI explained: 
They did not ask me to find the in-house information of the big buyers. 
They might think it was not impossible for us to access the crucial 
information. However, I quickly noticed that the investment plan of big 
buyers would have an impact on the firm’s future business. What I 
could do was put myself in an impartial position between them and 
contact the big buyers. 
Interaction with researchers in GRIs was also considered an important process to 
figure out the inspection process required in the new business area as well as industry 
trends. A combination of multiple levels of competing knowledge, skills, and 
experience embodied in individuals from different GRIs resulted in discovering more 
business opportunities than Firm P expected. 
Second, the interaction with the CEO and the top-management team required 
feedback to ensure they absorbed the knowledge. In this connection, the CEO 
indicated that the firm needed an interpretation of the knowledge in the new business 
area while the CEO accumulated technological knowledge over time. Interactions 
provided a learning opportunity for the firm in how the LED industry would bring 
new business opportunities that helped the firm overcome its bounded rationality. 
The firm only focused on the LED inspection system but was also able to access 
solar cell and bump wafer systems through several stages of the interaction process. 
Also, the interaction process played an important role in providing learning space 
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where the CEO and the top-management team shared and developed insights and 
ideas for new businesses. 
One researcher in particular made very good use of relationships in GRIs and 
Samsung Electro-Machine, to access in-house information. The researcher and a 
manager in Samsung Electro-Machine were KAIST graduates and used to work in 
one of the GRIs before they joined their current organisations. Along with the trust-
based relationship, the researcher’s impartial position helped in communicating with 
a manager and gaining the information. 
I told the manager about the SME. The manager already knew since the 
firm was one of the suppliers. I told her that the information would be 
used only for the firm and never be released to any other parties, 
emphasising that I would not represent the interests of any parties. The 
manager also agreed that having the competitive SME was also good 
for the corporation. 
The investment plan was very important but was only partial information that did not 
reveal the whole picture of industry prospects. The right set of resources, including 
intellectual materials and competent researchers, played a crucial role in supplying 
the qualified set of knowledge the firm required. 
KISTI configured the knowledge on technical and nontechnical aspects of the new 
business area, and was able to enable the knowledge more than they initially 
expected. The firm was satisfied with the process as well as the quality of knowledge, 
which facilitated knowledge flows between KISTI and the firm more effectively. The 
accuracy of knowledge as well as the attitudes of researchers contributed to building 
trusting relationships in both parties, which brought some visible outcomes. The 
CEO considered the firm to be capable of filling the R&D gap with its own efforts 
but incapable of bridging the knowledge barriers such as trends, strategies of big 
buyers, and regulations that hindered interaction with potential buyers. 
Firm P found it difficult to access and interpret the knowledge even when they were 
able to access it. By bridging the gap, the firm could make a decision to explore not 
only LED but also related areas for further R&D activities with confidence. This 
confidence exerted positive influences in initiating relationships with big buyers at 
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reasonably equal levels. Currently, KISTI provides long-term client support in the 
form of one-on-one follow-up services, and provides S&T information (reports and 
databases) helping the firm reconfigure the knowledge. 
Interviewee I, the executive director of Firm P, conceded, 
We were experts in semiconductor inspection systems and interested in 
the LED inspection system. KISTI configured the knowledge not only 
about LEDs, but also solar cells and bump wafer systems where we 
explored more business opportunities. Even though they were our 
buyers, we had limited access to their in-house information. Sometimes, 
people who maintained a long-term relationship with us had to quit, 
which resulted in a disconnection of information. However, KISTI 
found the facility-investment plan of the big buyer, which gave us 
confidence in entering into the new business area. 
KISTI enabled the knowledge that let the SME proactively prepare for the new 
inspection system over its competitors. The quality of knowledge and strong levels of 
interaction contributed to articulating demands even more than the firm demanded. 
Although the firm was mainly interested in the LED-inspection system, the 
researchers discovered more business opportunities in the field of solar cells and 
bump wafers. 
6.2.2.2.3 Facilitating Relations 
Unlike in the case of Firm K, Firm P knew the potential buyers, so the role of KISTI 
was limited to enabling the knowledge. The CEO remarked: ‘It may be difficult for 
any intermediaries to make a business deal between buyers and suppliers. 
Intermediaries can link us to potential buyers but then the cultural and psychological 
background of individuals must vary, that we only can deal with.’ Instead, the firm 
aligned different types of services provided by IF. IF played a crucial role in aligning 
different types of intermediary services to the innovation process of Firm P. Because 
KISTI service did not cover R&D activities, the support programme was 
complemented by the follow-up programme. The firm entered into a cooperative 
relationship with R&D partners in Germany and Switzerland and, in the latter case, 
was sponsored by the IF. IF played a crucial role in enhancing technological 
competitiveness proactively, which helped the firm build a credible image for big 
buyers. 
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Firm P was also able to decrease the knowledge gap between the firm and big buyers. 
The firm was not aware of nontechnical aspects of the industry that could have 
hindered entering into business relationships with big buyers. The CEO said, 
We decided to enter into the LED industry with my insights. What 
could we do if we did not get the knowledge? What we needed was 
anticipative research ahead of big buyers so they would choose my firm 
as an equal partner. The knowledge provided the firm with a sound 
understanding of the inspection process, market trends and other 
business opportunities. 
By filling the knowledge gap, the firm was able to extend relationships towards not 
only big buyers but also international R&D partners. The firm entered into joint 
R&D with two foreign firms: One was the German firm that owned the world’s best 
vision technology, which contributed to increasing the accuracy of the inspection 
system; the other was a Swiss firm that owned high-velocity sensors that would 
improve the velocity of the inspection process. In the latter case, IF supported the 
firm to open an international joint R&D centre. The various levels of knowledge 
interaction contributed to the firm’s ability to overcome barriers such as financial 
deficits, knowledge asymmetry, and relational gaps. 
6.2.2.2.4 Facilitating Learning 
The knowledge interaction facilitated learning associated with the new business area 
among employees and subsequently contributed to building the new infrastructure in 
a short period of time. The firm effectively adhered to the knowledge, new business 
ideas, and inspection process in the new area. At first, the CEO was unsure about the 
insight that the new business area could be another lucrative source for the firm. ‘The 
most important thing in running a business is confidence that drives active promotion 
of the new business. If KISTI had a negative opinion about the new area, I would 
have not expanded the business area.’ The knowledge interaction gave the CEO 
justification for the logic behind the insight to explore new businesses. The CEO 
gained confidence in exploring the new venture, which intertwined with the myriad 
barriers the firm needed to overcome. The strong knowledge interaction between 
KISTI and the top-management team brought broader learning to the firm, providing 
coherence of routines between old business areas and new ones. Firm P achieved two 
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objectives by building a new learning routine that changed the relationships and 
patterns of knowledge interaction inside the firm. 
First, the CEO adopted a new scheme called research fellowship, gathering new 
knowledge and linking the CEO and employees to facilitate learning at all levels. As 
the CEO indicated, the knowledge interaction was not a one-off process because 
changes of sociotechnical contexts consistently required the firm to reconfigure the 
knowledge to its own context. Thus, the CEO let employees apply the same process 
to the firm, analysing customer needs and trends to absorb the methodologies and 
processes KISTI delivered. Because most employees had an engineering background, 
lacking knowledge of nontechnical aspects of the industry and customers, the CEO 
had meetings with the top-management team twice a week to talk about social, 
political, and environmental changes. The replication of the knowledge-interaction 
process inside the firm contributed to establishing its own learning routines to 
integrate external knowledge into the firm’s innovation process. Second, the firm 
could align not only with IF and KISTI—the foreign firms, the R&D partners—but 
also potential buyers for its future business. 
6.2.2.2.5 Managing Interfaces 
During the interaction process, the firm was able to gain access to KISTI and its 
services. The interaction took place when the firm needed to reinterpret new 
knowledge to its own context or required additional services (e.g. providing 
technology or market information). The CEO continued, 
We should adapt ourselves to the new environment. We came to know 
the weaknesses of the firm while we were interacting with the 
intermediary, which provided us with industry prospects and the needs 
of the big buyers. It is a necessary and important ongoing process to 
remove waste elements constantly in managing the firm during the 
innovation. 
KISTI provided follow-up services, helping the firm reconfigure the knowledge 
when necessary. The CEO had regular meetings with the management team in charge 
of monitoring and sharing new knowledge trends. This process required constant 
interaction with intermediaries to scan and renew societal trends, and interpret them 
in the firm’s own contexts. In linking the firm to KISTI’s experts, the two major staff 
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members from the management team and the researcher at KISTI acted as conduits 
of constant knowledge interaction and maintained interfaces for a long period of time. 
Because they were alumni of KAIST, it seemed easy to build trusting relationships. 
Interviewee I at Firm P remarked, 
When we heard that she got a degree from KAIST, it gave us a kind of 
relief in the sense that she must be capable of understanding our needs. I 
felt comfortable in communication because she was one of our 
graduates. 
Since then, these key individuals have been acting as mediators, managing interfaces 
between Firm P and KISTI, and integrating external knowledge into the firm. The 
firm constantly obtained the specialized knowledge and industry reports essential to 
the innovation process for the new venture. The interfaces have been facilitating 
learning through interactions that have contributed to achieving more innovative 
outcomes than the CEO expected. 
6.2.2.3 Case Analysis 
This case illustrates knowledge interaction between public intermediaries and Firm P 
at the early stage of innovation (Table 6-5). Researchers from KISTI enabled the 
knowledge and had a strong level of interaction with the SME to meet its needs. 
Researchers focused on enabling the specific knowledge in the field of inspection 
systems where the firm could make the best use of technologies accumulated in the 
past. 
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Table 6-5 Major Changes in Firm P 
Period Key events Changes 
1995 Established the firm Supplied the inspection system to Samsung 
2004 Applied the new technology and 
developed the SPIE 
Supplied the SPIE to Samsung 
2009–2010 Found the new business opportunity 
Entered into knowledge interaction 
with KISTI to obtain the knowledge 
about the new business area 
Obtained the necessary knowledge 
Carried out R&D in the new business area 
(Inspection systems for LED, solar wafers, and 
cells) 
2010–2011 Follow-up programmes provided by 
the IF 
Entered into relationships with foreign firms for 
technological collaboration 
Developed inspection systems in the new areas 
and expanded relationships with new buyers 
2011–2012 Continued interactions with multiple 
public intermediaries 
Went public with an IPO (2011) 
 
The case illustrates various barriers (i.e. infrastructural, lock-in, and network 
failures) the SME faced in exploring the new venture. Although the firm had a long-
term relationship with big buyers, it had limits to overcome the barriers in the new 
business area. Often SMEs that could enter into a supplier–buyer relationship with a 
new big buyer have difficulty maintaining the relationship, due to the lack of 
resources. Firm P had to improve their capabilities by themselves but they hardly 
built their capabilities, spending all their energy on addressing the exact requirements 
of big buyers. This limitation brought two problems: On one hand, the firm had to 
learn the new knowledge and relationships required in the new business area; on the 
other hand, it had to increase technological and managerial capabilities consistently. 
This caused huge barriers between the current business area and the new business 
area that the firm had to resolve. Lacking in resources, like most SMEs, Firm P have 
limits in addressing barriers. 
How do SMEs survive by themselves? How could the firm build the new knowledge 
infrastructure and transform into the new business area by overcoming barriers? Was 
the firm capable of building the new process? It was the interaction with the 
intermediary and the formal program through which the firm could bridge the 
knowledge gap and enter new relationships. The knowledge configured by KISTI 
gave the firm confidence in a new business area by enabling the technical as well as 
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nontechnical aspects of knowledge. Along with long-term interactions, it also 
brought organisational changes such as adopting research fellowships, informal 
knowledge, and configuring processes. To examine the differences in this case that 
brought such changes, some questions could be answered. Why did this case become 
the successful one? What different things happened in this case? What was the key 
success factor? 
First is the capability of the firm. On one hand, it was the technological expertise and 
capabilities the firm could build as a supplier of Samsung. Interviewee I explained: 
SMEs are forced to build technological and managerial capabilities as 
suppliers to Samsung since the big buyer diagnoses technology, 
marketing, and management capability of cooperative SMEs regularly. 
It is like a consulting service. Then the big buyer evaluates SMEs again: 
whether they make changes based on the consulting services. The 
problem is that SMEs have to make the changes by themselves. 
Considering the technology-development speed of Samsung and its high criterion for 
choosing cooperative SMEs, only a few SMEs could meet its requirements. As a firm 
that had met the demands of big buyers for a long time, the firm could build 
technological and managerial capability, addressing the fastidious requirements. 
On the other hand, it was the capability of highly qualified employees from KAIST 
that had a world-class level of precision-measurement technologies. The CEO and 
the top-management team had the same research background in KAIST that helped 
the firm achieve high levels of technical expertise without internal discrepancies in 
exploring the new business area. The confluence resulted in knowledge absorption 
and active knowledge interaction, with a researcher in KISTI sharing similar 
experiences. Equipped with technical knowledge, active feedback also contributed to 
having frequent interactions that may have led to the articulation of hidden demands 
for Firm P. 
Furthermore, their long-term relationship with Samsung let the firm accumulate the 
knowledge on the inspection process of semiconductor packaging that was one of the 
key factors in maintaining competitive advantage that other firms could not imitate. 
Like the case of Firm K, these experiences allowed the firm to build specific routines 
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and to enhance learning capabilities that had a positive impact on knowledge 
interaction with intermediaries. The CEO and the top management team did not lock 
their knowledge in experiences accumulated in the past. The CEO and individuals 
did not passively receive the knowledge, but gave active feedback to intermediaries. 
This resulted in bringing organisational changes through knowledge interaction. 
However, the case of Firm P differed from the case of Firm K in the way the firm 
searched for new products in the same business area, the inspection industry. The 
demands of filling the relational barrier with potential buyers were considered less 
important because Firm P knew who the potential buyers would be. 
The CEO explained, 
My role is to read industry trends and customer needs. I am always 
thinking of discovering new products that ensure sustainable growth. In 
terms of technologies, there’s nothing I have to do urgently because we 
already know what to do in the field of inspection systems. 
Thus the CEO had strong needs for the knowledge that could show the direction the 
targeted industry would be headed so the firm could proactively comply with the 
trends. When the CEO and the top-management team started to use government 
support in the process of innovation, they had very focused knowledge demands. 
These demands led to having strong levels of interaction with few intermediaries, 
compared to other SMEs, who needed different type of services. 
The second difference is the technology-specific factor, which affected different 
levels of relationships and interactions. In inspection areas, the effectiveness and 
speed of the inspection system had been the major issue for big buyers who always 
pursued more accurate, faster, and more precise systems. Thus proactive R&D to 
achieve competitiveness was crucial to maintain a fair and competitive position with 
big buyers. Also, the level of uncertainty in the LED or solar-cell industry is 
relatively high. These characteristics brought different patterns of relationships. 
The accuracy and accessibility of the knowledge of big buyers were crucial. Once 
Firm P made a decision, the new business required considerable investment of time 
and effort. Accurate information on the investment plan of big buyers was highly 
important, followed by industry and technology prospects. In this case not only the 
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capability of a public intermediary enabling the knowledge, but also the relationships 
of individual researchers were crucial to accessing the in-house information of big 
buyers, shaping strong levels of interaction between Firm P and KISTI, and between 
KISTI and the big buyer. 
Unlike the cases of SMEs engaging in IT technology, it was essential for the firm to 
have long-term knowledge interactions with a few intermediaries on focused 
demands. Enabling knowledge at the early stage of innovation took time. In 
relationships with other innovation players, the firm needed to expand towards R&D 
partners rather than potential buyers to improve the level of effectiveness and speed 
of inspection systems. IF gave follow-up support, which let the firm carry out 
additional joint R&D with the international partner. Consequently, the relationship 
was shaped around the firm, KISTI, and IF at meso- and micro-levels, maintaining 
strong levels of interaction throughout the whole process (see Figure 6-2). 
 
Figure 6-2 Firm P—Multiplicity of relationships and interactions. 
 
The crucial question is whether these knowledge interactions facilitated the 
innovation process. How does the knowledge interaction contribute to lowering the 
various knowledge gaps and thereby the barriers to innovation? Several crucial 
factors underlay successful outcomes. 
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First was the multiplicity of relationships centred around public intermediaries. 
Collective action of public intermediaries played a crucial role in bridging the gap 
from the specific knowledge to finding R&D partners. The knowledge service was 
followed by additional follow-up services such as monitoring services (KISTI), 
transfer of foreign technology (IF), and market research (Frost & Sullivan). These 
collaborations minimised the risks in investment and strengthened the relationships 
between the firm and big buyers. Interviewee I, the executive director, explained: 
There may be some firms that don’t have unique technologies. Instead 
they may offer a discount to big buyers, but that won’t work at all. They 
are the high-end users who require the best quality product in the world. 
By obtaining the vision technology from abroad, we could occupy the 
unique position in the inspection-system area and only then were able to 
be an equal partner with big buyers. 
The CEO added: 
We proactively presented improved systems before the buyer requested 
it. I believe it raised awareness of our products inside Samsung. This 
was possible due to support programmes that played a key role in 
upgrading the technical performance of the systems. 
Second was the learning ability of the firm. The firm had a long period of business 
relationships with big buyers, which positively impacted building managerial skills 
and specific learning patterns. Individual employees had high levels of urgency 
towards changes and knew how to interact with external knowledge and integrate it 
into their own context. This led the firm to be involved in active knowledge 
interaction with the intermediary. Firm P reconfigured knowledge when it applied to 
go public. After the firm was listed on KOSDAQ, it had a healthy cash flow that 
provided the firm with opportunities to build technology-entry barriers by acquiring 
state-of-the-art technologies from Germany. Currently, the firm expects to reduce the 
several steps of the inspection process, which will result in achieving a simpler 
highest speed system. 
Third was the failure experiences in the past. The CEO learned a lesson that 
innovation in the firm could be achieved only through exogenous shock. 
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State of the art technology does not guarantee anything if there are no 
societal needs. I came to look into megatrends only after I failed. This is 
why I searched for knowledge intermediaries: because I and my 
employees have limited knowledge. 
Accompanying learning capability, the failure experience enlightened the CEO about 
the importance of building the new knowledge infrastructure in addition to R&D 
factors in pursuing innovations. The CEO became a reflexive actor applying the 
failure experience in exploring the new business area. Since then, the CEO and the 
top-management team did not lock in their knowledge, conceding the limits of their 
knowledge. The active knowledge interaction consisted of absorbing and 
reconfiguring knowledge during the interaction process. 
Fourth was the quality of knowledge, which related to the quality of individuals and 
relationships that may have influenced the ability to produce reliable knowledge 
throughout the process. The capability of enabling the quality of knowledge provided 
a basis of trust-building relationships that facilitated knowledge flow. As previously 
explained, the quality of knowledge was the result of a productive combination of 
competing knowledge embodied in individuals at KISTI and GRIs. The CEO 
remarked, 
I believed in the name of KISTI, but it is all about people. We felt that 
researchers were already equipped with similar levels of knowledge in 
the first meeting. It was quite surprising that we have been engaging in 
this area more than 10 years and KISTI has just started to analyse the 
industry. 
Fifth was the existence of boundary spanners. Researchers in KISTI and a project 
manager at IF interacted with the owner and the top-management team in the firm 
during the interaction process. This resulted in facilitating knowledge flow among 
participants in the knowledge-interaction process. The interaction helped the firm 
approach other types of service functions in KISTI and IF, such as one-on-one 
follow-up services and technology cooperation, supporting programmes that 
minimised gaps at the different stages of innovation. IF, especially, played an 
important role in monitoring the process and sponsoring the follow-up program for 
the firm. Interactions contributed to filling the knowledge gap between existing 
knowledge and the new knowledge required in a new business area. The firm could 
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forecast industry needs, getting ahead of big buyers, and ultimately got a chance to 
succeed as a result of proactive planning and preparation. 
The case illustrates the knowledge interaction, which decreased the gap that faced the 
firm. The knowledge interaction also facilitated ongoing learning during the process 
that resulted in some organisational changes. Although the internal structure did not 
change markedly, external relationships with R&D partners expanded. 
The barriers, innovative outcomes, and micro-level factors that affected successful 
knowledge interaction are summarised in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6 The Result of Knowledge Interaction: Firm P (successful) 
  Summary of the interaction process 
Barriers 
resolved 
 Internal - lack of knowledge required in the new business domain 
External - Relationships with new buyers  
Outcomes Internal - Building new routines (e.g. regular meeting with the top- 
management team) 
- Acquiring new technical and nontechnical knowledge 
- Entering into relationships with two foreign firms for joint 
R&D 
 External - Expanding relationships with R&D partners and a big buyers  
Micro-level 
factors 
 Firm - Technological capability and relationships with big buyers in 
the existing business domain 
- Failure experiences  
- Highly qualified employees 
 Process - Long-term interaction with focused intermediaries 
- Multiplicity of interactions and relationships, and productive 
combination of competing rationalities 
- Strong levels of interaction between the firm and 
intermediaries 
 Intermediary - Capability of intermediaries to generate the new knowledge 
- Existence of reflexive individuals and monitoring 
organisation 
 Current status - Entered into the new business area 
 
 
165 
 
6.2.3 Case 3: Firm T 
Firm T is a manufacturer of electrolysis ballast water-management systems 
(EBWSs),61 and has been interacting with KTVF since 2000. Firm T received 
various types of services for several years at the business incubation centre (BIC). 
The interaction was successful in enabling knowledge of the EBWS and facilitating 
relations with potential buyers for Firm T. 
Table 6-7 Description of Business 
The firm has been developing and delivering the first explosion-proof-type ballast-water 
management system, which first obtained approval in principal from IMO. 
Major products are: 
- EBWS for disinfecting ballast water that treats all incoming water and sediment passing 
through the electrolysis chamber unit. 
Source: Adapted from the homepage of Firm T. 
6.2.3.1 History of the Firm 
Firm T was founded in 2000 as a first venture firm that moved into the BIC at 
KIST,62 the centre at Hongneung Venture Valley (HVV). Firm T supplied the water-
quality diagnostic reagent based on electrolysis-disinfection methods, sterilizing 
microorganisms in wastewater from industries. The firm’s key buyers were private 
firms from various industries that used the system to sterilise wastewater. The CEO 
faced a problem in that a variety of wastewater required a different data set and 
methods for sterilisation. Firm T had to measure, experiment, and produce a new 
system each time and was unable to accumulate experience. It seemed the existing 
business did not prove to be a lucrative source of revenue. The CEO began exploring 
other business opportunities to overcome this financial challenge, preferably in an 
area where Firm T could use their electrolysis-disinfection methods. 
                                                        
61 According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), ballast water is pumped to maintain 
safe operating conditions throughout a voyage. Although ballast water is essential for modern 
shipping operations, it may cause ecological and economic problems due to the multitude of marine 
species—bacteria, microbes, eggs, cysts, etc.—carried in ships’ ballast water. To protect the marine 
environment for future generations, the International Convention for the Control and Management of 
Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BMW Convention) was adopted by consensus at a Diplomatic 
Conference held at IMO Headquarters in 2004 (International Maritime Organisation, 2014a). 
62 The BIC had been administered by the HVV team at KTVF until the HVV team at KIST became 
an independent foundation in 2000. 
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Meanwhile firm leaders attended an exhibition where the CEO met a researcher from 
the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology (KIOST) who inquired 
whether electrolysis-disinfection methods could be applied to sterilise ballast water. 
After a while, the CEO received the same inquiry from a researcher at KIST, when 
the new venture gained momentum. The CEO decided to venture into something new, 
encouraged by personal assets, those from GRIs that had technological expertise, and 
experiences. Firm T considered two factors in exploring the new business area: the 
first was building technological and nontechnological infrastructure as a start-up; the 
second lay in determining whether the newly developed technology was able to 
create a new market. 
Exploring the new venture might require a long period of time, money, and resources 
whereas the future market was quite uncertain and complex, involving several actors, 
regulations, technologies, and governments. A new set of challenges surfaced: 
(a) differences between the new technology Firm T developed to manage ships’ 
ballast water and existing technologies industries used—ozone or ultraviolet 
radiation, (b) differences in knowledge of the wastewater treatment possessed by the 
firm and what they would need to obtain to manage ships’ ballast water and 
sediments, and (c) the disconnection between Firm T and the potential innovation 
players (e.g. buyers and technologists) in the emerging field. 
The abovementioned challenges formed barriers between the realities of the situation 
at Firm T and the necessary conditions for T’s success in the field. Essential to 
increase the chances of T’s success was to have the barriers removed. With this 
ultimate goal in mind, the CEO started to seek professional intermediaries for their 
expertise. 
6.2.3.2 Knowledge Interaction and Development of Relationships 
6.2.3.2.1 Engagement of public intermediaries 
The CEO interacted with public intermediaries, the KTVF, KIST, and KIOST. 
• The Korea Techno-Venture Foundation (KTVF): The Innovation 
Facilitator 
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The KTVF is a not-for profit foundation that specialises in commercialising global 
technologies and fostering start-ups and small firms. Along with more than 15 years 
of history supporting small firms, the KTVF has highly qualified experts in all 
science and engineering disciplines, and patents, databases, industry reports, 
methodologies, and networks such as an HVV network, and domestic and overseas 
networks.63 In particular, the global technology-marketing programme designed by 
KTVF to deliver customized consulting services provides innovative SMEs and 
young start-ups with expertise to expand their business opportunities throughout the 
world. The qualities KTVF boasts convinced the CEO to conclude that the 
foundation had the credibility to help strengthen the argument to pursue new 
ventures. 
• The Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST): The Innovation 
Facilitator 
KIST is a not-for-profit research institute administered by the MSIP, founded in 1966. 
KIST was the first multidisciplinary scientific research institute in Korea and has 
contributed significantly to the economic and industrial development of Korea in the 
1970s and 1980s.64 KIST has a research staff of more than 1,800 research scientists, 
fellows, and trainees, and foreign scientists involved in basic research in various 
fields of science and technology. It has also been active in technology 
commercialisation and supporting SMEs throughout Korea. 
• The Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology (KIOST): The 
Innovation Facilitator 
KIOST is a not-for-profit research institute administered by the MSIP (founded in 
1973 as the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute). The institute has 
been playing a crucial role in researching and developing ocean science and 
                                                        
63 HVV includes seven universities, three banks, the Seoul Metropolitan Government, and another 12 
not-for profit organisations such as KISTI, KIST, and the Korea Technology Finance Corporation 
(Korea Techno-Venture Foundation, 2014). 
64 Recently, the institute announced it would put in effort to meet challenges such as the aging society 
and energy-food-resource shortages directly, while focusing on convergence research and open 
cooperation (Korea Institute of Science and Technology, 2014). 
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technology as the need arises from government policy, to keep current with 
developing ocean-industry trends. 
6.2.3.2.2 Knowledge Enabling 
HVV is a nickname for northern portion of Seoul that is said to be home to many 
GRIs, universities, and hundreds of start-up firms. KTVF was established as the 
HVV team at KIST and became an independent foundation in 2000. Since then, 
KTVF had close relationships with KIST in sharing facilities, resources, knowledge, 
and experts. Unlike Firms K and P, Firm T, as a new start-up, did not have a history 
of relationships with buyers and lacked human, financial, and technological 
resources at the beginning of the business. The CEO was actively involved in 
acquiring new knowledge and experiences through multiple intermediaries to address 
the different technological and nontechnological barriers the firm faced. 
The CEO learnt electrolysis-disinfection methods in sterilizing wastewater from a 
neighbouring firm in the BIC and was able to develop the methods to sterilise ballast 
water in collaboration with KIOST and KIST. The researcher from the KIOST 
already had sound knowledge of trends in ballast-water treatment and of the IMO65 
plan to regulate the sterilisation of ships’ ballast water and sediments. KIOST built 
the pilot plant for experimentation of the new methods and the results from an 
experiment were used when Firm T presented a report to the IMO. Technology 
development and the standardisation process involved unexpected problems and 
negative feedback from buyers. It was crucial for Firm T to interact with GRIs and 
policymakers constantly, aligning them with the innovation process in sharing risks 
and making the vague technology market more concrete. As the CEO indicated, the 
market was strongly affected by regulations and government policy that required not 
only technology development, but also shaping the new regulations. Firm T had 
strong interactions with KIOST and KTVF to address complex problems in the 
innovation process. 
                                                        
65 As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the IMO is the global standard-setting authority for 
the safety, security, and environmental performance of international shipping. Its main role is to create 
a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective, universally adopted, and 
universally implemented (International Maritime Organisation, 2014b). 
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In addition to the achievement, the CEO proactively established a market strategy 
and led the relationships, as a result of knowledge enabling. The following quotation 
seems to suggest the value of knowledge enabling that resulted in individual learning. 
While adapting the knowledge to the firm, the CEO came to know how to create the 
market by bringing in competent players. 
After exploring for several years in the field, I decided to [share] my 
[technological knowledge] to encourage the participation of potential 
competitors in the field. Although disclosure of technological 
knowledge in international conferences or seminars could be a risk for 
[Firm T], I believed that participation of potential competitors could 
contribute to the market growth of EBWS; that turned out to be true. 
6.2.3.2.3 Facilitating Relations 
It was crucial for Firm T to enter relationships with big buyers to gain a competitive 
position in a young market. However, identifying and approaching potential buyers 
was not easy. Big buyers tended to be reluctant to have business relationships with an 
unknown small firm, although the technology developed by the firm first received 
approval from the IMO. A barrier existed between a young firm and big buyers that 
needed to be removed in a short time. Only organisations equipped with the right set 
of resources—expertise and relational capital—could weather the demands 
successfully. 
Meanwhile, the CEO and Dr. H. J. Kim at KTVF had been sharing opinions on the 
progress and bottlenecks entailed in the innovation process since the firm moved to 
the HVV. The constant interaction helped the KTVF capture the urgent need of Firm 
T and the KTVF put efforts into searching for potential Japanese buyers, linking 
them to the firm through a global technology-marketing programme. These efforts 
were possible because the KTVF had an international office in Japan with hundreds 
of coordinators working for the foundation, building reputation and relational capital 
throughout industries. On the basis of their credible image, resources, and experience, 
the KTVF was able to act as an innovation facilitator between Firm T and potential 
Japanese buyers. The CEO, Dr. G. P. Lee, explained: 
The name value of KIST [and KTVF] provided good footing for the 
new venture. The Japanese government came to know that Firm T got 
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approval from the IMO and contacted Dr. H. J. Kim at KTVF to meet 
us. The contract with Japanese [sales agencies] helped the young firm 
build credibility at the stage that resulted in expanding big buyers 
towards a global market. 
In particular, the name value of KTVF played a crucial role in expanding the 
relational capital of Firm K rather easily. Business environments in Japan are quite 
conservative; small foreign firms hardly start businesses without involvement of 
credible third parties. Dr. H. J. Kim remarked, 
The not-for-profit structure of KTVF has significance in Japan. 
Japanese firms normally require mediators and seldom contact buyers 
or sellers directly. In this case, Japanese firms prefer public 
organisations to private agencies. Actually, many Korean small firms 
have tried to contact them directly but failed. 
The KTVF brought together Firm T and potential buyers (sales agencies) through the 
programme where all participants were able to share their views. As the CEO 
indicated, these relationships helped the firm shape the favourable innovation 
environment at the early stage and align more potential buyers with the innovation 
process. 
6.2.3.2.4 Facilitating Learning 
The firm faced diverse barriers in exploring the new venture as a start-up and thereby 
interacted with experts outside the firm, which was crucial to absorbing diverse 
knowledge and overcoming the barriers. Firm T had knowledge interactions at 
multiple levels of public intermediaries to facilitate learning on a broader level, 
which minimised the risks associated with exploring the new business, and 
subsequently contributed to developing the global-standard technology. Unlike other 
cases in the field of mechatronics, the CEO was unable to use government-support 
programmes easily at the early stages of business. To do so, the CEO built networks 
to bridge internal infrastructural and relational barriers, and the network was 
extended, centred around public intermediaries including GRIs and ministries. 
In the case of Firm T, several intermediaries contributed to learning, although the 
KTVF seemed to play the major role in providing learning space at the early stages 
of the business. Knowledge interaction with diverse experts from public 
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intermediaries took place actively for a long period of time, helping the firm learn 
about knowledge of technical and nontechnical aspects of the new business area, and 
co-shaped the new technology market. 
The firm established an informal decision-making process that played as a new 
routine for learning: (a) first, interacting with experts (b) second, deeply interacting 
with experts at a wider level, and (c) interacting with employees to configure 
knowledge to the firm’s own context. Because the firm lacked organisational 
infrastructure and experiences, the CEO proactively used intermediaries as partners 
to access necessary resources and facilitate learning inside the firm during the 
innovation process. At first, the firm was unaware of its potential buyers and 
regulatory bodies, and it was difficult for an unknown small firm to enter a 
relationship with big buyers. A vast disconnection existed between Firm T and the 
potential innovation players of the new business area, even though the firm 
successfully developed the EBWS. However, the long-term relationship with the 
KTVF and other GRIs opened a global-business opportunity at the right time. 
To summarise, the strong knowledge interaction among various levels of experts 
facilitated the interactive learning that provided a new organisational routine and 
created the new technology market structure. In the field of ballast water-treatment 
systems, the EBWS was the first technology approved by the IMO in 2006, despite 
domination of chemical, ultraviolet, and ozone methods in managing ships’ ballast 
water and sediments at that time. The EBWS soon became the major standard 
technology and Firm T was able to enjoy first-mover advantage in the field. Firm T 
achieved three objectives through the knowledge interaction. First, the firm was able 
to use GRIs as innovation facilitators. Second, the firm obtained the specialized 
knowledge essential to the innovation process for the new venture and received 
approval from the IMO as a result. Finally, the firm was able to interact with 
potential buyers for its future business as the first firm to develop electrolysis-
disinfection methods in the manufacturing of EBWS. 
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6.2.3.2.5 Managing Interfaces 
KTVF managed interfaces with the firm after the firm moved into the BIC operated 
by KTVF. The firm lacked experience, expertise, networks, and physical 
infrastructure; therefore, residing in the incubating centre played a crucial role in 
achieving innovation in two ways: accessing all the resources, experts, and facilities 
in KIST; and constant knowledge interactions with KTVF. By managing interfaces 
with KTVF, Firm T received various services such as management consultation, 
marketing, and use of equipment to conduct experiments that might have been 
essential for the new start-up. The KTVF observed and monitored the firm and 
provided support throughout the process that helped decrease various barriers at the 
early stage of innovation. 
For example, it was KTVF that advertised EBWS to Japanese industries when the 
firm received the first basic approval from the IMO. Interviewee Dr. H. J. Kim, 
explained, ‘We supported firms even if their project was completed. Follow-up 
services normally take 3 years, although the contract period is just 1 year.’ 
Interviewee K, a staff member at KTVF, went on, ‘This may be the reason that firms 
trust us. We emphasise consistency and responsibility in delivering services, 
meaning we continue to provide necessary services to firms.’ 
From the CEO’s perspective, managing interfaces with multiple levels of public 
intermediaries was important in the field of ballast-water-treatment systems because 
the firm needed diverse activities: developing and improving the new technology, 
creating the new market, and leading technology standardisation. The barriers were 
often unpredictable and addressing the barriers required long-term collaboration with 
multiple intermediaries. In this vein, managing interfaces with KIST, KIOST, and 
KTVF played a crucial role in resolving the barriers over time, ranging from 
developing new ideas to establishing new rules and regulations for electrolysis-
disinfection methods. 
In particular, the CEO played a crucial role in establishing and managing interfaces 
with KIST, KIOST and KTVF, which helped the firm build its routines, especially 
when the firm did not have organisational infrastructure (e.g. human and financial 
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resources) at the beginning of the business. The constant knowledge interaction at 
various levels took place through the interface that brought some outcomes the CEO 
desired: Firm T built technological capabilities based on relationships with GRIs and 
experts from diverse industries, and shaped the new technology market. 
6.2.3.3 Case Analysis 
This case illustrates knowledge interactions between public intermediaries and Firm 
T at the early stage of innovation. Multiple intermediaries enabled those with 
technological and nontechnological knowledge to strongly interact with Firm T to 
meet its diverse needs. Table 6-8 describes the major events and changes that 
occurred as a result of relationships with public intermediaries. The changes include 
not only a sales increase but also technology development, expanding relationships, 
and the creation of a new technology market. 
Table 6-8 Major Changes in Firm T 
Period Key events Changes 
2000 Established the venture firm and 
moved into the BIC 
Entered into a relationship with KTVF 
Expanded a relationship with KIST 
2005 Participated in the Exhibition Entered into a relationship with KIOST 
2006 Entered into a cooperative R&D 
relationship with KIOST 
Obtained the world’s first in-principal basic 
approval from the IMO 
2007 Initiated the knowledge interaction 
with KTVF 
 Expanded relationships with potential buyers 
in Japan 
2008 Continued to interact with KIST, 
KIOST, KTVF, and new buyers 
Upgraded technological capabilities 
 Obtained final approval from the IMO 
Created the new technology-market using the 
electrolysis methods 
~ 2012 Obtained orders from global buyers Sales increased 
 
In the beginning, the firm only needed technological knowledge, but the innovation 
journey required additional knowledge about relationships and the standardisation 
process, as the level of interaction intensified. Unlike other cases, this case highlights 
the barriers of innovation, in particular, knowledge barriers between the firm and the 
new field where the technology market and regulations were not yet identified. 
Firm T had limits in exploring the new venture. First, the firm had no idea how 
regulations on EBWS would be designed and applied in the new field. A high level 
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of uncertainty existed as to whether the IMO might approve the new technology, 
allowing the firm to create the new market. Second, the technological knowledge and 
supplier–buyer relationships in wastewater-treatment systems were no longer useful 
in the field of ballast water-treatment systems, which required a different set of 
knowledge. Like other cases in the mechatronics field, Firm T faced difficulties in 
obtaining the required knowledge because little information was available when Firm 
T decided to explore the new business. It was necessary to work with innovation 
players to obtain uncodified knowledge and co-shape the innovation path at the early 
stage of innovation. 
Having little internal organisational infrastructure, the CEO put effort into building 
relationships with public intermediaries (i.e. multiple GRIs and ministries) to 
overcome the barriers. The CEO believed this process would consistently bridge 
knowledge infrastructure problems and relationships necessary in the uncertain 
innovation process when adapting to a new business area. How could the firm 
explore and adapt to the new business area by resolving the barriers? Was the young 
firm capable of building new relationships from the beginning? 
The constant interaction between the CEO and other innovation players (i.e. 
intermediaries and experts), and the formal programme through which the firm could 
bridge the barriers, allowed Firm T to enter into new relationships with potential 
buyers. The CEO added, ‘As a CEO, I observe the trends in how this business would 
progress through the relationships with many experts in various areas. The [informal 
and formal] relationships helped me establish the business direction by constantly 
reconfiguring the idea.’ Residing in the BIC was advantageous to the newly 
established young firm, which lacked human resources and physical infrastructure. 
The CEO was able to gain technological knowledge from a neighbouring firm and 
KIST, and access experimental equipment. Additionally, the KVTF played a crucial 
role in bridging the relational barriers between Firm T and potential buyers at the 
beginning, which opened business opportunities with multiple buyers (see Figure 6-
3). 
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Figure 6-3 Firm T—Multiplicity of relationships and interactions. 
 
The first major factor that differentiates this case from other cases is the firm’s 
capabilities in building technological expertise and relationships. More precisely, the 
learning capabilities of the CEO improved the level of knowledge infrastructure and 
built necessary relationships. Because the firm faced several challenges such as 
market creation, technical failure, and lack of skill and human resources, the firm had 
little chance of obtaining government support at the beginning, due to a high level of 
uncertainties and risks. However, the CEO had a very strong vision from the outset 
that positively influenced the integration of new knowledge, relationships, and 
learning. The CEO remarked on his vision and strategy, 
From the beginning, Firm T targeted becoming a global leader. I met 
government officials and persuaded them to support us. I formed 
relationships with experts from various industries [to shape the 
favourable innovation environment]. I also worked with a law firm to 
establish regulations in Korea and these activities contributed to 
increasing the level of awareness of Firm T. 
In this case, the consistent and strong levels of knowledge interaction with multiple 
intermediaries over long periods of time were an important factor in building a new 
routine for the young firm. Like two other firms in the field of mechatronics, Firm T 
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had very focused knowledge demands that resulted in strong levels of interaction 
with a few public intermediaries. 
The second major difference was the technology-specific factor, which may have 
affected different levels of relationships and interactions. When Firm T made its 
decision to explore the new business, it required a different set of technological 
knowledge, rules, players, expertise, and skills. As the CEO described, the 
interaction process was the rule-making process surrounding the development of the 
EBWS. These initial stages tended to be extended and required more resources than 
subsequent stages because the knowledge at this stage was ambiguous and entailed 
contingencies. It took time for the firm to achieve technological development and 
shape the business environment that might be far from commercialisation or gaining 
profits. Therefore, it was important to bring public intermediaries into the innovation 
process to enable knowledge in the early technology market. Along with the CEO’s 
capabilities, the technological characteristics affected the pattern of relationships, 
which were shaped to centre around several intermediaries with targeted buyers. 
The crucial question is whether this knowledge interaction facilitated the innovation 
process and thereby reduced various knowledge barriers. Several crucial factors 
undergirded this process. First was the capability of the CEO. The CEO played a role 
as a boundary spanner who learnt quickly, constantly integrating and reconfiguring 
new knowledge. In particular, the CEO actively engaged in expanding relationships 
towards GRIs, ministries, and buyers, linking them into the innovation process. 
“Success depends on powerful committees [with multiple levels of relationships] 
relating to areas of policy, media, regulations, and technology that hedge unexpected 
risks. This offered me insights on the business.” The powerful committees provided 
the CEO with the learning space where competing rationalities could be combined 
and tested. 
Second was the level of individual and organisational capability in intermediaries, 
producing reliable knowledge on technology, buyers, and societal trends throughout 
the innovation process. GRIs provided the firm with necessary knowledge and 
constantly bridged diverse barriers. Coupled with KIST and KIOST, KTVF played 
an important role in monitoring the firm and discovering potential buyers for the firm 
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through the formal support programme. The credible image of KVTF played a 
crucial role in linking the firm to potential buyers when the firm entered relationships 
with big Japanese buyers. However, like other cases, the level of trust depends on 
individual capabilities rather than the name of GRIs, as relationships develop 
throughout the process. 
This case illustrates the knowledge interaction that decreased the barriers Firm T 
faced. The long-term interaction and multiplicity of relationships contributed to 
resolving the diverse barriers between internal and external resources and 
relationships at the early stage of innovation. The CEO, researchers from GRIs, and 
KTVF played a crucial role in maintaining strong levels of interaction, shaping rules, 
and monitoring activities over a long period of time. The multiple levels of 
interaction process can be viewed as the learning process that brought organisational 
changes (knowledge infrastructure and social capital) and created the new market 
structure. Firm T had starting capital of US$500,000 in 2000 and its annual revenue 
sharply increased to US$80 million in 2012. The EBWS became the leading 
technology that shared 60% of the market, despite its short history of market entry. 
The barriers, innovative outcomes, and micro-level factors that affected successful 
knowledge interaction are summarised in Table 6-9. 
Table 6-9 The Result of Knowledge Interaction: Firm T 
  Summary of the interaction process 
Barriers 
resolved 
Internal - Lack of technological and managerial capabilities 
- Lack of knowledge, human and financial resources 
External - Relationships with GRIs and buyers 
Outcomes Internal - Building wide networks throughout industries and academia 
- Acquiring new technological and nontechnical knowledge 
External 
 
 
- Entering into relationships with big buyers 
- Expanding relationships with policymakers 
- Creating the new market 
Micro-level 
factors 
Firm 
 
- Capability of the CEO (wide networks) 
- Residing in BIC at KIST and gaining name value 
Process - Long-term interaction with multiple intermediaries 
- Strong levels of interaction between the CEO and multiple 
intermediaries 
- A productive combination of competing rationalities 
Intermediary - Existence of reflexive individuals in each intermediary 
- Existence of monitoring organisation (KTVF) 
- R&D capabilities and providing test cites 
Current statue - Entered into the new business area 
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6.2.4 Case 4: Firm H 
Firm H is an IT-solution provider established in 2001 that has been interacting with 
KISTI since 2006. The firm was involved in knowledge services provided by KISTI, 
followed by other services provided by GRIs. The knowledge interaction on wind- 
field modelling technology66 failed at first and interaction was initiated exploring 
smart power-distribution units (PDUs). The smart PDU has integrated equipment 
with a computer rack and isothermal-isohumidity functions that were managed 
separately before Firm H started to develop. Table 6-10 describes the business area 
of Firm H. 
Table 6-10 Description of Business 
The firm has been developing and manufacturing a range of high-quality cooling and monitoring 
systems: smart racks and smart PDUs 
Major products are: 
- Smart racks: Cabinets for holding computers, networking equipment, and air-conditioning 
systems in the data centre, maintaining temperature and humidity 
- Smart PDUs: PDUs refer to equipment fitted with multiple appliances designed to distribute 
electric power to smart racks in the data centre. Smart PDUs refer to rack-based intelligent 
PDUs that maintain constant temperature and humidity, manage data, and measure CO2 
emission. 
Source: Adapted from the homepage of Firm H. 
6.2.4.1 The History of the Firm 
Firm H was established in 2001 specialising in network management. The chair had 
a 20-year history of working in GRIs and had sound knowledge of network 
management. The chair’s experiences and relationships with GRI customers shaped a 
stable business environment for several years until the firm faced stagnant sales 
growth. When the firm recorded a turnover of US$2.3 million in 2006, the chair 
realised the market share could not expand in the current business area at that time, 
and decided to look for another business opportunity. The chair sensed the limits of 
expanding market share in the network-management area and began exploring other 
business opportunities to weather the stagnant period. One member of the chair’s 
                                                        
66 The simulation and modelling technology of wind speed (or wind-flow velocity) analyses the 
movement or diffusion of air pollutants in the atmosphere. It can be used in placement (arrangement) 
of buildings at construction sites by analysing congested areas of air pollution (or bad-smelling areas). 
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informal network, working as a researcher in KISTI, initiated interest in wind-field-
modelling technology. 
The firm had an opportunity to merge with another small firm that had been 
specialising in system integration for 10 years, and where the CEO had a good 
reputation. The CEO had several strengths: first, the CEO had a good relationships 
with GRI customers in the field of system integration; second, the firm had proficient 
marketing capability; third, the CEO had managerial capabilities. The CEO was well 
aware of the characteristics of the IT industry where severe competition ensued 
among SMEs and innovative products appeared frequently. Thus, it was necessary 
for the firm to build a new knowledge base in a short period of time to gain 
competitive advantage. 
Although the firm had a relatively long history in system integration and the 
network-management business with human resources, the infrastructure did not seem 
to work in the new business area. Furthermore, long experience and accumulated 
knowledge in the existing business area made the firm hesitant to explore the new 
business. The firm was faced with new challenges: (a) the difference between the 
technology the firm had used and the new field of technology, (b) the difference 
between the knowledge the firm accumulated in SI and network management and the 
knowledge they might need to obtain for wind-field modelling technology, and 
(c) the disconnection between Firm H and potential players in the new business area. 
As a result of these significant barriers between existing knowledge and new 
knowledge of wind-field modelling technology, along with the increasing urgency of 
the CEO to make changes, the firm started to seek professional intermediaries. 
6.2.4.2 Knowledge Interaction Process 
6.2.4.2.1 Engagement of Public Intermediaries 
The CEO contacted the KISTI, the Small and Medium-Sized Business 
Administration (hereafter SMBA), and other GRIs. 
• SMBA: The Innovation Sponsor 
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The administration delivers SMEs a large number of services from R&D funding to 
knowledge consultations through public and private intermediaries. KISTI is one 
organisation that links its policies and knowledge services to SMEs. 
• KISTI: The Innovation Facilitator 
• Other GRIs: The Innovation Users 
The Korea Electronics Technology Institute (KETI), Korea Aerospace Research 
Institute (KARI), National Fusion Research Institute (NFRI), and the Korea Basic 
Science Institute (KBSI) were government research institutes that played a role as 
intermediate users. 
6.2.4.2.2 Knowledge Enabling 
Two researchers from KISTI participated in the process of knowledge enabling. In 
addition to the two researchers, Senior Researcher K from KISTI facilitated 
communication between KISTI and Firm H, because Researcher K had interacted 
with the chair and CEO for a long time. Researcher K was quite interested in the 
technology as well as the firm, having a positive view of its future market share, 
which influenced two other researchers to have a biased view of the technology and 
the firm. Instead of having comprehensive interviews with the owner and the CEO, 
the researchers presumed the firm could be successful in developing the wind-field-
modelling technology. Without analysing the capability of Firm H, two researchers 
analysed the technology itself, overlooking the nontechnological factors such as 
regulations, policies, and potential customers. 
Furthermore, knowledge enabling regarding wind-field-modelling technology 
connoted some assumptions that were conditions to be successful in the wind-field-
modelling technology market. The first assumption was that the firm could overcome 
the R&D gap through joint R&D; second, the firm could have been the system 
provider for the environmental assessments required by regulatory legislation. The 
government tried to legislate that any construction company would have to have an 
environmental-impact assessment for any new building, which included an 
assessment of the new wind field caused by the building. If this legislation had come 
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into effect, Firm H could have been a provider of these assessments, which would 
have constituted a significant market. However, they faced several difficulties in 
carrying out the additional R&D and marketing. 
The first difficulty related to technological capabilities. Firm H accumulated 
technological competencies in the field of network management and system 
integration. It had neither the technological capability nor the human resources for 
the new business area. Thus, the firm became involved in a technology-cooperation 
programme with the university to cope with the rapidly changing IT environment. 
However, the R&D period was longer than the CEO expected, and this led the firm 
into financial stress. Moreover, according to the CEO, the university partner had a 
closed attitude and did not open the technology source, which started to hamper 
mutual trust. As a result, technological capability building through technology 
cooperation for launching a new business failed. Because knowledge flows from the 
intermediary to the firm unidirectionally, the intermediary was not aware of the 
problems involved in the technology-cooperation programme. 
The second difficulty related to policy legislation. The researchers forecast that the 
environment-effect assessment market would be created but the market had not yet 
been formed. The third difficulty related to the marketing capability that the CEO 
had in the system-integration area. When the CEO started marketing, the technology 
targeted bigger customer groups than expected and had to be expanded for the new 
business. The CEO explained, ‘In fact, wind-field modelling technology was not 
appropriate for a small firm. The assumed price of a final product is about 
US$500,000, whilst we have been building a sales network targeting products worth 
US$20–30,000.’ The researchers analysed the future technology market but the 
analysis turned out be wrong in enabling knowledge in the firm’s context because the 
knowledge-enabling process did not involve experts or policymakers; rather, it 
centred on researchers in the intermediary who seemed to lock in their own 
knowledge and experiences. 
The researchers erred in forecasting the future market by configuring knowledge 
based simply on the interaction with a few experts, rather than interactions with 
policymakers and other innovation players. Another problem was that researchers 
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analysed the wind-field-modelling technology without enough interaction with the 
CEO, which resulted in an overestimation of the firm’s capability. They did not 
consider the possibility of a failure of technology cooperation between the firm and 
the university, but only presented an optimistic future market. Although the firm was 
incapable of bridging the R&D and managerial barriers in the new field, which 
required new experts and skills, KISTI did not participate in the process of 
interaction between Firm H and the university and other players in knowledge 
configuration. This led to the mismatch between the knowledge supply and the 
knowledge demands. 
The problem was not only from the intermediary side, but also from the firm side. 
The firm had never been involved in knowledge services before, which seemed to 
affect the pattern of interaction with KISTI. The chair and the CEO passively 
received the knowledge and seldom gave feedback to KISTI, which shaped 
knowledge flow from the intermediary to the firm unidirectionally. Instead, the CEO 
tried to build the new relationship and new knowledge by taking a formal academic 
programme, using the topic of wind-field modelling as the CEO’s master’s thesis, 
not fully depending on KISTI’s knowledge service. Despite the lack of active 
knowledge interaction with KISTI, the CEO was able to use the knowledge network, 
which helped in making a quick decision to withdraw from exploring wind-field-
modelling technology before the firm lost more money. This action reduced the costs 
of failure at an early stage. The CEO considered the failure of knowledge interaction 
to be due to the unilateral interaction with KISTI, receiving the knowledge that was 
offered. 
Because the firm had a strong relationship with customers in the field of system 
integration, the CEO started to consider new business related to existing customers. 
The government support policy offered an idea: to foster a ‘Green’ IT industry (an 
environmentally friendly IT technology contributing to saving energy and decreasing 
carbon dioxide), from which the manufacturer of PDUs could benefit. The CEO 
supposed the existence of customer needs and markets if the technology was 
strategically supported by the government. In exploring the new business opportunity 
of PDUs, the CEO considered government support to be essential to resolve the 
183 
 
barriers in carrying out R&D, testing the new equipment, and launching the new 
business in a short period of time. 
The second knowledge enabling took place when researcher K introduced the firm to 
the centre in KISTI to identify problems with the first model of PDU through the 
supercomputing-simulation programme. KISTI consistently enabled knowledge 
regarding the technology market, together with the aerodynamic structure of the 
PDU and related policies, focusing on the firm’s capabilities and demands. This time, 
the knowledge interaction occurred actively to customise the technological 
knowledge to the firm and the firm sometimes pushed the researchers in KISTI to 
keep to the service schedule, which may have affected entry to the market at an 
earlier stage. As a result of the second knowledge enabling with KISTI, the firm 
could minimise the trial-and-error process in R&D activities. The reliable technical 
data and market prospects from KISTI also helped the firm get R&D funding as a 
firm capable of creating new markets. The CEO remarked, 
Since we found the problem with the first model of PDU, we needed 
more time for additional R&D and more resources, such as budget and 
personnel etc. However, there were limits for a small firm in sustaining 
a long period of time just doing R&D without yielding profits. 
Reducing the R&D period using the KISTI facility, gaining credible 
data and its linkage to the funding programme of SMBA, let us 
overcome the lack of those resources in developing and improving the 
equipment. 
Along with the knowledge interaction with KISTI, the firm needed to test and 
improve its new products simultaneously to meet with reduced R&D cycle and 
innovation speed in the field. Thus, the firm planned to expand its relationships from 
GRI buyers to big buyers, which required participation from innovation facilitators to 
overcome the relational barrier between the firm and potential buyers. 
6.2.4.2.3 Facilitating Relations 
Initially, the firm targeted data centres in GRIs, as they were the customers of the 
firm. The firm used the relationships with GRI customers to test its first, second, and 
third model before it started to develop big customers. The firm sold the first model, 
which had many technical defects, to KARI, which played the role of a proxy user. 
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The institute investigated and reported all problems in the first model to the firm. 
Although the supercomputing centre in KISTI helped improve the second and third 
models, KISTI also acted as a proxy user together with other GRIs such as KARI, 
NFRI, and KBSI, which participating in monitoring and delivering feedback on the 
equipment to Firm H. The CEO explained, 
We do not have customers in the private sector. They are quite 
fastidious about new products and we cannot expect any feedback from 
them. We would feel lucky if our ideas are not stolen. However, GRIs 
allow failures and mistakes while it is difficult to sell the first product. 
Of course, we promised to upgrade the equipment on a free basis if they 
gave us feedback. Firm H would not exist if we did not have 
relationships with them. 
When the firm developed the final product, as expected, it started to expand its 
customer base from GRIs to global firms in cooperation with KISTI. Because the 
firm had interacted with KISTI for several years, the CEO came to know other 
services that would fit their needs. The Technology Commercialisation Information 
Department in KISTI helped facilitate relations between the firm and potential 
innovation players such as big buyers, GRIs, and policymakers. Strong interaction 
occurred between KISTI and the firm at all levels of employees, enabling them to 
identify appropriate markets and innovation players. It was crucial for the firm to 
enter the market in the shortest period of time to attain a competitive advantage. The 
impartial position of the public intermediary played an important role in aligning 
potential buyers to the unknown firm’s innovation process in a few months. As a 
small firm without name value, it would have taken a long time to build relationships 
with potential buyers without the innovation facilitator, even though the firm was 
successful in developing the new innovative equipment. 
KISTI guaranteed the firm’s technology and credibility, which helped the firm build 
its social capital with innovation players. The CEO said, 
Since we entered into a relationship with KISTI, researchers have been 
showing consistency in supporting us that led us to trust KISTI. 
Researcher [K] was the bridge to link to the other types of services in 
KISTI and SMBA. KISTI not only introduced potential buyers, but also 
shortened the gap between us. If we would have done that it would take 
several years and it might be too late to gain a competitive advantage. 
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It takes time to build technological and managerial capabilities to lead big buyers 
into business relationships; most SMEs are easily exhausted and stop putting effort 
into capability building due to a lack of resources to sustain them during this period. 
Instead, the firm used KISTI as its knowledge repository to overcome the knowledge 
and relational barriers prior to entering a fair relationship with big buyers. 
6.2.4.2.4 Facilitating Learning 
At the beginning of knowledge interaction with KISTI, the firm passively received 
knowledge from KISTI; therefore, knowledge interaction did not take place. 
Knowledge interaction itself seemed to fail because it did not bring any changes, but 
the CEO learned how to use the knowledge services and decided to actively use 
‘external knowledge’ to search for other business opportunities: ‘I came to know 
many programmes provided by the government that seemed to be very useful for 
SMEs. I made a government-support map for SMEs to use establishing our business 
strategy.’ The KISTI researcher also learnt the importance of knowledge interaction 
and tried to focus on the needs of the firm. The reflexivity of the CEO and researcher 
brought new patterns of interaction to the intermediary and firm that led to active 
learning inside the firm. Passive interaction changed to active interaction with wide 
levels of researchers inside KISTI, other GRIs, and potential buyers after the firm 
experienced the knowledge service. Multiple levels of relationships with various 
partners in GRIs led the CEO and the top-management team to learn how to interact 
with GRIs, filling the knowledge barrier as scheduled. 
Well, researchers in GRIs tended to react quite slowly regarding our 
requests because they did not know or care about the business 
environment we were facing. Thus, we showed them our progress and 
product-delivery plan, pushing them to follow our schedule. (Vice 
President) 
The proactive attitude of the firm brought positive effects on trust-building 
relationships with partners, showing capability and responsibility. The firm could 
build its networks for further knowledge interaction in the new business area. In 
addition to constant interaction with GRIs, the CEO and the top-management team 
enthusiastically attended various education programmes, such as patent-management 
programmes, to cope with the changing market environment and potential 
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competitors, which helped in replicating knowledge interactions with KISTI and 
other GRIs on the new knowledge processing inside the firm. 
As previously explained, interaction with the supercomputing centre in KISTI 
facilitated technological learning by identifying the problem with the first model of 
PDUs. It was KETI that improved the technological defects of the first and second 
models of PDUs, based on collaboration with Firm H, whereas KARI, NFRI, and 
KBSI acted as proxy users who delivered feedback on PDUs. The knowledge 
interaction with these public intermediaries facilitated not only individual and 
organisational learning but also brought about transformation of the SME from a 
small firm to an innovative learning SME. Learning contributed to build the new 
business and organisational structure. 
The CEO established three departments responsible for system integration, new 
business development (Smart PDUs) and future strategy, and all departments were in 
charge of acquiring and reconfiguring the related knowledge. Employees came to 
share the problems and risks of the new business through multiple levels of 
relationships and interactions that contributed to decreasing discrepancies between 
the CEO and employees. The CEO explained, 
Now, employees start to indicate problems related to our business by 
themselves. It seems there was no gap between employees and me since 
I had been trying to deliver all the knowledge to them and let them 
communicate with experts outside the firm. 
The interactions with KISTI and other GRIs led the firm to learn how to interact with 
experts, how to apply external knowledge to the firm, and how to build an internal 
and external knowledge structure. This long social process requires interfaces in 
which the firm and intermediaries identify and resolve problems along the innovation 
process. 
6.2.4.2.5 Managing Interfaces 
As explained in the knowledge-enabling process, the first knowledge enabling 
regarding the wind-field-modelling technology was unsuccessful. In spite of the 
disappointing result, both parties were able to initiate the second knowledge 
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interaction when the firm needed support to explore the second business 
opportunity–smart PDUs. Researcher K in KISTI had maintained good relationships 
with the CEO and the chair, delivering necessary information on government-support 
programmes and regulations in the IT sector after the first knowledge interaction. 
During the interaction, Researcher K came to know that Firm H faced technical 
barriers to developing PDUs. The researcher introduced the firm to the 
supercomputing centre in KISTI to identify problems with the first model of PDU 
through the supercomputing-simulation programme. KISTI provided the market 
knowledge, together with the aerodynamic structure of the PDU, to the firm. In 
addition, the CEO maintained relationships with several GRIs (i.e. KETI, KARI, 
NFRI, and KBSI), which helped the firm constantly identify and resolve barriers 
during the innovation process. 
The firm was able to access different types of services which brought benefits to the 
firm such as receiving additional funding for product development, shortening the 
R&D period, and bridging the gap between the firm and potential buyers. 
Considering GRIs as innovation partners, maintaining interfaces with multiple 
intermediaries was crucial for the firm as a mechanism to overcome the lack of 
capability of the firm. The interfaces acted as the conduit for constant knowledge 
interaction such that the CEO was able to absorb specific knowledge from each 
intermediary, deliver the experiences and knowledge to employees, and make the 
best use of them to develop the new equipment, contributing to enhancing the 
innovative capability of Firm H. The firm finally succeeded in developing the 
integrated equipment of rack and smart PDUs, which had the unique functions of 
controlling, monitoring, and storing temperature, humidity, and energy consumption. 
By adopting the new equipment, the data centres could manage the level of carbon 
emissions as well as energy consumption. Being certified as the Innobiz firm in 2012, 
the sales record of the firm reached US$9.2 million, four times higher than in 2006. 
6.2.4.3 Case Analysis 
This case showed knowledge interaction between the public intermediary and the 
SME at the early stage of innovation, which started with the emerging need of Firm 
H, based on the barriers in knowledge and resources the firm faced when exploring 
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the new business area. Although the firm had business experience in the field of 
system integration for a long period of time, the relationships built in that field and 
technical knowledge were not helpful when the firm started to look for a new 
business area. 
Like Firm H, many SMEs have an informal relationship with experts in academia 
and industry to overcome barriers, but the relationship does not decrease the barriers 
in the 4 or 5 years that are the maximum expected period for yielding profits. 
Informal relationships bring indirect benefits in the short run but may take a long 
period of time to yield positive economic outcomes. Few SMEs can survive while 
investing huge resources to cope with changes during the period. The problem for 
Firm H came when the R&D period of developing PDUs got longer without yielding 
profits. The firm needed various types of services such as R&D funding, technical 
support, and help discovering potential buyers. Marketing of the new product was 
not a problem because the CEO had good relationships with former customers in 
GRIs, whereas entering into business relationships with big buyers was a barrier the 
firm had to overcome. 
How could an SME keep abreast of new knowledge in the innovation process? 
Engaging in formal programmes provided by the government to resolve the barriers 
and to shorten the distance with innovation players could be the answer. Table 6-11 
shows the major events and changes that occurred as a result of knowledge 
interaction with public intermediaries. 
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Table 6-11 Major Changes in Firm H 
Period Key events Changes 
2001 Established the firm Maintained the business in the field of system 
integration 
2007–2008 Entered into knowledge interaction 
with KISTI to explore the new 
business area 
Entered into technological 
collaboration with the university 
No changes occurred as a result of the 
knowledge interaction and technological 
collaboration 
Withdrawal from developing the wind-field 
modelling technology 
2009–2010 New business areas found by the 
CEO 
Entered into technology 
collaboration with several GRIs 
Active interaction occurred with GRIs and 
universities 
Achieved a technological goal in developing 
smart PUDs and smart racks 
2010–2011 Produced the first and second models 
of smart PDUs 
Continuing collaboration with KETI 
to improve defects in the first and 
second models 
Expanded buyers by targeting GRIs that 
delivered defects of the two models 
Established a research laboratory affiliated 
with the firm (2011) 
2012 Continued interaction with multiple 
GRIs 
Restructured the organisation to address the 
diverse needs 
~ 2013 Developed 3rd models 
Received the supporting programme 
from KISTI (Technology Round 
Table) 
Expanded relationships with potential players 
who operated big data centres 
 
Firm H interacted with several GRIs throughout the innovation process. Impartiality 
and capability of innovation facilitators were crucial because the not-for-profit 
structure, assets, and social capital of the public intermediary allowed the firm to 
configure and align the necessary resources of an SME, regardless of the support 
period and interests representing specific parties. The KISTI, as one of the GRIs, had 
a large number of reports, databases, experts, and relational capital as a result of 
long-term government support. By engaging in the SME support programme together, 
KISTI could fill the knowledge barrier in the early stages and link the firm to other 
types of services and players, facilitating relations throughout the process. However, 
the status of the intermediary does not always guarantee successful knowledge 
interaction. If the intermediary loses its impartial position or lacks interaction with 
experts outside the intermediary in knowledge configuration, the knowledge 
interaction may not bring positive outcomes. 
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As shown in this case, knowledge enabling failed at first for two reasons: the supply 
view of the public intermediary, and a lack of knowledge interaction with the SME in 
articulating its demands. This caused a mismatch between the supplier’s view of 
knowledge and the SME’s demands. The researchers at KISTI overlooked the 
capabilities of the firm, and instead provided a simple analysis of the technology 
itself. The researchers seemed to lock their experiences and processes in configuring 
knowledge rather than considering the firm’s capabilities, embedded in its 
experiences, which varies from firm to firm. The knowledge lacked a ‘combination 
of competing rationality’ of various innovation players, mainly relying on the 
knowledge from published reports and databases. Lack of multiplicity of interaction 
resulted in exaggerated prospects of the wind-field-modelling technology. In contrast, 
a problem arose in the firm, which maintained a passive attitude in knowledge 
interaction that deepened the one-way interaction from KISTI to the firm and hence 
resulted in failure to deliver the firm’s needs. The researchers could not analyse the 
firm’s technology and managerial capability. 
However, trust-based relationships and reflexivity elicited a second opportunity for 
knowledge interaction from the initial failure in knowledge enabling and interaction. 
In this case, reflexive individuals or organisations played an important role in 
reopening and shaping the multiple levels of relationship. To look at the differences 
between this case and other cases in which the public intermediary failed in the 
knowledge interaction in the first place but then redeemed the mistakes in enabling 
the knowledge, some questions arise. Why did this case become successful after the 
initial failure? What are the differences that happened in the case? What are the 
crucial factors? 
The first major factor that differentiates this from other cases can be explained as a 
technology-specific factor that affected different levels of relationship and interaction. 
The smart PDU is strongly affected by the IT-industry cycle, which is relatively short. 
The boundary between the early R&D stage and later commercialisation stage in the 
innovation process is unclear. Unlike in other cases, the firm could not fully depend 
on one intermediary, but needed to use several intermediaries, aligning them to its 
innovation process at nearly the same time. Timing was crucial and various kinds of 
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support, from R&D funding to testing the product in a short period of time, were 
necessary. The CEO believed large corporations could imitate the products in a few 
years, as they had done with other IT-related products. Also, competition among 
SMEs had become severe because many start-up firms emerged with innovative 
products in the sector. Developing innovative equipment may not have been enough 
for the firm and entering the market at the right time was key to gaining a 
competitive advantage. 
To do so, the capability of the intermediary to configure the market-prospect 
knowledge, followed by developing potential buyers, was highly important. In 
particular, enabling a high level of accurate knowledge in a timely manner was more 
important than the depth or amount of knowledge because the level of market 
uncertainty was not very high. In this case, the network and reputation of the public 
intermediary played a crucial role in identifying potential big buyers and aligning 
them to the innovation process in a short period of time. This process bridged not 
only the knowledge barrier but also the credibility and relational barrier of the firm in 
a short period of time. 
The second difference also concerned a technology-specific factor: the multiplicity 
of relationships on different levels of the support system. Unlike cases in the 
mechatronics industry, the interaction with many GRIs occurred simultaneously, not 
in serial order, due to the characteristics of the technology. As mentioned above, 
although the firm was willing to develop a new business, it still needed support in the 
short term and someone to help and share the risk. In addition to the knowledge 
interaction with KISTI, the firm was involved in joint R&D with KETI to fill the 
technological gap. Then, the firm used GRIs as proxy customers who were the 
customers in the system-integration business and had a good relationship with the 
CEO. 
The GRIs delivered all the defects of the first and second models to the firm, 
influencing production of the final product: smart PDUs targeting big buyers. At the 
same time, the firm interacted with KETI to improve the performance of the models. 
When the firm came to have confidence in their product, KISTI organised a 
technology round table of potential buyers, policymakers, and GRIs, to share their 
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views on the business opportunities. Because KISTI had monitored and shared 
knowledge with the CEO in the innovation process, it was not a difficult issue to link 
an appropriate programme to the firm. The relationships evolved centred on multiple 
public intermediaries at meso- and micro-levels that resolved technological barriers 
constantly and provided interfaces with potential buyers (see Figure 6-4). 
 
Figure 6-4 Firm H—Multiplicity of relationships and interactions. 
 
Whenever the firm faced problems in the joint project, not only KISTI, but also other 
partners in the GRIs were more responsible than partners in private sectors in 
delivering feedback (i.e. defects or problems of the new equipment). Each public 
intermediary had its own strengths: KISTI provided knowledge; KETI was a R&D 
partner; and KARI, NFRI, and KBSI were proxy users. These complementary 
relationships with multiple levels of GRIs helped the firm overcome different types 
of barriers and achieve development of the new equipment in a short period of time. 
This is one success factor of the knowledge interaction. Being together in the 
innovation process of the firm, they could link their activities closely and understand 
the activities more clearly. Furthermore, entering into multiple relationships could 
help the firm learn from the GRIs in the way the firm approached other services and 
researchers. Those services consistently bridged the barriers at every stage of 
innovation. More importantly, multiple levels of relationships and interactions with 
various players played an important role in launching the new product from 
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technology development to finding buyers. Although the first interaction brought 
disappointment, the learning initiated relationships again to overcome the 
weaknesses in the new business area: the computer rack and smart PDUs. In addition, 
the firm could take advantage of a good relationship with the KISTI and GRIs, using 
them as test beds before targeting big buyers in private sectors. 
The case illustrates the barriers the firm has in the new business area. As can be seen 
from the beginning, the firm was willing to move to a new business area but lacked 
technical and nontechnical knowledge and the S&T expertise to explore the new 
business. The intermediary failed to enable knowledge based on a supply-side view 
of supports, transporting the knowledge to the firm unidirectionally, but then initiated 
the knowledge interaction, focusing on the firm’s demand was likely to have good 
result in the near future. This knowledge interaction was possible because the CEO 
learnt about several government-support programmes during previous failure 
experiences and managed interfaces with public intermediaries. As a reflexive actor, 
the CEO saw an opportunity to use government support, even though the relationship 
with KISTI had failed in the first place. Instead, the CEO learned how to make the 
best use of government-support programmes and policies in the firm’s business 
strategy, linking all the services in GRIs with the innovation process of the firm. 
However, not only the CEO’s attitude, but the CEO’s experience sand effort in 
learning paved the path to success. The CEO took a postgraduate course with the 
theme, wind-field-modelling technology, and on completing the course, started a 
Ph.D. programme. The coursework initiated an idea about the innovation process and 
how to align resources and relationships to the firm’s business. Researcher K in the 
intermediary also learned from the first knowledge enabling, which turned out to be 
irrelevant for the firm. The researcher maintained the relationship with the CEO and 
delivered the information to the firm focusing on the demands of the firm. They were 
reflexive individuals who learnt from failures and were able to apply experiences in 
the second knowledge-enabling process. 
The firm could build technological competencies in cooperation with GRIs. The 
learning capability of the firm could rebuild the knowledge infrastructure through 
interaction. The interaction led multiple public intermediaries to join in to resolve the 
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barriers the firm faced. The public intermediaries were able to consistently provide 
various types of services such as knowledge enabling, funding, using facilities 
(supercomputing), technology transfer, and technology roundtable. The not-for-profit 
status of the public intermediary played an important role in supporting the firm for 
several years at the early stages of innovation, especially when the firm hardly made 
profits and was unable to pay for the services.  
Table 6-12 summarises barriers, outcomes and micro-level factors that resulted in 
one-way knowledge interaction at first but led to successful knowledge interaction 
when both parties entered into second knowledge interaction. 
Table 6-12 The Result of Knowledge Interaction: Firm H (less successful) 
  Summary of the interaction process 
Barriers 
resolved 
 Internal - Lack of technological capabilities 
- Lack of technological and nontechnological knowledge 
External - Lack of relationships with big buyers 
Outcomes Internal - Establishing three departments 
- Acquiring new technical and nontechnical knowledge 
 External - Expanding relationships with GRIs and big buyers 
Micro-level 
factors 
 Firm - Learning and marketing capability of the CEO 
- Long-term trust-based relationships with multiple GRIs 
- Existence of reflexive individuals 
 Process - Multiplicity of relationships with GRIs 
- From one-way knowledge flow to multidirectional knowledge 
interaction 
- Productive combination of competing rationality 
 Intermediary - Various types of support programmes provided by multiple 
GRIs at nearly the same time 
- Existence of reflexive individuals 
 Current status - Used failed experiences to develop another business 
opportunity, occurring at the time of interviews 
 
6.2.5 Case 5: Firm M 
In this case, the firm used knowledge services provided by KISTI in 2008; this 
relationship continued until the firm closed down in 2011. The knowledge interaction 
centred on ‘multiview and photography based 3D scanning technology’, which was 
the major business area of the firm from its inception (Table 6-13). 
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Table 6-13 Overview of Business 
The firm developed multiview and photography-based 3D-scanning systems to measure body fat, 
body frame, body shape etc. 
Major products are 
- Body Scanning Systems: The system scans the entire body in few seconds and uses the image 
to make fit and sizing predictions, create avatars for 3D virtual fit, and produce custom 
garments. Scan data can be used across industries such as fitness training, weight-loss 
tracking, and pre and postsurgery medical applications. 
Source: Adaptation from the interview script with the CEO. 
6.2.5.1 History of the Firm 
Firm M, established in 2006, specialised in a photography-based 3D-scanning system. 
The CEO had worked as a consultant for a global consultancy in the United States 
for more than 10 years before becoming special economic advisor to the South 
Korean President in 2003. During this period, the CEO succeeded in building broad 
formal and informal networks throughout Korea. Although the firm did not initially 
have any technological infrastructure, the CEO believed the firm could make the best 
use of IT infrastructure as well as the CEO’s networks in Korea. Using these 
relationships, the CEO was able to attract angel investors to help develop the 3D-
scanning system to measure body fat and size (e.g. obesity rate, skeletal muscles, and 
basal metabolic rate). 
Between 2006 and 2008, the CEO employed qualified graduates with backgrounds in 
engineering to carry out in-house R&D. At the same time, the CEO developed 
potential customers by targeting hospitals after entering the market at the right time, 
one of the main factors in the firm’s success. To bridge the technology gap, the firm 
entered into joint R&D with a university developing 3D-measurement technology. 
However, no proper process or methodology existed that could transform and 
integrate external knowledge into the firm’s innovation process. Lacking in business 
experience and internal resources for this new field, the CEO experienced difficulties 
in carrying out additional R&D, as well as in marketing and operating the firm. 
Although there were few major global corporations in the industry, some innovative 
SMEs were likely to enter the 3D-scanning-system market a few years after the firm 
initiated R&D. Because the firm aimed to compete with laser-based foreign products 
using its photography-based products, the timing of market entry was an important 
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factor in enjoying first-mover advantage. Knowledge regarding market feasibility, 
competitors, and regulations was a major barrier to be solved at the same time, along 
with securing funding for additional R&D. In particular, the CEO put greater 
emphasis on bridging the technology gap than on other factors because the firm had 
relationships with potential customers. The CEO, therefore, started seeking 
professional intermediaries for their expertise. 
6.2.5.2 Knowledge Interaction Process 
6.2.5.2.1 Engagement of Public Intermediaries 
The CEO contacted KISTI, followed by SMBA and other intermediaries. 
• SMBA: The Innovation Sponsor 
The role of SMBA was the same as in the case of Firm H. 
• KISTI: Innovation Facilitator 
The role of KISTI was the same as in the case of Firms K and P. 
• Other Intermediaries 
The IF and one design company took part in the innovation process. The ETRI, a 
GRI, participated in the technology-transfer process. 
6.2.5.2.2 Knowledge Enabling 
Researchers from KISTI participated in the process of knowledge enabling and 
articulated the demands the firm would face in developing this technology. When the 
firm started a knowledge interaction with KISTI, it had a research contract with S 
university regarding 3D-measurement technology. Developing a 3D-scanning system 
required not only 3D-measurement technologies but also system building and 
application technologies that could process the data and produce an image. The CEO 
employed qualified experts to develop the application technology while seeking 
GRIs to receive the 3D-imaging-process technology. This situation resulted in a lack 
of funds, and the CEO became interested in acquiring funding rather than the 
knowledge itself, even though technical and nontechnical knowledge gaps continued. 
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Based on their interaction with the CEO, researchers assumed the firm could be 
successful if more funding was provided for additional R&D. Moreover, the 
researchers seemed to place too much confidence on the networking capabilities and 
reputation of the CEO. This view resulted in the researchers overlooking knowledge 
interactions with potential innovation players such as policymakers, GRIs, and 
potential buyers. As a result, knowledge was combined under two assumptions: the 
technological capability of the firm was such that they could manufacture the final 
product without failure; and the managerial capabilities of the CEO meant the firm 
could align all the necessary technologies into the innovation process successfully. 
Lacking an in-depth knowledge of the firm’s capabilities, the researchers provided it 
with a rosy picture of the future of 3D-scanning systems. 
In addition, the researchers did not appear to have any interaction with experts or 
potential buyers, and only used reports and databases from KISTI. They simply 
combined this knowledge into exactly what the CEO wanted, overlooking any 
obstacles the firm may have had to face in the innovation process. The researchers 
and the CEO believed the firm would be successful in developing the scanning 
system that might generate economic outcomes. This resulted in enabling a poor 
quality of knowledge. The CEO remarked, 
Whomever I talked to, I knew more about 3D data processing than they 
did. My employees or the researchers in GRIs did not have enough 
knowledge, which was frustrating. In terms of KISTI’s report, I assume 
the analysts produced the report based on my knowledge and their 
communication with me. There was nothing new in the report. 
The CEO’s disappointment at the level of knowledge caused hesitation in 
interactions with the researchers, which hampered ongoing learning and trust 
building. However, the CEO had a very passive attitude and had not sent feedback to 
the researchers, resulting in a one-way knowledge flow from the intermediary to the 
firm. Although the CEO was dissatisfied with the report, the CEO requested no 
additional information or knowledge. He added, ‘I did not know myself [what the 
problem was] at that time. Although my intention was to get the funding rather than 
acquire the knowledge, the researchers should have let me know that those goals 
might not be achieved.’ The CEO considered this failure of knowledge interaction to 
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be due to the ambiguity of knowledge, but could not see the problems caused by a 
unilateral knowledge interaction. 
Based on their two assumptions, the researchers overestimated the firm’s 
technological and managerial capabilities, which contributed to securing the R&D 
funding from the SMBA. This helped the firm invest in additional research on the 
3D-body-scanning system. However, problems arose when, contrary to expectations, 
the research contract with one university failed to develop image processing. This 
outcome, in turn, negatively affected the profit structure of the firm, as it meant the 
product launch was delayed. Under increasing pressure from the angel investors, the 
CEO made use of other intermediaries to fill the technology gap and yield profits. At 
the same time, the CEO brought forward R&D inside the firm and decided to receive 
technology from a GRI that had a good reputation in the field. 
6.2.5.2.3 Facilitating Relations 
KISTI introduced a programme sponsored by the IF through which firms could 
receive design support along with help in building a business model. First, the firm 
applied to the ‘Total Design Support’ programme sponsored by the IF, grafting 
technologies onto design to create a new business model. One famous design 
company took part in the programme as a partner of the firm, and focused on 
materialising the design rather than the firm’s status at the time. Although the firm 
was able to produce a 3D-upper-body-scanning system that could yield initial profits, 
the design firm insisted on designing and manufacturing a 3D-full-body-scanning 
system because it would have more design value. KISTI advised the CEO to produce 
the 3D-upper-body-scanning system in advance and observe the response from the 
market. Because the CEO had a negative attitude towards KISTI (based on initial 
disappointment with their work), the CEO was reluctant to follow their advice and 
decided to adopt the new business model suggested by the design company. This 
required additional R&D, more funding, and more time, and the firm had to address 
the situation without generating any sales. Such a risky decision led the CEO to enter 
into a relationship with ETRI. 
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The CEO signed a contract with ETRI for the transfer of multiview-photography-
based 3D-image-processing technology that could visualise the scanned object on the 
screen. Lacking in technological knowledge, the CEO was unable to have an 
informed discussion with the researchers at ETRI. Instead, employees took part in 
the interactive process, but this was a unilateral transfer of knowledge rather than 
genuine interaction. The engineers were less active than the CEO in developing the 
system. When the CEO received the technology, it was imperfect and required 
additional R&D to visualise the scanned object. From that moment, some arguments 
arose between the firm and ETRI regarding technology readiness. Because the signed 
contract had not indicated any detailed technological requirements, the firm could do 
nothing, leading to a second failure in filling the technology gap. 
The CEO explained, 
I had potential customers for the scanner and funds for manufacturing. 
If the technology had met my expectations, I could have sold the 
products to the National Health Insurance Corporation and health 
centres throughout the country. As I could not provide the products, I 
lost all the trust I had built, and this is linked to the failure of the 
business. 
There were limits as to how much KISTI could mediate this problem for two 
reasons: first, the researchers at both public intermediaries seemed to be reluctant to 
have communication with each other because KISTI was not the organiser for the 
technology-transfer programme. The lack of a programme coordinator hindered the 
facilitation of interaction, especially when both parties had problems; second, the 
CEO seemed not to have interest in support from KISTI at the beginning because of 
experiences of knowledge service that fell short of the CEO’s expectations. 
Although the CEO tried to align all the resources in the innovation process, the 
support programmes of KISTI, IF, the design company, and ETRI did not link 
effectively. The design company seemed to have interest in the value of the design 
itself rather than the commercial side of the product, whereas ETRI was more likely 
to focus on technology-transfer activities, which was the main reason for 
collaboration. Individuals involved in the interaction were not responsible for 
bridging the barriers that had resulted in poor quality services. However, problems 
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also arose when the CEO received knowledge service from the intermediaries but did 
not use it actively to improve the services for which he was responsible. The CEO 
said, 
Many government agencies have good programmes but it is my 
responsibility to organise all the support. Now I can tell I should have 
been more proactive in telling them what I wanted. Even so, if there had 
been someone or an organization that could have controlled the process 
or monitored the services, then that would have been much better. 
The knowledge interaction among all intermediaries was not active, and the firm’s 
knowledge gap remained the same. Continuous failure led to angel investors leaving, 
bringing about financial difficulties for the firm. To make matters worse, the firm 
had to return funding to the SMBA because of its R&D failure. As a result, 
employees started to leave, one by one, followed by potential buyers. As the firm had 
lost its internal organisational structure along with its external relationships, it was 
forced to close down in 2011, just before product commercialisation could begin. 
6.2.5.2.4 Facilitating Learning 
Unlike the other four firms, Firm M lacked accumulated experiences in R&D and 
businesses and this lack of capabilities seemed to affect the pattern of knowledge 
interaction with public intermediaries. Knowledge interaction mostly took place 
unidirectionally from each intermediary to the firm and there was lack of 
communication between the CEO and employees. Facilitators did not exist and as a 
result, learning did not take place throughout the knowledge-interaction process. 
6.2.5.2.5 Managing Interfaces 
The interfaces between intermediaries and the firm for delivering feedback, 
accessing additional services and human resources to each intermediary, and 
adapting the new knowledge to Firm M’s context were not managed well. 
6.2.5.3 Case Analysis 
This case shows knowledge interaction between a public intermediary and an SME at 
the early stages of innovation. The firm sought knowledge services to overcome the 
barriers in its capabilities. When it decided to develop a new product aimed at 
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competing with global products, it did not have an adequate infrastructure. There was 
little knowledge about a ‘photography based 3D scanning system’ and it was not 
possible to approach global corporations to obtain knowledge regarding the level of 
technology, expected competitors, research trends, related organisations, and 
potential customers. Like CEOs of other SMEs, the CEO chose public intermediaries 
to bridge the knowledge barrier at the early stages of innovation. The major events 
and changes in the innovation process are summarised in Table 6-14. 
Table 6-14 Major Changes in Firm M 
Period Key events Changes 
2006 Entered into technological cooperation 
with the university 
Failed in achieving a technological goal within 
the timeframe 
2008 Entered into knowledge interaction 
with KISTI 
No changes occurred 
Received R&D funds from the SMBA 
2009 Entered into a relationship with the IF 
and the design company 
Designed the entire body scanner but did not 
link to product development 
2010 Entered into a cooperative R&D 
relationship with a GRI 
Failed to achieve a technological goal within 
the timeframe 
Failed in commercialisation 
2011 Withdrew funds due to the failed R&D  Closure of the business 
 
The knowledge was provided, followed by funding, but the firm failed because it did 
not succeed in overcoming technology barriers. Because the ‘multiview and 
photography-based 3D image processing technology’ for the body-scanning system 
was the core technology for the final product, the ostensible reason for closing down 
the business was the failure of technology transfer, indicated by the CEO. However, 
analysis of the interaction process revealed some interesting factors other than mere 
technology gaps. 
The firm was successful in developing optical, electronic, and electric technologies, 
and was capable of manufacturing a 3D-upper-body-scanning system, so why did 
failure of technology transfer cause the firm to close down? It is questionable 
whether technological and managerial barriers could be overcome. If the firm had 
manufactured the 3D-uppe-body-scanning system in the first place and generated 
profits, the situation might have been different. If the CEO was capable of securing 
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potential customers while starting R&D, it begs the question as to why the firm 
closed down. 
One reason for failure relates to the firm’s abilities to interact with new knowledge 
and absorb it. In other words, no routines were in place for learning in the firm 
because the firm was a new start-up and did not have any business experience, which 
hindered the interaction of the CEO with employees, as well as that of the firm and 
other organisations. Unlike CEOs from the four cases that had long period of 
technological or marketing experiences before they explored the new business areas, 
the CEO of Firm M did not have any expertise in the new area. 
In most cases, the CEO received the knowledge passively and did not translate it into 
the firm’s innovation context. The CEO did not think that accuracy of knowledge 
was a problem as long as the firm could obtain funding for additional R&D. Taking a 
linear view of innovation, an inability to communicate and absorb external 
knowledge not only resulted in passive one-way interaction with intermediaries, but 
also in an inability to maintain relationships with potential players. 
A lack of routine also affected communication with employees inside the firm. 
Unlike CEOs from successful cases, who facilitated knowledge interaction inside 
their firms, the CEO put little effort into communicating with employees. The CEO 
did not transmit a sense of urgency to employees; thus, employees were unable to act 
as bridge builders when the CEO experienced problems with intermediaries. Formal 
and informal communication channels did not appear to work well, hindering 
interactive learning and maintaining the barriers inside and outside the firm. 
Characteristics of the technology and multiplicity of relationships provided another 
reason for failure. The 3D-scanning technology was to replace laser-based scanning 
technology soon after the firm started R&D. The CEO was well aware of the market, 
where potential competitors would emerge in a few years. If the CEO had been 
successful in developing the 3D-photography-based-scanning system as planned, and 
had entered into the market earlier than potential competitors, the firm could have 
dominated the domestic market. Therefore, the CEO entered into relationships with 
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multiple intermediaries to address rapid changes in the market and a lack of 
resources. 
It was crucial to obtain support from multiple intermediaries to fill the various 
barriers—from technology development to design and marketing—in a short time. 
To do so, two factors needed to be fulfilled during the innovation process: the 
capability of the intermediary to configure the credible knowledge and the alignment 
of multiple relationships in the innovation process. In particular, enabling a high 
level of credible knowledge in a timely manner was more important than the depth or 
amount of knowledge, as the level of market uncertainty was not very high. In 
aligning all the services, KISTI linked the firm to the programme sponsored by the IF 
through which it could enter into a relationship with a design company. In addition, 
the CEO signed a contract with ETRI to receive technology to shorten the R&D 
period. Relationships were formed at meso- and micro-levels but the levels of 
interaction among organisations was not active, showing one-way knowledge flow 
(see Figure 6-5). 
 
Figure 6-5 Firm M—Multiplicity of relationships and interactions. 
 
Relationships seemed quite successful at first, but problems emerged during the 
interactive process. The first of these was the CEO, who linked all the services but 
focused mainly on technology development, ignoring knowledge interaction with 
intermediaries. It seemed the CEO believed the degree of completeness of 
technology might guarantee commercial success and this thought hindered constant 
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knowledge interaction in the complex innovation process. Because the firm was 
capable of producing the 3D-upper-body-scanning system, one researcher at KISTI 
advised the CEO to produce this system to yield initial sales, which would also cost 
less than developing a whole-body scanner. The researcher from KISTI added, 
I advised him several times to produce the upper-body scanning system, 
but he decided to invest in developing the whole-body scanner. It was 
too risky to invest more money in R&D without sales for several years. 
I think he was unable to assess the quality or credibility of the 
knowledge he received. 
The CEO may have been disappointed with the knowledge service provided by 
KISTI, but it was the CEO who had insufficient interest in that knowledge, preferring 
to focus on funding. Learning did not occur as knowledge tended to flow in one 
direction and the CEO’s views remained unchanged as a result. 
Similar problems arose when the firm signed the contract with ETRI for technology 
transfer. There was no clear consensus over the level of technology readiness for 
commercialisation and the CEO simply believed in the name of the GRI, a unique 
organisation that owned the photography-based 3D-image-processing technology. 
This resulted in a second failure of knowledge interaction and a failure to fill the 
knowledge gap. The CEO noted, 
I carried out a marketing survey but I wanted to get an objective opinion 
from industry experts. Should I not have trusted the design company? 
Should I not have trusted GRIs? I do not think so. If they had acted 
responsibly, or if there had been someone who could have monitored 
them, I would not have had to close down the firm. 
However, the CEO made a choice based on his own instincts (rationality) rather than 
on interactions with employees or intermediaries at multiple levels who had different 
competing knowledge. This resulted in fragmentation of relationships and services 
rather than their alignment. 
The second major problem was the wholehearted trust the CEO placed in public 
intermediaries. As other cases have shown, trust can only be built when there is 
responsibility, credibility, and a quality of knowledge. The status of the intermediary 
does not always guarantee successful knowledge interaction. If the intermediaries 
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lose impartiality, they can easily lead SMEs in the wrong direction, delaying 
innovation. In this case, misplaced trust resulted in the provision of a poor level of 
knowledge, damaging the trust-built relationship. By losing their credibility, KISTI 
became limited in their ability to facilitate relations between the firm and the design 
company. 
The third factor was the one-way knowledge flow and the mismatch between 
knowledge demand and supply. The one-way knowledge flow caused several 
problems. Crucially, researchers failed to assess the firm’s capabilities. Due to a lack 
of experience, the CEO could not envisage what the firm might face during the 
innovation process. Considering the firm’s 2-year history, funding would only have 
bridged the technology gap but would not have solved other issues such as the 
relational and managerial barriers. In particular, intermediaries should have outlined 
the technological barriers the firm would face during the innovation process. For 
example, the firm aimed to compete with foreign products in Korea. That being the 
case, KISTI should have provided knowledge about who owned state-of-the-art 
technologies and an accurate assessment of them. It was also the intermediaries’ 
responsibility to provide access to the experts and facilitate interaction so the firm 
could successfully shape its innovative environment. 
Instead, the researchers followed the CEO’s interests in securing the funding rather 
than enabling the knowledge. From a linear view of innovation, the researchers 
appeared to overestimate the abilities of the CEO, ignoring whether the firm could 
absorb and reconfigure the required knowledge. They followed their routines of 
analysis work based on the supply-side perspective. One researcher at KISTI 
involved in the interaction process admitted, ‘We thought our role was to provide 
technology market expectations and help them obtain funding. The design company 
was interested in designing the new product itself, and ETRI was interested in 
technology transfer activity.’ 
The fourth major problem was the lack of productive combination of competing 
rationalities; a healthy mix of different views. The researchers appeared to make a 
mistake in forecasting the future market by interacting solely with the CEO rather 
than with multiple levels of innovation players. This lack of differing viewpoints 
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resulted in limited knowledge that misled the young firm and hampered any chances 
of positive prospects for its 3D-scanning technology. The researchers at KISTI 
analysed the technology theoretically and talked about the promising aspects without 
interacting sufficiently with the technology developers. The CEO explained, 
The analysis should have considered two different views, one of which 
was the profitability of the technology, which was important to me. The 
report was good in that aspect. But they neglected the other view which 
was the technology’s credibility. They should have analysed the level of 
technology development, and whether it was enough to commercialise 
if it was transferred. 
It seemed both the intermediary and the firm overlooked multiple levels of 
interaction, emphasising the technology itself. As was shown in this case, knowledge 
interaction did not bring changes for the following reasons: 
Along with the weak, one-way interaction, the enabled knowledge was not credible 
enough to fill the firm’s knowledge gap. It is likely that the firm’s lack of knowledge 
and poor levels of interaction with other innovation players in knowledge 
configuration led to a mismatch between the knowledge supply and demand. 
However, the firm maintained a passive attitude during the knowledge-interaction 
process, deepening the one-way interaction from intermediary to the firm, thereby 
failing to meet its needs. Researchers could have analysed the firm’s technology and 
managerial capability. Furthermore, intermediaries and the firm had a very narrow, 
linear view of innovation, believing that funding for R&D would guarantee 
commercial success for the firm. 
As a result, the interaction did not lead to any changes in the approach of the firm or 
the CEO, who seemed to have a similar attitude towards all intermediaries. In 
addition to the firm’s limited resources, a lack of experience meant the CEO had to 
rely on knowledge from personal limited experience. Unlike other CEOs, this CEO 
believed that technological capability was the essential factor and overlooked other 
knowledge necessary in the innovation process. Although the first interaction was 
unsuccessful, the firm failed to learn from its mistakes, and the barriers remained the 
same (Table 6-15). 
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More importantly, multilevel relationships with a one-way interaction did not bring 
about changes. No capable boundary spanners existed in the multiplicity of 
relationships, as KISTI was limited in providing links to all services for two reasons: 
the CEO’s dissatisfaction with the knowledge provided meant the CEO was reluctant 
to interact, and a lack of formal programmes for interaction existed. Although the 
CEO tried to play the role of boundary spanner, the CEO was unable to align to the 
innovation process.  
The barriers, innovative outcomes, and micro-level factors that affected the 
unsatisfactory knowledge interaction are summarised below (Table 6-15). 
Table 6-15 The Result of Knowledge Interaction: Firm M (Failure) 
  Summary of the interaction process 
Barriers 
remained 
 Internal - Lack of routines to absorb, integrate and transform external 
knowledge into the firm’s innovation process 
- Lack of technological capabilities 
- Lack of nontechnological knowledge 
External - Lack of relationships with GRIs 
Outcomes Internal - None 
 External - None 
Micro-level 
factors 
 Firm - Lack of interaction between the CEO and employees 
- Lack of experience in the existing business area 
- A breakdown in trust between individuals in GRIs and the 
CEO, and between GRIs and the firm 
 Process  - Lack of interaction between intermediaries and the firm 
- One-way knowledge flow from intermediaries to the firm  
(lack of feedback) 
- Lack of linkages among multiple intermediaries and their 
services 
 Intermediary - Lack of multiplicity of interaction in knowledge enabling 
- Absence of individuals who could have linked all the services 
in GRIs with the innovation process of the firm 
- Linear view of innovation from the intermediary and the firm 
 Current status - Closed the firm 
 
208 
 
6.3 Case Summary and Initial Conclusions 
6.3.1 Evolution of Knowledge Interaction at Meso-and Micro-levels 
In this chapter, I observed the knowledge-interaction process of five SMEs to answer 
the first, second and third research questions. To open the black box of the 
interaction process at specific levels of the KNIS, I combined other disciplines—
intermediary studies and sociological dimensions—into the NIS concept to aid in 
investigating how knowledge flow takes place at meso- and micro-levels, decreasing 
the barriers in the innovation process. Knowledge interaction in five cases involves 
more than two parties as simply identified in the NIS concept (Section 2.4.1). The 
relationships evolve around multiple intermediaries and potential buyers over time to 
address the heterogeneous barriers of SMEs. 
Multiplicity of relationships at meso- and micro-levels is crucial to overcome the 
various barriers at the early stage of innovation or niche markets that innovative 
SMEs plan to explore because less information exists on the area. In this case, the 
multiplicity of relationships and interaction provide an opportunity to combine 
competing rationalities of individual minds and knowledge relating to very specific 
areas (or local problems). Actors involved in the knowledge interaction often co-
shape a favourable innovation environment where multiplicity facilitates interactive 
learning among actors, resolving disagreements among actors, and removing the 
barrier to a particular problem of innovation. This process may initiate other 
problems that typically require different types of relationships and knowledge in the 
uncertain and complex innovation process.  
From this point of view, innovation can be seen as a cyclical process of trial, failure, 
and resolving the barriers to innovation; therefore, specific knowledge requirements 
and relationships need to shape and evolve along with the process. The loose NIS 
framework has not yet fully explained this dynamic nature of the system but 
examining the interaction process at meso- and micro-levels seems to unpack the 
different patterns of relationships. Although evolution patterns of relationships differ 
from five firms, two different fields of technologies have similar patterns of 
knowledge interaction (Table 6-16). 
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Table 6-16 Different Patterns of Relationships: Mechatronics vs. IT 
 Mechatronics IT 
Demands of firms 
 
 
 
- Technological and 
nontechnological knowledge 
- Identifying potential partners 
 
- Technological and nontechnological 
knowledge, testing products, 
discovering potential partners, 
additional R&D, and marketing 
Characteristics of 
sectors 
 
- High level of uncertainty 
- Lack of available information 
 
- Medium to low level of uncertainty 
- Existence of technological 
information and infrastructure 
Evolving patterns of 
relationships 
- Centred on few intermediaries 
- Strong levels of interaction 
- Multiple levels of intermediaries 
addressing various demands 
Period of interaction - 4 to 5 years - Less than 2 years 
 
In particular, the cases belonging to mechatronics are differentiated from the cases 
belonging to IT. In the case of mechatronics, as stated in Chapter 4, the technology is 
characterised by a combination of mechanics, electronics, and other technical fields. 
Because the firms in this field try to create new markets or products that are able to 
replace existing ones, the process entails a relatively high level of uncertainty in 
emerging areas. Firms K, P, and T spent a long period of time in planning, R&D, and 
market research as potential partners of large global corporations, but they did not 
know whether this pathway would lead them to successful innovation. The emerging 
areas require different sets of players, regulations, expertise, and skills, and these 
become huge barriers for the firms to overcome. Most of all, less information and 
knowledge is available at the early stages in this field, and private consultants may 
avoid becoming involved at this stage due to the vagueness of expected outcomes. 
Thus, a frequent and strong level of interaction with public intermediaries is crucial 
to articulate demands and address the diverse requirements of innovation during the 
interaction process. As a result, the pattern of relationships focuses on a few 
intermediaries, but with relatively long-term interactions. 
The firms in this field tend to require high-quality knowledge and align the potential 
innovation players to hedge the risk, which takes 3–5 years in the knowledge-
interaction process. In the cases of Firms K and T, actors involved in the knowledge-
interaction process shaped the innovation and created new business opportunities 
together. Long-term interaction is also crucial for SMEs because they may bring 
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more learning opportunities to firms, so individuals might replicate the problem-
solving process to address the unexpected problems they may face. Due to the high 
level of uncertainty in emerging markets and for innovation players in the field of 
mechatronics, managing the interface with intermediaries is important to address 
changes in the innovation setting in the uncertain innovation process. In this sense, 
managing the interface acts as a conduit for the process of identifying and resolving 
barriers through ongoing interactive learning. 
In the field of IT technology, SMEs have easy access to the accumulated 
technological infrastructure, compared to firms in the field of mechatronics, whereas 
the competition among SMEs is quite intense. As illustrated in Chapter 5, a large 
number of IT ventures were established in the early 2000s as a part of a government-
support policy to foster the IT sector and small venture businesses in this field. As a 
result, abundant accumulated infrastructure exists at the industry level in 
technologies, funding, information, support policies, and programmes. The level of 
uncertainty in the future-technology market is less high than in the case of 
mechatronics, due to a relatively short product life cycle and, consequently, entry 
timing to the target market is crucial for SMEs to gain competitive advantages over 
potential competitors. In this case, the services required at the early R&D stages and 
the later commercialisation stages in the innovation process need to be provided at 
nearly the same time to overcome barriers in a timely manner; the service provision 
can be R&D funding, testing opportunities for new ideas, technology transfer, or 
aligning potential buyers. 
Multiple levels of relationships evolved, centred around GRIs, to meet the various 
demands of SMEs. For example, GRIs could take the risk on behalf of SMEs and act 
as proxy users in the case of Firm H. Interaction with GRIs gave Firm H a certain 
period to test and enhance the quality of the new equipment for global markets. In 
this case, a single intermediary was unable to provide all the services needed to 
complement and enhance its own services, which were limited, to address diverse 
barriers in a short time. Therefore, managing the interface with multiple 
intermediaries seems to be more important than long-term interaction with a few 
focused intermediaries to make sure all services (e.g. testing products, discovering 
211 
 
potential partners, additional R&D, and marketing) are simultaneously well 
connected. In the field of IT, aligning the resources and actors takes 1–2 years 
whereas it takes 3–5 years in the field of mechatronics. 
In the case of Firm H, the CEO was capable of aligning different types of 
intermediaries (mostly GRIs) to overcome the weaknesses the firm faced in the 
targeted market. The CEO monitored the process and actively requested what was 
needed from intermediaries. However, in the case of Firm M, neither the CEO nor 
intermediaries monitored the whole process of alignment of resources and actors. 
Although the firm was successful in identifying all the necessary resources and 
actors at the beginning of the innovation process, the weak linkage resulted in poor 
knowledge interaction. Consequently, the innovation process of trial, failure, and 
solution was not observed and the barriers to innovation remained the same. From 
this point, monitoring the innovation process is crucial to connect all actors and 
facilitate efficient knowledge interaction among them. 
6.3.2 Influential Factors Determining the Innovation Process 
Section 6.2 tacitly explained that intermediaries supported SMEs externally around 
the four dimensions that have been pulled out for analysis: facilitating relations and 
managing interfaces (i.e. linking SMEs to other GRIs or potential buyers), thereby 
enhancing the external capability of firms. Long-term interactions with SMEs during 
the process of knowledge enabling and facilitating learning helped firms build 
internal capabilities. These are described as outcomes in five tables: the result of 
knowledge interaction. The section further identified several factors that differentiate 
patterns of interaction and relationships, thereby bringing a certain level of change to 
the firm. Although factors differed by firm, some influential factors determining the 
innovation process could be summarised at the level of firms, intermediaries, and 
interaction processes. 
First, specific resources that SMEs accumulated in their history have positive (or 
negative) impacts at the organisational level: learning routines and capabilities, 
technological strengths, relationships, levels of urgency, and vision. Firms K and P 
had been suppliers of big buyers (or GRIs) for more than 10 years and these two 
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firms had accumulated technological, managerial, and learning capabilities through 
these relationships. These SMEs are able to manage interactive relationships, giving 
frequent and active feedback to intermediaries. Learning routines embedded in these 
firms seem to have positively impacted the knowledge-interaction process and 
thereby brought changes inside firms. In contrast, lack of learning routines of Firm M 
hindered knowledge interaction and interactive learning with intermediaries and, as a 
result, little change occurred. The technological, managerial, and learning 
capabilities of the five firms differed and these differences affected knowledge 
interactions with intermediaries. 
Second, capability of public intermediaries and their constant supports to resolve the 
barriers seemed to have significantly impacted positive changes in firms. Public 
intermediaries are equipped with intellectual materials, experts, and supporting 
experiences with firms. They are capable of shaping a network with other actors to 
address the heterogeneous barriers throughout the innovation process. As explained 
in Chapter 5, public intermediaries, as linkage organisations in the KNIS, generate 
new knowledge, connecting all the actors and addressing barriers of firms. Therefore, 
public intermediaries can be the innovation partners of SMEs because their 
members’ capabilities specialise in identifying barriers and responding to the 
challenges faced by SMEs in the KNIS. 
For example, Firms K and P had technological capabilities in existing business areas 
but existing relationships with big buyers may not be helpful in acquiring necessary 
knowledge in the new business area. According to the cases, knowledge hardly flows 
through relationships or interactions from big buyers to SMEs unless SMEs are able 
to offer valuable information to big buyers. In addition, the more SMEs are 
innovative in certain fields, the less knowledge is available at the early stages of 
innovation. In this case, participation in support programmes provided by public 
intermediaries can be opportunities for SMEs to overcome the lack of capabilities 
and resolve heterogeneous barriers at the early stages of innovation. 
Third, two influential factors were essential at the process level: the existence of 
reflexive individuals and a productive combination of competing rationalities. The 
existence of capable individuals who are more reflexive and learn faster than others 
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is important. In SMEs, most of these capable individuals were CEOs who had 
experienced several failures in the past and took the experiences for granted in the 
innovation process. In common, they had a wide network throughout the industry 
and research institutes, providing learning opportunities for them. They acted as 
boundary spanners, providing an interface for interactive learning through which 
firms could constantly access various services in intermediaries, and thereby absorb 
and reconfigure the knowledge in their own context. Trust building among actors is a 
crucial factor in constructing the quality of relationships that facilitate active 
knowledge interaction and learning. Reflexive individuals in intermediaries and 
firms played a crucial role in bridging the different boundaries of organisations in the 
knowledge-interaction process. 
Productive combinations of competing rationalities were crucial in knowledge-
interaction processes because the combinations involved experience, skills, and 
knowledge embodied in individuals. Knowledge was not simply technological but 
also social, concerning the technology-development process that linked with routines, 
expertise, regulations, and management systems taking the specific form of 
knowledge to individuals. Four successful and less successful cases illustrated that 
researchers at intermediaries had a multiplicity of relationships in the knowledge-
interaction process, whereas researchers depended on their own knowledge without 
interaction with external experts in the failure case. This difference implies the 
successful process requires interaction among multiple levels of knowledgeable 
individuals who have not only technological knowledge, but also insights and 
experience to address uncertainties in the early technology market. is section 
demonstrates influential factors that affect the innovation process at the level of firm, 
intermediary, and process.  
As summarised in five tables on the results of knowledge interaction (see Section 
6.2.), five firms were heterogeneous in innovative capabilities, which resulted in 
different demands of knowledge and barriers. In other words, micro-level interaction 
processes differed by firm. Some firms might need more diverse services than others. 
The range of services provided by public intermediaries might increase over time, in 
addition to providing the four functions. The following chapter will explore the role 
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of public intermediaries in specific contexts: how they address the dynamic and 
uncertain nature of the innovation process, which has not been well defined in the 
NIS literature. 
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7 Chapter 7. Public Intermediaries: Creating 
Dynamics in the KNIS 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5, in describing the history of KNIS, emphasised the role of public 
intermediaries that act as non-market mechanisms to correct systems failures, 
stimulating knowledge interaction by enhancing the innovative capabilities of SMEs. 
Chapter 6 examined the knowledge-interaction process and the constraints between 
intermediaries and five SMEs. The knowledge-interaction process between public 
intermediaries and SMEs addresses a number of challenges and constraints, such as 
the limited capability of SMEs to access other actors and resources reflecting the 
heterogeneous knowledge requirements at the early stages of innovation processes. 
In this context, the previous chapter analysed five cases, each with different demands 
on knowledge and relationships in the innovation process, due to different types of 
internal and external barriers arising from a lack of capabilities. 
This assemblage of heterogeneous barriers and constraints leads SMEs to depend on 
credibility and reputation of public intermediaries in the KNIS. This chapter observes 
how four functions of public intermediaries can be expanded or multiple levels of 
(public) intermediaries collaborate to address various types of barriers and how 
public intermediaries act as innovation facilitators, augmenting capabilities of SMEs. 
Then the chapter includes criticism of the linear view of innovation underlying 
supporting policy, which tends to consider innovation too simply, overlooking the 
wider dimension of innovation that can be achieved by a DUI mode of learning. 
Hence, this chapter argues that perspectives between policymakers and SMEs 
misalign. 
Section 7.2 considers how SMEs define innovation as a process that involves a 
number of failures and constraints, and covers a wide range of activities such as 
technological progress, exploring markets and customers, and organisational changes. 
This section describes the characteristics of functions that are open and flexible, due 
to the uncertainties and complexities embedded in the innovation process. Next, I 
investigate the strengths of public intermediaries that facilitate innovation at the 
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systems level in Section 7.3, which examines how these intermediaries augment the 
innovative capabilities of SMEs at the early stages, maintaining constant knowledge 
interaction with multiple actors and facilitating a mutual-learning process. Section 
7.4 puts forward the option of public intermediaries focusing on their role as linkage 
organisations in the KNIS, and explicates unresolved issues. The perspectives of the 
innovation concept between policymakers and SMEs misaligns. Section 7.5 
highlights the nature of knowledge interaction as a process, with some policy 
considerations. 
7.2 What is Meant by (Successful) Innovation? 
7.2.1 Innovation: From Narrower to Wider approaches 
The previous chapter examined the knowledge-interaction process and its effect on 
innovation for SMEs. Some SMEs are successful in innovation whereas others are 
not. Therefore one may ask how SMEs define successful innovation and what SMEs 
define as its characteristics. As defined in Chapter 4, this study adopted a wide 
approach to innovation following Schumpeter, which corresponds to the view of 
CEOs. Many interviewees had a similar view of innovation as ‘something new’ that 
ensures sustainable growth in the long run, rather than a ‘quantum leap’. From an 
SME point of view, innovation means not only technological progress but also 
expanding relationships, exploring new markets, and organisational changes, all of 
which bring changes to organisational infrastructure and individual behaviour in the 
long run: a wider DUI mode of innovation. 
The CEO of Firm K said, 
All employees need to know the management system [what is 
happening in the firm] as active participants in the innovation process. 
To create the best company, I believe all employees need to think 
differently and that their way of working also needs to change. All 
individuals in the firm are able to create value. Innovation is fostering 
the company as a space for creating value. 
The CEO at Firm A affirmed, 
Policymakers consider innovation as radical change accompanying 
intense pain. We regard exploring new markets and new customers also 
217 
 
as innovation because it ensures the sustainable growth of firms. You 
have no idea how many years of effort I have made to form 
relationships with new customers. 
The explorative paths of the new venture varied among the five firms described in 
the case studies. 
As explained in Chapter 5, innovative SMEs do business in risky, uncertain, and 
unique areas where ideas on technology are vague and innovation players have not 
yet been identified. SMEs are heterogeneous in history, technological expertise, 
routines, and relationships; factors that may shape different innovations. Thus, 
innovation can be seen as a unique, localised process, embedded in components and 
individuals in firms interacting with sociotechnical actors and conditions in the 
system. In this regard, the CEO at Firm E stated, 
Policymakers always emphasise the importance of being the best SME 
in the world as the result of government support. But ironically, they 
always ask if I know of any firms to benchmark whenever my firm 
requests certain types of service. Basically, the government encourages 
us to copy competitors’ technologies or products. If firms are really 
innovative, they have no idea what circumstances they are going to be 
dealing with in the innovation process. The programmes that 
government organisations provided did not consider the uniqueness of 
our technology and products. 
Due to the heterogeneous and localised nature of the innovation process, each SME 
faces different types of intertwined barriers. SMEs often fail when facing 
unpredictable barriers at the early stage of innovation. CEOs emphasise that 
innovation involves a number of failures, but that this does not necessarily mean the 
failure (closure) of the innovation or the business. CEOs also contend that no 
company can achieve success 10 times in 10 tries, and they cannot predict how many 
trials will lead to successful innovation, due to contingencies and uncertainties. For 
some SMEs, interim failures become opportunities when firms meet serendipity. 
From this point, I have chosen the term ‘barriers to innovation’ rather than ‘system 
failures’,67 because the term ‘failures’ seems to imply the end state of a certain 
                                                        
67 This concept has also been described as ‘barriers’, ‘problems’, ‘inefficiencies’, and ‘weaknesses’ 
by different authors (Chapter 2). 
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system or situation. Various types of barriers can be resolved through bridging 
mechanisms, as emerged in the five case studies. The barriers are often beyond the 
internal capability of SMEs, and therefore SMEs must increasingly complement their 
technological (or nontechnological) efforts by accessing external expertise and 
knowledge, learning how to organise a wide range of collaborative relationships and 
knowledge to shape the innovation process to suit their own circumstances. In other 
words, innovation is a complex process rather than ‘a quantum leap’ that takes place 
in a systemic context related to identifying and mobilising resources and elements 
and interacting with multiple actors and institutions. 
In this regard, interviewees emphasised the importance of various types of support 
rather than one-off services (e.g. R&D funding) to address the barriers that emerged 
in the process. Thus, facilitating innovation for SMEs does not mean simply 
transferring one single piece of technological knowledge at a specific point in time, 
but is an interactive process that enables complex knowledge and facilitates multiple 
relations at the systems level. By participating in an interactive process, SMEs can 
achieve successful innovation that guarantees the sustainable growth of firms, 
addressing uncertainties that lie ahead in their innovation process. The manager from 
Firm K said, 
If the funding agency asks me how much we earn as a result of the 
support programme, we would answer that we are not successful [even 
if we’ve made profits]. I consider innovation success to mean 
establishing infrastructure, such as a processual change, which promises 
sustainable growth. 
Sustainable growth can be encouraged by constant knowledge interaction through 
four functions, leading to interactive learning between intermediaries and SMEs and 
innovation. The previous chapter delineated that public intermediaries have 
decreased the internal and external barriers of each firm and brought various 
structural changes (i.e. innovation outcomes) to firms in new technology 
development, organisational change, individual learning, or expanding relationships. 
The following section will provide understanding of how public intermediaries 
perform four functions to augment the innovative capability of SMEs and facilitate 
innovation in the KNIS. 
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7.2.2 Four Functions: Openness and Flexibility 
Public intermediaries are obliged, as linkage organisations, to achieve targets 
imposed by the government, supporting firms to enhance their innovative capabilities. 
Public intermediaries have close and continuous knowledge interactions with each 
SME which seems to involve crucial, but largely hidden, functions in supporting 
innovative outcomes in SMEs. Four functions of public intermediaries—knowledge 
enabling, facilitating relationships and learning, and managing interfaces—are 
crucial in addressing diverse barriers relating to a wider dimension of innovation, 
thereby achieving the sustainable growth of SMEs. Four functions of public 
intermediaries supported firms to overcome barriers and achieve innovative 
outcomes, not only improving linkages in the KNIS, but also creating new 
opportunities and dynamics in the KNIS at meso- and micro-levels. 
As indicated in Chapter 5, the KNIS has grown in size and sophistication for several 
decades where demands for innovative SMEs were more diverse than ever. SMEs 
faced heterogeneous barriers, some of which were unexpected at the beginning of the 
knowledge interaction due to contingencies and uncertainties embedded in the 
innovation process. For example, Firm H found technological defects of first and 
second models of PDUs and entered into traditional joint R&D with KETI while the 
firm received four functions of public-intermediary services. Associated with this, a 
wider range of intermediary functions needs to be considered when public 
intermediaries provide services to a single firm. Some evidence in the previous 
chapter supported the concept of four functions that can grow over time. 
As analysed in Chapter 6, Firms H and M passively received knowledge service at 
the beginning of first knowledge-interaction process when the public intermediary 
(i.e. KISTI) acted as a traditional intermediary that did not involve interactions with 
other actors and organisations but transferred knowledge to the firm unidirectionally. 
However, KISTI performed four functions as the innovation intermediary in the 
second knowledge-interaction process while working directly with the firm on a one-
to-one basis. Likely, Firm K and I constantly received information services through 
managing interfaces after these firms achieved innovative outcomes through long-
term knowledge interaction. In the case of Firm M, the CEO required a single type of 
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services—technology transfer or funding—partly because the CEO did not know the 
importance of knowledge-interaction processes. 
Public intermediaries did not solely restrict themselves to those functions, but rather 
covered more traditional roles such as providing supercomputing facilities in KISTI, 
access to experimental facilities in BIC at KIST, and supplying additional 
information (e.g. technology-market reports, policy reports, and government 
publications) without involving third parties. The question is, when do public 
intermediaries play the roles of traditional intermediaries in addition to performing 
innovation-intermediary roles? 
First, public intermediaries seemed to act as traditional intermediaries by managing 
interfaces. In the case of Firms K, I, and T., public intermediaries provided four 
functions as innovation intermediaries that led firms to overcome barriers and 
achieve various innovative outcomes (Chapter 6). Although public intermediaries 
supported firms to achieve initial goals of knowledge interaction, that interaction 
often resulted in demands for additional services. For example, four firms came to 
learn how to apply their experiences of knowledge interaction with intermediaries to 
their own innovation processes. However, the replication of knowledge-interaction 
processes required firms to constantly access external knowledge sources because 
firms needed to adapt the knowledge to their firms repeatedly. In this case, public 
intermediaries tended to act as traditional intermediaries. Often, individuals in public 
intermediaries were aware of changes in societal contexts and delivered new 
information to the firms with which they interacted. 
Second, public intermediaries provided traditional intermediary roles when firms 
required services such as delivering market information, providing test sites, or 
acting as proxy users close to commercialisation stages. Firms H and M required 
various types of services—information service, one-off funding, designing the 
product, and joint research—in addition to the four functions. Firm H had strong 
knowledge interactions with KISTI while formed relationships with other GRIs that 
provided traditional types of services. KISTI, as the S&T information institute, 
provided knowledge and aligned potential buyers but was not able to provide funding 
or carry out joint R&D. Other GRIs—KETI, KIST, and KIOST—carried out joint 
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research to overcome the technological barriers that Firms H and T had while these 
GRIs did not involve themselves in any innovation-facilitation activities as third 
parties. GRIs can be seen as ‘sources of innovation’ rather than ‘innovation 
facilitators’. 
Third, public intermediaries acted as traditional intermediaries when they failed to 
articulate demands of firms or firms did not have learning routines and did not know 
how to interact with external organisations. In the case of Firm M, the CEO was 
interested in acquiring R&D funding, overlooking the importance of interaction with 
multiple actors in the innovation process. In this case, public intermediaries might 
weigh in more with traditional intermediary roles rather than facilitating the 
innovation process as innovation intermediaries. As a result, no public intermediaries 
or individuals were involved in the innovation process of Firm M as third parties to 
facilitate interaction among multiple intermediaries. 
In sum, at the early stages of innovation, public intermediaries are increasingly 
involved in more complex relationships such as a single intermediary to an SME or 
multiple public intermediaries to an SME collaboration, facilitating interactions. 
Certainly, although public intermediaries tend to remain specialised around four 
functions, the range of services during the complex knowledge-interaction process 
provided appear to be expanding over time in five cases. On one hand, public 
intermediaries are often not only involved in providing four functions as innovation 
intermediaries, but also supplying traditional services directly to firms. On the other 
hand, performing four functions can be (partly) iterated if new barriers emerged that 
were unexpected at the beginning of the knowledge-interaction process. In this vein, 
performing four functions can be understood as an open and flexible activity that can 
be iterated and expanded to address specific innovation barriers and consistently 
augment the capability of SMEs. The following section will explore the functional 
characteristics of public intermediaries. 
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7.3 Augmenting Capabilities of SMEs in the KNIS 
7.3.1 Constant Knowledge Interaction in the Early Stages 
As examined in the previous chapter, innovation in its early stages entails several 
barriers. Service provision and the period of knowledge interaction may expand more 
than intermediaries planned at the beginning of the knowledge interaction. This is 
partly due to the nature of future technology markets and unexpected problems that 
are difficult to foresee during the early stages of innovation. Accordingly, the 
knowledge-interaction patterns of the five SMEs in the case studies evolved in 
different ways to address specific problems that each SME faced during their 
innovation process (Chapter 6). These issues have enormous impact on the interface 
between SMEs and intermediaries, leading to SMEs consistently interacting with 
public intermediaries and joining in formal programmes to build internal capabilities 
that address uncertainties and remove barriers. 
Few SMEs can survive coping with a diverse range of barriers during the innovation 
process. The situation can worsen when this period continues without yielding profits. 
Asymmetry of knowledge intensifies the distance between the SMEs and potential 
innovation players (e.g. competitors or buyers), and this situation isolates small firms 
from the innovation environment. The CEO from Firm I said, 
They need to build their own capacity for becoming a medium-sized 
firm but business environments are [not favourable for SMEs]. The trust 
that makes big buyers adopt our new products does not exist even if we 
develop innovative products. We do not know when the relationship is 
over. I do not complain about the tough business environment which 
should be the same everywhere in the world. Instead, improving 
innovative capabilities for dealing with this tough business environment 
is the best strategy for maintaining the relationship. 
Many SMEs attempt to maintain an informal relationship with experts in academia 
and industry to create new knowledge at the early stage of innovation. However, 
these relationships do not help remove knowledge barriers because informal 
relationships are only helpful in sharing general trends in technology markets. Often, 
a lack of internal capabilities hinders the establishment of informal relationships with 
potential buyers. The CEO at Firm I said, 
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There is a give and take rule between SMEs and big buyers. We could 
get the information from them only if we are able to provide them with 
something that solves their problems. My firm was not capable enough 
of doing this so that global big buyer S would not have liked to meet 
with us. I needed to anticipate their needs one step ahead, but it was 
really difficult. 
In this context, constant knowledge interaction with public intermediaries plays a 
crucial role in enhancing the internal capabilities of SMEs over time. Director S. J. 
Lee of the IF, former industry analyst for Hyundai Securities Inc., had a very strong 
sense of the importance of constant knowledge interaction. He explained: 
Most SMEs do not know what they do not know. They have to identify 
the nontechnical aspects of an industry such as markets, policies, and 
regulations before making key investment decisions. However, the 
limited resources of SMEs impede their access to in-house knowledge, 
although that knowledge may help increase their chances of success. 
As a way of facilitating successful innovation, the IF manages a business-
information centre that houses a large collection of highly valued reports and data on 
emerging technology markets acquired from various domestic and international 
sources. This, along with SME support programmes, may help SMEs overcome their 
lack of internal resources by gaining easier access to the resources of public 
intermediaries. 
In addition, SMEs can benefit from their relationships with public intermediaries by 
accessing other types of resources (or services) and thereby constantly renewing their 
knowledge to suit their own contexts. Individuals at SMEs can expand their 
relational capital through the staff in public intermediaries, which often results in 
obtaining critical information such as government policy, regulations, or other 
support programmes from various government agencies. Dr. H. J. Kim at KTVF said, 
‘The SMEs in our incubating centre [belonging to KIST] can use its facilities under 
the same conditions as KIST researchers. We also provide management support 
services and sometimes link external experts to the needs of SMEs.’ The staff at 
KTVF provide follow-up services after project completion, emphasising 
responsibility and consistency that contributes to resolving the various problems 
SMEs face during the innovation process. This can be possible because public 
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intermediaries work towards the success of SMEs in the KNIS, as their objective is 
not their own success. 
In this regard, one researcher at Firm V conceded, 
There are differences between public and private organisations. Service 
provisions provided by private organisations are quite limited and thus 
there was little chance to see them again after the project completion. 
However, public organisations have many services, and we could 
therefore obtain additional services on a free basis after project 
completion. It is good to know other researchers who sometimes 
provide us with useful information. Relationships with public 
organisations give us long-term benefits. 
The innovation journey is unpredictable. Decision making on future technology 
markets is conjecture on an uncertain future with inevitable time lags between 
creating new knowledge and market application. The process requires constant 
efforts to identify problems, mobilise resources, and facilitate interaction with 
different types of knowledge, as well as to engage with heterogeneous actors at the 
systems level to shape a favourable innovation environment. 
Consequently, the innovation process can be mediated by public intermediaries 
involving multiple levels of actors, arrangements between firms, and individuals, and 
building confidence among actors to minimise the risk of an uncertain innovation 
process. Public intermediaries can be appropriate innovation partners of innovative 
SMEs, sharing the risks and uncertainties embedded in the innovation process. They 
interact with institutions and multiple actors at the systems level on behalf of SMEs, 
as their resources and capabilities specialise in identifying barriers and responding to 
the challenges faced by SMEs. This aspect will be discussed further in Section 7.4. 
7.3.2 Multiplicity of Knowledge Interaction 
Multiplicity of knowledge interaction has been emphasised in removing barriers, 
especially at the early stage of innovation. The interaction process has two 
characteristics: the process entails several barriers rarely solved with one single type 
of service or knowledge, and little information is available relating to niche markets. 
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First, innovation does not depend purely on technological capability but on other 
activities such as management, marketing, networking, societal trends, and policies, 
as several CEOs indicated. The CEO at Firm L said, 
A single technology does not guarantee the success of a business. In my 
experience, technology does not solve hunger, but most people do not 
know this. There is no way to make profit only with technology. It may 
contribute to 10% of a successful innovation. There are factors other 
than technology [such as regulations, relations, or luck]. 
This viewpoint suggests that removing barriers requires the interaction of 
constellations of actors, from scientists to policymakers, who have different expertise 
and experience on specific matters. 
In addition, young venture firms often do not know how to use the R&D funding 
they receive. Dr. H. J. Kim at KTVF offered, 
Most start-up firms look for funding. They have technological ideas and 
believe sufficient funding will make them succeed. Once SMEs have 
experienced failure, they begin to realise that nontechnical factors are 
just as important as technology. [The problem is that] they do not know 
where or how to spend the R&D funding. This is why SMEs who 
receive R&D funding from the government often fail [when they meet 
unexpected barriers]. 
SMEs are unsure what kinds of demands they have and are thus unable to have 
effective knowledge interaction, forcing intermediaries to guess. Because it is not 
possible to predict future technology markets, interaction with multiple actors plays a 
crucial role, not only in compensating for insufficient infrastructure in a short time 
but also in facilitating interactive learning as a way to strengthen the internal 
capability of the SME in the long run. By doing so, SMEs are also becoming capable 
of addressing various and unexpected barriers. 
Second, codified information is rarely found in the niche areas where innovative 
SMEs do business. This information is too expensive to purchase or requires an 
additional in-depth-analysis process. However, SMEs are limited in identifying and 
accessing all resources, and acquiring information is a different matter from 
interpreting it to fit their own contexts. The interviewee, H, at Firm K added, 
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We are limited in accessing all information. It is time consuming, and 
costs are high in contacting people and buying overseas reports. We 
also do not have specialists dealing with information. I think it is the 
role of specialized organizations to purchase reports and databases to 
reproduce reliable knowledge. At KISTI, one researcher analyses the 
information and then may have a discussion with other researchers 
about the initial analysis results. [In my firm,] I have to depend on one 
member of staff, and it can therefore be unreliable because I know 
basically how it is produced. 
The interviewee understands the complexity of the knowledge-interaction process 
through which knowledge becomes useful and reliable to a specific context. The 
question arises, what makes knowledge more accurate and reliable? Multiplicity of 
knowledge interaction may increase the level of accuracy of what was vague 
knowledge. 
Knowledge interaction occurs among constellations of actors, and the process may 
provide a space with a productive combination of competing rationality. If the 
knowledge interaction is completely dominated by two parties—intermediaries and 
SMEs—or between staff in intermediaries, very little knowledge would be gained 
and very little learning would occur (i.e. Firm M). Dr. YJ Choi at KISTI said, 
KISTI is the national S&T information centre, but this does not mean 
all researchers produce the same quality of knowledge. I do not simply 
use purchased information by myself to meet the demands of SMEs. I 
look for specialists from industries and academia to get their insight and 
compare their opinion with mine. It is especially important to increase 
accuracy and reliability of expectations when there is a different 
interpretation of information on the same issue. There are always active 
interactions between me and other experts. 
Knowledge interaction is the combination process of individual minds, knowledge, 
and experiences (defined as competing rationalities in Section 2.2.2). The CEO at 
Firm K said, ‘What you provided us was not simple knowledge. It was the 
combination of insights, relationships, experiences and characteristics.’ 
Therefore, the system is the connections of knowledgeable individuals, and the 
knowledge interaction is a dynamically complex web of these individuals (Figure 7-
1). 
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Figure 7-1 Multiple levels of interactions in producing knowledge. 
 
In sum, creating knowledge requires the imagination to analyse future technology 
markets and find solutions for new businesses that have not yet been identified or 
articulated at the early stage of innovation. Multiple levels of interaction are 
important to coordinate all the resources in the system and the different views of 
actors. This increases the accuracy of future technology-market expectations by 
overcoming the bounded rationality of individuals in intermediaries or SMEs. 
Knowledge interaction may generate a wide range of outcomes not only for SMEs 
but also intermediaries. Intermediaries can constantly accumulate and renew their 
knowledge repository, and SMEs can combine necessary resources throughout the 
interaction process with competing knowledge enabled by intermediaries at the 
systems level. Considering it brings mutual benefits, knowledge interaction can be 
seen as a mutual-learning process. 
7.3.3 Knowledge Interaction as a Mutual-Learning Process 
7.3.3.1 Public Intermediaries and SMEs 
As explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1.), involving public intermediaries helps to 
overcome different types of internal and external barriers such as infrastructural 
barriers, relational barriers with big buyers, lock-in barriers of firms, or 
organisational barriers among employees. A single type of service is insufficient to 
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address the different types of barriers that are not defined easily at the beginning of 
an R&D planning stage. In this context, the previous two sections emphasised that 
overcoming these various barriers requires constant knowledge interaction among 
multiple actors at the systems level, bringing organisational as well as individual 
learning opportunities. From an SME perspective, knowledge interaction provides a 
learning space where organisational and individual changes occur, such as the 
expansion of relationships with potential innovation players, entering into new 
markets, and establishing an interaction process in the firm. 
Some innovative SMEs are becoming capable of using knowledge in various ways as 
a result of ‘learning by interacting’. Figure 7-2 shows the result of knowledge 
interaction between Firm K and intermediaries. The decision-making process was 
quite linear before the firm became involved in the programme, but they established 
a new department where interaction among employees actively occurred. This 
change can be defined as an innovative outcome. The firm replicated the knowledge-
interaction process with intermediaries and began, by themselves, to monitor and 
integrate various types of knowledge—technological, buyers, or market based—in 
specialised local contexts. 
 
Figure 7-2 Example of organisational change (Firm K). 
 
One interviewee at Firm K said, 
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It made our firm, which had previously had had a passive attitude 
towards big buyers, proactive. Now we can present a new process in 
advance before a big buyer comes to us. We interact, communicate, and 
make decisions based on the established system. 
The SME contributed to the innovation of the big buyer by providing the improved 
process proactively. By adopting a new process provided by the SME, the big buyer 
was able to decrease its production costs for manufacturing semiconductors. 
Individuals in firms often change dramatically through knowledge interaction and 
become active boundary spanners, as examined in the previous chapter on firms and 
innovation players. They learn about themselves, discerning why they need specific 
resources and how they are going to develop these resources to provide sustainable 
or competitive advantages over potential competitors. Sometimes, individuals 
consider themselves lobbyists, finding solutions through trust-based relationships and 
constant interaction with intermediaries. The CEO at P emphasised, ‘After all, it 
[successful innovation] is all about people.’ Innovations are rooted in the everyday 
activities of firms and in the capabilities of individual employees. 
Thus, the consequences of knowledge interaction cannot be examined without 
considering individuals and combinations of multiple minds, where innovation 
emerges through the course of interactive learning. These systems depend on the way 
knowledgeable individual’s link by knowledge flow; thus, innovation takes place 
when this connection creates new knowledge by solving a problem. This can be seen 
as a learning process, identifying opportunities and solving problems. The 
interviewee at Firm HC continued, 
This firm uses a consultation service every year, which has changed me 
and the firm gradually [through interaction]. As our firm has been 
growing rapidly, I feel it is necessary to improve the culture of the 
organisation. In my case, I can catch up with the speed of growth, 
thanks to the consultation programmes I am involved in. I study a lot to 
keep abreast of requirements from the intermediaries. The way of 
thinking has changed. People need the motivation to grow, which needs 
to come from outside. 
These individuals contribute to producing invisible outcomes by approaching 
additional services and researchers in intermediaries. Although not directly linked to 
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sales growth, the firm was able to save time in R&D or marketing costs. Outcomes 
do not only come from SMEs but also from the intermediary side. This interaction 
provides learning opportunities for intermediaries as well. 
7.3.3.2 Individuals as process facilitators of social learning 
As noted in Section 7.3.2, individuals in intermediaries became knowledge 
repositories, expanding their own relationships with innovation players in specific 
areas. Along with these individuals’ progress, the knowledge of intermediaries 
increased as a result of the knowledge interaction, and this interaction positively 
impacted their reputation as a competitive knowledge source. In particular, 
interaction failures give individuals in intermediaries the opportunity to re-examine 
the knowledge-interaction process and address any weaknesses in the support 
programme. When these individuals become involved in the support programme 
again, they seem to focus on the demands of SMEs and the process itself rather than 
on achieving visible outcomes (i.e. sales growth). 
Individuals begin to realise that they can be wrong, even though they have strengths 
in accumulated experience and knowledge. In other words, these are reflexive 
individuals who store particular experiences and knowledge, and can apply these to 
the knowledge interaction with other SMEs. They learn that the expected outcomes 
that an intermediary predicts at the early stage may turn out to be wrong at the later 
stages. They start to retain what they learn over time though effective forms of 
interaction, and tend to give feedback to the knowledge-interaction process through 
continuing self-evaluation. Individual learning in intermediaries takes place in the 
same way as it occurs in the SMEs. 
As described in Section 3.2.2, some individuals act as intermediaries performing 
more than these four functions. They identify specific barriers to each firm and steer 
the customised interaction process based on their understanding about firms. 
Although these individuals link government programmes to SMEs, they did not 
deliver the knowledge to SMEs based on the top-down approach. Rather they 
creatively shape the interaction process reflecting specific problems of each SME. 
Knowledge enabling and managing interfaces with SMEs can be crucial through 
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which individuals can identify problems and solutions because several problems 
intertwine that may change over time. Therefore, individuals often go beyond these 
four intermediary functions to address the new problems, such as acting as test sites, 
or linking SMEs to funding agencies (i.e. SMBA) or other intermediaries, as 
illustrated in five cases. These individuals are not bound by formality of intermediary 
roles and often link the formal programme to programmes provided by other GRIs 
(i.e. Firms H and T); expanding intermediary functions when necessary. 
Existence of reflexive individuals in SMEs is a crucial factor that affects successful 
social learning and thereby innovation of firms. CEOs in innovative firms tend to 
learn faster than others, span boundaries across intermediaries, policymakers, and 
other firms, and have constant interactions with multiple parties after project 
completion. CEOs have strong responsibilities and have a broad scope of authority 
and action. They seem to feel they own knowledge-interaction processes rather than 
depending on public intermediaries to effect interactive learning. 
Thus, the knowledge-interaction process can be seen as a mutual-learning process 
taking place between intermediaries and SMEs, as well as between organisations and 
individuals. Intermediaries are the legitimated actors to facilitate social learning, 
aligning potential innovation players into the specific innovation process based on 
impartial position, coordinating and maintaining the new relationships until SMEs 
are becoming capable of leading the new relationships. 
7.4 Public Intermediaries: Specificities and an Unresolved Issue 
7.4.1 An Effective Mechanism in the KNIS 
Public intermediaries function as effective mechanisms to remove the barriers to 
innovation described in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 further examined characteristics of 
functions in the knowledge-interaction process, discerning how public intermediaries 
facilitate innovation of SMEs at the systems level. This section explores some 
national specificities behind the choice of public intermediaries as linkage 
organisations between firms and other actors in the KNIS: performing as resources 
with impartiality, facilitating innovation at the early stages. Public intermediaries 
have been the innovation partners of firms for several decades. SMEs can access 
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other types of intermediaries (i.e. GRIs, IF, SMBA, or private intermediaries) 
through public intermediaries. For example, in the case of Firm K, the IF aligned the 
private intermediary (see Figure 6-2) to provide overseas market information but 
services of the private intermediary were funded and monitored by the public 
intermediary—IF. From an SME perspective, working with public intermediaries 
decreases risks and costs involved in the early stages of innovation. How do public 
intermediaries become innovation facilitators in the KNIS? National specificities 
seem to influence on the choice of public intermediaries. 
First, the role of public intermediaries supporting industries links closely to the 
historical path of relationships between government and industries. Professor SS Seol 
at the Economic Department of Hannam University explained: 
The majority of Korean firms have a short history and have not been 
able to accumulate sufficient infrastructure for innovation. Furthermore, 
people are reluctant to pay for information services [one of the 
distinctive feature of the Korean business environment] and therefore 
small private consultancies yield little profit68 [without public support]. 
Small Korean private consultancies should receive more service fees 
than they do at present, but SMEs do not feel the value of it. Especially, 
innovative SMEs expect a high level of knowledge services provided by 
multinational consultancies, but this is too expensive to afford. There 
has been a mismatch between the price they would like to pay and the 
value of the services they receive. It is likely to take a long time for 
private consultancies to build such a huge S&T infrastructure since 
government-funded organisations have been building those 
infrastructures since the 1960s. 
This unwillingness to pay for the costs of services is found especially at the early 
stage of innovation where SMEs have not yet yielded any profits and are reluctant to 
pay for ex ante services. Moreover, outcomes of four functions of public 
intermediaries are complicated to measure due to the vagueness (or intangibility) of 
the end result of the innovation process. As analysed in Chapter 6, the outcomes vary 
                                                        
68 The majority of SMEs were established as a result of strong government policy (Chapter 5), and 
many programmes, from funding to consultation services, were provided on a free basis. Furthermore, 
small private consultancies are often involved in government programmes, as they get certified by 
public intermediaries. In this regard, one private consultant, Dr. KH Baek, the CEO at PSMB said, 
“Yes, we are limited in our resources compared to global consultations and public intermediaries. My 
firm makes a profit by joining the programmes of government bodies such as the Small and Medium 
Business Corp.” 
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from firm to firm; outcomes are not just technological progress but also building 
innovation networks, acquiring new sets of technological and nontechnological 
knowledge, and creating new markets. Those outcomes are not just S&T innovation 
but rather wider dimensions of the NIS; the so-called DUI mode of innovation.  
Activities associated with supporting innovative SMEs is that the often long lead 
time to the realisation of the innovation process makes it difficult to recover the costs 
incurred, and firms may require more time and effort than anticipated. Such 
complexity relating to the wide range of service provision and knowledge interaction 
may require the participation of credible intermediaries equipped with experts and 
expertise. Innovative SMEs, in particular, that have experienced turbulent periods, 
are well aware of the complex characteristics of innovation, which entail unexpected 
events and failures. These situations increase dependency on public intermediaries. 
Second, the impartial position of public intermediaries play a crucial role in aligning 
resources and innovation players on behalf of SMEs. Public intermediaries involved 
in the knowledge-interaction process are capable of developing preferred potential 
partners, other public and private intermediaries to dovetail their services with 
government policies or to overcome the functional weaknesses of public 
intermediaries (e.g. the speed of service and limited roles).69 Mr. S. J. Lee at the IF 
emphasised the participation of various types of intermediaries: ‘We have been 
linking two different types of services from public and private intermediaries to 
increase the level of success in the process of innovation.’ 
This linking is possible due to their impartial position, far removed from representing 
the interests of specific parties. Dr. H. J. Kim at KTVF said, 
The impartial image and the not-for-profit structure of the Foundation 
play a more important role in Japan than in Korea. The Japanese are 
more conservative than [Koreans]. Japanese firms that visit us feel at 
ease. Especially, they feel comfortable when public intermediaries 
participate as mediators [in knowledge interaction]. This situation may 
be different among American [and many other Western firms]. 
                                                        
69 In general, intermediation is just one of several roles played by an entire organisation (e.g. GRIs). 
Different organisations may have different expertise, which may result in strengths or weaknesses in 
specific areas. 
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In addition, past experiences that SMEs have had with private investors may lead 
them to depend on public intermediaries that maintain impartial positions without 
pursuing profits for their own or specific parties involved in the innovation process. 
Dr. H. J. Kim at the KTVF added, 
In early 2000, stocks of many venture businesses became completely 
worthless; this brought wrong learning effects. Since then, angel 
investors have been reluctant to invest in risky areas even though those 
areas require long-term investment. In Korea, the SMBA established the 
Angel Investment Association because it does not work [for private 
investors to refrain from long-term investment]. 
Both parties seemed to disappoint each other, losing credibility, and many SMEs 
have been unwilling to receive private investment since then. Dr. Kim continued,  
The name value may be the most important thing for SMEs. It can be a 
source of pride. One of our firms [residing in the KIST incubating 
centre] used to say that they were the first venture firm certified by 
KIST. 
Last, the dependence on public intermediaries relates to the characteristics of the 
innovation process at the early stage. The process requires ongoing efforts to 
mobilise various resources, relationships, expertise, and experts interacting with 
components and actors in the system. However, knowledge interaction at this stage 
does not always bring measurable outcomes and therefore intermediaries have 
difficulty aligning potential buyers. Private intermediaries may refrain from 
involvement in the early stages where it is difficult to make a profit due to 
uncertainties and high risk. SMEs face unexpected barriers but do not have effective 
functions to address constraints. In this case, public intermediaries are quite efficient 
when diverse barriers (e.g. internal discrepancies, lack of infrastructure, or relational 
gaps) tend to arise in uncertain innovation processes. 
Public intermediaries increase learning opportunities and innovative capabilities of 
SMEs by maintaining long-term relationships with them as external knowledge 
linkages in the NIS. These linkages are the conduits for facilitating knowledge 
interaction between public intermediaries and SMEs, removing internal and external 
barriers; thus, firms can compensate for their lack of innovative capabilities and 
achieve innovation (e.g. rebuilding knowledge infrastructure, expanding 
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relationships, and any organisational or individual change). Furthermore, public 
intermediaries are not motivated to undermine services to increase profits, because 
increasing the overall efficiency of the innovation system is the most important role 
of public intermediaries, as explained in Section 3.2.2. 
The outcomes of knowledge interaction may not bring a ‘quantum leap’ but rather 
diverse (invisible) outcomes: a wider dimension of innovation. Establishing a new 
decision-making process or expanding relationships can be outcomes of innovation 
in providing the sustainable growth of SMEs over time. However, functions of public 
intermediaries facilitating the innovation process are often underestimated in spite of 
their contribution to the innovation of SMEs. In this vein, the following section 
compares the complex nature of the innovation process with the simplistic view of 
SME policy described in Chapter 5, and further criticises the mismatch between 
policy and the heterogeneous demands of innovative SMEs. 
7.4.2 Does Policy Reflect the Wider Dimension of Innovation? 
The previous section explicated the national specificities behind the roles of public 
intermediaries in supporting SMEs. Public intermediaries have been the partners of 
innovative SMEs addressing the uncertainties and complexities in innovation 
processes; linking them with other actors and creating dynamism in the KNIS. To 
minimise the risks and time involved in exploring new business areas, SMEs tend to 
rely on the credibility and reputation of public intermediaries; a safer choice in 
advance purchase and ex ante assessment of a knowledge service. The knowledge 
interaction may not yield quantitative outcomes in a short period of time, but may 
bring various innovative outcomes from technical achievement to organisational 
changes. As Section 7.2.2 revealed, public intermediaries provide a wider and more 
holistic role for firms in their innovation process than have been identified. 
From this perspective, innovation needs to be interpreted in a broad sense—a wider 
DUI approach—but the concept of innovation is often narrowly determined by 
policymakers (or intermediaries), who overlook the dynamic interaction process and 
heterogeneous nature of innovative SMEs and their demands. The effects of 
knowledge interaction pervade various activities and outcomes from which the 
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returns of knowledge use are difficult to measure in a quantitative sense. It may take 
a long time to digest this knowledge—a long learning process is involved in 
absorbing and using it—and it requires follow-up services to maximise business 
opportunities. As a result, four functions increase over time, as analysed in Section 
7.2.2. However, the linear view of innovation or a narrower approach seems to have 
prevailed in policymaking spheres that do not reflect diverse knowledge 
requirements of innovative SMEs (see Chapter 5). 
Policymakers have a tendency to identify success factors and measure outcomes of 
support programmes based on a simplistic view of innovation.70 However, success 
factors may not apply to all firms, due to the localised context of interactive learning 
and innovation, as analysed in Chapter 6. Micro-level factors that affected successful 
(or less successful) innovation differed from firm to firm. Firm K was not considered 
a successful case because the R&D funding did not result in sales growth in 2 years 
time. The quotation below illustrates the misaligned perspectives towards innovative 
outcomes between policymakers and SMEs. 
The CEO at Firm M conceded: 
It is ironic that the government has been emphasising ‘innovation’ 
(which takes a long period of time) but always measures success in 
terms of sales growth soon after they have provided us with some 
support. … We collaborated on a joint R&D project with Google this 
year which will take a long time to yield profits. The contract with 
Google changed everything, such as our vision, our relationships with 
big corporations in Korea, and the new biz plan for the future etc. That 
is innovation [even though we have not had any visible outcomes]. 
Going back to Chapter 2, the NIS is not a concept that only aims to achieve technical 
innovation but rather a practical device to remove barriers that need to be understood 
as a tool to facilitates the innovation process and stimulates new-knowledge creation 
related to a specific innovation. A mismatch might occur between policy and SMEs; 
policymakers lacking a wider DUI approach tend to skew to the linear view of 
innovation (see Chapter 5). As a result, supporting programmes designed by 
                                                        
70 The idea that investment in R&D results in increased profits has prevailed in measuring support 
programmes. Sponsoring organisations are likely to measure overall performance by quantitative 
indicators such as commercial success, sales growth, number of contracts, and contracted price. 
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policymakers often overlook interaction and interactive learning in the innovation 
process, and therefore hardly reflect the heterogeneous knowledge demands of 
innovative SMEs. This lack may threaten intermediaries’ provision of diverse 
services and their facilitation of knowledge-interaction processes to enhance the 
innovative capability of firms, and as a consequence, may decrease the quality of the 
KNIS over time. 
In particular, the paradoxical situation may arise when intermediaries find 
themselves trapped between the narrow view of innovation (i.e. STI-based 
approaches) prevailing in policymaking spheres and the diverse demands of 
innovative SMEs that require wider dimensions of services (i.e. DUI-based 
approaches). The trap makes public intermediaries avoid innovation facilitation 
processes and mislead intermediary staff to focus on producing visible outcomes, as 
can be seen in cases H and M. Public intermediaries and SMEs tried to bridge 
technological barriers, based on the assumption that technological capabilities might 
bring commercial success directly. As a result, SMEs could not overcome barriers 
that arose between the R&D stage and commercialisation stage. 
This outcome highlights the importance of innovation-facilitation processes that 
should address a number of barriers occurring in the innovation process. The 
problem still remains that the knowledge interactions do not explain how 
intermediary functions and related activities can lead to economic application and 
thereby innovation of firms. As evidenced in Chapter 6, public intermediaries rarely 
show the impacts of services in absolute terms, due to the invisible nature of 
facilitation processes; therefore it has been difficult to identify whether 
intermediaries affect the innovation of firms in a short space of time. For that reason, 
adopting a wider dimensions of innovation in the policymaking sphere seems to have 
limitations, though there has been some positive changes. In recent years, public 
intermediaries have become aware of the complexity of the innovation process and 
the dynamic nature of innovative SMEs. Mr. S. J. Lee at the IF said, 
The government policies focused on R&D funding should be changed. 
R&D funding is important but it can spoil the venture spirit of SMEs. 
They do not know how to explore business opportunities after they 
complete R&D. If we provide them with consultation services 
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(knowledge) such as market, technology, competitors, and regulations 
prior to investing in R&D, SMEs can increase the possibility of success 
in developing business opportunities. We can also target promising 
areas (firms) before we provide R&D funding, which will also increase 
the success rate of R&D investment. 
To fill the gap between policy and innovative SMEs, a theory or conceptual tool to 
underpin diverse activities in the innovation process needs to be examined to 
understand the nature of complex innovation processes and address heterogeneous 
barriers in designing supporting programmes. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Public intermediaries have been effective mechanisms for linking national policies to 
industries, removing barriers to innovation, and thereby enhancing the efficiency of 
the KNIS. Public intermediaries have strengths in their knowledge infrastructure and 
experience in collaborating with Korean industries over a long period, maintaining 
an impartial position, and providing services at the early stage of innovation. SMEs 
define innovation as a process that may involve several failures and various types of 
outcomes; the single type of services delivered by intermediaries at a specific point 
in time is insufficient to solve all the problems or achieve the innovative heights to 
which SMEs aspire. In this regard, answering the first research question, this chapter 
emphasises how and why public intermediaries facilitate innovation processes in the 
KNIS (Figure 7-3). 
 
Figure 7-3 Knowledge interaction at the systems level. 
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Although Chapter 5 provided the rationale, based on a historical perspective of 
relationships between public intermediaries and SMEs, this chapter answers the 
question by demonstrating the innovation-facilitation process between public 
intermediaries and SMEs and linking it to four functions of public intermediaries that 
have not been fully explained in the NIS framework. In particular, this chapter 
analyses how public intermediaries manage four functions addressing the 
uncertainties in the innovation process of each SME. The functions may increase 
from facilitating innovation to delivering traditional services along with the evolution 
of a multiplicity of relationships. The four functions are performed based on a 
constant process of interaction, multiplicity of relationships, and mutual learning. 
This chapter also highlights the concept of innovation as a process of achieving 
sustainable growth of firms. On this point, outcomes of innovation vary from 
technological progress or sales growth to organisational changes. As a consequence, 
innovation does not always bring visible outcomes in a short space of time and often 
fails to yield any profits. This leads SMEs to rely on public intermediaries to address 
the cost, effort, and risk involved in the uncertain innovation process. However, 
some mismatches may emerge between the supporting programmes and 
heterogeneous demands of SMEs. As indicated in the previous section, an 
intermediary’s functions in the knowledge-interaction process may be hard to 
formalise and quantify, and taking into account ex ante services in the process is 
often neither easy nor planned, due to the contingency and complexity of the 
innovation process. 
However, policy tends to overlook a wider dimensions of innovation rather skewed 
to the linear view of innovation, which is too simplistic to explain innovative 
outcomes of SMEs (Chapter 6). To summarise, in this chapter, I presented and 
discussed empirical findings relating to the rationale and involvement of public 
intermediaries in the KNIS. Along with Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 discussed the 
main research problem of the study, which is to determine the limitations of the roles 
of intermediaries and SMEs in the NIS. The final chapter aims to suggest policy 
directions in knowledge interaction between intermediaries and SMEs. 
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8 Chapter 8. Discussion and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This study began with the aim of examining how public intermediaries facilitate 
innovation of SMEs through interactions. The more ambitious objective was to offer 
insights that can be applied to build on the existing NIS concept, improve 
understanding of key actors (public intermediaries and SMEs), and provide an 
account of how knowledge interactions and relationships can facilitate innovation in 
SMEs by decreasing the barriers described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Thus, this study addresses a combination of issues that cannot be answered by 
research using only existing NIS concepts. Chapter 8 discusses shortcomings of the 
NIS approach to answer the research questions and the necessity of incorporating 
other approaches to address the questions. These include how relationships between 
the public intermediary and SMEs are evolving and the interactions that occur at 
multiple levels, how individuals affect learning and innovation, and how the various 
barriers specific to firms may be overcome. The results of this study show that the 
NIS concept may fit specific contexts, but only if combined with intermediary 
studies and the social dimension to delineate the knowledge-interaction process that 
is supported by the extensive empirical evidence presented in the five case studies of 
Korean SMEs. 
This chapter concludes the study by providing an overview of findings and a 
recapitulation of its contribution to debates around the NIS. Four key functions are 
presented: first, I examine the research problems; second, I present the implications 
discerned from theories, policies, and SMEs, and the generalisations of these 
findings; third, I discuss the research strengths, limitations, unresolved questions, and 
suggestions for future research; and finally, I present concluding remarks for the 
study. 
8.2 Research Problems 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the NIS has been a popular concept in policymaking and 
academic spheres for several decades. Debates continue about its intellectual 
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coherence and policy relevance, even amongst its founding authors. Lundvall 
supported the usefulness of a loose-umbrella concept as a policy tool for a wider 
application in different contexts, whereas Edquist emphasised the need for more 
systemic conceptual development. Indeed, the conceptual approach of the NIS 
contributes to providing increased visibility to S&T policies and stimulates the 
emergence of other literatures such as RSI, SSI, and Regional Industry Systems: 
analytical tools that can be complementary to each other or combined (Edquist, 1997; 
Lundvall, 2007c). However, important criticisms have been advanced about the NIS 
approach; in particular, the conceptual framework it offers is rather abstract and 
rhetorical (Godin, 2006, 2009; Sharif, 2006, 2010; Song, 2009; Woolthuis, 
Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005) and has shortcomings that apply in specific 
institutional settings (OECD, 2002). The conceptual framework revolves around a 
somewhat schematic account of institutions and interactions that overlook the 
different characteristics of the social setting of states, firms, and their patterns of 
interaction and relationships. 
In the NIS approach, the roles of various actors and their different capabilities in 
knowledge generation are not sufficiently well defined, although those differences 
may result in barriers to innovation, as shown in the five cases. The role of SMEs 
and public intermediaries in Korea cannot be effectively explained with the NIS 
concept (Fig 2-1 in Chapter 2). Sharif (2010) also criticised the NIS concept for 
failing to accurately emphasise the role of firms. By providing an incomprehensible 
NIS framework, it does not demonstrate the extent to which SME needs are met by 
government support and the key barriers that KNIS must overcome to increase their 
deficiencies: that is, weak SMEs. The simple framework does not indicate SMEs as 
active knowledge generators, which contrasts with the central role of firms at the 
heart of the NIS, provided by OECD reports (Sharif, 2010). 
In the same vein, the loose nature of the framework does not seem to distinguish 
between individual firms, groups of firms, or capabilities of firms in the system 
(Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003) or the level of knowledge among firms or 
between large corporations and SMEs. For example, the COSTII index described in 
Chapter 5 indicates the low level of cooperation between firms but does not delineate 
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the characteristics of weak SMEs and the barriers they face. Furthermore, the NIS 
emphasises national institutions and economic growth at the macro-level but pays 
remarkably little attention to the character and distribution of knowledge itself 
(Godin, 2006), despite its presumptions about access to knowledge being the crucial 
condition to increase the amount of innovative capabilities (David and Foray, 1995). 
This macro-level approach has shortcomings in addressing some problems, as I now 
describe. 
First, the NIS framework presented in Figure 2-1 has limited ability to reflect 
national characteristics that have different historical, social, and political settings. 
Somewhat paradoxically, although the whole idea of the NIS is to attempt to address 
cross-national differences in innovative performance (Borrás and Edler, 2014), the 
concept does not have analytical tools (Godin, 2006; Sharif, 2010) or indicators to 
capture why performances are different, and how specificities of NIS can be analysed 
(Smith, 2001). Lundvall (2007a) criticised the distortion of the NIS concept, which 
has been applied in a narrow understanding of the concept by policymakers (i.e. 
international organisations) and scholars, compared to the original versions from 
Freeman and the IKE-group in Aalborg that emphasised national characteristics. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, reports from OECD highlight the differences among 
nations,71 based on the same criteria, regardless of the specificities of institutional 
settings in every nation. For example, as outlined in Chapter 5, industry–academia 
interaction was uncommon in Korea because, for the nation’s education system, the 
most important role was in providing a supply of trained engineers and applied 
scientists to assist manufacturing firms to catch up (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007) 
rather than building R&D capabilities in universities. 
Instead, Korea’s economic development exhibits some unique features, in particular 
through the strong coordinating role of the state similar to the ‘controlled 
competition’ in Japan discussed in Chapter 3. GRIs were the major mechanisms 
actively involved in fostering the development of indigenous national R&D 
                                                        
71 The OECD scoreboard, which is published every 2 years, includes a series of economic, science, 
and technology indicators, ranking countries on different dimensions, with a brief analytical text 
(Godin, 2006). 
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capabilities and interacting with industries for several decades. However few studies 
addressed GRIs as important actors in the NIS. Therefore, a lack of local variation, 
the particular circumstances, and dynamics of particular settings call for another line 
of inquiry, which I propose here: that is, a focus on the dynamics of knowledge 
interaction among particular actors, public intermediaries, and SMEs. As Lundvall, 
Intarakumnerd and Vang (2006), and Lundvall (2010) have suggested, a need 
persists for more empirically based research of Asian innovation systems. The NIS 
literature and much of the innovation literature generally does not yet recognise 
diversities and cultural legacies in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China (Dodgson, 2009), 
although institutional approaches cannot be separated from sociopolitical and cultural 
contexts (Godin, 2009). This specificity cannot be fully explained by the macro-level 
approach that leads to the second problem. 
The second shortcoming concerns the simplistic perspective adopted in mainstream 
NIS studies on the interaction and knowledge flows between players. Firms are 
conceived primarily as a recipient of innovation inputs and the qualitative nature of 
interaction is ignored in the NIS (Sharif, 2010). However, I argue, innovation 
interactions occur at multiple levels72 and relationships evolve through the process 
because of the heterogeneous characteristics of firms in ways that are not effectively 
addressed by the schematic NIS framework. Firms have different levels of 
knowledge demand that may require different levels of knowledge interaction, 
illustrated by the five case studies. New knowledge is not produced in a formalised 
way and knowledge interaction does not occur in a vacuum. Often, knowledge does 
not flow if there is asymmetry of knowledge and thus constellations of actors may 
coalesce into an interaction process to overcome barriers. Knowledge interaction has 
to be seen as a highly contextual social process. 
As a result, different patterns of interaction and relationships are shaped and many 
factors affect this shaping. However, the NIS framework is somewhat devoid of 
micro-level factors, especially social dimensions in the interaction process, and is 
                                                        
72 Lundvall emphasised the importance of interactive learning, while contending the usefulness of a 
loose-umbrella approach. The loose concept does not deliver methodology on how to identify a 
mixture of rationality and facilitate learning (Sharif, 2010). Lundvall (2004, 2007c) provided a brief 
guideline on how to analyse the NIS based on four steps. 
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unable to fully account for multiple levels of interaction processes, learning 
processes, and influences of individuals in specific circumstances. These factors 
make it difficult for the NIS concept to account for the complex knowledge 
interaction that affects innovations of firms. Lundvall (2007c) also welcomed the 
adoption of a social dimensions, emphasising the importance of meso- and micro-
level approaches.73 Here STS perspectives have emphasised micro-level analysis in 
examining the detailed dynamics, local learning, and contingencies in the innovation 
process that differ among firms, scholars, and regions (Russell and Williams, 2002). 
To recapitulate, the limitation of the NIS approach to fully account for the innovation 
process of SMEs is partly due to the lack of attention paid to social dimensions with 
their embedded complex relationships and interactions. This is the crux of this study, 
focusing attention on different patterns of relationships, evolution of relationships, 
multiplicity of interactions, and micro-factors that affect innovation of firms. 
Third, this study found that knowledge interaction is the process of circumventing 
knowledge and relational barriers at each stage.74 A nascent knowledge-flow 
approach to the NIS framework also has shortcomings, as described above: how 
interactions and relationships can bridge the barriers, and what factors make this 
feasible. It seems that the conceptual framework of the NIS approach only offers a 
view of the elements and framework conditions that determine and affect innovation 
processes in general. Numerous innovation processes exist in firms, technologies, 
sectors, and regions. Each process has its own specific (sub-) system of actors, 
organisations, and institutions with their own specific relationships and interactions, 
determining and affecting how they function. Without customisation of the 
framework to a specific context, it may not be possible to examine the interaction 
process where actors can identify specific relational or capability failures of SMEs 
for further support. 
                                                        
73 Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) highlighted that micro-level analysis gives room to 
analyse the value of individual behaviour. 
74 Facilitating innovation of firms is not just a matter of interaction and knowledge flow, as suggested 
by an NIS framework, but rather a complex process of overcoming barriers and bridging the gap while 
also outlining the mediating mechanisms and activities of intermediaries. 
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To more specifically grasp the characteristics of an NIS, the conceptual framework 
has to be ‘operationalised’ at an appropriate level (Edquist, 2001; Lankhuizen and 
Woolthuis, 2003; Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005)—for example 
interaction between SMEs and big buyers or between SMEs and public 
intermediaries—to investigate innovation processes. The conceptual framework of 
the NIS approach can be used as a ‘focusing device’ that puts interactive learning 
and innovation at the centre of analysis (Lundvall, 2002) rather than an ex ante 
policy tool. This study, therefore, developed and applied the conceptual framework 
proposed in Chapter 4, which attempts to address these limitations, in the case of 
SMEs in Korea, with a specific focus on interaction with public intermediaries under 
which heterogeneous actors—SMEs, multiple intermediaries, and buyers—may 
coalesce to bridge the barriers in the innovation process. The research explored the 
relationships and influences in the process of complex innovations, focused 
specifically on exploring the roles of intermediaries through their specific activities 
(Chapter 3) in bridging the barriers at each stage of the innovation process. 
The empirical aspect of the study was undertaken in two stages. The first involved 
gathering information on SMEs and intermediaries to map the landscape of the 
innovation process through interaction. The information identified public 
intermediaries that represented the state, regions, and different ministries, and I 
selected those innovative SMEs that interacted with those intermediaries for the first 
round of interviews. Based on the interviews, I selected five SMEs for in-depth 
interviews for further analysis. I reported and analysed the evidence gathered from 
this second stage, through semi-structured comprehensive interviews. 
8.3 Contribution and Findings of the Research 
Whereas knowledge interaction and learning focus more on the meso- and micro- 
levels, with interaction between actors in the economic system as its level of analysis, 
the elements taken from evolutionary theories focus more on the macro- level. 
According to empirical findings, interaction does not occur only between industry 
and academia. Lundvall (2007c, p112) also indicated, 
There is a need to understand how the core of the innovation system is 
embedded in the wider set of institutions that shape people and the 
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relationships between people. Without knowledge of the micro-
structures, we might get little out of attempts to manipulate institutions 
and organizations at the meso- and macro-level. 
To do so, it is necessary to incorporate social dimensions to uncover the relationships 
and the role of individuals, and provide intermediary studies to examine the process 
of bridging the barriers. 
This study developed a conceptual framework anchored in the knowledge interaction 
and intermediating nexus, highlighting the barriers in knowledge and relationships at 
early stages of innovation. By focusing on the exploration of how public 
intermediaries might influence the innovation of SMEs, the study was able to 
consider the micro-factors in interaction processes, the need for knowledge 
facilitation and learning, and the importance of knowledge enabling and managing 
interfaces. The intermediary functions developed in Chapter 3 provide understanding 
of the process by which intermediaries interact with SMEs and organise actors at 
multiple levels to circumvent the barriers posed by innovation processes. 
In this vein, the framework builds on insights about constellations of actors in the 
knowledge-interaction process, which is evolving over time, and the importance 
placed on multiple levels of interactions and actors in the studies of the evolution of 
complex systems (Lundvall, 1992; Molina, 1994; Nelson, 1994; Williams, Stewart 
and Slack, 2005). This approach also provides a way to explore the micro-level 
factors and multiple-level interactions that are mostly neglected in NIS and in 
intermediary studies, that is, a productive combination of competing rationalities, the 
importance of reflexive individuals, redefinition of firms and their capabilities, and 
social learning. 
First, a productive combination of competing rationalities by engaging 
heterogeneous actors in the knowledge-interaction process is crucial not only for 
knowledge generation but also for ensuring the quality of that knowledge at an early 
stage, when actors and technologies have not yet been identified. Along with the 
quality of knowledge, the NIS concept overlooks the role of public intermediaries 
linking all the activities and relationships (Watkins et al., 2014). ‘Pre-dominating 
rationality’ (Lundvall, 2002) tends to rule organisations, hindering absorption of new 
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knowledge and learning. As several interviewees indicated, in Chapter 6, 
involvement of a credible third party is crucial to persuade employees at all levels in 
a firm to facilitate self-interaction to decrease discrepancy of views on innovation. In 
combining multiple rationalities, embedded in individuals having different ideas, 
experiences, and knowledge, intermediaries link different spaces and actors, and by 
doing so, accommodate competing rationalities for new knowledge creation. 
Intermediaries combined the technical and nontechnical knowledge through 
interactions with different organisations and experts to address the heterogeneous 
barriers of SMEs. In the cases of Firms K and T, researchers from public 
intermediaries contacted big buyers and GRIs not only to access in-house knowledge, 
but also to combine insights from experts on future technology markets. Researchers 
in public intermediaries and experts were often from the same university and shared 
the same social world, which seemed to have a positive impact on knowledge 
enabling. 
In this regard, Williams, Stewart and Slack (2005, p81) indicated the requisite 
intermediating role of having the ability to cross different spaces—between different 
organisations and different departments within organisations—and between different 
knowledge communities. Yet, these authors did not distinguish between public and 
private intermediaries. Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing (2005) asserted these 
relationships not only involve big buyers, but also the government, public 
intermediaries, and third parties, but do not explain why and when the participation 
of public intermediaries is important. The role of public intermediaries are not well 
defined or identified in the NIS literature and the macro-level focus of earlier NIS 
studies tends to emphasise university–industry linkages (Watkins et al., 2014). 
Empirical analysis shows the role of public intermediaries as important actors, 
especially when the firm does not have capability, and the technology is vague and 
malleable at an early stage. It takes a long time to cross over ‘death valley’ and the 
‘Darwinian Sea’ (Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003; Branscomb and Auerswald, 
2002; Dalziel, 2010). 
Although causal links, interactions, and relationships between actors in the NIS are 
central elements to the analysis (Nelson 1992, 1993), the NIS concept limits 
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delineating why and how other actors become involved and how patterns of 
relationships vary, based on the snapshot of the framework at one point. It is difficult 
to understand what effort has to be made to overcome the barriers without reference 
to linkages or relationships in the NIS (Sharif, 2010). The study demonstrates that 
various actors participate in the knowledge-interaction process rather than just two 
parties, where relationships are evolving and factors for success and failure differ 
from case to case (Chapter 6). Often, success or failure of knowledge interaction 
comes not only from the capability of firms to interact with external knowledge 
infrastructures, but also with individuals from intermediaries, which relates to the 
second finding. Existing literature on intermediaries rarely addresses the weaknesses 
of functions or activities. 
Second, even though the NIS and intermediary studies emphasise individual learning, 
they have shortcomings in how these individuals create knowledge and contribute to 
bridging the gap. In the NIS framework, little explanation exists of a particular 
mechanism for learning that facilitates the innovation that is often missing (Watkins, 
et al., 2014). However, the empirical findings from this study suggest that individuals 
must be considered when analysing the knowledge-interaction process, especially at 
the early stage. In this vein, Williams, Stewart and Slack (2005) emphasised that 
particular individuals or groups often emerge as intermediaries in the course of ICT 
projects, although this role is not always formally recognised and often is not a result 
of a formal designation of roles, but instead arises in the interstices of an 
organisational structure. Other intermediary studies also indicate the role of brokers, 
researchers, and private consultants (as discussed in Chapter 3), but make insufficient 
progress towards opening the black box of knowledge interaction among 
heterogeneous actors and institutions. In this regard, Balzat and Hanusch (2004) 
argued that extension of the NIS study has to do with still-limited knowledge of 
dynamic properties of the NIS. 
In the case of SMEs, four CEOs from successful and less successful cases fulfil the 
role of spanning boundaries, by actively learning and delivering feedback to 
intermediaries, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. These individuals have long periods 
of R&D or marketing experience in specific areas and some have successful business 
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relationships with big buyers in global markets. They are capable of replicating the 
existing interaction process with big buyers to the new interaction process with 
intermediaries more easily than other CEOs without this experience. Interestingly, 
most also have failure experiences in R&D, but they regard these as a part of the 
learning process. Along with competitive technological knowledge, these 
experiences contribute to their adaptive skills, making them more reflexive than 
others. 
In the case of Firm H, the first knowledge interaction with KISTI did not bring any 
changes to the firm that gave the CEO an opportunity to reflect on why he was not 
able use the knowledge and how he used government support programmes next. The 
CEO analysed and produced the government support map for a future business and 
actively delivered feedback regarding new requirements in the new business area. 
The CEO also was able to make better use of different types of services (e.g. the 
supercomputing centre and the technology commercialisation centre) by accessing 
multiple intermediaries. Reflexive CEOs have a tendency to become quick learners 
and actively forward their demands to intermediaries, helping to build a virtuous 
cycle of ongoing knowledge interactions that facilitate learning and strengthen 
routine momentum. 
In the case of intermediaries, reflexive individuals from successful and less 
successful cases had experiences in different sectors and different firms from which 
they accumulated high levels of specialised knowledge and related expertise. These 
individuals are capable of integrating knowledge from different disciplines and 
reconfiguring them as competitive new recipes of knowledge for specific firms, 
described as ‘cross-pollination’. They also strongly build trust because they are 
capable of producing high-quality knowledge, identifying and enlisting potential 
actors to the innovation space based on their impartial position and consistent 
manners, as analysed in Chapter 7. 
As Williams, Stewart and Slack (2005) indicated, critical to successful 
intermediation is the ability of reflexive individuals to mobilise knowledge and 
resources inside and outside their organisations: they are the crucial factor to 
integrate and adapt new knowledge. The four CEOs created a sense of urgency inside 
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their firms to facilitate coordinated action of employees towards the innovation and 
actively used public intermediaries as legitimate facilitators to construct new 
knowledge infrastructures. Firms K, I, and H established new departments or 
processes to replicate the knowledge-interaction process with public intermediaries 
that became new routines of integrating and adapting external knowledge. In the case 
of Firm T, the CEO integrated knowledge outside the firm for a long period of time, 
crossing boundaries of multiple GRIs (i.e. KIST, KIOST, and KISTI) and the 
ministry, which resulted in establishing the standardised technology and creating the 
new market. During the innovation process, the CEO accessed a neighbouring firm 
to learn about new technology and the KIOST to try out the system at the test site. 
This is noteworthy in a knowledge-interaction process where SMEs have difficulty 
entering new business relationships, due to problems with the asymmetry of 
knowledge. In this case, with relational capital and credible images, individuals have 
a direct impact on linking relational gaps of SMEs, as evidenced in Chapter 6. 
Lundvall (2004, 2007c) described them as ‘interactionists’ whose roles are important 
activities at an early stage because embedded knowledge flows best through 
individual relationships. They can be perceived as boundary spanners (Friedman and 
Podolny, 1992) who act as conduits for knowledge interaction and may strongly 
impact successful knowledge interaction and thus innovation. 
In contrast, lack of reflexivity of individuals often leads a firm to fail in adapting new 
knowledge, as shown in Firm M. The CEO of Firm M received knowledge from 
multiple intermediaries without delivering feedback to intermediaries. The CEO had 
good relationships with potential buyers when the firm was established, leading the 
firm to overlook the multilevels of interaction in knowledge enabling. The CEO did 
not collaborate with employees (or intermediaries) to solve the problems the firm 
faced and, as a result, knowledge was not adapted to the firm’s particular context. 
Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) described this situation as strong network failure, 
where individual actors are guided by other network actors in the ‘wrong direction’ 
and consequently fail to supply each other with the required knowledge. The authors 
averred failure is caused by a lack of information exchange with actors who perform 
a bridging role, that is, those who tap into new knowledge and question existing 
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routines. However, empirical analysis shows that guidance in the wrong direction can 
be used as a way of learning by failure, if there is a reflexive individual. 
Third, operationalisation of an abstract concept at appropriate levels contributes to 
the understanding of SMEs by addressing issues not well tackled by the generic NIS 
concept. To be able to innovate, firms must constantly access new knowledge 
sources that lie outside the firms or even outside the existing field of knowledge 
(Burt, 1992). However, the capability to access external knowledge sources depends 
on the capability of firms that are often overlooked in innovation studies. Figure 2-1 
in Chapter 2 describes firms as recipients of innovation input, playing a very small 
role in generating innovation (Sharif, 2010). Compared to large corporations, SMEs 
in general have resource disadvantages due to a lack of highly qualified employees 
and financial resources (Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003; Freel, 2005; Lankhuizen 
and Woolthuis, 2003; Massa and Testa, 2008; Nooteboom, 1994, 1998). 
As described in Chapter 3, exploring new businesses entails considerable costs for 
SMEs. In addition to the costs of properly safeguarding their interactions and 
relationships, and of enhancing learning, the specialist knowledge required to fill the 
barriers may be absent. The case studies I developed here indicate that most 
innovative SMEs possess competitive knowledge in existing business areas; however, 
exploring new business areas requires them to identify barriers and build new 
routines in a short space of time (i.e. new relationships and knowledge). Often, 
innovative SMEs lack the capability to address the problems they face and build new 
routines with the speed needed to address these problems. CEOs tend to look for 
intermediaries not just because of the need to acquire new information and 
relationships, but because of the desire to formalise the new knowledge-interaction 
process inside firms. 
As analysed in Chapter 6, differences often exist in views between CEOs and 
employees towards exploring new businesses. Employees are not as motivated as 
CEOs for a better future and are easily locked in their own routines. They pursue 
stability rather than changes, as the CEO at Firm K contended. Thus, it might be 
difficult for CEOs (or firms) to decrease the barriers in a short space of time without 
external innovation facilitators. In addition, the old knowledge infrastructure and 
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decision-making processes in the existing business area are unsuitable for new areas 
because of different sociotechnical settings, different requirements of knowledge, 
and different innovation players. Especially when dealing with big buyers, this lack 
of knowledge infrastructure may be a problem. Whereas a large corporation will 
often have specialised knowledge ‘in house’, SMEs often lack this knowledge and 
thus either have to build the knowledge infrastructure (which is costly), or depend on 
big buyers not to exploit their vulnerability. Although innovative SMEs have 
qualified employees and technological capabilities, the empirical analysis in this 
study shows that knowledge asymmetry hinders cooperative interactions with 
potential buyers. Existing informal and formal relationships may not be helpful in 
building necessary networks in new business areas. 
This phenomenon contrasts with the assumption about knowledge flow between 
industry and academia and learning by interaction (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; 
Lundvall, 1992, 2005; Nelson, 2002). According to the empirical analysis presented 
here, SMEs that need cooperation, in theory, rarely enter cooperative relationships 
because they cannot get the advantages of interaction to gain access to knowledge 
resources and to raise their innovation if they do not have knowledge to offer in 
return. Hence, knowledge does not flow between SMEs and potential buyers. Only if 
there are formal mechanisms established between SMEs and potential partners can 
SMEs leap the barriers, and by doing so, form equal partnerships and further 
interactions (Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003). 
Evidence from this study also suggests another characteristic of SMEs: they are not 
necessarily passive recipients of knowledge in interaction processes, as described in 
most intermediary literature that focuses on the supply side, viewing the delivery 
service to customers and its impact on innovation. SMEs might be very active in 
conveying feedback and reconfiguring knowledge to their own contexts, especially 
when they have routines built by interaction with business partners and external 
experts. It is rather easy for these SMEs to adapt new knowledge and to build new 
routines required in new business areas, based on accumulated experiences and 
capabilities. Along with the capabilities, reflexive individuals in firms and 
intermediaries (Chapter 6 and 7) play an important role in three ways: 1) constantly 
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translating and reconfiguring the knowledge, 2) building new learning routines inside 
firms and new relationships with external experts, and 3) co-shaping a favourable 
innovation environment with actors involved in a multiplicity of interactions (i.e. 
potential buyers and multiple intermediaries). 
Last, another key contribution of this study is that it links the enabling knowledge 
and networking activities of intermediaries with social learning. SMEs do not only 
bridge the gap or acquire knowledge; they also build new knowledge infrastructures, 
relations, and skills through interactive learning. Case studies in Chapter 6 show that 
SMEs built new knowledge infrastructures, established new departments, designated 
a person in charge of knowledge management, and explored new relationships. 
Interviewees considered these infrastructural changes that ensure sustainable growth 
as success, rather than defining success by immediate growth in sales. 
In this vein, this study highlights managing the interfaces, one of the main functions 
of intermediaries provided in Chapter 3, which means more than accessing 
knowledge and brokering services described in the existing intermediary literature. 
These roles in intermediary studies have an image of a particular service, 
overlooking that learning and building relationships may take a long period of time. 
Evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 shows intermediaries actively facilitate 
relationships and learning by managing interfaces where ‘heterogeneous 
constellations of actors’ facilitate not only business relationships in a short space of 
time, but also constant learning. Because relationships, demands of buyers, or social 
settings (e.g. regulations) may change over time during innovation, managing 
interfaces is important for ongoing interactions and reshaping the innovation space to 
address changes, as evidenced in Chapter 6. 
Boundary spanners play a crucial role in linking different actors and translating 
sticky knowledge into their innovation context, which is rarely accomplished by 
accessing or brokering activities on a single occasion. SMEs were not just passive 
recipients of knowledge, as Sharif (2010) argued that the NIS framework seemed to 
fail to accurately emphasise the roles of firms; intermediaries were not merely 
passive knowledge transporters. As analysed in Chapter 7, public intermediaries also 
accumulate experiences and renew their knowledge repositories. Intermediaries are 
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reflexive actors in the way they reconfigure their knowledge and identify which 
elements of knowledge and experience can be applied in a new setting. They also 
learn from knowledge interaction with SMEs and apply learning experiences in other 
settings. 
8.4 Critiquing the Research Findings 
8.4.1 Potential for Generalising the Results 
Here, I reconsider the findings from this study to ensure the robustness of the 
conceptual framework, research findings, and implications derived from them. A 
commensurate question regarding the results is whether these cases be generalised 
for all kinds of innovations. As discussed in Chapter 4, one concern about case 
studies is the issue of generalisation: to generalise, results need to be sufficiently 
implemented over different settings and contexts and provide consistent results. 
This study aimed to obtain ‘insights’ rather than ‘generalisations’ about the role of 
public intermediaries facilitating the innovation of SMEs; others may use the results 
to build on existing NIS and intermediary theories. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate 
how Korea built its own NIS and how the particular Korean setting differs from other 
settings, linking to the general criticism of NIS in Section 8.2, because it does not 
have indicators to explicate national specificities and the richness of individual 
situations. Early NIS studies have strong focus on country-specific features, but 
broad empirical cross-country analysis that draws on OECD data does not reflect the 
multifarious factors of each nation (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004; Mahroum and 
Alsaleh, 2012). During the process of diffusion of the NIS, the original concept has 
been distorted in policymaking spheres by applying narrow understanding of the 
concept, leaving significant elements of innovation-based economic performance 
unexplained (Lundvall, 2007a). 
One missing part of the main NIS literature was any real attempt to identify and 
clarify institutional intermediaries or bridge institutions in specific industries whose 
function needed to solve problems for individual firms (Watkins et al., 2014).75 As 
                                                        
75 Viotti (2002) contended the narrow understanding of the NIS limited to encompassing institutions 
and relationships that influence innovation processes.  
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discussed in Chapter 3, knowledge interactions between public intermediaries and 
SMEs can only be examined when the NIS framework is operationalized. Yet, case 
studies align with analysing emerging phenomenon: how relationships evolve over 
time, why they evolve in a particular way, and how they can be intentionally formed. 
Comprehensive research provides insights about particular institutional settings 
occurring in some Asian countries and cultural specificities embedded in innovation. 
Adopting an appropriate meso- and micro-level approach, the results based on the 
interviews provide evidence of how knowledge interactions at multiple levels might 
influence innovations of SMEs and how social dimensions play crucial roles in 
successful knowledge interactions (Chapter 6). Microsociological factors such as 
reflexive actors, relational capital, and the evolving characteristics of relationships 
and knowledge have significant importance in the innovation process. These insights 
on knowledge interaction represent crucial elements (see section 8.3.) that can be 
generalised to other innovation contexts of SMEs. For example, the literature on 
functions of public intermediaries and empirical findings supports these insights. The 
public intermediary engages in knowledge interaction, knowledge enabling, 
facilitation of learning and relations, and managing the interfaces that might 
influence the different processes of innovation of SMEs, as analysed in Chapter 6. 
Although the findings may not be applicable to all kinds of innovation at this stage, 
as there is a need for further research, the results presented in Chapters 6 and 7 
provide insights that are rich enough to draw tentative implications for theories and 
policies (see section 8.5.). The empirical basis of the study is, however, robust 
enough to provide a foundation for conclusions: first, the NIS framework needs to be 
operationalised at an appropriate level to examine interactions and relationships; 
second, micro factors (e.g. social dimensions) should be considered to analyse 
different patterns of knowledge interaction and relationships; and third, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, intermediaries facilitate interactions and relationships through the four 
functions evidenced in Chapter 6. The process contributes to building a new 
knowledge infrastructure and thus innovation of SMEs at early stages. 
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8.4.2 Effects of the Research Context 
What lessons can be drawn from the Korean experience for the rest of the world? Did 
the location of the study in Korea have wider application, given contextual 
differences? Despite factors specific to Korea, these peculiarities may have 
implications for generalisation of the findings. In this regard, Chapter 3 demonstrated 
the important elements of Asian industrial development, indicating that most 
developed Asian countries traditionally possess non-market modes of coordination 
such as the key role of active government support (Dodgson, 2009; Fransman, 1990, 
1991; Gu, 1996; Hu, Lin and Chang, 2005; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Wong, 
2004; Yusuf, 2008). Thus, the Korean context might apply to other Asian countries, 
based on the analytical generalisations discussed in section 4.2.2. Processual 
understanding developed for this study might provide diagnostic tools for a better 
understanding of what happens in Japan or Taiwan, enabling policymakers to 
identify similar settings and processes in other countries: that is, the role of 
governments that are actively involved in shaping favourable environments of firms. 
For example, in Korea, the role of the strong state and five-year economic-
development plans between 1962 and 1997 were major driving forces for rapid 
economic development. Since then, GRIs have been a major policy tool to 
implement government policies, as described in Chapter 5. The role of the strong 
state is not limited to Korea, as many examples come from the international arena, as 
explained in Chapter 3. Underlying the history of catching up and achieving 
economic development in a short period of time, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and more 
recently China, have strong government intervention as the state fostered a small 
number of large firms or many small firms. Intervention related closely to cultural 
and historical contexts, characteristics of people, and social norms (Dodgson, 2009). 
In a similar vein, public intermediaries (e.g. GRIs) are not a unique phenomenon to 
Korea; they have been acting as innovation facilitators for firms in other Asian 
countries. 
This situation is likely to be the same in some other developing countries as they try 
to catch up with advanced countries where firms are incapable of pursing innovation 
by themselves. The evidence from this study suggests that public intermediaries do 
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appear to facilitate innovation in SMEs in a short period of time through the 
functions suggested in Chapter 3. In particular, the public position of intermediaries 
is crucial in some countries where organisations struggle to enter cooperative 
relationships, due to secrecy issues and low levels of trust (Xiaoyuan and Yanning, 
2011). For firms that are less capable and have fewer resources, engagement of 
public intermediaries in knowledge interaction, learning, and facilitation may 
accelerate innovative capability of SMEs. Thus, focusing the study on Korea might 
have some implications for others. 
8.5 Implications of Findings 
8.5.1 Implications for Theories 
The NIS concept has been considered a useful framework that helps explain 
differences in how countries manage and enhance innovation, but has limits in 
depicting the complex nature of innovations in numerous subsystems, with various 
actors and factors. Although several researchers (Edquist, 1999, 2001; A. Johnson 
and Jacobsson, 2000; Liu and White, 2001) tried to define functions and 
determinants, they did not account for exactly what happens in the interaction 
process,76 as pointed out in Section 8.2. Evidence reported in Chapter 2 supports the 
claim that an NIS is an abstract framework that needs to be complemented by other 
disciplines and subsystems (i.e. public intermediaries and SMEs); the instruments of 
innovation policy are rarely used alone in decision-making processes (Borrás and 
Edquist, 2013).  
The empirical evidence highlights how constellations of heterogeneous actors under 
different subsystems interact to configure the knowledge and innovation environment 
while they are affected by individuals, levels of trust, and social capital. Thus, 
additional micro-level factors, especially social dimensions, institutional aspects, and 
their functions must be considered in the knowledge-interaction process at the early 
stages to encompass specific characteristics of a subsystem and the evolving nature 
of interactions and relationships. This amalgamation of multiple levels of interaction 
                                                        
76 Lundvall (2005) criticised that some activities are difficult to see as organised by any specific type 
of organisations, and several other factors influencing innovations could be listed. 
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and micro-level sociological factors contribute to the production of high-quality 
knowledge to reduce gaps in knowledge interactions, learning facilitation, and 
relations. This dynamic of interaction processes is likely to impact the process of 
innovation significantly. As Borrás and Edler (2014) argued, the disciplinary 
tradition of sociological dimensions of STS and evolutionary economists continue to 
echo the wider contexts of S&T and innovation systems, focusing on the 
sociocultural context of sociotechnical innovation systems. They bring potential 
synergies by linking the sociological background of STS and innovation studies. 
In contrast, Martin (2012a) attempted to find a missing link between Science Policy 
and Innovation Studies (SPIS) and other fields of study and emphasises a move to 
forge closer links among SPIS, STS, historians, and philosophers of science. Martin 
(2012b) further suggested that innovation studies need to avoid disciplinary sclerosis 
by bringing other disciplines as an ‘intellectual melting pot’. These scholars try to 
bridge the gulf between disciplinary fields. This can be seen as the ‘double 
movement’, bringing innovation studies into science, technology, and innovation 
studies based on STS; and vice versa, bringing STS into SPIS; in this study, I have 
tried to link STS and innovation studies. This incorporated approach could provide a 
robust way to explore the knowledge-interaction process when the limitations of the 
NIS concept are unmet. 
For intermediary theories, most researchers seem to adopt a supply viewpoint, 
focusing on specific functions that intermediaries deliver to customers 
unidirectionally rather than interactions and relationships where the role of the 
demand side can also be emphasised. Heterogeneous demands required at the early 
stages of innovation facilitate interactive learning and thereby innovation. In this 
case, four functions of public intermediaries facilitate the DUI-mode of learning 
rather than the STI-mode of learning. The relationships and interactions between 
SMEs and intermediaries bring learning opportunities and infrastructural changes of 
knowledge not only in SMEs but in intermediaries (Chapter 7); the innovative 
outcomes of four firms are often invisible—so-called ‘dark innovation’. Facilitating 
dark or invisible innovation entails diverse activities that require collaboration of 
multiple intermediaries or flexible application of intermediary functions. Evidence 
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from Firm T illustrates that multiple public intermediaries provide the knowledge 
SMEs need through collective actions with other intermediaries (e.g. consultants) to 
complement what the intermediary lacks in services. 
KTVF was able to monitor the firm at BIC and provide necessary services in 
cooperation with KIST and consultants in Japan. In a similar vein, KISTI aligned 
GRIs to generate new knowledge in the early technology market and the IF linked 
KISTI service with the private consultancy (e.g. Frost and Sullivan) to provide Firm 
K with global-market information. As S. J. Lee at the IF remarked, the foundation 
has been linking different types of services from public and private intermediaries to 
address various demands such as knowledge service, providing test sites, and 
technology transfer (Section 7.4.1). 
In this case, the specific intermediary monitors all activity and service during the 
interaction process, which gives the intermediary a learning opportunity to build and 
renew the knowledge repository. Findings suggest a need for the augmentation of 
demand-side actors (SMEs) in intermediary studies to consider their engagement in 
relational innovation. In this case, it may be difficult to define the functions of 
innovation intermediaries at one point because the role changes over time, which 
seems to contrast with the literature distinguishing traditional from innovation 
(systemic) intermediaries (Chapter 3). 
Another crucial implication from this study is the usefulness of the public 
intermediary in the NIS: a constant process of interaction, multiplicity of 
relationships, and mutual learning. These activities are crucial but not explicit, and 
this is why the area of public intermediaries has been undertheorised. Actually, states 
are active, as evidenced in Chapter 5. My empirical evidence suggests that public 
intermediaries might play a crucial role in knowledge interaction with SMEs, based 
on their impartial position and resources, neither of which was given much 
theoretical attention in intermediary literature. It is especially important in emerging 
technological fields, when innovation is unpredictable in the early stages, that 
constant efforts are required to mobilise the necessary resources due to contingency 
and complexity in the innovation process, and SMEs tend to depend on reputation 
and the credibility of intermediaries under uncertainties. Evidence shows (Chapters 6 
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and 7) that the capability and credibility of intermediaries are crucial to provide 
cohesion between capabilities of SMEs built in the past and the capabilities required 
in a new business. Old routines and relationships built in the past guide innovation in 
SMEs and SMEs may be locked into their accustomed knowledge. 
Smith (1999) and Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) referred to the phenomenon that 
small firms may lack the capability to learn rapidly and effectively and hence may be 
locked into existing technologies, and thus unable to jump to new technologies. 
Central to the argument is that small firms are unable to make the leap from an 
existing to a new paradigm that is beyond the capabilities of SMEs. This is illustrated 
as system failures in Chapters 2 and 7. Thus, reliance on credible third parties to 
engender interaction, knowledge enabling, facilitating relations, and learning is 
important to address barriers at the systems level. Borrás and Edler (2014) argued 
that knowledge production and innovation comprise an uncertain process that 
technological advance would direct. In addition, changes not only come from 
technological advancement but from a process of problem solving and identifying 
opportunities that lead to new problems and solutions. More importantly, this long 
process may not produce any profits; thus, for-profit organisations tend to refrain 
from participation in the innovation process of SMEs, as discussed in Chapter 7. For 
SMEs, the involvement of public intermediaries is a safer choice, in advance of the 
purchase of knowledge and sharing risks. 
To conclude, the public intermediary has rarely been studied in the NIS framework, 
despite their important role as innovation facilitators in NIS. Most intermediary 
studies do not give much attention to the role of public intermediaries in addressing 
uncertainties at the early stage of innovation or the role of innovation facilitators of 
SMEs. The approach developed in this study demonstrates, through analysis of the 
empirical evidence, the essential role of public intermediaries in coordinating the 
necessary actions and actors, facilitating learning of SMEs who have to address 
different sets of knowledge (e.g. social settings, technology, and potential customers) 
and thereby the DUI-mode of innovation. 
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8.5.2 Implications for Policymakers  
Crucial to the NIS is that the system is in constant flux and does not reach 
equilibrium based on the evolutionary approach. Hence, neither products nor the 
economic system ever reach a perfect state of equilibrium (Edquist, 1999). For 
government policies, this implies that policy measures should not be aimed at 
achieving a set goal, but rather should aim at facilitating the process of novelty 
creation, variety, adaptation, and selection, shifting away from a search for ‘cook 
book’ recipes for success towards a processual approach (Clark and Staunton, 1989; 
Lankhuizen and Woolthuis, 2003; Williams and Edge, 1996). To do so, policymakers 
should move away from seeking to make strong generalisations about the role of 
particular policy settings and all-purpose programmes, considering the heterogeneity 
of the local contexts of SMEs and contingencies in innovation processes, as analysed 
in the empirical findings. 
However, this approach can only be supported when policymakers change from 
linear views of innovation and thus shift from a static system of measuring outcomes. 
Researchers tend to measure the success of services provided by public 
intermediaries by focusing on quantitative analysis (Bathelt and Zeng, 2010; Izushi, 
2003; Kodama, 2008; Lin, 2009). In other words, performance indicators of 
knowledge interaction skew towards visible outcomes whereas the innovators I 
studied drew attention to the broader feature of the innovation process, including 
many informed activities: the process involves a number of failures and constraints, 
and covers a wide range of activities such as technological progress, exploring 
markets and customers, and organisational changes (refer to Chapter 7). 
Several scholars (Carlsson et al., 2002; Freeman, 1995; Freeman and Soete, 2009; 
Godin, 2006, 2009; Lundvall, 2007c; Smith, 1995) discuss how the measurement of 
innovative outcomes77 has been driven solely by quantitative STI indicators and 
need to move towards DUI (Lundvall, 2007c). In this regard, Martin (2012b) also 
argues that dark innovation (or invisible outcomes of innovation) has been 
                                                        
77 “Another approach was used in where a great amount of data on the structure of production and the 
structure of R&D were pooled and analysed statistically in an exploratory way (Y.T. Park and Park, 
2003). This conclusion seems to follow from a biased perspective on innovation where the STI side is 
emphasized and the DUI side is largely neglected” (Lundvall, 2007c, p111). 
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overlooked in the innovation process. This outlook may imply the importance of 
diverse activities that contribute to achieving successful innovation. In the same vein, 
a processual approach needs to emphasise processual knowledge, which might share 
the idea of ‘dark innovation’. According to the evidence provided in Chapter 7, this 
oversimplified view of innovation might result in a mismatch between the demands 
of SMEs and what intermediaries provide during the uncertain and complex 
innovation process. 
In this case, intermediaries are likely to ignore early stage knowledge demands where 
it is difficult to deliver the outcomes listed earlier. This may lead intermediaries to 
focus on short term remedies for SMEs; however, this type of service does not help 
SMEs develop knowledge infrastructure: learning may not occur and thus the 
barriers may remain unchanged. Focusing on static outcomes, some important factors 
found in empirical analysis can be ignored. For example, relationships are not well 
understood by the parent organisation, which therefore finds it difficult to develop 
indicators for activities that involve the transfer of tacit knowledge (Lyall et al., 2004, 
p75). Although the history of relationships may strengthen easy use or access to the 
original recipe of knowledge and bridge the barriers by building a mutual knowledge 
base in the innovation processes (Izushi, 2003), static indicators do not address the 
importance of relationships in the innovation process. The processes just “tell a story 
readily understandable by generalists and the press” (OECD, 1998, p3). 
Along with those limitations, it is difficult to expect contingencies, social changes, 
and individual behaviours of learning and motivation during the innovation process: 
“Changes in practice often appear to stem from a general ‘awareness raising’ or 
conceptual shift. Precise measurement of the impact of research upon a particular 
change in practice is likely to be unattainable” (Meagher, Lyall and Nutley, 2008, 
p170). Dalziel (2010) also contends that no such indicators can be accepted 
universally to measure progress in transforming new technologies to the status of 
commercial readiness. 
Therefore, policymakers need to understand the specific characteristics of each case, 
which may be helpful in examining whether, and in what way, knowledge interaction 
would enhance innovative capabilities and thereby achieve innovation in SMEs. It 
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might be important to consider the policy environment that guides the activities of 
intermediary organisations and to overcome the policy deficits explained as system 
failures (Chapter 3). This specificity links to the implications for theories in Section 
8.5.1 that different subsystems may have a complex mixture of actors, causes, and 
effects in various innovation contexts. If applied to the entire national innovation 
system, the design and implementation of policies will prove too complex. 
By examining each case, one important issue can be addressed. Innovation processes 
may take a long time and even entail several failures along the way, before the 
overall success of the venture can be determined. Several interviewees assert that 
policymakers sometimes fail to see the whole picture of innovation when faced with 
such interim failures and are prone to make ill-considered reactions. As examined in 
Chapter 6, public intermediaries considered the knowledge interaction with Firm H 
as a failure because it did not bring any visible outcomes. However, failure 
experiences led the firm to find other business opportunities making them more 
reflexive actors. Policymakers tend to judge success or failure of innovation based on 
visible outcomes, although instead they should be judged on the wider outcomes 
from the innovation process as a whole. 
Policymakers are unwilling to address the possibility of failure or risk taking in the 
innovation process. However, my empirical analysis supports that failure experiences 
contribute to learning, which can ultimately lead to successful innovation. This is 
especially true in the case of emerging or new technologies in which the innovation 
environment is vague with high uncertainty and risk, eliciting the necessity of 
designing a different measuring system for policy implementation with a long-term 
view. 
8.5.3 Implications for Public Intermediaries 
A crucial lesson from this study is the influence of public intermediaries in the 
innovation process of SMEs. As argued in Section 3.5, intermediary studies have 
been conducted in the context of static functions overlooking the relationships and 
interactions that involve intermediaries. In particular, public intermediaries in the 
NIS, which shapes relationships and provides collective knowledge to resolve the 
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barriers of individual firms, are not well identified. Evidence developed in Chapter 6 
supports the claim that public intermediaries engage in knowledge interactions that 
might affect the innovation process through four functions: knowledge facilitation, 
learning facilitation, knowledge enabling, and managing interfaces. 
The role of the public intermediary as an innovation facilitator is particularly 
important to identify and facilitate the circumvention of barriers during the 
innovation process when the risks and costs of undertaking innovation are high. 
Especially when the barriers emerge at the early stages of innovation, diversified 
responses and programmes may be necessary to provide different sets of knowledge 
and actors, collaborating to achieve the optimum opportunity for success. This places 
the issue of various long-term and diverse support to enhance innovative capabilities 
of SMEs on the policy agenda: flexibility of intermediary functions, the importance 
of monitoring activities, and consideration of heterogeneous demands. 
The first agenda relates to limited functions of the public intermediary in addressing 
the diverse barriers that might intertwine (Chapter 2). Resolving the barriers may be 
challenging for a single public intermediary or the four functions may not be 
sufficient to meet the heterogeneous requirements. In this case, public intermediaries 
increased their roles, providing services directly to firms on a one-to-one basis that 
were considered functions of traditional intermediaries (Firms K, P, T, and H). For 
example, KISTI provided Firm H with not only four functions of innovation 
intermediaries but also the traditional role of intermediaries, providing technology-
market information services and supercomputing simulation programmes that did not 
involve third-party collaboration. Once firms have received a wide range of services, 
they may no longer need four functions of innovation-intermediary services, but 
require little or particular forms of services instead; for example, four successful and 
less successful cases constantly received services through managing interfaces. 
In the case of Firm T, the firm did not have any infrastructure, as a new startup faced 
with several internal and external barriers, and thus needed a wide range of extensive 
services for a long period of time. Ministries, multiple GRIs, and KTVF, whose 
expertise was diverse, ranging from pure R&D to matchmaking, were involved to 
address the unexpected barriers. In these cases, a single public intermediary may 
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have limits in undertaking all the services required by SMEs in a short period of 
time; thus, the public intermediary may need to align other intermediaries or private 
consultancies during the interaction process. In the case of Firm K, the company 
required extensive and specific services, focusing on a new set of knowledge in the 
early technology market, rather than a wide range of services (e.g. R&D funding, 
marketing activities, or technology transfer). 
In practice, the knowledge-interaction process is more flexible and complex than 
public–private interactions, as shown in the NIS framework (Appendix 2). Therefore, 
as indicated in Section 3.5.1, public intermediaries should not restrict themselves to 
innovation intermediary functions and need to consider a range of intermediary 
services. Functions might increase over time or could iterate, highlighting the 
importance of networking or collaboration among various types of intermediaries, 
and a flexible application of functions. In other words, support programmes should 
consider the dynamics of the innovation process and the dynamic interplay between 
multiple intermediaries and SMEs, rather than focusing on static functions. 
The second agenda is how to coordinate and manage the knowledge interaction 
process when the interaction process involves multiple intermediaries and actors to 
address different types of internal and external barriers. In this case, networking with 
other intermediaries calls for monitoring activities that regulate and restrict flows of 
knowledge and influence governance, rather than facilitating knowledge interactions 
(Lyall, 2007). Public intermediaries must focus on monitoring activities that integrate 
services, provide coherence, and control the process by facilitating ‘associativeness’ 
among participants; otherwise success can be hampered. The failure case of Firm M 
(Chapter 6) supports the importance of the gatekeeping role where a ‘lack of 
cohesion’ among multiple intermediaries results in one-way knowledge flow from 
intermediaries to the firm in the knowledge-interaction process. As a consequence, 
the service of each intermediary was not linked to the others and the firm was unable 
to obtain a productive combination of competing rationalities through multiple levels 
of interactions. 
The third agenda is the consideration of heterogeneous demands of SMEs in 
designing the support programme; each SME has different barriers that entail 
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different levels of complexity and uncertainty. Understanding the capability levels of 
SMEs that have different business relationships, technological competences, 
qualified employees, and learning potential is crucial in developing programmes. The 
heterogeneous nature of SMEs may result in different knowledge demands, different 
involvement of actors, and different interaction processes. Evidence collected from 
this study suggests that SMEs who have had business relationships with global 
buyers or other intermediaries seem to have greater chances to establish learning 
capabilities inside firms that can be replicated by interaction with public 
intermediaries. Certain SMEs may find it more important to build learning routines 
than acquire the new knowledge required to explore new business areas; they would 
take more time to attain the knowledge interaction that needs to be considered in the 
programme-design process. 
This study has demonstrates different SMEs need different approaches as illustrated 
in figure 8-1: different innovative capabilities, barriers, and uncertainties embedded 
in the innovation process. Depending on the level of uncertainty and barriers specific 
to each SME at the early stages of innovation, range-of-knowledge requirements and 
characteristics of services could vary. In this vein, a single standardised programme 
does not meet the heterogeneous demands of SMEs. Programmes designed for 
technologies of less innovative firms will differ from those aimed at articulating and 
attaining early involvement in innovation processes. In other words, the wide range 
of programmes, from one-off services to highly specialised and targeted activities, 
need to be considered in support-programme design. This study suggests that 
important policy targets are the facilitating innovation processes of firms and the role 
of public intermediaries that link policy and the needs of SMEs. 
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Figure 8-1 The types of services offered by (multiple) intermediaries. 
 
8.6 Reflections on Research 
8.6.1 Research Strengths 
The NIS concept discussed in Chapter 2 does not address the issue of the 
heterogeneity of institutions and micro-factors in any substantial manner, based on 
its abstract framework. In the NIS literature, public–private interaction is important 
for knowledge flow and learning (Lundvall, 1992, 2010; Nelson, 1992, 1993) but 
little empirical attention has been given to public intermediaries. Researchers 
overlook the interactions between other system actors such as firms, intermediaries, 
and science (Lyall, 2007), whereas such a focus is appropriate especially for small 
firms, constrained by a lack of internal resources that impede the firms’ ability to 
engage in innovation (Rothwell, 1991). Exceptionally, intermediary literature has 
provided several accounts describing how intermediaries facilitate innovations. The 
conceptual framework attempts to synthesise the NIS concept and intermediary 
studies, rendering it feasible for this study to analyse institutions and their 
interactions at an appropriate level—public intermediaries and SMEs (Chapter 4). 
269 
Arguing that the NIS literature has paid little attention to the role of public 
intermediaries, this study provides systemic investigation of particular kinds of 
public intermediaries and their role, influencing innovation of SMEs in the Korean 
context, which has not previously garnered much attention. 
A further conceptual contribution has been made using the NIS framework to analyse 
sets of actors, public intermediaries, and SMEs, little studied heretofore. Previous 
NIS studies largely focused on firms and universities with few focusing on 
intermediaries. By focusing on public intermediaries and SMEs, this study illustrated 
the utility of NIS, the importance of government organisations, and of SMEs in 
particular. Also, by defining firms, this study helps in understanding the 
heterogeneous nature of SMEs, which may cause knowledge and relational gaps at 
the early stages of innovation and, as a result, may affect the formation of different 
patterns of relationships. 
The key strength of this study is the contribution to understanding public 
intermediaries by presenting a conceptual framework that attempts to analyse the 
knowledge-interaction process between public intermediaries and SMEs according to 
four functions. By categorising them, it becomes possible to explore the nature of the 
interactions and evolving relationships that have not been recounted in other 
literature, which tends to focus on knowledge flow from the supply viewpoint or 
interactions at macro-levels. Functions were based on the extent to which 
intermediaries and SMEs conjoin in knowledge interaction; where relationships and 
knowledge have evolving characteristics. 
The conceptual framework helps to explore the links between meso- and micro-
levels in NIS research by incorporating intermediary studies and STS perspectives. 
Although macro-level studies only show general patterns of interactions, this bridge, 
developed in this study, provides a way to analyse how institutions matter, how their 
relationships are evolving, and what specific characteristics and micro-factors 
contribute to the innovation process, based on the functions developed in Chapter 3. 
This study highlights the role of public intermediaries as reflexive actors, whereas 
most intermediary studies consider them to be service providers or suppliers and 
seldom reveal the weaknesses of intermediaries. Public intermediaries do fail and 
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have functional weaknesses (Chapters 6 and 7); however they also learn from 
interactions with various SMEs and other innovation players, and apply their 
particular experiences to other firms, acting as knowledge repositories. In the case of 
Firm H, KISTI focused on the demands of the firm rather than depending on locked-
in knowledge, as KISTI did in the first knowledge interaction that failed. Evidence 
from Firms K and P illustrate how researchers interact with multiple levels of actors 
(e.g. GRIs, buyers, and policymakers) and this specific knowledge and experience 
can be used in other settings. From this viewpoint, public intermediaries can be risk 
takers as innovation partners of SMEs and these relationships further reinforce social 
learning. 
Empirically, this study contributes to existing knowledge by collecting and analysing 
empirical data on this understudied field. As introduced in Chapter 3, a large number 
of intermediary studies focus on limited roles and activities at a specific point of time. 
Few studies address the process of knowledge interactions in which heterogeneous 
actors may be involved over time, the role of individuals is emphasised, and learning 
changes the knowledge infrastructure of SMEs. The qualitative data and semi-
structured in-depth interviews of key actors of innovative SMEs provide rich 
evidence to support these findings and policy implications. In doing so, this study 
could reassert the neglected role of public intermediaries from the NIS concept and 
therefore facilitate the effective application of the NIS concept in different contexts. 
8.6.2 Research Limitations and Future Agenda 
Though this study achieved its broad objectives, some limitations and unresolved 
questions remain that in turn point to opportunities or needs for future research. First, 
though I have shown how knowledge interaction between intermediaries and SMEs 
affect the innovation process, this study does not indicate the strength of the impact 
of interactions and relationships. The research design is exploratory and mainly 
focuses on examining the interaction process between intermediaries and SMEs and 
how it impacts innovation processes. Larger scale methods may be needed to 
establish the wider applicability of these findings. Although it would be difficult to 
measure the impact using quantitative metrics, due to the nature of uncovering the 
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relationships and interactions, indicators could be developed based on interviews and 
applied to a large-scale survey to support interview-based empirical findings. 
Second, though this study did highlight the importance of detailed qualitative 
analysis, the research design did not provide a basis for the kind of detailed 
ethnographic study that would be needed to explicate the role of a number of 
sociological factors such as power and trust, and how these might affect the 
interaction process. For example, the power aspect of relationships can affect 
willingness to share information and create new knowledge, and entering into 
trusting relationships, especially when multiple public intermediaries engage in the 
process, may complicate the process of achieving a convergence of interests. 
Conflicts and misalignment of interests may have negative impacts on innovation 
activities, leading SMEs in wrong directions. This study does not address this topic 
in depth because the aim was to identify the facilitating activities of intermediaries. 
Future research could deepen understanding by examining issues of economic and 
political power among multiple actors from the public side. 
Third, the issue of governance of multiple intermediaries needs to be studied. This 
study provides some implications regarding the importance of monitoring 
organisations as gatekeepers (Section 8.5.2). However, interaction is not only 
important between SMEs and other actors but also among intermediaries, as well as 
between intermediaries and policymakers. Investigation of the policy network at 
multiple levels could contribute, for example, to integrating the related programmes 
provided by various organisations and ministries. 
Fourth, another fruitful issue for future research concerns learning. A key implication 
of this study is the attention to knowledge interaction, which promotes social 
learning in agreement with the NIS literature (Edquist, 1997; Lundvall, 1992; van 
Mierlo et al., 2010). Researchers should compare how learning by firms under 
intermediaries and formal programmes differs from learning by firms in informal 
settings. Further study here could make an important contribution to the literature in 
discovering the factors facilitating interactive learning that may occur not only in 
SMEs, but also in intermediaries. 
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Finally, there is the need for a better understanding of how these types of knowledge 
interactions are created and how experiences may differ across sectors and countries. 
This study examined two different fields of technologies (IT and mechatronics); 
however, it has shortcomings in analysing the differences between the two fields due 
to the small number of cases and the multidisciplinary nature of the technologies of 
the five firms. Different technology fields and subfields seem to exhibit different 
challenges and dynamics. In spite of differences, each field has commonalities at the 
meso-level: length of interaction, number of intermediaries involved in the process, 
level of uncertainty about the future technology market, and types of services. 
Therefore, it will be useful to compare the actors and factors behind the formation of 
relationships in different technology fields and the role of the government in each 
field, based on large data sets. 
Also, there may be marked differences between national economies in how 
innovation is supported and organized. Intermediation in particular is organized very 
differently. This particular type of public intermediary is quite common and 
important in Korea, but perhaps not as common in Western economies. In lasses-
faire economies, those roles are played by private-sector actors or by people with a 
less stable institutional position. An opportunity exists for further systematic research 
to understand the very different formations and roles innovation intermediaries can 
play. A need persists to understand public intermediaries; they are tacitly important 
in some countries whereas they are explicitly important in other countries. Further 
study of other countries’ experiences would be useful as supporting evidence, 
providing opportunities for comparison and learning. 
8.6.3 Challenges for Public Intermediaries 
This study suggests that four functions of public intermediaries can be expanded to 
cover the roles of traditional intermediaries by developing more functions in the 
single intermediary (KISTI or KTVF) or networking with other intermediaries (e.g. 
GRIs or a private intermediary). Multiple innovation intermediaries with different 
expertise may be involved in addressing the barriers of a single firm. Empirical 
evidence has emphasised the role of public intermediaries complementing each other 
by providing different functions that helped firms resolve different types of barriers 
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at the early stages of innovation and achieve innovation in a short space of time. 
Firm H shaped a network of multiple levels of public intermediaries whose strengths 
varied (i.e. KISTI as a knowledge provider, KETI as a R&D partner, and other two 
GRIs as proxy users). Sometimes, public intermediaries may not be enthusiastic 
about SMEs’ business schedules or are not as desperate to make progress as CEOs, 
resulting in feedback delays. In this case, intermediaries can delegate some roles to 
other (private) intermediaries to address the rapid rate of market and technological 
changes, which, close to the later stage of innovation, allow SMEs to respond in a 
timely manner. In the case of Firm K, a private intermediary was involved in the 
innovation process that was organised and sponsored by the public intermediary. 
The challenge may emerge in how public intermediaries do not limit their roles as 
innovation intermediaries at the early stages of innovation and expand their functions 
by shaping networks at multiple levels. In other words, public intermediaries could 
address how to identify, involve, and manage collaborative relationships, providing 
all organisations and individuals with motivation during the uncertain innovation 
process. Individuals may have interests that conflict with the organisational purpose 
of intermediaries. Multiple intermediaries may cause rivalry rather than cooperative 
relationships. Therefore, as indicated in Section 8.6.2, the role of monitoring 
organisations as legitimated facilitators may be crucial in controlling the process. 
Although this study has examined the evolution of multiplicities of relationships, 
observing different organisations, it focused on public intermediaries at the early 
stages of innovation. The study was limited in showing the relationships between 
different types of innovation intermediaries, discerning how intermediaries get 
involved in the innovation process or whether relationships emerge spontaneously. 
Therefore, additional work is needed to understand not only the functions fulfilled by 
public intermediaries, but also other types of intermediaries presented in Section 
3.2.1. Organisations such as incubating centres, universities, consultant firms and 
individuals may be needed. Identifying their strengths or fostering different types of 
innovation intermediaries in the Korean context may be helpful in organising 
networks of intermediaries in a broader innovation context. 
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8.7 Concluding Remarks: Towards an Interactive and Processual 
Approach 
As previously stated, many Asian nations traditionally have turned to non-market 
modes of coordination as mechanisms to remove the barriers of innovation and 
improve the overall efficiency of the NIS. In Korea, public intermediaries played a 
crucial role in strengthening industries and facilitating the rate of innovation by 
linking policy to industries for several decades, however the government policy has 
failed to develop an effective infrastructure for SME promotion. ‘Weak SMEs’ still 
remains a chronic problem in the KNIS even though fostering innovative SMEs has 
been a major policy concern. An ongoing debate has ensued about whether policy 
and programmes would be useful for enhancing the innovative capabilities of SMEs.  
However, in spite of the increasing concern about the mechanisms to correct failures, 
how public intermediaries facilitate innovation among SMEs and how knowledge-
interaction process between SMEs and intermediaries could decrease the barriers 
have not been fully examined in the NIS literature. This was the key problematic 
when my study gained momentum. As discussed in Chapter 1, the central focus of 
this study was on the knowledge-interaction process between public intermediaries 
and SMEs occurring at multiple levels of interaction in the KNIS. In particular, this 
study sought insight into how barriers at the early stages of innovation could be 
removed through knowledge interaction under context-specific arrangements. In this 
case of SMEs in the KNIS, the institutional arrangements that shape the interaction 
process and decrease the barriers are far from general. These would be different in 
other nations, regions and types of firm.  
Yet little is known about the interaction process between public intermediaries and 
SMEs, and a paucity of research has attempted to understand the role of 
intermediaries as linkage organisations in the KNIS. Based on the analysis of 
literature and empirical findings, two reasons could be inferred. On one hand, the 
NIS approach is a loose concept that does not have indicators to identify national 
specificities, interaction between specific actors, or problems for innovation in 
localised contexts. As the KNIS has grown in size and sophistication, it is difficult to 
analyse the system and identify barriers based on the loose framework. On the other 
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hand, the intermediary literature is fragmented, and tends to focus on specific 
functions of private intermediaries and far less on public intermediaries. However, 
this study is not a critique of the rationale of NIS but rather an attempt to analyse 
neglected parts of the framework to the literature, lack of substance and specificity, 
and the black box of interaction process. From this point, this study makes a broad 
investigation into the interaction process between SMEs and intermediaries, based on 
the conceptual framework to address research questions. 
This study therefore draws on the NIS concept, intermediary studies and in particular 
SLTI perspectives to scrutinize the interactions among the heterogeneous actors and 
factors that affect different patterns of evolving relationships. As explained in the 
previous section, the multidisciplinary approach enables this study to analyse 
complex meso- and micro-dimensions of the relations and interaction processes 
between public intermediaries and SMEs that are mutually shaped. The perspective 
gives an analytical lens to look into the complexity and diversity of knowledge-
interaction processes and their local contexts, which differ from firms. 
Emphasising the hidden value of relationships and interactions between public 
intermediaries and SMEs, this study broadly investigated social aspects in the 
interaction process between SMEs and intermediaries, based on the conceptual 
framework in Chapter 4. As analysed in Chapter 6, the five SMEs studies are all 
heterogeneous due to the history of technological expertise and relationships, and 
these affect different requirements of knowledge and different patterns of 
relationships in new business areas. Knowledge interaction and facilitating 
innovation require long-term effort, cost, and risks; the process is lengthy, reflexive, 
and localised, involving several failures and unforeseen problems. Accordingly, the 
knowledge-interaction patterns of the five SMEs have evolved in different ways to 
address the specific problems each SME faced during their innovation process. 
Empirical evidence in Chapters 6 sheds light on the importance of a productive 
combination of competing rationalities at multiple levels and the importance of 
reflexive individuals in successful knowledge interaction and social learning. 
Knowledge interaction at multiple levels provides learning opportunities for 
intermediaries and for SMEs. The knowledge-interaction process to decrease diverse 
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barriers can be seen as social learning, as SMEs constructed organisational and 
managerial processes by linking old and new skills, expertise, and relationships, 
rather than by simple acquisition of knowledge. This study highlights the role of 
reflexive actors who accumulate multidisciplinary knowledge through interaction 
with heterogeneous actors, learn from failures, and apply these experiences in 
different settings. 
Furthermore, Chapter 7 provides a rationale of the role of intermediaries providing 
resources where resources are lacking and motivating forms of collaboration among 
diverse actors. Interaction can be seen as a social process that requires long-term 
system-level interactions to identify and interact with components and actors in the 
system, characterised as a constant process of interaction, multiplicity of 
relationships, and mutual learning. In this vein, public intermediaries play a crucial 
role in facilitating interaction with components and multiple actors, as their resources 
and capabilities specialise in identifying barriers and responding to the challenges 
faced by SMEs in the KNIS. The NIS concept, as a device to remove barriers, needs 
to be understood as a process of identifying and solving problems, which stimulates 
the creation of new knowledge related to a specific innovation. 
In this vein, this study suggests the need for two approaches towards innovation 
facilitation. First is the processual approach. Empirical evidence supports the idea 
that innovation in its early stages entails several constraints and unforeseen barriers 
that are contextual and localised. Therefore, service provision and the period of 
knowledge interaction and relationships may expand and differ across firms. Second 
is the interactive approach. Knowledge does not flow from one side to another, but 
flows back and forth at multiple levels, which facilitates interactive learning. 
Considering that SMEs are heterogeneous in capabilities (e.g. in terms of level of 
knowledge, learning routines, and relationships) and innovation occurs in a localised 
context, understanding the dynamic nature of innovative SMEs is a prerequisite 
condition for knowledge interaction. From this viewpoint, this study suggests that 
support programmes should move away from one-size-fits-all models. 
To summarise, knowledge interaction is a long learning process and the effects and 
outcomes, which are the products of knowledge use, are often difficult to measure in 
277 
a quantitative sense. Furthermore, success or failure of innovation at a specific point 
of time needs to be understood as flexible states in which firms are still learning and 
experiencing movement towards sustainable growth. In this vein, public 
intermediaries, as non-market mechanisms, have strengths in linking national 
policies to industries constantly, increasing learning capability of SMEs, removing 
barriers to innovation, and thereby enhancing the efficiency of the KNIS. This study 
demonstrated that public intermediaries—though still sometimes underappreciated—
have a crucial role in the KNIS. 
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Appendix 1. Definition of the NIS 
“… is a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance of national firms” (Nelson, 1993, p4) 
“… is constituted by elements and relationships which interact in the production, 
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful knowledge … a national 
system encompasses elements and relationships, either located within or rooted 
inside the borders of a national state” (Lundvall, 1992, p2) 
“… set of institutions that (jointly and individually) contribute to the development 
and diffusion of new technologies. These institutions provide the framework 
within the governments form and implement policies … it is a system of 
interconnected institutions to create, store, and transfer of knowledge, skills, and 
artifacts which define new technologies “(Metcalfe, 1995 in OECD, 1999, p24) 
“… a set of interrelated institutions; its core is made up of those institutions that 
produce, diffuse and adapt new technical knowledge, be they industrial firms, 
universities, or government agencies.” (Niosi, 2002, p291) 
“… adopted from the innovation and innovation learning theories, such as the 
belief that firms do not innovate in isolation, but are in constant interaction with 
other actors in the system, profit and non-profit actors” (Lankhuizen and 
Woolthuis, 2003, p12) 
“… set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the 
framework within which governments from and implement policies to influence 
the innovation process” (Carlsson, 2006, p58) 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Appendix 2. Core knowledge flows in the NIS 
Type of knowledge flow Main indicator 
Industry Alliances  
Inter-firm research co-operation 
 
Firm Survey 
Literature-based counting 
Industry-university interactions  
Co-operative industry/university R&D 
Industry/University co-patents 
Industry/University co-publications 
Industry use of university patents 
Industry/University information-sharing 
University annual reports 
Patent record analysis 
Publications analysis 
Citation analysis 
Firm surveys 
Industry-research institute interactions  
Co-operative industry/Institute R&D 
Industry/Institute co-patents 
Industry/Institute co-publications 
Industry use of institute patents 
Industry/Institute information-sharing 
Government reports 
Patent record analysis 
Publications analysis 
Citation analysis 
Firm surveys 
Technology diffusion  
Technology use by industry 
Embodied technology diffusion 
Firm surveys 
Input-output analysis 
Personnel mobility  
Movement of technical personnel among 
industry, universities and research 
Labour market statistics 
University/Institute reports 
Sources: OECD, National Innovation Systems, 1997, p45. 
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Appendix 3. Interviews conducted for the case study 
Interviews conducted with actors in five firms 
Interviewee by 
Affiliation 
Interviewees Roles 
Firm K CEO - Led collaboration with external organisations 
- Managed the internal knowledge-interaction 
process 
 Executive director - Acted as a liaison between the CEO and 
employees, R&D departments, and 
management departments 
 Manager - Led the strategic-management team 
KISTI Dr. YJ Choi - Project manager in charge of the knowledge-
interaction process 
- Managed interfaces with Firm K 
Firm P CEO - Led collaboration with external organisations 
 Executive director - Conducted R&D 
- Managed joint R&D programmes 
KISTI Dr. HS Roh - Project manager in charge of the knowledge-
interaction process 
- Managed interfaces with Firm P 
Firm T1 CEO - Managed collaboration with external 
organisations 
- Conducted R&D 
KTVF Dr. HJ Kim 
Ms. JH Kwon 
- Project manager in charge of the knowledge-
interaction process 
- Managed interfaces with Firm T 
Firm H CEO - Managed collaboration with external 
organisations 
 2 CTOs - Conducted R&D, managing joint R&D 
programmes 
KISTI Dr. CH Kim - Involved in knowledge interactions 
- Managed interfaces with Firm H 
Firm M2 CEO - Led collaboration with external organisations 
KISTI Dr. CH Kim - Managed interfaces with Firm M 
Note. 1 For Firm T, I interviewed the CEO, the founder of the firm who served from 2000 to 2011. 
The CEO changed in 2011 due to the takeover; 2 Firm M closed the business at the point of 
interviews and it was not possible to access key employees.  
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A list of Interviewees 
Fields Interviewee by Affiliation Interviewees Dates 
Mechatronics Firm K CEO, Executive director, Manager 08 Oct. 2012 
26 Oct. 2012 
06 Apr. 2013 
Firm P CEO, Executive Director  09 Oct. 2012 
28 Mar. 2013 
Firm T  CEO  25 Jan. 2013 
04 Mar. 2013 
Firm V VSI CEO, Director, Senior Researcher 
KISTI 
09 Jan. 2013 
 
 
Firm B  CEO  14 Feb. 2013 
Firm EE  President, Vice President 30 Jan. 2013 
Firm KD  CEO  24 Dec. 2012 
Firm KP  CEO 19 Dec. 2012 
Firm A  CEO KISTI 04 Dec. 2012 
Firm D  CEO 01 Nov. 2012 
Firm B  Director KISTI 30 Oct. 2012 
Subtotal 11 17  
IT Firm H  CEO, 2 CTOs  30 Oct. 2013 
14 Mar. 2013 
22 Mar. 2013 
Firm M  CEO  
 
19 Oct. 2012 
31 Oct. 2012 
Firm NR CEO  30 Jan. 2013 
17 Apr. 2013 
Firm C  CEO  16 Apr. 2013 
Firm ML  CEO  15 Feb. 2013 
Firm NV  CEO  02 Jan. 2013 
Firm S  Executive director  26 Dec. 2013 
Firm E  Executive director  04 Dec. 2013 
Firm KG  CEO  30 Oct. 2012 
Firm EP  CEO  18 Oct. 2013 
Firm ME  CEO  09 Oct. 2013 
Firm N  CEO  07 Nov. 2012 
Subtotal 12 14  
Chemistry Firm HD  CEO, Director 26 Nov. 2013 
Firm KC  CTOs (2)  24 Oct. 2012 
Firm MH  Executive director, Director, 
Manager 
18 Dec. 2012 
Subtotal 3 7  
Intermediary KISTI Dr. CH Kim 
 
Dr. YJ Choi 
Dr. HS Roh 
19 Oct. 2012 
11 Apr. 2013 
08 Oct. 2012 
28 Mar. 2013 
 Innovation Foundation Director SJ Lee 11 Apr. 2013 
 KTVF Dr. HJ Kim 
Ms. JH Kwon 
19 Apr. 2013 
 Private consultancies (2) Dr. KH Baek 
Dr. IS KIM  
11 Dec. 2012 
19 Dec. 2012 
 University Professor Sung-Soo Seol 26 Mar. 2013 
Subtotal 6 9  
Total 32 48  
 
